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I’m pleased to introduce Development as a Battlefield: an innovative explo-
ration of the multidimensional meanings of—and interactions between— 
conflict and development. The two phenomena are all too often regarded as 
ostensibly antagonistic. This was exemplified again in the context of the Arab 
Spring that erupted in December 2010 and was eventually short-lived in several 
countries of the Middle-East and North-Africa (mena) region. This volume—
the 8th thematic issue of International Development Policy—is an invitation to 
reconsider and renew the way social scientists usually seek to make sense of 
socio-political and economic developments in the mena region and beyond.
To achieve this, the guest editors bring together a set of contributions that 
collectively bridge anthropology, history, political sociology and political econ-
omy. The volume draws on the expertise of a dozen authors who present and 
discuss research carried out in countries spanning a region strictly larger than 
‘mena’: it includes a geographical area ranging from Afghanistan in the East 
to Morocco in the West, and from Turkey in the North to Sudan in the South. 
The multiplicity of this volume’s compilation also mirrors a central premise 
of International Development Policy, which is to address critical issue domains 
from interdisciplinary, multi-level angles to account for the complexity of the 
social dynamics at work. I wish to commend the guest editors, Béatrice Hibou 
and Irene Bono, for bringing together such a wealth of perspectives by invit-
ing selected scholars—all of them women—who share a deep understanding 
of past-present, local–global interactions that infuse power relations. Many of 
the authors originate from the region under study.
Overall, this special issue makes a convincing case for reconsidering widely-
held assumptions about past and ongoing conflicts as well as development 
trajectories in ‘mena countries’ and neighbouring Sudan and Afghanistan. 
Through an in-depth examination of the evolving social reality anchored in 
specific institutional and historic circumstances, the authors demonstrate 
the need to stay clear of homogeneous approaches that neglect the pluralistic 
socio-political landscapes of a region too easily subsumed under one group 
referred to as the Arab or mena countries. The contributions in this volume 
challenge the widely-shared belief that these countries represent an excep-
tion in the developing world, a supposed space of ‘ungovernability’ charac-
terised by ‘extraneous’ states ruling over an undisciplined population that 
inevitably leads to submission-revolt cycles. The chapters further challenge the 
assumption that Islam, or a deep sense of clan or ethnic identity, act as an 
obstacle to development, due to beliefs and values that prevent the advent of 
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a  techno-rational order associated with modernity. Violence associated with 
power asymmetries is part and parcel of political relations and could be con-
sidered analytically relevant from a development viewpoint, rather than a de-
fining characteristic of a homogenous cultural and geopolitical ‘mena region’.
That said, the authors acknowledge that development shortfalls may partly 
account for the uprisings and conflicts witnessed in the countries under re-
view. However, they question the idea of an inverse linear relationship between 
development and conflict. The notion of development itself, often defined as a 
process of profound social transformation, is contested and understood differ-
ently depending on the scale of analysis, discipline and prevailing narratives. 
In their introductory chapter, Irene Bono and Béatrice Hibou note that devel-
opment appears not only as a practice and central paradigm in international 
relations, but also as a narrative and an ideology embedded in power relations. 
They define development as ‘a set of complex social relations and a balance of 
power oscillating constantly between consensus and conflict’.
This compilation of chapters offers novel insights on regional, national and 
local dynamics involving developmental concerns such as justice, equity, gov-
ernmentality and citizens’ role in society. Through an in-depth examination 
of development cycles linked to defining historic events and by distinguishing 
between incremental change and disruption, the authors factor in local and 
global dynamics to analyse the conflicts and tensions associated with globali-
sation. Their insights are pertinent from both an academic and policy view-
point. These insights on the conflict-development nexus will be of interest for 
all those who care about a region whose fate matters a great deal not only for 
the people who live there, but for all of us.
The guest editors have led this ambitious project to successful fruition, re-
sulting in a compelling collection of articles under the title of Development as 
a Battlefield. A workshop, organized on 7–8 September 2015 in Geneva, brought 
together all the authors and selected experts to review each draft paper and 
make suggestions for improvements. I join the guest editors in thanking Jean-
François Bayart, Yvan Droz and Didier Péclard for insightful remarks and sug-
gestions at this workshop. My thanks go also to the authors, who revised their 
articles in two successive rounds: first after the Geneva workshop and then in 
response to the remarks raised by an anonymous reviewer who carefully ex-
amined the draft volume as a whole and raised critical comments on individ-
ual contributions. I wish to extend our gratitude to the anonymous reviewer. 
Marie Thorndahl initiated this special issue as former managing editor of our 
journal. Frances Rice took over by end-2015, and was supported by Emmanuel 




This volume is an invitation to ‘think again’. It is indeed high time to recon-
sider the development-conflict nexus in a region whose population has been 
facing violence and insecurity for many decades and whose fate will deter-
mine global security, migration, development and humanitarian agendas in 
the years to come. This special issue makes the convincing case of dismiss-
ing sweeping statements and simple policy recipes. It calls for localising or 
grounding interventions in specific polities where the driving force lies above 
all in the citizenry—youth, women and men who wish to improve livelihoods 





International Development Policy is a critical source of analysis of development 
policy and international cooperation trends and is aimed at scholars, policy-
makers and development professionals. It offers a diverse range of academic 
views from both industrialised countries and emerging economies.
International Development Policy is edited by the Graduate Institute of In-
ternational and Development Studies, an institution of research and higher 
education dedicated to advancing world affairs. Located in Geneva at the heart 
of an international centre of multilateral governance, the Graduate Institute 
benefits from a rich legacy linked to the founding of the international system 
and the League of Nations in the 1920s, and the emergence of the developing 
world in the 1960s.
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Development as a Battlefield
Irene Bono and Béatrice Hibou
Abstract
Conflict and development are commonly understood as two contradictory phenom-
ena. Some apparently self-evident ideas, such as gaps in development being a source 
of conflict and social and political conflict being a major obstacle to development, 
have been revitalised by the debate about the Arab Spring and used to orient develop-
ment projects in the mena region. This chapter aims to explore a radically different 
perspective: we conceive development as a complex social relationship, involving a 
vast constellation of actors, interests, logics, spaces, causalities and temporalities, and 
we consider conflict in a multidimensional sense, as an expression of struggle, compe-
tition, tension, resistance, opposition and critique. Conceived in these terms, conflict 
and development appear to be strictly interlinked rather than opposites. Three par-
ticular configurations characterise development as a ‘battlefield’: conflicts that create 
consensus around development; consensus as an expression of conflict; and the defi-
nition of legitimate conflicts. There is special focus on the interconnection between 
different temporal layers characterising the formation of the state and the transfor-
mation of capitalism, and the consequences of development for society, the assertion 
of sovereignty, the definition of social order and how people conduct their lives. This 
examination of the links between development and conflict thus sheds fresh light on 
injustice, inequality, modes of government and on how people interpret and live in 
political society far beyond the mena region.
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1 Introduction
Except for studies in anthropology or in historical and political sociology that 
focus on highly localised processes,1 few recent analyses have examined the 
process of development in what is conventionally called the ‘mena’ (Middle 
East and North Africa) region. After the Arab Spring, the first timid approaches 
to the subject in the late 1990s and the decade that followed2 gave way to an 
almost exclusive preoccupation with conflict. After 2011, there were very few 
contributions dealing with this region in major journals devoted to develop-
ment issues3 and conflicts were discussed in terms of protests and social move-
ments, especially in Tunisia and Egypt,4 or in terms of armed conflicts and civil 
wars, especially regarding Syria and Libya.5
This analytical turn rests on a multiplicity of causally self-evident observa-
tions underpinning a rather widespread understanding of development and 
conflict, in which the two terms are presented as two contradictory phenom-
ena. However, it is still difficult to provide an overview of the different ways in 
which the relationship between these two phenomena has been understood 
over time. If we take the view that the discontent, social movements, revolts 
and revolutions that the mena region has experienced are in part born of gaps 
in development, including the existence of pockets of poverty, the inadequate 
integration of the region, and difficulties in getting young people into the 
1 See, e.g., Elyachar (2005) on self-entrepreneurship in Cairo, Bono (2010) on the phenomena 
of participation in the Moroccan town of El Hajeb, and Canesse (2014) on rural development 
policy in the Tunisia of Ben Ali. Implemented between 2008 and 2011, the Agence Nationale 
de la Recherche (French National Research Agency) programme, ‘Tanmia. Le “Développe-
ment”: fabrique de l’action publique dans le monde arabe?” contributed to fostering studies 
on development in the region. The work produced in this context includes Catusse et al. 
(2010), Abu-Sada and B. (2011), Ruiz de Elvira (2013) and Sbeih (2014).
2 See in particular Santucci and El Malki (1990) and Henry and Springborg (2001). Note also the 
launch of the Middle East Development Journal in 2009.
3 For example, the Journal of Development Studies did not refer to any country in the region be-
tween volume 46–10 (November 2010) and volume 50–9 (September 2014). By not publishing 
any article referring to the Arab Spring after 2011, the Middle East Development Journal made 
a significant editorial decision. In the same trend, in 2011 the Revue Tiers Monde devoted a 
special issue to the conflicts and protest movements present in the region: see Ben Néfissa 
(2011).
4 Camau and Vairel (2014) and Rougier and Lacroix (2015) address the cases of Tunisia and 
Egypt, respectively, from this point of view.
5 This view of conflict is particularly central in Burgat and Paoli (2013). It also underlies the 
discussion of the role of isis (also known as Daesh and isil) in the Arab world expressed in 
Fellous (2015).
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 labour market, we are implicitly drawing on the presuppositions of theories of 
modernisation.6 These theories see development as essentially pacificatory, as 
a vector of equality and justice and as promoting inclusiveness and the dissem-
ination of economic rationality, and thus as alleviating conflict. In this evolu-
tionary and ‘progressivist’ perspective, development—it is claimed—can lead 
a society towards greater prosperity and, consequently, towards greater equity, 
peace and consensus. According to this interpretation—adopted by the ma-
jority of donors,7 the social conflicts facing the mena region arise from the 
ineffectiveness of development when viewed as a vector of equality and from 
its unexpected negative effects. These analyses thus bolster the classic argu-
ment that various supposedly atavistic factors are hindering the development 
of countries in the region. These factors include merely cosmetic reforms and 
the limits of economic liberalisation in the face of the interests of rentiers, cli-
entelism, and the importance of ‘clans’; the constraining influence of religion 
on economic behaviour, especially on the integration of women; and the way 
that wealth is siphoned off into security apparatuses and sociopolitical groups 
linked to the government.8
The social conflicts that have proliferated in the wake of the Arab Spring 
have often been seen as further evidence of the conflictual and unstable nature 
of the societies in the region. Echoing this, ‘reverse versions’ of this interpre-
tation have developed in the form of analyses aimed at defining the negative 
effects of conflict on development. From this point of view, conflict is seen 
as the main source of underdevelopment, or as an obstacle to the pursuit of 
the aims of development. Violence, especially in the form of civil wars, is then 
perceived as one of the main causes of poor economic performance and, even 
more, of the growth of poverty in the world.9 Analyses sometimes focus on is-
sues of conflict and then show that violence feeds economic strategies that run 
6 Rostow (1960) is one of the main proponents of this school of thought. Gilman (2003) pro-
vides us with material for further reflection on the relationship between conflict and devel-
opment in theories of modernization.
7 Among the most recent examples of this, see in particular the World Bank (2015) and usaid 
(2015).
8 Analyses that consider these characteristics as typical of the countries in the region go back 
several years. Among the first authors to highlight them were Gellner and Waterbury (1977) 
and later Heydemann (2004). After the Arab Spring, these arguments were at the heart of the 
various studies on the ‘political economy of the Arab Spring’, including Springborg (2011), 
Malik and Bassem (2013) and Cammett et al. (2015).
9 See in particular the World Bank (2005). This argument is developed analytically in North et 
al. (2013).
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counter to development. All analyses of the ‘greed and grievance’10 kind that 
flourished in the second half of the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the 
‘renewal’ of armed conflict, fall within this paradigm: thus, it is claimed that 
resources (natural resources, financial resources from international groups or 
organisations such as migrants, or humanitarian aid) are turned into weapons 
of war, strengthening not only the parties in conflict but also the murderous 
competition to appropriate these resources.11 With the same self-assurance, 
other analysts take the opposite view and argue for example that the fact that 
Tunisia was the first country to revolt is not surprising, especially because it 
had a higher level of development than its neighbours—witness its demo-
graphics and the level of education of its population.12 Others highlight the 
negative effects of the protests, outbreaks of violence and even civil wars on 
the region’s development.13
These various arguments comprise a temporal and spatial sequence of 
supposedly ‘self-evident’ relationships that are, in fact opposed, or even con-
tradictory and incompatible—a sequence made possible by the tangled in-
terweaving of three simplistic modes of reasoning. The first is undoubtedly 
the adoption of very narrow conceptions of the two phenomena studied: the 
notion of development is understood in a limited and economistic sense, 
purportedly neutral and expressed in growth rates; the notion of conflict is 
reduced to war, physical violence or social protest.14 The second mode of rea-
soning, transposed from the economy,15 is based on the premise that develop-
ment and conflict are independent of one another. This approach transforms 
these complex phenomena into ‘variables’, which makes it possible to seek pat-
terns, and leads to the logics of development and of conflict being separated: 
there cannot be any overlap between a ‘period of development’ (characterised 
by a partial or complete absence of conflict) and a ‘period of conflict’ (which 
10 The expression comes from Collier (2000a; 2000b). These arguments have also been de-
veloped in Jean and Rufin (1996), Kaldor (1999), and Collier and Hoeffler (2002; 2004).
11 Within the community of practitioners, these arguments have in particular been raised 
by the Development Assistance Committee (oecd-dac, 1997).
12 See, e.g., Todd (2011).
13 See, e.g., Amin et al. (2012). The financial press and the grey literature from donors are full 
of articles or reports on the subject.
14 From another very interesting point of view, albeit almost the complete opposite of our 
own, Cramer (2006) shows that when conflicts are examined from the angle of develop-
ment, they are reduced to what becomes an oversimplified reality.
15 Marchal and Messiant (2002; 2003) pioneered this critique.
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in itself can hamper the process of development).16 Finally, the third mode 
of reasoning, the causal mode reduced to its simplest expression,17 sees the 
relationship between development and conflict as part of the search for one 
causality, ceteris paribus, but also as falling within a normative analysis that 
claims to set out good and bad practices, define good and bad development, 
perceive its failure or success and highlight its positive or negative, beneficial 
or adverse effects.18
Beyond the mena region and the Arab Spring, these modes of argument 
underlie and promote expertise and development projects and their bureau-
cratisation. Thinking, within decision-making bodies (by their ‘organic’ intel-
lectuals), has indeed been heavily oriented towards the quest for strategies 
aimed at ‘breaking the conflict trap’ and creating the necessary conditions for 
the sole (or main) purpose of fostering the positive effects expected from de-
velopment.19 The so-called conflict-sensitive approach and its ‘do-not-harm’ 
strategies20 are based on these assumptions. They were all responsible for the 
exponential growth of various schemes that claimed to provide appropriate 
responses to these new issues in cooperation and development policy. Manu-
als and training guides devoted to these approaches provide a set of standards, 
procedures, dispositifs and instruments to neutralise the conflicts arising from 
development projects.21 The extremely commonplace processes that have 
made it possible to design these technologies, to make them operational and re-
producible, to rationalise them so that they can be assessed and to standardise 
them to make them compatible and comparable has turned into a  process that 
16 This argument lies at the heart of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 (Word 
Bank, 2011).
17 For a critical view of the link between development and security, see Duffield (2007) and 
the debate on his book in the periodical Politique Africaine (Ambrosetti et al., 2012).
18 See, e.g., Thomas et al. (2000).
19 See the eloquent title of the World Bank report (World Bank, 2003).
20 For these approaches, see Leonhardt (2002) and Anderson (1999). For a critical analy-
sis, see Schloms (2005). These arguments have been mainly developed in the grey litera-
ture. See, for example, The Collaborative for Development Action, http://www.cdainc.com 
or http://territoires.ecoledelapaix.org/mali/methode-do-no-harm (accessed on 13 July 
2016).
21 For example, Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2012) See also the ‘resource pack’ of pfo, 
cecore, cha, fewer: International Alert, Saferworld, Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to 
Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack, http://www 
.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/148-conflict-sensitive-approaches-to-devel 
opment-humanitarian-assistance-and-peacebuilding (accessed on 13 July 2016).
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produces indifference, one that has detached them from their very meaning. 
Paradoxically, this process has produced other forms of coercion and domina-
tion22 that traditional readings of the link between development and conflict 
neglect or completely ignore.
The limits of these perspectives become evident as soon as one engages in 
a rigorous exploration of the meaning of the two terms. Instead of consider-
ing development as a one-dimensional explanatory variable, we felt it would 
be more productive to define it as a complex social relationship involving a 
vast constellation of actors, interests, logics, spaces, causalities and temporali-
ties; a social relationship that necessarily gives rise to diverse understandings. 
Similarly, if we do not reduce conflict to civil war, protest movements and the 
explicit use of violence, it can appear as an expression of struggle, forms of 
competition, tensions, resistance, opposition and critique. By adopting these 
complex and multidimensional meanings, an examination of the links be-
tween development and conflict can shed fresh light on injustice, inequality 
and modes of government, but also on the ways people understand and exist 
in political society. Then, development cannot fail to foster simultaneously a 
number of trends and characteristics; of different and even contradictory in-
terpretations. It thereby becomes a more deep-rooted factor in struggle, overt 
competition and the asymmetry of relations rather than an element in conver-
gence, harmony and the pacification of social relations.23
By observing development in all its conflictual nature, we have—in the 
present volume— sought to transcend the aforementioned limits by integrat-
ing the logics of action and social relationships, which are considered to be 
offset and out of scope by normative, mono-causal arguments. The first of 
these limits concerns the relationship to time. Eschewing analyses that claim 
that the temporality of development and the temporality of conflict succeed 
one another, we have sought to understand the way they are interconnected 
by situating the analysis of these relationships within national and global tra-
jectories. Giving them a historical setting has led us to understand, always in 
a contextualised and localised way, what exactly development means, com-
prehending it as a multiplicity of combinations of consensus and conflict— 
combinations that are not necessarily tense and paradoxical. By shifting the 
focus to the link between development and conflict thus defined, this vol-
ume also aims to question the relevance of the mena region as a category of 
22 These processes are highlighted and analysed, in other contexts, by Hibou (2015) and 
Samuel (2013; 2014).
23 Bono et al. (2015) argue for this view, drawing on Weber and his confrontational concep-
tion of social relations (Weber, 1968).
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 analysis, to the extent that it homogenises utterly different political situations 
and development practices.24
2 Understanding How Different Temporalities are Interconnected
The sceptical gaze we are bringing to bear on this overall understanding of 
the region does not stop us being sensitive to the existence of several major 
features common to the various entities that comprise it. These extraverted 
societies have continually brought their own historicity, including the nine-
teenth century reform movement—islah—into dialogue with the Western 
matrix of development that emerged at the same time. All these societies have 
been integrated, in their own ways, into the grand narrative of the nation that 
is inseparable from the processes of globalisation, and have participated daily 
in the transformations of modes of government that have shaped the great 
paradigms of intervention with regard to development. We, as editors, felt that 
this return to history was required, not to illustrate the evolutionary process to 
which development is often reduced, but to show the diversity and originality 
of configurations bringing together development and conflict over the years 
and to help us grasp the plurality of meanings of development and its con-
flictual dimensions in the neo-liberal era in which we are currently living. If 
we are to understand the interconnections of temporalities, we must not only 
take into account the link between global trajectory and national or regional 
trajectories; we must also consider the relationship between periods of devel-
opment (with their specific conception of the state and ways of governing) 
and periods of great events in history (such as the fall of empires, the end of 
colonisation, the end of separatist nationalism after decolonisation, and the 
end of industrial development). And we also need to take into account the link 
between the ‘long periods’ of incremental transformations and periods of con-
tingency and abrupt change, and the connection between the ‘long periods’ 
of the intrinsic logics of development and the equally long, but more specific, 
span of human memory.
Understanding the link between development and conflict requires first 
and foremost that we situate the historicity proper to the region within the 
process of globalisation, particularly in the related reconfiguration of interna-
tional relations. In interpreting this phenomenon without resorting to analy-
ses focused on the clash of civilisations, on imports (of the state, modernity, or 
24 In line with the ideas put forward in Bayart (2016).
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the market)25 or on dependence,26 this reading highlights the ambiguity and 
complexity of interactions between two global trajectories—that of countries 
in the region and that which structures international relations in the context 
of Western hegemony. In this way, it is possible to understand the specific ways 
in which the great geostrategic conflicts have daily shaped the ideas, dispositifs 
and practices of development in given societies.27
We need to go back to the eighteenth century to understand the process 
by which the models of ‘Western’ and ‘Ottoman’ (or more generally Muslim) 
modernity grew apart and then came into conflict, ending, in the nineteenth 
century, with the hegemonic self-assertion of the Western model. As Nora Lafi 
suggests in her contribution to this volume, the practices of development in 
the region in the late nineteenth century were not reducible to the Ottoman 
configuration or to the subtle and ambiguous relations between the Sublime 
Porte28 and the provinces. To understand them, our analysis needs to take ac-
count of the tensions between this Ottoman configuration and the triumph of 
the European world, and of the violence fomented by the colonial ambitions 
of the major European nations, especially on the economic level. During the 
colonial period, this tension was reflected in the coexistence of convergences, 
affinities and encounters between these two modernities, but also in the open 
conflicts between them, for instance in matters of education, administrative 
reorganisation and economic investment, as evidenced by the discussions that 
took place within the colonised societies.29 As the Moroccan example para-
digmatically illustrates,30 this tension can also be seen in the processes of the 
‘invention of tradition’ and the appropriation of tradition. The link between 
the temporalities of development and conflict finds one of its international 
expressions in the operation of the bipolar world that emerged from the Cold 
War. In the case analysed by Anouck Côrte-réal Pinto, the ‘Turkification’ of the 
defence industry—used both as a lever of economic development and as a 
symbol of technological modernity—seems inseparable from the climate of 
permanent conflict characteristic of the Cold War. As a full member of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato), (and thus undoubtedly belonging 
25 As shown by Huntington (1996) and Badie (1992), whose ideas have caused significant 
reverberations in the academic and political worlds.
26 In line with the work of Frank (1968), Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and Amin (1974).
27 This approach is based mainly on Wallerstein (1979), Lonsdale (1981), Cooper (1981), Bay-
art (1989) and Arrighi (1994).
28 The Sublime Porte was the name of the Ottoman court at Constantinople.
29 For Tunisia, see Berque (1967), Mahjoubi (1982), Tlili (1984), Kraïem (1990), Sraïeb (1995) 
and Ben Achour (1996). For an overview, see Hibou (2009).
30 On this aspect, see Adam (1972), Rabinow (1995), Tozy (1999) and Hibou (2006).
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to the Western Bloc), Turkey has continuously tried to assert itself as a regional 
player by insisting on its ‘non-aligned’ importance vis-à-vis its allies. In the case 
of Afghanistan, as analysed in this volume by Fariba Adelkhah, this intercon-
nection is reflected in the coexistence of the time of development imposed by 
Western powers through the assistance they have provided for reconstruction, 
and the time of ‘war as life’ that characterises national trajectory and creates 
conflicts conducive to the continuation of this permanent state of war. These 
two experiences of the neo-liberal moment do not, of course, exhaust the pos-
sible configurations of this crossing of trajectories.
Indeed, the plural and elastic dimension of what is called ‘neo-liberalism’ 
explains how a very wide variety of forms exist behind the general principles 
presiding over its operation (government by norms, procedures, rules and 
figures; the dissolution of the specificity of the ‘public’ and the universalisa-
tion of the private as a benchmark of government; the imperative to create 
frameworks for the development of market and business logics; the replace-
ment of general laws by pragmatism and case-by-case decisions; the replace-
ment of collective responsibility by individual responsibility, and so on). Thus, 
the areas covered in this volume suggest that the neo-liberal hegemony can 
be understood and interpreted in an open and pluralistic manner that goes 
beyond the standardising paradigm of development in which guise it usually 
appears.31 These areas reveal direct forms of state interventionism and strate-
gies of delegation, the development of evergetic and charitable practices on 
the part of private individuals and the redeployment of social policies, the 
mobilisation of associations and individuals in civil society and of large ad-
ministrations, and the engineering of both participation and planning. Thanks 
to this plasticity and the existence of a multiplicity of ways of behaving and 
governing ‘neo- liberally’, each society offers a range of behaviours and con-
ducts that can extend to the expression of radical alternatives and oppositions. 
Thus, consensus and conflict can exist simultaneously. In this sense, Merieme 
Yafout’s article on the development activities implemented by Moroccan Is-
lamist associations that thereby seek to criticise the action of the state in this 
area demonstrates clearly that models of society that in principle are com-
pletely opposed—which some observers might read as ‘shocks’ of civilisation, 
rekindling the opposition between East and West—can find in the neo-liberal 
development paradigm both common ground and a place of conflict or even 
31 On the diversity of neo-liberal principles, see Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005), Nemo and 
Petitot (2006), Plehwe et al. (2006), Dardot and Laval (2013) and Peck (2010). On the diver-
sity of neo-liberal practices, there are many studies, but see especially Laurie and Bondie 
(2005), Ong (2006), Chang et al. (2012) and Peck and Theodore (2015).
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violence. The chapter by  Adriana Kemp and Talia Margalit, on urban develop-
ment projects in Tel Aviv, convincingly shows that any challenge to neo-liberal 
practices borrows from the very repertoire of the neo-liberal paradigm—a 
paradigm that it also helps to renew.
The link between development and conflict must then be read as part of the 
historical trajectory of the formation of states. In the region as elsewhere, con-
flicts mark out and comprise this trajectory and mark the transition between 
different conceptions of the role played by state authority in development in 
the imperial, colonial, national and neo-liberal eras.32
In the Tunisian fez sector in the late nineteenth century, as studied by Nora 
Lafi, the strategies deployed by the workers provide us with a concrete under-
standing of the tensions that existed at the time between the imperial gov-
ernment and foreigners’ ambitions. The government aimed to foster the shift 
in the artisanal production of the Tunis beylik towards proto-industrialisation 
through economic and administrative reforms, while foreign actors, by intro-
ducing competition, further legitimised the process of mechanisation, quickly 
generating conflicts within corporations and the colonial state itself (in its 
role as an agent both of development and of protection in the sector). The 
demands for the introduction of trade union rights in Sudan after the Second 
World War—the theme of Elena Vezzadini’s contribution to this volume—
take us to the heart of two other ‘conflictualities’. The first conflictuality con-
trasts the different conceptions of development found in the metropolis and 
reflects the transition from a colonial state that highlights the importance of, 
and exploits, its colony to a colonial state that empowers its colony and places 
it under its tutelage. The second conflictuality contrasts nationalists with the 
supporters of a developmentalist colonisation likely to provide the future in-
dependent state with its guiding principles.33 Marie Vannetzel analyses the 
trajectory of the Egyptian state, which is emblematic of the developmentalist 
and interventionist nation state that involves itself in groups and territories in 
the name of national interest. She focuses her initial remarks on the ways in 
which the conflict between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood is 
managed. She then examines the ways in which the different parties mobil-
ise this developmentalist imaginary in the heart of the neo-liberal period, a 
period that encourages us to examine and interpret the conflicts between the 
multiple conceptions of the role of the state in development. The various con-
tributions to this volume highlight the diversity of ‘what development means’ 
when the state reforms itself in the name of neo-liberalism. It probably means 
32 On these aspects, see especially Bayart (2010).
33 These contrasts are highlighted in Mitchell (1991) and Berman and Lonsdale (1992).
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 liberalising but also nationalising; it also means intervening directly and dis-
investing in the name of rationality and competitiveness in the private sec-
tor; and, yet again, it means using intermediaries and drawing on unexpected 
convergences but also giving free rein to market forces. Yasmine Berriane il-
lustrates this trend with the emblematic example of collective lands in Mo-
rocco. She shows that their commercialisation lies at the crossroads of several 
economic and social issues linked to gender conflicts within society but also to 
conflicts between different social groups and territories. Raphaëlle Chevrillon-
Guibert highlights the regional asymmetry characteristic of development in 
Islamist Sudan, an asymmetry that has widened under the impact of the neo-
liberalism proper to that country—namely, the combination of institutional 
disinvestment and an increased reliance on the private sector in the form of 
incentives to resort systematically to charity.34
The analysis of the link between transformations in modes of government 
and transformations in capitalism constitutes a third approach to the link be-
tween development and conflict. Many studies have shown that, worldwide, 
development initiatives are indeed permeable to the major international eco-
nomic paradigms, but that they do not submit passively to them: they par-
ticipate in the process of the appropriation, adaptation and renewal of modes 
of government that are thus legitimised in the exercise of their domination.35 
Following this line of argument, the contributions in this volume highlight the 
innovative and inventive dimensions of this process, dimensions that are di-
rectly related to the specific characteristics of capitalism in historical configu-
rations but also in specific national or regional forms.
In her article, Ayşe Buğra distinguishes between the development process 
and developmentalism defined as a strategy and as a legitimising discourse. She 
draws on the Turkish trajectory to uncover the process by which development 
becomes, in a given political situation, a knowledge of government, and shows 
how the shift from the paradigm of interventionist development to the para-
digm of regulative development, privatised and decentralised, acquires partic-
ular and specific meaning in the capitalist configuration that characterises it. 
By encouraging the decentralisation of powers, favouring regulation over direct 
intervention and opting for the assessment of results rather than the planning 
of interventions, these neo-liberal modes of governing create new margins of 
34 For similar analyses in other contexts, see Kuran (2003), Bonner et al. (2003), Haenni 
(2005) and Singer (2008).
35 On Africa, in particular see Ferguson (1990) and Hibou (1998). For a more general reflec-
tion on this aspect, see Hibou (2011).
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ownership, negotiation and arrangement while renewing  former practices.36 
As suggested by the example of the Casablanca Development Plan, analysed 
by Nadia Hachimi Alaoui, the neo-liberal revolution,  especially in its manage-
rial component, and the modes of government associated with the interests of 
the new players in Moroccan capitalism combine with the permanence of the 
imaginary but also with the Makhzen’s practices of exercising power so as to 
create spaces for negotiation and moments conducive to action in areas that 
go far beyond development goals alone. By focusing on urban development in 
Tel Aviv, Adriana Kemp and Talia Margalit highlight another important feature 
of the current period. They show that those who are involved in development 
projects are not the only ones to provide guidance for the interpretation of 
government paradigms; protest and resistance also contribute to inventing, re-
formulating and legitimising these paradigms, partly because they are part of 
the same political economy and reflect the same capitalist configuration.
This extremely flexible reading of conflict defined as a social and political 
conflictuality, this approach sensitive to historical trajectories and their inter-
connections, is in the final analysis closer to studies that have addressed the 
history of development in terms of the singular narrative of endlessly reformu-
lated expectations37 than to studies on the political economy of development. 
The contributions in this volume may, to some degree, be read as fragments of 
narratives of development seen through the prism of conflictuality, allowing a 
very broad spectrum of social phenomena to be taken into account.
3 The Link between Development and Conflict
The contributions to this volume, then, form part of the historicity of globalisa-
tion, the formation of states, and the transformation of modes of government, 
and aim to grasp the links uniting these factors with periods of development 
and the connection between development and conflict. They capture the mul-
tiple faces of development and modes of conflict these faces convey, and they 
come at the problem from many different angles and scales of observation. For 
example, it is possible to reconstruct this variety of facets (with their different 
scales) by examining the vernacular terms, local translations and synonyms 
used in specific situations to talk about development, but also the words often 
associated with them, albeit in a great variety of ways. This richness better re-
flects the complexity of the relationship between development and conflict; 
36 This aspect is also addressed by Hibou (2015) and Samuel (2013).
37 This is, in particular, the point of view of Cooper (2010) and Eckert et al. (2010).
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we can move away from abstract and general analysis to observe the way de-
velopment becomes an ‘everyday’ feature38 through what it means in concrete 
terms. This volume focuses specifically on this phenomenon, examining the 
consequences of development for the organisation of social life, the assertion 
of sovereignty, the definition of social order and the shaping of how one con-
ducts one’s life.39
To analyse development and the conflicts that may arise from it in everyday 
life, it is thus appropriate firstly to analyse the reorganisation of social life in 
accordance with a state model favouring continuity or territorial stability, the 
ethnic uniformity of the population, the primacy of the individual over the 
group and competition between individuals. By analysing international aid as 
a dispositif and as a form of knowledge of a region (in this case Bamyan, in Af-
ghanistan), Fariba Adelkhah shows that development can trigger a process of 
‘ethnicisation’ and religious ‘confessionalisation’ among those participating in 
the political economy of aid, but also a process of territorialisation and there-
fore the affirmation of specific identities. Her contribution suggests that aid for 
development does not necessarily succeed conflict, even when it is intended to 
support the reconstruction of a region. Instead, it allows conflicts to be perpet-
uated beyond open warfare by supplying them with resources and providing 
them with a grammar. This grammar of development transforms the conflicts 
that had once been expressed in a warlike manner by giving them a diffuse 
and plural nature, albeit one that is not necessarily less cruel. This is shown 
by the exacerbation of violence connected with disputes over land, ethnicity 
and gender. The micro-social angle chosen by Yasmine Berriane allows us to 
observe a process of this nature embodied by the Soulaliyate movement. This 
movement arose in Morocco following the intensification of the commodifi-
cation of collective land formerly owned by the tribes, and is led by women 
fighting against their exclusion from the process of the distribution of profits 
from the sale of these lands. Yasmine Berriane shows that the grand idea of 
development can also lead to the satisfaction of crassly pecuniary demands; 
in particular, she notes that development initiatives are likely to intensify so-
cial inequalities through an asymmetric enhancement of the territory and 
the ‘tribalisation’ of the individuals who inhabit it. Implicitly, the Soulaliyate 
movement reflects the fact that different land requirements may also create 
38 Weber’s Veralltäglichung is not translated here as it is usually rendered (‘routinization’) 
but as ‘mode of penetration in everyday life’, following Grossein’s French translation (quo-
tidianisation) and interpretation. See Grossein 2006: 68; 123–124.
39 This problematisation was developed by Weber: see especially Weber (1971) and Chal-
craft, D.J., and A. Harrington (eds) (2001).
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antagonisms between town and country, between different farming methods, 
and also between different social strata. Raphaëlle Chevrillon-Guibert analy-
ses the charitable practices implemented by Darfuri traders in the Libya souk 
in Khartoum to benefit their region of origin. Without international aid and 
social policies, the traders’ charitable activities have become the main pillar of 
territorial development and the fight against famine in Darfur, as in Khartoum. 
By transforming charity into the ‘government of the social’,40 these initiatives 
undoubtedly reinforce the civilisation project fostered by the Islamist govern-
ment. But they also contribute to the ethnicisation and the ‘communitarisa-
tion’ of solidarity—the complete opposite of Islamist rhetoric. Thus, amid the 
perpetuation of the war in Darfur, conflicts occur between different genera-
tions of wealthy traders, but also between antagonistic clienteles, social groups 
and territories that are all competing to qualify for aid.
This volume also approaches the links between development and conflict by 
analysing the implications that development initiatives have had for the emer-
gence of a sovereign political authority and the sometimes conflictual modes 
of the assertion, exercise and legitimation of sovereignty in a given society. 
The spectrum and variety of viewpoints chosen by the authors highlight the 
characteristics of developmental conflicts in a specific period and the impact 
these conflicts have on how sovereignty is conceived. By studying the late Ot-
toman period, Nora Lafi captures the effects of development on the processes 
of affirmation and legitimation of political authority. The petitions denounc-
ing the collapse of the fez industry in the Ottoman province of Tunis called 
into question the validity of integration into international trade as a mode of 
development. The protest against international competition viewed as unfair 
and against the deteriorating living conditions of workers following the mech-
anisation of the sector also denounced a new form of foreign interference and 
domination and criticised an Ottoman rule that, in the view of artisans, had 
become an agent of globalisation. Conflicts between the centre of the empire 
and the provinces, as well as conflicts between the various economic interests 
in the Tunisian province being studied, combined with conflicts with Euro-
pean powers to pave the way to colonisation and the loss of sovereignty.
At the other chronological extremity of the colonial experience, Elena Vez-
zadini’s study of Sudan highlights the comparable disputes over sovereignty 
that can arise during national struggle. Immediately after the Second World 
War, the earliest legislation on employment was introduced under the leader-
ship of the nascent Sudanese trade union movement and the  developmentalist 
40 For our conception of the government of the social, we refer the reader to our previous 
work, especially Hibou and Bono (2016).
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orientation of the colonial power, influenced by the Keynesian paradigm that 
prevailed in England at the time. In a colonial context, the fact that the devel-
opment model took into account the right to employment paved the way for 
an interpretation of development as a matter of citizenship, sovereignty and 
sociopolitical order. Thus, alongside the nationalist conflict that would give 
birth to a sovereign Sudanese government in 1956, there was a real prolifera-
tion of conflicts between different levels of government, different generations 
of employees, but also between various components of the nationalist move-
ment, different ethnic groups and different economic interests. By reconstruct-
ing the trajectory of the Turkish defence industry during and after the Cold 
War, Anouck Gabriela Côrte-réal Pinto views the issue of sovereignty from a 
different angle. The official defence policy of the public authorities and the al-
most continuous (but still incomplete and perhaps impossible) promotion of 
the ‘Turkification’ of the military–industrial complex were presented at once 
as an example, a proof and a precondition of the country’s economic, techno-
logical and political development. These investments were a pillar of the ex-
ercise of national sovereignty: lying at the heart of government legitimacy for 
decades, they undoubtedly supported government action aimed at defusing 
conflict with opposition movements. Moreover, they allowed recognition of 
the survival of the state and the nation, and underpinned the power and great-
ness of a country anxious to assert itself on the international stage in the name 
of a conflict forever on the verge of breaking out. The Turkish word kalkınma 
masterfully expresses this idea, since it includes the meaning of development, 
but also that of recovery and healing. To some extent, the graduated reading 
(more or less, better or worse) of development evolved into a binary reading 
(the life or death of the state) that forcefully enacted a consensus against a 
background of conflict.
Analysis of the daily implications of development also allows us to observe 
the characteristics of the sociopolitical order that is shaped through it.41 At 
this level, conflicts of development may also set different actors, groups with 
conflicting interests, and conflicting world views against one another. In a 
Gramscian perspective, different world views, which coexist in an incoherent, 
disjointed and fragmentary manner, are the source of a continuous reformula-
tion of the assumptions that discipline the way people live together through 
the conflicts they can trigger.42 This third perspective in this volume is based 
41 A study by Ayşe Buğra (2007), who considers this issue from the viewpoint of unequal 
practices of citizenship, is particularly useful for developing this perspective.
42 This is one of the central ideas in Gramsci (2011). On the concept of dislocation in Grams-
ci’s thought, see Prestipino (2009).
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on the work of Gramsci but also on other authors such as Polanyi (1944). Ayşe 
Buğra proposes that we must define economics as a discipline and as a form 
of knowledge if we are to grasp the way these different levels of conflict are 
interrelated in Turkey. She shows that the discourse on development fosters 
a socio-economic order of progress, modernisation and social cohesion and 
encompasses economic policies that have been created by different and some-
times opposed theories. However, as a historically and ideologically situated 
form of knowledge, conflict is expressed not only in its theoretical or ideo-
logical form. By analysing the economic development strategies promoted in 
Turkey before and after the country’s integration into the world market, it is 
possible to understand the territorial, ethnic and class divisions within Turk-
ish society and the mainsprings of the political order that accompanied social 
conflicts, especially those targeting Armenians and traditional rural society 
before liberalisation and, more recently, the conflicts that have set the secular 
urban elites against the new elites emerging from political Islam.
The development strategy in Casablanca as analysed by Nadia Hachimi 
Alaoui is emblematic of a sociopolitical order based on private initiative, 
territorial competition and the devolution of power in the name of proxim-
ity. Through various initiatives based on participation and consultation, the 
shapes assumed by notions of development seem so imprecise that develop-
ment may act as an instrument of government and domination, despite the 
conflicts between different levels of political authority and between different 
economic interests. These conflicts, played out in non-formal areas on the 
edges of the development plan, have shaped the sociopolitical order that char-
acterises Casablanca today, emphasising an apolitical vision of development, 
technicising it by expertise, excluding elected figures from consultations while 
integrating them into non-formal spaces of negotiation and giving the wali43 
the status of a major player in development. The city is also the level of obser-
vation chosen by Adriana Kemp and Talia Margalit to study the conflicts that 
development brings about in shaping modes of government and the socio-
political order. Complementing previous analyses, Kemp and Margalit show 
that protests against the construction of high-rise buildings in Tel Aviv high-
light issues of social cohesion and the public interest of urban development. 
By targeting only the partial and limited aspects of urban planning choices, 
these movements, often perceived as anti-neo-liberal (and viewing themselves 
as such), do not resist the neo-liberalism of urban space and the sociopoliti-
cal order but rather play a full part in them. Diffuse conflicts over funding for 
public services and the privatisation of urban space arise behind the disputes 
43 A wali is a state representative at the territorial level. See Hachimi Alaoui (2016).
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between the promoters of urban projects and their detractors, without chal-
lenging the neo-liberal order.44
Following Weber, the authors of the chapters in this volume also reflect the 
fact that development can be a vector of the expression and construction of 
‘the ways in which one conducts one’s life’ and how they characterise different 
‘types of person’.45 The multiplicity of ‘material and thought-based interests’ 
that these concepts foster may result in cohabitation, confrontation or some-
times even in opposition between different ways of behaving and conceiving 
of the lives of individuals in society. The ‘constellation’ of interest, logics and 
behaviours that development brings together does not presuppose the exis-
tence of a spontaneous and peaceful harmony but of permanent adjustments 
resulting from conflicts, antagonisms, struggles, competitiveness and asym-
metrical relations that lead to the emergence of different, sometimes even an-
tagonistic worlds and world views.46 In this fourth and final perspective, the 
authors have often chosen Islamist movements as a starting point for exploring 
the links between development and conflict. Marie Vannetzel and Merieme 
Yafout, respectively, study the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Wal Ih-
sane movement in Morocco using different scales of observation. Marie Van-
netzel focuses on the continuity of the developmentalist imaginary before and 
after the fall of Mubarak and on the tensions between the imaginaries and 
the practices of development that have resulted. Merieme Yafout, meanwhile, 
examines a particular district in Casablanca, analysing the activities promoted 
by a development association whose female members are supporters of the Al 
Adl Wal Ihsane movement. In the case of Egypt, development is problematised 
through the distribution of benefits and the fostering of the spirit of service, 
while in the case of Morocco, it is understood as a process of emancipation 
and construction of ‘ways in which one conducts one’s life’ based on positive 
personal social, economic and spiritual development. Going beyond the sup-
posed existence of a conflict between a secular and an Islamic way of develop-
ment (an idea systematically used in political speeches, in the community of 
development practitioners and in public debates), it is possible to highlight 
much more subtle conflicts between those two convictions, which are not rigid 
44 The way in which protest movements have contributed to the consolidation of the neo-
liberal order in Israel has already been stressed in connection with microfinance by Kemp 
and Berkovitch (2013). For a general discussion of this process in the neo-liberal era, see 
Hibou (2015). Theoretically, this process had already been emphasized by Weber (1978).
45 See especially Weber (1971) and Chalcraft, D. J., and A. Harrington (eds) (2001).
46 This problematic, which we adopted in order to analyse the government of the social in 
Morocco (Bono and Hibou 2016), is developed by Weber (1968). See Grossein (2005; 2016).
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but constantly changing and evolving and continue to redeploy themselves 
through concrete ways of living in society.
4 Recognising the Coexistence of Consensus and Conflict  
on the Battlefield of Development
Development thus appears at once as a discourse, a practice, an ideology, a 
paradigm, a dispositif, a fiction and a power relationship. More importantly, the 
chapters of this volume point out that the meaning of development as a social 
action cannot fail to be historical and cultural. If they highlight national and 
regional differences, they also illustrate the reality of globalisation and its ideo-
logical and cultural hegemonies. Development appears as a relevant indicator 
of the degree of globalisation of the mena region, where the political situation 
is all too often analysed as specific or exceptional. Each chapter places national 
experiences back in the context of a trajectory conditioned by generalising, 
global paradigms. Conceptions of development are not identical, and their 
links to conflict are not only plural but undefined and unstable. Once we aban-
don an abstract and general standpoint and instead observe development in 
its day-to-day form, the richness of this approach gives us a better understand-
ing of the complexity of the relationship between development and conflict.
Beyond these variations, there appears one common feature: development 
helps build a consensus inseparable from the expression of conflicts. This be-
comes merely an apparent rather than a real paradox once we rid ourselves 
of simplistic visions of consensus. In the Weberian and Gramscian perspec-
tive adopted here, the convergence of norms, practices and interests is not 
the result of an intentional action or of supposed harmony, nor does it arise 
from a sharing of values, conceptions or meanings.47 Instead, the multiplicity 
of perspectives and understandings, the differences of interests, and the plu-
rality of logics of action feed into a continuous reformulation of the implicit 
factors that allow people to live together, precisely through the conflicts they 
are forever triggering. From this perspective, the distinction between develop-
ers and the developed—like that between rulers and those ruled and between 
the dominant and the dominated—is of little interest if our aim is to grasp the 
relationship between development and conflict: any active player is part of a 
47 We develop this argument at length in Bono and Hibou (2016), drawing on Weber (1968 
and 1971) and Gramsci (2011).
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world view in which development is constructed as a consensual subject, while 
helping to preserve this conception, to modify it, and to create new ones.48
On the basis of shared beliefs and imaginaries, development presents itself 
as an indisputable fact.49 At least two factors help explain this consensus. First, 
economic forms of knowledge of development tend to be considered as tech-
nical, objective and independent. This stance is based on the fiction that the 
economic sphere is independent of all political processes and able to regu-
late itself. The consensual nature of development stems partly from the way in 
which initiatives undertaken in its name are usually constructed and planned 
using tools that are intended to be technical and neutral in order to intervene 
on problematics themselves considered as objective. By questioning the ob-
jectivity of development, we recognise that it can be a place for the expression 
of subjectivity, values and ethics. Similarly, the fact that major development 
paradigms are legitimised internationally and that the expertise that accom-
panies them is often foreign—when aid itself is not directly foreign—helps 
give development an apparent neutrality that facilitates consensus. By ques-
tioning the neutrality of foreign intervention, we recognise that development 
can have different meanings in specific political situations. Second, the link 
forged between development and imaginaries of modernisation, progress and 
rationality also contributes to establishing this consensus: development is 
unanimously considered a desirable objective. Beyond the positive moral con-
notations generally associated with development, we need to carefully con-
sider the processes of prioritisation and interests as well as the inequalities 
and asymmetries that any development initiative brings with it. By choosing 
as a case study ‘development conflicts’, we wanted to focus our reflection on 
the ‘frictions’50 that any experience of development generates. This stance has 
enabled us to simultaneously take into account the different conflicts and dif-
ferent kinds of understanding and apprehension of development and the con-
sensus constructed around them, while defining development as a ‘battlefield’ 
on which prioritisation, discrimination and, ultimately, processes of domina-
tion are played out.51 The situations analysed in the various chapters of this 
48 On the multiple meanings of the subject in the processes of government, see also the 
reading of Foucault’s conception of ‘governmentality’ in globalization proposed by Bayart 
(2007).
49 These issues are addressed in Rist (2002) and Cooper (2010).
50 On problematisation in terms of friction, see Tsing (2004).
51 For the same approach as applied to the government of the social, see Hibou and Bono 
(2016).
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volume have helped to highlight three configurations that have structured this 
special volume.
The first part, entitled ‘Conflicts that Create Consensus’, brings together a 
series of articles that show in particular that disputes relating to the organisa-
tion of social life, the assertion of sovereignty, the definition of a social order 
or the construction of ‘the ways in which one conducts one’s life’ contribute 
to creating a consensus on development, or at least to reinforcing it. Conflicts 
are necessary for a certain conception of development to become hegemonic. 
Hegemony, as Gramsci says, is born of conflicts and perpetuates itself through 
them.52 To understand these conflicts, it is necessary to try and grasp power 
and domination relationships without limiting oneself to the concepts of co-
ercion and the exercise of physical force and to give all necessary attention to 
the mechanisms that allow values and interests to be considered as true and 
natural, even though they are based on discriminatory and hierarchical pro-
cesses. From this perspective, the point of transition between different hege-
monic paradigms of development is a propitious moment at which to observe 
how conflicts build consensus. By studying, respectively, the assertive phase 
of neo-liberal developmentalism in Turkey and the role of industrialisation in 
the modernisation of the Ottoman province of Tunis, Ayşe Buğra and Nora 
Lafi show that the conflicts that accompany the shift from one consensus to 
another are related to the processes of ‘creative destruction’53 that punctuate 
the transformations of capitalism. Examining the case of Sudan as it achieved 
independence, Elena Vezzadini places less emphasis on the role of internal 
transformations within capitalism than on the paradigms that connect capi-
talism with the struggle for the establishment of an independent, modernising 
nation state. Finally, Merieme Yafout stresses the importance of laissez-faire 
and disengagement in the assertion of consensus with regard to a hegemonic 
vision of development in Morocco.
The articles in the second part—entitled ‘Consensus as An Expression of 
Conflict’—highlight various examples of consensus with regard to develop-
ment as a quintessential expression of tensions and conflicts that go well be-
yond such development. Indeed, development is never the work of a single 
group of actors who take the initiative. It should be understood as the result 
of a web of relationships and a constellation of social actions carried out by a 
variety of actors rather than as an explicit public policy that is definite, focused 
and unambiguous (a vision characteristic of analyses of conventional public 
52 See Gramsci (2011). The analysis of Gramsci’s terminology in Frosini and Liguori (2004) 
highlights this aspect.
53 To use the terminology proposed by Schumpeter (2010).
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policies). Beyond the theme of brokers and intermediaries, it is important to 
consider the actors by whom development is furthered and interpreted—those 
who give it its colour and meaning, thanks to their style, ethos and modes of 
behaviour. In other words, one cannot understand the practical and conflictual 
dimensions of development without taking into account those people whom 
Weber called the ‘bearers’ of development.54 By considering them in all their 
diversity, it is possible to observe the process by which their consensual actions 
vis-à-vis development can become the main field of expression for conflicts: 
these are embodied in the various conceptions of the common good, of the 
public interest and of development as well as in the many modes in which 
these objectives can be achieved, modes linked to different conceptions of the 
state and the exercise of power. Consensus about development can thus be 
a vector for the perpetuation and exacerbation of conflicts, as in the Afghan 
province of Bamyan, analysed in this volume by Fariba Adelkhah. Conversely, 
in their analysis of protests against urban projects in Tel Aviv, Adriana Kemp 
and Talia Margalit show that conflicts can paradoxically express a consensus. 
And consensus can also conceal conflicts of networks, power and temporal-
ity, such as those expressed in the implementation of the development plan 
for the city of Casablanca, studied by Nadia Hachimi Alaoui. Marie Vannet-
zel, finally, gives us another vision of this relationship between consensus and 
conflict by showing that in Egypt, for several decades, the whole machinery of 
development harboured conflicts of position between the nationalist elite and 
the Muslim Brotherhood; this machinery came to halt when conflict gave way 
to the triumph of one of the parties involved.
The third part, entitled ‘The Definition of Legitimate Conflicts’, addresses 
the theme of this volume from the vantage point of the contribution of devel-
opment initiatives to the apprehension of questions of legitimacy. Develop-
ment cannot be neutral if it is to avoid being ineffective. It does not appear here 
in the naive, technical, apolitical and sanitised guise that is often associated 
with it, but is presented as a targeted and thus inegalitarian social action (even 
if the targeting is extremely broad), an action that favours certain objectives 
and priorities over others, even if these are all numerous and contradictory. 
Development is by definition an action that differentiates and discriminates, 
often in the name of the war on inequality.55 It is nonetheless a social action 
that influences processes of legitimation by modifying the representations of 
the state, of political space, and of social justice. The conflictual dimension of 
54 Weber (1971), as highlighted by Grossein (2006).
55 Bono (2014) has analysed in these terms the construction of the ‘responsible indigent’ and 
the ‘employable young person’ as target categories for development aid to Morocco.
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development is evident in the way its results are assessed, its inequalities are 
grasped, and the injustices it fosters are managed; but also in the way the vio-
lence inherent in any social action is fully taken into account. The neo- liberal 
consensus on development defined as a process of modernisation, reform and 
market expansion can then lead to the drawing of a distinction between le-
gitimate and illegitimate conflicts, as suggested by Yasmine Berriane in her 
analysis of the commodification of collective lands in Morocco. In the case of 
Sudan, Raphaëlle Chevrillon-Guibert highlights the fact that the constitutive 
asymmetries of consensus regarding development can also generate conflicts. 
Anouck Côrte-réal Pinto, in turn, draws on the case of Turkey to remind us that 
it is essential to understand the means by which the national-liberal consensus 
underlying the developmentalist fiction makes conflicts acceptable, tolerable, 
marginal or even legitimate.
In our view, this threefold perspective contributes to the renewal of ap-
proaches usually adopted by studies in the social sciences to interpret the so-
ciopolitical and economic situation in the mena region.
First, this perspective undermines the idea that these countries are excep-
tions to the rule. This idea comes in different forms, including that of the un-
governability of the region’s societies. The intrinsic contrast between the state 
and the population—related to the extraneous nature of the former and the 
indiscipline of the latter, or to the fact that state actors are detached from so-
cial processes—explains, it is said, the alternation of periods of submission 
and revolt, and makes these societies ungovernable.56 The study by Adriana 
Kemp and Talia Margalit, and Ayşe Buğra’s contribution to this volume, suggest 
that the neo-liberal moment cannot be reduced to a contrast between the state 
and society. Instead, they highlight a hegemony that underlies the conflicts 
and brings together ways of ruling and ways of opposing the rulers. In other 
words, neo-liberal practices form a common basis for the deployment of re-
lations, interests and processes in which conflict and consensus, domination 
and resistance, inclusion and exclusion are interwoven. The idea that these 
countries are exceptions to the rule is also reflected in the way their markets 
are viewed as imperfect. This argument, often developed in terms of the econ-
omies of rent—particularly in the case of oil-producing countries and those 
that live by the exploitation of other natural or geopolitical resources, licit or 
illicit—is based on a historicist reading of the evolution of these countries and 
the idea that imperial and colonial experiences have imposed limits on the 
56 For example, see Salamé (1994), Waterbury (1994) and Ayubi (1996). Those analyses that 
aim to establish the winner of the showdown between the state and civil society share 
this vision: see for example Fernández Molina (2011).
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market economy.57 Nora Lafi, Elena Vezzadini, Yasmine Berriane, and Anouck 
Gabriela Côrte-réal Pinto challenge this interpretation, and put forward three 
counterarguments: the inherently indigenous nature of the market, the impor-
tance of national movements in its appropriation and the ongoing process of 
reinvention that it is currently undergoing, for instance by the gradual place-
ment of ‘fictitious commodities’ on the market.58 Finally, the chapters in this 
volume offer an implicit critique of this idea of ‘exceptionality’ in the urban 
setting. With some significant exceptions, the literature on cities in the mena 
region suggests that these are affected only marginally, and passively, by glo-
balisation.59 Nadia Hachimi Alaoui, Adriana Kemp, and Talia Margalit show 
instead that analyses on an urban scale allow for a detailed reading of the in-
terrelationship between the space of the city and globalisation.
Second, this threefold perspective relativises and even undermines the idea 
that Islam and the strength of feeling inherent in ethnic identity act as barriers 
to development. In line with the theories of modernisation, it claims that Islam 
and ethnicity are based on values and beliefs incompatible with modernity, ra-
tionality and technical development.60 Moreover, the low level of development 
supposedly fuels the rise of political Islam and the  persistence of ethnicity.61 
The contributions of Merieme Yafout, Mary Vannetzel, Raphaëlle Chevrillon, 
and Anouck Gabriela Côrte-réal Pinto suggest the existence of  different links 
between development and political Islam. They show that  political  Islam ‘or-
dinarily’ uses strategies of extraversion and fashionable  international  rhetoric 
and argue that it has thus become just as ‘developmentalist’ as secular political 
trends and plays a part in the neo-liberal paradigm as much as do other political 
movements. These authors also defend the view that religious reference points 
are an alternative source of legitimacy for new elites and enable the creation of 
new alliances that depoliticise inequality in the name of Muslim  solidarity.62 
By exploring the reinvention of ethnicity and social and political bonds that 
has been produced by the processes of development, Fariba Adelkhah and 
57 See in particular Beblawi and Luciani (1987), Richards and Waterbury (1996) and Henry 
and Springborg (2001).
58 This is the view of Polanyi (1944).
59 Authors who oppose this trend include Yacobi (2009) and Peraldi and Tozy (2011). For a 
critical analysis of this literature in the context of the Arab Spring, see Allegra et al. (2013).
60 The questioning of the relationship between Islam and modernity is a theme treated by 
Lewis (2003) and more recently by Masud et al. (2009).
61 Kepel’s work (2003; 2006) rests on the idea that Islamism is a monolithic bloc whose 
birth was mainly due to an alliance between a deprived younger generation and a pious 
bourgeoisie.
62 Following Haenni (2005) and Tozy and Hibou (2015).
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Yasmine Berriane also address the relationship between ethnicity and devel-
opment in a new way. The conception of the role and place of women in Mus-
lim or Mediterranean societies is often mentioned in this literature as another 
impediment to development.63 Yasmine Berriane and Merieme Yafout address 
gender issues from a very different angle and show that women participate in 
the renewal of power relations within political movements and, moreover, that 
their positions as women contribute to legitimising certain struggles (and thus 
to delegitimising many others) and to the inclusion of certain actors (and thus 
to the exclusion of certain others).
Finally, looking at development via the connection between conflict and 
consensus allows us to see anew the issue of violence in the region.64 These 
different approaches invite us to think about violence on the basis of the 
constitutive asymmetries of society rather than examining it frontally as a 
separate phenomenon; these asymmetries are considered as the normal and 
commonplace components of political relations and the exercise of power and 
not as features found only in the countries of the mena region. Ultimately, 
many of our stances converge on a deconstruction of the concept of the mena 
region defined as a well-delineated cultural and geopolitical area or as a ho-
mogeneous ensemble characterised by common trends in development.65 By 
favouring one situated moment (the neo-liberal moment) and developing our 
argument on the basis of specific locations (geographic, but also sectoral, eco-
nomic and cultural locations), this volume explores common conceptions of 
the region from a new angle so as to highlight the diversity of development 
patterns and thus the possible links between development and conflict. Multi-
plying disciplinary approaches—from history to political economy via anthro-
pology and political sociology—we have abandoned a purely geographical or 
regional framework to adopt one that encompasses the relationship between 
global and local dimensions, including necessarily local perspectives on glo-
balisation. Development is not analysed here as an explanatory variable or 
as an inevitable consequence, much less as revealing a stabilised ‘culture’ or 
the ‘nature’ of societies. It is defined as a set of complex social relations and 
a balance of power, oscillating constantly between consensus and conflict, 
a definition that highlights the extreme diversity of the situations observed. 
63 This argument is omnipresent in the grey literature and in public debate. Various schol-
arly analyses and popular books have attempted to move beyond these stereotypes; 
Mernissi (1987) and Kandiyoti (1991) are among the first of these.
64 For a history of violence in the region, see Bozarslan (2008).
65 Our implicit critique of thinking in terms of ‘cultural areas’ draws on the analysis of this 
topic explicitly developed by Jean-François Bayart (2016).
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This is what prompted us to put together this volume by taking the liberty of 
not remaining faithful to the boundaries conventionally attributed to this cul-
tural area and not seeking regularities, convergences or divergences. Algeria, 
Libya, Syria, and Jordan are not among the countries studied, but we provide 
analyses of certain political situations often left on the margins or outside the 
supposed boundaries of the region, including Turkey and Afghanistan for eth-
nic reasons, Sudan for geographical reasons and Israel for religious and histori-
cal reasons. As the reader will have realised, the mena region has been—for 
us—simply a pretext; a concrete place to think in general and generic terms of 
development as a ‘battlefield’.66
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Developmentalism refers to a particular ideology marked by a sense of inevitability 
about the nature of historical change and to political interventions to implement par-
ticular strategies of development. The paradox between the ideology of development 
and development policy challenges the notion of market-led economic progress that 
proceeds without government intervention and is closely related to social conflicts 
engendered by economic progress. This chapter approaches capitalism as a socio- 
economic order where the idea of progress is central to the ideological universe. It also 
highlights the historically changing and societally different characteristics of capital-
ism that affect its ideological universe and determine the way conflicts engendered 
by progress are handled through political intervention. It argues that the concept of 
developmentalism needs to be examined with reference to the political choices that 
are situated in different historical varieties of capitalism and that differ in the ways in 
which they shape the character of economic processes and in their impact on the life 
and livelihood of the individual. This argument is situated in an analytical frame built 
by drawing on Karl Polanyi’s work and by remembering the historical trends in devel-
opment economics, and is developed through a case study on Turkey that shows the 
variations in the relationship between the economy and politics in different historical 
periods.
1 Introduction
Developmentalism is a term that can be defined as ‘an ideological orientation 
characterised by the fetishisation of development, or the attribution to devel-
opment of the power of a natural (or even divine) force which humans can 
resist or question only at the risk of being condemned to stagnation and pov-
erty’ (Dirlik, 2014). However, the term is also used in discussions of ‘national 
developmentalism’ with reference to the strategies of economic development 
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promoted by international organisations and implemented by the countries of 
the periphery (Bresser Pereira, 2006; Kahn and Christiansen, 2011).
Developmentalism, then, refers both to a particular ideology marked by 
a sense of inevitability about the nature of historical change and to political 
interventions to implement particular strategies of development. There is, 
therefore, a somewhat paradoxical relationship between the ideology of de-
velopmentalism, which attributes to economic progress the characteristics 
of a natural force, and the very idea of development policy or strategy, which 
is about political action. This paradox between the ideology of development 
and development policy, first, challenges the notion of market-led economic 
progress that proceeds without government intervention. Second, it is closely 
related to social conflicts engendered by economic progress. The impact of the 
economic progress of different social classes or groups is never the same, but 
progress might also put social cohesion at risk in a way which might be unbear-
able for society at large.
Progress is central to the ideological universe of capitalism, as the following 
well-known passage from The Communist Manifesto clearly reveals:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the in-
struments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and 
with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes 
of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition 
of existence of all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of 
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlast-
ing uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all 
earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and 
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones 
become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, 
all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober 
senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
marx and engels, �005 [�848], 9–�0
This passage, in which we find probably the most succinct expression of what 
distinguishes capitalist society from all other societies, also makes us wonder 
whether any human society could survive without taking measures to control 
such a dynamic of ‘creative destruction’ in order to protect social cohesion. In 
his treatise on nineteenth century capitalism, Karl Polanyi discusses how the 
unleashed forces of economic progress would be inimical to the survival of 
society and argues that not only the form but also the pace of progress should 
be politically determined according to the goals of non-economic character. 
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However, the extent to which the forces of creative destruction are checked 
by political action or left to function unhampered differ in different historical 
periods and societal contexts.
In this chapter, I will approach capitalism as a socio-economic order with 
historically changing and societally different characteristics that affect its ide-
ological universe and determine the way conflicts engendered by progress are 
handled through political intervention. I will argue that the concept of devel-
opmentalism needs to be examined in its relationship with the relative roles 
played by the market and the state in determining the character of economic 
processes and these roles’ impact on the life and livelihood of the individual. 
I will try to show that the old and the new forms of national developmental-
ism are situated in two different historical varieties of capitalism with refer-
ence to the particular case of Turkey’s economic development strategy before 
and after the country’s insertion into the global market economy in the post-
1980 period. The empirical case of Turkey also shows that the state remains an 
important actor in both historical contexts where development strategies are 
shaped within different frames of economic regulation and in both contexts 
state action is guided by political motives as well as economic growth related 
objectives. The analytical frame of the discussion is built with reference to 
the work of Karl Polanyi and the historical trends in development econom-
ics that closely follow the transformation of capitalism and change in nature 
in conformity with the characteristics of the historically different varieties of 
capitalism.
2 Analytical Backdrop
In Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1944), the word ‘capitalism’ appears 
very rarely and where it is used it is almost always preceded by a qualifying 
 adjective—that is to say, ‘early’, ‘industrial’, ‘agricultural’ or ‘modern’. Like capi-
talism itself, the existence of markets, found in all kinds of societies in all his-
torical periods, is not the problem that is explored in this book. What Polanyi 
analyses is the nineteenth century market economy as a ‘singular departure’ 
from normal historical patterns where the economy remains embedded in so-
ciety, subservient to the requirements of the norms that define the social order 
and assure its survival. It is only in the market society—where the totality of 
economic activity is guided by market exchange—that the economy consti-
tutes an autonomous domain disembedded from society.
Polanyi discusses the concept of ‘disembeddedness’ in relation to ‘the insti-
tutional separation of society into an economic and political sphere’ (Polanyi 
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1944, 71) and the emergence of ‘economic society’ as distinct from the ‘political 
state’. According to him, market society was conceived independently of law 
and government and its foundations were ‘utterly foreign to the moral world of 
which body politic hitherto had formed part’ (Polanyi, 1944, 116).
The separation of the political and the economic finds its expression in the 
principle of non-interventionism, which, in The Great Transformation, is ex-
plicitly discussed in relation to the problem of progress. ‘Nowhere has liberal 
philosophy failed so conspicuously as in its understanding of the problem of 
change’, observes Polanyi (1944, 33–35), and continues by writing that:
Fired by an emotional faith in spontaneity, the common-sense attitude 
toward change was discarded in favor of a mystical readiness to accept 
the social consequences of economic improvement, whatever they might 
be. The elementary truths of political science and statecraft were first 
discredited, then forgotten. It should need no elaboration that a process 
of undirected change, the pace of which is deemed too fast, should be 
slowed down, if possible, so as to safeguard the welfare of the commu-
nity. Such household truths of traditional statesmanship […] were in the 
nineteenth century erased from the thoughts of the educated by the cor-
rosive of a crude utilitarianism combined with an uncritical reliance on 
the alleged self-healing virtues of unconscious growth.
In his defence of the sixteenth century statesmen who resisted the enclosure 
movement only to be criticised by nineteenth century historians who quali-
fied them as ‘demagogic’ or ‘outright reactionary’, Polanyi argues against the 
view that these statesmen had failed in their vain interventionist attempts and 
that their failure was proof of the futility of all interventionist attempts to ob-
struct the forces of progress by legislation. ‘[S]uch a view seems to miss the 
point altogether’, Polanyi writes (1944, 36–37):
Why should the ultimate victory of a trend be taken as a proof of the 
ineffectiveness of the efforts to slow down its progress? And why should 
the purpose of these measures not be seen precisely in that which they 
achieved, i.e. in slowing down the rate of change? […] The rate of change 
is often of no less importance than the direction of the change itself; 
but while the latter frequently does not depend upon our volition, it is 
the rate at which we allow change to take place which well may depend 
upon us.
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This passage clearly reveals that it is not development per se that Polanyi 
problematises. What is problematic, according to him, is the principle of 
 non-interventionism informed by a blind faith in progress led by the self- 
regulating market which comprises all elements of industry including land, 
labour and money. As Polanyi puts it (1944, 72):
[…] labor, land and money are obviously not commodities […] Labor is 
only another name for human activity that goes with life itself […] land is 
only another name for nature […] actual money, finally, is merely a token 
for purchasing power which, as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes 
into being through the mechanism of banking or state finance. None of 
them is produced for sale. The commodity description of labor, land and 
money is entirely fictitious.
Polanyi writes that this commodity fiction is a logical absurdity, but it was ac-
cording to this fiction that the nineteenth century market economy functioned 
and the faith in unhampered progress blocked the possibility of political inter-
vention to prevent the inevitable human and social devastation caused by an 
institutional order where human beings, nature and purchasing power were 
treated as commodities.
While blind faith in the spontaneous forces of progress informed the liberal 
ideology of non-interventionism, the emergence of this strange institutional 
order organised according to the commodity fiction had nothing spontane-
ous about it: ‘The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an 
enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled inter-
ventionism’ (Polanyi, 1944, 140). Commodification of land, labour and money 
was realised by a series of deliberate interventionist measures and further in-
tervention was required to make such a strange economic organisation com-
patible with human society.
Polanyi in fact presents detailed empirical discussion of the ‘frenzy’ of leg-
islative activity as characteristic of the nineteenth century episode of capital-
ism, which ended after a series of disasters involving the Great Depression, the 
rise of fascism in Europe and the Second World War. The Great Transformation 
ends in the post-Second World War setting with Polanyi writing that ‘After a 
century of blind “improvement”, man is restoring his “habitation”’ (Polanyi, 
1944, 249).
Polanyi’s vision of the post-war world economy was one where the diversity 
of instituting the economy in society was recognised. However, this diversity 
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of choices was going to have one outcome common to all societies: ‘the mar-
ket system will no longer be self-regulating, even in principle, since it will not 
comprise labor, land and money’ (Polanyi, 1944, 251).
In the period following the Second World War, in all societies grouped in 
the first, second and third worlds—in developed capitalist societies, centrally 
planned economies with communist parties in power, and (as they were then 
called) underdeveloped countries—the protection of the domestic economy 
with trade barriers and financial controls as well as a series of agricultural sub-
sidies, wage and price controls, and different instruments of demand manage-
ment precluded an economic organisation based on the commodity fiction. 
Labour, land and money were indeed not commodities.
The rise of development economics was situated in this international envi-
ronment. As some of the pioneers of the field later observed, the global victory 
of Keynesian ideas over economic liberalism constituted an important source 
of inspiration to the daunting task they have undertaken with the optimism 
characteristic of the period. One of these pioneers, A.O. Hirschman (1981), later 
commented on this unrealistic optimism, adding that without this they would 
never have attempted even to understand the problems at hand. But they did 
attempt to understand these problems and they also understood the limita-
tions of development economics even before the discipline had come under 
attack from pro-market liberals.1
Development economics indeed had many failings, the most important of 
which was probably the failure to properly address the political determinants 
of economic activity and society-specific policy approaches designed to shape 
the economy in line with the objectives of nation building and social cohesion 
or with the interests of ruling politicians. Such objectives often dominated the 
strictly economic growth oriented alternatives and seriously limited the suc-
cessful application of development models.
Nevertheless, during the first phase of developmentalism these models 
were of a nature that provided ample room for protectionist policies, which 
could play a role in preventing the aforementioned kind of ‘creative destruc-
tion’ and its accompanying enormous human costs. This, as we know, has not 
been possible in the context of the market-oriented development strategies 
that accompanied late twentieth century globalisation.
In the early 1980s, at the end of this first phase of developmentalism, while the 
pioneers of development economics were engaged in thorough  self-criticism, 
1 See, among other essays on self-criticism by development economics, Hirschman (1981), 
Seers (1979), Streeten (1979), and Lewis (1984).
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neo-classical economists who, until then, had been largely absent in the field, 
became increasingly vocal in their criticism of the sub-discipline. The demise 
of development economics was celebrated with the confident affirmation of 
the superiority of neo-classical economics and market-oriented policies. D. 
Lal’s Poverty of Development Economics, which presented a particularly fero-
cious attack against what he called the ‘dirigiste dogma’ and ‘the harm it had 
done to the vast bulk of the humanity contained in the Third World’, has even-
tually become a very influential text, with several other editions following the 
first, published in 1983 (Lal 1983). This was not surprising in a period marked 
by statements such as Margaret Thatcher’s ‘There is no alternative’ or Ronald 
Reagan’s ‘Government is not the solution to our problems, government is the 
problem’. The second age of global market society had begun and unbridled 
progress of the kind Hayek (1960, 39–40) associated with civilisation was the 
order of the day: ‘In one sense, civilisation is progress and progress is civili-
sation. The preservation of the kind of civilisation that we know depends on 
the operation of forces which, under favourable conditions, produce progress.’ 
It should perhaps be added that the phrase ‘the kind of civilization that we 
know’ refers to, or is even identical with, a self-regulating market society.
The global transformations of the last three decades have led to the emer-
gence of a new capitalism with a renewed Hayekian faith in the self-regulating 
market mechanism strengthened by the demise of socialism. The markets, 
which were ‘tamed’ using different mechanisms in the post-Second World War 
period, have been freed to expand in a way that encompasses the ‘fictitious 
commodities’. The second life of developmentalism began in the setting of this 
new capitalism.
As in the nineteenth century context of the self-regulating market economy 
discussed by Polanyi, contemporary market institutions were put in place by 
political intervention. In this process, international organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (imf) and the World Bank, as well as the more 
recently formed World Trade Organization, have played an important role by 
presenting the blueprints for institution building, which have become the cen-
trepiece of the international development policy environment. Economic sta-
bilisation and structural adjustment were the key words and, apart from fiscal 
austerity, what they meant was privatisation, the liberalisation of trade and 
financial liberalisation, labour market de-regulation, and the elimination of 
agricultural subsidies.
While the previous mechanisms of protective state intervention were dis-
mantled, the new capitalist order came with its own of mode of regulation, 
which is characterised less by retreat than by a thorough ‘metamorphosis’ 
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of the state whereby political power becomes ‘diffused’ or ‘de-centred’ or is 
‘privatized’.2 Hence, private–public partnerships of different kinds proliferate 
in different sectors of productive activity and in the provision of social services 
hitherto considered to be the realm of redistributive action by the state. At the 
same time, the voluntary sector is increasingly called upon to assume what 
were once the responsibilities of the state, and here—too—partnerships be-
tween the state and non-governmental organisations (ngos) have become an 
important aspect of the models of good governance.
These models, which have been systematically discussed by the interna-
tional organisations that set the present agenda for development policies 
considered to be viable in the context of the global market economy, are char-
acterised by a blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private, 
between the governmental and non-governmental.3 In the context of the new 
capitalism in which the approaches to development have been shaped, the 
‘network’, as organisational form and analytical concept, has become an inte-
gral part of socio-economic relations and social analyses. As Manuel Castells 
(2000, 14) discusses in his analysis of the new network society, the state has 
now appeared as ‘a network state made out of a complex web of power sharing 
and negotiated decision making between international, multinational, nation-
al, regional, local and non-governmental political institutions’.
What we observe in this context is a change from one type of developmen-
talism to another type where state intervention continues by taking a different 
form within a network society. While the nation state is limited in its capacity 
to interfere with the commodification of land, labour and money, intervention 
can still be motivated by political factors, which vary in their compatibility with 
the requirements of economic progress. As mainstream development theories 
and policies undergo an important change, they continue to be marked by the 
tendency to overlook the significance of those objectives of a political nature 
pursued by nation states. In the meantime, deviations from ‘rational’ policy 
lines continue to frustrate attempts to put national economies on the market-
led path to economic progress. The case of Turkey shows how these deviations 
2 The authors who use these terms do so in different paradigms of political power and state 
action. The terms together indicate, however, a major change from the standard forms of the 
modern bureaucratic state towards formations where the boundaries between the political 
and non-political become blurred. See, especially, Strange (1996), Chandhoke (2002), and Hi-
bou (2004).
3 In this regard, the 1997 World Development Report of the World Bank (1997) is particularly 
significant.
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appear in society in specific ways that nevertheless reflect the nature of the 
historically prevailing variety of capitalism.
3 National Developmentalism in a Protected Economy:  
Turkey before the 1980s
Starting with the Union and Progress Party’s rule in the early twentieth cen-
tury, there have been intense debates on the development of a ‘national econo-
my’ in Turkey. These debates have involved, to a significant degree the creation 
of an ‘indigenous bourgeoisie’ consisting of Muslim Turkish business people. 
A transfer of capital to these business people from non-Muslim minorities, 
who had a centrally important presence in the nineteenth century Ottoman 
economy, was an integral component of the new nation building project. Two 
historical developments have significantly contributed to an accumulation of 
capital in the hands of a Muslim bourgeoisie that has emerged with consider-
able state support: the government initiated the forced dislocation and delib-
erate massacre of Armenians in 1915, which reduced the Armenian population 
from around 1.5 million to 100,000, and the population exchange after the First 
World War, when 1.2 million Greeks left Anatolia. Politically supported mecha-
nisms of capital accumulation continued to benefit Muslim entrepreneurs, at 
times at the expense of their remaining non-Muslim peers, as in the case of the 
notorious Wealth Levy of 1942.
These tragic episodes marked and tainted the twentieth century nation 
building experience of modern Turkey. They were obviously not in confor-
mity with a rational economic strategy given the fact that entrepreneurship 
is a scarce resource and national development would necessarily be affected 
negatively by the elimination of the holders of that resource. Yet, even beyond 
the extraordinary circumstances of the war years, optimum use of entrepre-
neurial resources has not been the most important motive determining the 
state support provided to entrepreneurs. Government-business relations have 
continued to be influenced by political factors, and the potential to contribute 
to economic development has not necessarily been the main criterion guiding 
the choice of the beneficiaries of political support (Buğra, 1994).
Deviations from the pursuit of strictly economic goals have not been in-
formed solely by nationalistic motives. To maintain social stability and, after 
the transition to multi-party rule in the post-Second World War period, to 
gain electoral support, Turkish governments followed a policy orientation that 




The commitment to support the agricultural sector and to prevent the dis-
mantling of the peasant economy was an important aspect of government 
policy from the early years of the Republic, and continued until the 1980s. In 
fact, one of the first economic policy decisions taken by the founders of the 
Republic was the abolition of the agricultural tithe—a major source of public 
revenue—in 1925. Agriculture was thus left out of the tax system and subse-
quent governments, even in the planned economy period between 1960 and 
1980, have never followed a strategy of using the surplus extracted from agri-
culture to support industrial development.
This has been at times questioned by economic planners, among others 
by the important Keynesian economist Nicholas Kaldor, who was invited to 
advise on the tax reforms to be implemented following the establishment of 
the State Planning Organization by the government formed after the military 
intervention that had overthrown the Democratic Party’s government in 1960. 
There are, in fact, anecdotes about Kaldor’s surprise with regard to the tax sta-
tistics presented to him, which indicated that the agricultural sector, where 
the overwhelming majority of the workforce was employed, paid practically 
no taxes. According to these anecdotes, Kaldor, who could not appreciate the 
political significance of leaving the peasant population undisturbed, actually 
thought that the statistics had to be inaccurate.
Along with other forms of support provided to agriculture, the political 
choice that the statistics reflected was instrumental in sustaining peasant 
farms as the typical land tenure pattern and slowing down the pace of urban-
isation. The urban population was about 25 per cent of the total population in 
1945 and had only reached 44 per cent in 1980. After several decades of a first 
unplanned and then systematically planned policy of industrialisation, 45 per 
cent of total employment was still in agriculture.4
However, even these statistics do not give a fully adequate idea of the dy-
namics of rural–urban development in Turkey. The survival of family farms 
has defined a situation where immigration to the city has not led to a total 
rupture with the countryside. The remittances that immigrants sent to family 
members who remained in the village contributed to the survival of family 
farms, and these remittances—which were reciprocated by in-kind or in-cash 
support from the peasant economy—would constitute a mechanism of social 
protection for workers in urban industry or services.
4 Hobsbawm (1995, 291) observed that, in the ‘neighbourhood’ of Europe and the Middle East, 
Turkey appeared to be an exceptional case of a still remaining ‘peasant stronghold’ in the 
early 1980s.
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Urban employment relations were situated in a protected economy with the 
risk of unemployment being much lower than that which currently prevails in 
open market economies. However, the integration in the urban economy did 
not only depend on the prevailing employment opportunities. There was an-
other society-specific mechanism of integration, which owed its existence to 
the character of state–society relations. Gecekondu, the Turkish form of irregu-
lar housing settlements, in fact appears as a key to any analysis of the nature 
of the interaction between politics and the economy during the first phase of 
developmentalism in Turkey. The unique economic and social significance of 
irregular settlements in Turkey can be explained with reference to two factors. 
First, illegal appropriations of public land and housing developments without 
construction permits, which built on what were previously agricultural plots 
in the urban periphery, were enabled by the characteristics of urban real estate 
property. Hence, irregular settlements, which in another context of property 
relations would have met with strong opposition from the owners of private 
land with proper construction permits, could easily mushroom. Also signifi-
cant in this development was a second factor, which was political. This pattern 
of irregular access to urban land was situated in a context where a proper pub-
lic housing policy was absent, but electoral competition prevented political ac-
tors from being indifferent to popular demands. In this context, the habitants 
of gecekondu acquired title deeds through periodically enacted amnesty laws 
and the irregular settlements were regularised through the provision of mu-
nicipal services, usually around election time as favours granted in exchange 
for votes. Hence, the gecekondu appeared as a society specific form of popular 
housing and the irregular settlements have developed to also include middle-
class residences. However, it would be a mistake to regard irregular settlements 
solely as a response to the need for shelter. These settlements were also spaces 
of livelihood with a variety of both formal and informal economic activities 
gravitating around them. The inhabitants engaged in these activities could re-
main together with their family members in space and often in economic in-
terest. Kinship ties could thus remain strong in their ability to provide support 
to individuals in social risk situations.5
This policy environment of the first phase of developmentalism in Turkey 
clearly reflected a disregard for the institutional norm expected to guide eco-
nomic development in a market economy. Policies that were implemented 
checked the forces of creative destruction and slowed down the pace of eco-
nomic development. Nevertheless, it would not be justified to suggest that 
the country’s strategy of economic development was entirely unsuccessful. 
5 See, on this, Buğra (1998) and Buğra and Keyder (2006).
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 State-owned enterprises and the modern firms in the private sector could 
contribute to a process of industrialisation that constituted the basis for the 
expansion of Turkish manufactured exports after the insertion of the coun-
try into the global market. These enterprises could also provide decent jobs— 
today conspicuous by their absence in Turkey, as in most other countries—at 
least to a limited segment of the workforce.
Nevertheless, such positive developments were overshadowed by the unsta-
ble environment created by macroeconomic mismanagement, which proved 
to be fatal after the oil crisis of 1973. Inflationary pressures and the growing 
deficit of balance of payments led the government to adopt an economic 
stability package imposed by the imf in January 1980; but the package could 
be implemented only after the military intervention of 1980, by far the most 
ruthless and the most enduring of such interventions in terms of its impact 
on political and social relations. Turkey has thus entered the age of globalisa-
tion with a military intervention and, for those of us who were around at the 
time, it was quite surprising to hear the leader of the junta state, in his first 
public address broadcast on television, that the implementation of a market- 
oriented, outward-looking development strategy was among the objectives of 
that intervention.
4 The Second Phase of Developmentalism: Turkey in the  
Global Market Economy
In Turkey, the country’s insertion into the global economy started with a thor-
ough change in the foreign trade regime. Most tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to trade were eliminated, and the foreign direct investment regime was liber-
alised. Towards the end of the 1980s, capital controls, too, were eliminated with 
full financial liberalisation. While the barriers to agricultural imports were 
eliminated, agricultural subsidies, too, began to be discontinued without being 
fully eliminated. In the meantime, the most fertile plots of land in the western 
and southern regions of the country were sacrificed to tourism and real estate 
development, which had become the leading sectors for economic expansion 
in the 1980s. Thus, de-ruralisation has gained impetus; in the mid-1980s rural 
and urban populations reached parity and urbanisation has proceeded at an 
increasing rate since. Yet, the final hour of the peasant economy came only 
in the first decade of the new millennium, when a series of policies directed 
at the full commercialisation of agriculture were systematically implemented. 
Until then, agricultural productivity continued to decline in such a way that 
Turkey appeared to be one of the few countries in the world where there were 
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no productivity improvements in agriculture between the early 1980s and the 
late 1990s (World Bank, 2001, 312).
At the same time, the gecekondu began to lose its basis of legitimacy as the 
indisputable need for shelter no longer seemed sufficient to morally justify ir-
regular patterns of access to urban land. With the geographic expansion of 
the cities and the new popularity of suburban, middle-class residences, the 
inhabitants of irregular settlements and new immigrants hoping to find shel-
ter in these areas found themselves in intense competition with real estate 
developers. However, the outcome of this newly competitive environment also 
only became clear in the first decade of the new millennium, when the urban 
property regime was finally established as part of a systematic strategy of ur-
ban transformation.
During the 1980s and 1990s, these trends continued without a proper regu-
latory framework in which a market economy could develop. Neither could 
the separation of the economy from politics be achieved since the political 
concerns of the governments in power prevented them from implementing 
drastic measures to eliminate all agricultural subsidies, organising the urban 
land market in conformity with the norms of private property relations or even 
refraining from attempts to control interest rates to prevent the ruin of many 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Ongoing state intervention in an unregu-
lated market economy, which was nevertheless set out to function by treating 
labour, land and money as commodities, led to a series of crises, in 1994, 1999 
and the worst in 2001. When the decision to eliminate capital controls was be-
ing debated at the end of the 1980s, Keynesian economists warned the policy 
makers that financial liberalisation in the absence of mechanisms to assure 
fiscal discipline was a recipe for disaster (Akyuz, 1990). These economists were 
proven right by the developments that followed.
The hold of the imf and the World Bank on Turkey’s economic develop-
ment strategy became particularly strong after the crises of 1999 and 2001. In 
the aftermath of the devastating economic crisis of 2001, the coalition govern-
ment then in power invited a high-ranking World Bank bureaucrat of Turk-
ish origin, Kemal Derviş, to implement a series of market reforms. The main 
purpose of these reforms was to prevent discretionary political involvement in 
the economy. Hence, a series of independent regulatory agencies were put in 
place and existing agencies were further strengthened. The importance of the 
central bank’s autonomy was also stressed and consolidated.
While these reforms were clearly in conformity with the logic of an  efficiently 
functioning market economy, and could in fact play an important role in pre-
venting serious financial crises in the following decade, the majority of the 
population—whose lives had already been devastated by the crisis—was not 
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at all happy to swallow the bitter pill of economic rationality. It was thus not 
surprising to see the newly founded Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkinma Partisi, akp)—the final reincarnation of a series of political 
parties that were situated in the Islamist National Outlook Movement,6 and 
were closed one after the other due to their nonconformity with secularist 
principles—come to power in the general elections held in 2002.
The leaders of the akp had drawn important lessons from the crisis-laden 
years of the 1990s. They had learned, first and foremost, the importance of the 
risks involved in any kind of intervention that would erode investor confidence 
in an open economy, given Turkey’s extreme vulnerability to capital outflow. 
This called for respect for the regulatory framework of a market economy, but 
also required political stability, which any manifestation of Islamic radicalism 
would endanger. The rise of Islamic politics and the Islamic radicalism that 
marked the discourse of the Welfare Party—in which most of the leaders of 
the akp, including Erdogan, had held important positions—had constituted 
a source of serious political tension in the 1990s. By replacing overt Islamism 
with references to the party’s conservative liberalism and avoiding previously 
popular debates around Islamic economic and social institutions, the akp, at 
least until quite recently, managed to keep these tensions under control by 
presenting its outlook as simply a culturally conservative one limited to refer-
ences to the merits and potentialities of ‘our culture’ and the special emphasis 
placed on traditional family relations and philanthropy as an antidote to the 
social disruption caused by modernisation. But modernisation has remained 
an important objective and in an interview given to the Washington Post in 
2002, Erdogan, the leader of the akp, answered a question about his vision of a 
different Turkey by saying ‘I will modernize Turkey’ (Waymouth, 2002).
The akp’s commitment to a culturally informed process of modernisation 
respectful of market reforms was more than welcomed by the Western estab-
lishment especially in an international environment dominated by the fear of 
radical Islam. For over a decade, international media and many academic re-
searchers presented Turkey under its ‘moderately Islamic’ akp rule as a model 
that proved the possibility of successful economic development and a political 
6 The origins of the National Outlook Movement go back to 1969 when a group of  conservative 
members of the parliament split from the centre-right Justice Party and began to follow an inde-
pendent political trajectory characterized by a religious conservatism that has taken different 
forms closely reflecting the political opportunity space defined by the nature of domestic and 
international developments. It was in the 1990s that the movement began to affirm its  Islamist 
orientation forcefully. In this period, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, rp), situated within the 
movement, enjoyed significant electoral victories in municipal and national elections.
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democracy in a Muslim country. ‘The Turkish model’ has often been discussed 
in terms of the extension of industrial production to some Anatolian provinc-
es, where local business people have acquired a more important position in 
an economy previously dominated by big enterprises located in a few indus-
trial centres. These new Anatolian business figures have been praised for their 
competitiveness and non-reliance on state support. Their Islamic mentality 
and outlook have been widely discussed as variables in studies on the rise of 
political Islam and the compatibility of Islam with capitalist development and 
political democracy.
While it is indeed possible to observe that religion has recently become an 
important element in business life in Turkey, the direction of causality be-
tween religious outlook and political developments seems to be somewhat dif-
ferent from the one generally emphasised in the literature. In the 1990s, the rise 
of political Islam with successive victories in Turkish municipal and national 
elections was accompanied by the emergence of voluntary business associa-
tions that used Islamic references in their organisational discourse and strate-
gies. With close ties to Islamist politicians, these associations have played a 
role that is not limited to a straightforward representation of interests. They 
have, rather, interpreted Islamic identity in ways that are compatible with 
capitalist development and used this as a network resource to bind their mem-
bers in coherent communities of interest and outlook situated within the con-
stituency of political Islam. The networks thus established have been useful 
for small and medium-sized enterprises as channels of access to markets and 
as sources of input or technological know-how. They have also been beneficial 
with regard to relations with local government or to the formation of subcon-
tracting relations with larger firms operating at the national level. The complex 
relational matrices thus formed with the active involvement of business as-
sociations could hardly be interpreted in terms of a unidirectional causality 
between the emergence of a provincial Muslim bourgeoisie and the ensuing 
political developments in the country.7
The extensive attention the media and academic circles have devoted to 
‘Anatolian Tigers’ has been unable to provide a meaningful analysis of the re-
lational matrix in question. Furthermore, it has precluded a deeper scrutiny 
of the nature of the country’s economic development strategy and the inter-
faces between economic and political processes. During the akp’s first decade 
in power, attention was diverted from the fact that investments in infrastruc-
ture and construction had become the engines of growth and, like those in 
energy and mining as well as in the now commercialised health sector, these 
7 For an in-depth discussion, see Buğra and Savaskan (2014, Chapter 4).
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 investments were carried out in a context marked by serious government inter-
vention. The government has remained a crucial actor in investments in infra-
structure and, in the construction sector, a giant of public administration—the 
Mass Housing Development Administration (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı, 
toki)—has been able to acquire quasi-total control of developments in real 
estate in collaboration with private contractors. Government regulation re-
mained important during and after the privatisations in energy and mining, 
which gained impetus under akp rule. Meanwhile, the current significance of 
the private sector in the health care domain has not undermined the role of 
the government in the new system, where private provision goes together with 
public funding.
During the last decade, in all of these areas there has been a frenzy of leg-
islative activity that aims to expand the scope of discretionary political inter-
vention in these areas beyond the regulatory framework consolidated before 
the akp came to power, and to limit the involvement of the judiciary in policy 
decisions to protect the public interest. One of the outcomes of these changes 
has been the limiting of the authority of independent regulatory agencies, 
many of which have lost their autonomous powers.8 Higher courts still tried 
to intervene to protect the public interest with regards to the privatisation pro-
cess, until their prerogatives in this area were largely eliminated by the consti-
tutional amendment accepted by the referendum held in 2010.9
The legislative action taken to eradicate the barriers to discretionary in-
tervention in the economy has been significantly directed at the creation of 
opportunities for capital accumulation in the hands of privileged business 
people. The spectacular rise of a group of big business figures who had no se-
rious presence in the economy until recently has been a particularly striking 
development of akp rule. Even those provincial small and medium-sized en-
terprises whose competitive potential has been widely praised have not been 
excluded from this picture of a politically shaped market economy. Although 
these ‘Anatolian Tigers’ could hardly take part in government bids related to 
infrastructure megaprojects or in privatisations in energy and mining, those 
with the right political affiliation and associational membership have been 
able to benefit from politically supported processes of capital accumulation as 
subcontractors to big business.10
8 In 2011, a government decree practically ended the autonomy of these agencies, placing 
them under the authority of the ministries in their respective areas of responsibility.
9 On this, see, Buğra and Savaskan (2014, Chapter 3) and Sonmez (2010).
10 In this regard, Article 15 of the Public Procurement Law, allowing the administrative unit 
granting the contract to demand that the contractor change the subcontractor, has been 
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The akp government’s cosy relations with these privileged business people 
have gone together with its increasingly tense relations with the established 
big business community, uncomfortable with deviations from the market re-
forms put in place after the economic crisis of 2001. Established big business 
figures who refused to provide their unqualified support to the akp faced seri-
ous threats of marginalisation and, at times, punitive tax inspections. In this 
new setting of government–business relations, it is in fact possible to observe 
certain parallels with the early twentieth century history of the politically 
guided transfer of capital from one group of business people to another. Once 
again, this process is hardly in conformity with economic rationality, although 
it now takes place in a country that is active in the global market economy.
The policies of the akp government have, however, conformed fully with 
the trend towards the commodification of life and livelihood that currently 
prevails in the global economy. Most of the legislative changes that have led 
to a complete restructuring of the agricultural system were introduced in the 
first decade of the new millennium. These changes include the elimination 
of state-supported purchases of agricultural produce; the restructuring of the 
tobacco, sugar and dairy product markets, which has opened them up to agri-
business; the ‘seed law’, which introduced intellectual property legislation that 
has also contributed to the increasingly important presence of agribusiness in 
the sector; a direct income support policy that was designed as a temporary 
measure to compensate farmers and support them in readjusting their crop 
choices during the phasing out of subsidies, but has actually led to a loss of 
crop diversity; and measures leading to the expansion of contract farming with 
the involvement of domestic and foreign companies as important actors in the 
trends towards the commercialisation of agriculture and the commodification 
of land.11
The dismantling of irregular settlements and the commodification of ur-
ban land has also been a particularly impressive achievement of the akp. 
While the municipality laws of 2004 and 2005 have proved important in ex-
panding the prerogatives of municipal governments in controlling urban 
land, the real turning point in this dismantling process came in 2007 with 
the Law for the Protection of Dilapidated Historical and Cultural Real Estate 
through Protection and Renewal. In a massive wave of demolition, eviction 
useful in expanding the scope of discretionary political involvement in the business op-
portunities of smaller firms. For a detailed interpretation of the article, see Doganyigit 
(2009, 416–424).
11 For a comprehensive discussion of these transformations and their consequences for 
farmers, see Aydın (2010).
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and  reconstruction in Istanbul, Ankara and a number of other smaller cities, 
the inhabitants of irregular settlements were displaced. The mixed property 
structure of these settlements, in which owners as well as tenants lived, made 
the displacement process very complicated, but at times also facilitated it by 
allowing the authorities to benefit from the conflicts of interest existing be-
tween those entitled to different types of compensation and tenants who were 
often unable to secure low-cost housing elsewhere. There were episodes of re-
sistance, supported by civil society initiatives, such as the widely known case 
of the gentrification project in Sulukule, the centuries-old Roma neighbour-
hood in Istanbul. The response of the political authorities to such resistance 
has involved the widespread mobilisation of the security forces, and appeals 
to the requirements of public morality and social order that have described 
the irregular settlements as hotbeds of criminality, terror and violence. As the 
head of the Istanbul Municipal Housing Administration succinctly put it: ‘Ter-
rorist groups and people who are involved in drug and women trafficking try to 
obstruct urban transformation projects, by manipulating innocent people who 
live in gecekondu settlements. Irregular urbanization breeds terrorism’ (Bartu 
Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008, 19).12
The urban transformation process was not, however, limited to the demo-
lition of irregular settlements, neither was it only about changing forms of 
residential housing. In Istanbul and elsewhere, it proceeded unscrupulously at 
an accelerating pace through the construction of hotels, business plazas and 
shopping malls, and through mega investments in urban infrastructure, all 
proudly presented as signs of the country’s impressive economic progress en-
vied throughout the word. This ‘impressive economic progress’ was also related 
to infrastructure projects involving the construction of interurban highways, 
bridges and dams that extended to the country at large and contributed to the 
transformation of the countryside led by the previously discussed changes in 
the strategy of agricultural development.
While the impressive economic progress in question was not exactly blind 
to its impact on the process of capital accumulation, the forces of creative 
destruction have remained largely unchecked with regard to their impact on 
the socio-economic and natural environment of people. In the period follow-
ing the economic crisis of 2001, Turkey’s economic growth figures were quite 
good, although not very high compared to other Asian ‘emerging countries’, to 
emerging countries in Latin America, or even to the Organisation for Econom-
ic Co-operation and Development (oecd) average. However, unemployment 
12 On popular protests against urban transformation projects, see also Deniz (2010).
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 remained around 10 per cent throughout the decade13 and informal employ-
ment has continued to be important especially among female workers.14 The 
failure of the prevailing economic strategy to create ‘decent work’ is reflected 
in the importance of ‘vulnerable employment’—the self-employed and unpaid 
family workers, according to the definition of the International Labour Organi-
zation (ilo).15 Flexible employment practices, especially the widespread prac-
tice of subcontracting, along with very repressive policies with regard to trade 
unions, have made it practically impossible for labour unions to be effective 
in their defence of workers’ rights. According to oecd statistics, trade union 
density in Turkey fell from 20.8 per cent in 1986 to 4.5 per cent in 2012.16 The 
dismantling of the peasant economy accompanied by the increasingly narrow 
urban opportunity space has forced people to accept extremely hard working 
conditions. Currently, Turkey is one of the countries where weekly working 
hours are the longest in the world and work accidents claim the lives of hun-
dreds of workers annually.17
Under these circumstances, rural–urban migration patterns, too, have 
changed. As economic opportunities in the city have ceased to be attractive, 
people have begun to look to non-agricultural employment in rural areas 
where agriculture could no longer offer them a viable source of livelihood. 
Seasonal service work in tourism and employment in the privatised mining 
industry have been among the opportunities that have presented themselves.
Fatal accidents in the mining sector have recently attracted widespread at-
tention in Turkey. Especially since a disaster in the coal mining town of Soma, 
which is located in a once relatively rich agricultural region in western Turkey, 
revealed the literally criminal neglect of basic safety measures in the mines 
operated by private subcontractors of public mining administrations. Unlike 
other mining accidents where casualties had been fewer in number, the Soma 
13 World Data Bank, World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
reports.aspx?source=2&country=&series=SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS&period (accessed on 7 Octo-
ber 2015).
14 Half of the country’s working women are currently employed in the informal sector: 
turkstat, Household labour force statistics, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo 
.do?istab_id=2258 (accessed on 17 November 2015).
15 turkstat, Basic Indicators of Workforce, household labour force survey 2014: http://www 
.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=2257 (accessed on 8 October 2015).
16 oecd, Trade Union Density, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN# 
(accessed on 8 October 2015).
17 ilostat, Database of Labour Statistics: http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/help_home/
data_by_subject?_adf.ctrl-state=1au3aa3w04_321&_afrLoop=17358436464058 (accessed 
on 17 November 2015).
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tragedy—in which over 300 miners lost their lives—received widespread 
media coverage that clearly showed the helplessness of a rural population 
that had no choice but to enter these lethal mines in the full knowledge of 
the threat to their lives that working there entailed. Erdogan, the then Prime 
Minister, reacted to the tragedy by saying ‘such accidents are in the nature of 
mining’ (Daloglu, 2014), which rightly caused outrage among a large number 
of people. Yet Erdogan’s statement, in a way, conformed to what people were 
being forced to accept as natural in the context of the country’s prevailing de-
velopment strategy.18
In fact, shortly after the Soma disaster media reports emerged of a coal 
mine—this time in the south-eastern town of Şırnak—where the informally 
employed miners worked under unbelievably hazardous conditions. The mine 
was eventually closed by the authorities despite strong resistance from these 
workers, who wanted to continue risking their lives and to work in truly inhu-
man circumstances because they had no other source of livelihood.19
5 Conclusion
Protest against loss of livelihood did not always take the form it did in Şırnak. 
During the last two decades there have been strong popular movements 
against the forces of ‘creative destruction’ that have been unleashed in the 
new capitalist economy of Turkey. The massive, nation-wide demonstrations 
of 2013, which began in downtown Istanbul, were preceded by a series of local 
urban and rural protests and formed part of a wave of global anger reported 
by The Economist magazine in a cover story entitled ‘The march of protest’.20
This march of protest was against the form developmentalism had taken 
within a variety of capitalism organised on the basis of what Polanyi called the 
‘commodity fiction’, a capitalism that aimed to function by separating politics 
from the economy. In reality, however, government intervention continued 
not only to put the market economy in place but also to achieve objectives 
18 For a comprehensive discussion of different aspects of the Soma mining disaster, see the 
report prepared by an interdisciplinary group of professors and students from Bogazici 
University: Bogazici Universitesi Soma Calısma Grubu (2015).
19 Milliyet, 7 and 8 July 2014; Radikal, 7 July 2014.
20 The cover of The Economist, dated 29 June 2013, featured four figures, representing the 
protests of 1848 in Europe, of 1968 in America and Europe, of 1989 in the Soviet Empire 
Bloc, and of 2013 everywhere. http://www.economist.com/printedition/2013-06-29 (ac-
cessed on 19 February 2017).
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of a non-economic nature. In fact, in 2012 The Economist magazine published 
a special report entitled ‘The rise of state capitalism: the emerging world’s 
new model’. The report focused on the crucial role of giant national or state- 
controlled companies in the rapid growth and the increasing global influence 
of the ‘emerging economies’ including Russia, China, Brazil and India, as well 
as several others. The report’s investigation of the subject was accompanied by 
the expressions of concerns about developments whereby ‘the invisible hand 
of the market is giving way to the visible, and often authoritarian, hand of the 
state.’ (The Economist, 2012).
The visible hand of the state in these countries was of course present also in 
the post-war period that preceded the globalisation of the late twentieth cen-
tury. In that period, as now, economic development was an important objec-
tive pursued by policymakers and the conflicts of capitalist development were 
not independent of the political concerns of governments. What becomes im-
portant, then, is to see how the dynamics of conflict and conflict management 
articulate with the particular political economy setting proper to the existing 
historical variety of capitalism.
We have seen, for example, that in Turkey politically supported capital accu-
mulation has always been important in defining the character of government 
intervention. Therefore, government intervention has not been neutral in its 
impact on different groups of people; beyond differences of class, both ethnic-
ity and political affiliation have played a role in the way the opportunities and 
challenges of economic development have presented themselves to different 
members of society. However, during the first phase of developmentalism, the 
measures taken to prevent the social dislocations brought about by capitalist 
development from threatening social cohesion and political stability were also 
important. To control the dismantling of the peasant economy and to keep ur-
ban poverty under control, political authorities were willing to resist the com-
modification of land and labour at the expense, when necessary, of achieving 
a higher rate of growth.
In the current setting of the global market economy, economic-growth- 
oriented objectives can still be dominated by political concerns in a systematic 
and sustained policy orientation that serves the accumulation of capital in the 
hands of politically privileged business people rather than in those of other 
business figures who are not close to the government. However, attempts to 
prevent the commodification of land and labour are no longer in the picture. 
In other words, the forces of creative destruction are left unchecked in terms 
of their impact on the natural and social environment, but progress is far from 
blind to its impact on the business interests it serves.
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The state–society relations of the past cannot provide models that can be 
emulated in an attempt to change the present order. What must be acknowl-
edged is the need for a serious assessment of both the pace and the direction of 
progress in light of the requirements of a viable and just society. It is possible 
to affirm that this is the main challenge facing critical approaches to economic 
development in our contemporary societies—societies that increasingly ap-
pear to be neither viable nor just.
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The Ottoman province of Tunis between the 1850s and its integration into the French 
colonial sphere in the 1880s, was marked by the emergence of new issues directly aris-
ing from an international configuration undergoing profound change. This chapter 
aims to analyse the relationship between economic development, geopolitics and lo-
cal issues in the last decades during which the province belonged to the Empire. It will 
home in on an emblematic conflict, one related to the fate of workers and artisans in 
fez factories as they protested against what they saw as unfair competition imposed by 
the European powers, and against the industrialisation that followed the mechanisa-
tion of production. These new operating conditions, in a market subject to the growing 
dominance of foreign trade and to instability in local production, gave rise to many 
protests. This chapter endeavours to compare and contrast the different levels and 
scales of this sector, to explain the impact of a new global dimension on local balances 
and the vectors of a new form of foreign interference. These conflicts also involved 
different ways of negotiating the reformed relationship between the Ottoman Empire 
and its province of Tunis in the face of the threat of ever-increasing foreign domina-
tion and colonisation. Focusing on the voices of the most modest local players, who 
spoke out to condemn the deterioration of their living conditions, and on the local and 
international context, the chapter aims to reveal the dynamic interrelation between 
different levels and issues, and individual destinies and wider perspectives, at a time 
of great historical change.
1 Introduction
Between 1860 and 1877, Tunis’ urban society was stirred by a bitter dispute 
concerning not only foreign economic competition and the threat it posed 
to local production, but also the prospect that, in the capital of the Ottoman 
province, textile factories dedicated to manufacturing hats known as the fez 
(shashiyya or chechia) would be mechanised. Artisans and workers in the 
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sector,  threatened by this new development, protested repeatedly, address-
ing petitions to local authorities and the central government in Istanbul. The 
purpose of this chapter is to draw on these exceptional documents (the peti-
tions themselves and the reports written in response to them) so as to interpret 
various issues related to the changing world of work in the context of great 
technological and economic change, and to the intermingling, at different 
levels, of local life and international realities. In Tunis, artisans and workers 
protested both against what they saw as the unfair competition imposed by 
the European powers and against the Ottoman response to this competition, 
which took the concrete form of a mechanisation perceived to be perverse and 
placed at the service of unbalanced development. They also protested against 
the tendency of local authorities to accept the new operating conditions of a 
market now dominated by foreign trade. The imposition of new conditions 
of production in Tunis was seen as a form of external control. This chapter 
will endeavour to compare and contrast the different levels and scales of this 
sector, in an attempt to explain not only the impact of a new global dimen-
sion on local balances, but also the vectors of a new form of foreign interfer-
ence in a Tunis increasingly placed under tutelage. It also aims to decipher 
the different ways in which the reformed relationship existing between the 
Ottoman Empire and the province of Tunis was negotiated in the face of the 
threat of ever-increasing foreign domination and, before long, of colonisation. 
The  development-related conflict analysed herein is read as an unfolding and 
deployment of broader issues that were the result not only of the economic 
development strategies adopted by the Ottoman Empire and the local elites 
of Tunis, but also of external interference exerting its influence far beyond the 
sphere of economic competition. A perspective ‘from below’ captures these 
issues in a way that brings out clearly the direct link between the living condi-
tions of the population and major economic and geopolitical changes.
2 Historiographical Considerations on the Impact of the Industrial 
Revolution on the World of Artisans in Different Contexts
The publication in 1963 of E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working 
Class, a book destined to exert considerable influence, ensured that interna-
tional historiography would begin to take a new look at the social consequenc-
es of the Industrial Revolution (Batzell et al., 2015). The shift from artisanal to 
industrial-type production began to be viewed not only in terms of economic 
rationality and efficiency, but also as an episode whose often traumatic social 
consequences needed to be studied. Thompson also stressed the need for a 
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politicised reading of this transition, for which an analysis of the different 
phases of conflict can provide a crucial entry point.
The interpretation of the conflicts related to the advent and evolution of 
the various phases of economic transformation has since given rise to other 
important re-evaluations. For Europe, historians have shown that the roots of 
the Industrial Revolution went back to the various local forms of ancien régime 
and have stressed both the complexity of the processes of economic upswing 
and mechanisation (Verley, 1997) and the close link between the world of ar-
tisans and the industrial intensification of production (Guillerme, 1998 and 
2007). This has led to a re-reading of mechanistic interpretations of the Indus-
trial Revolution in which a simple technological innovation induced a para-
digm shift affecting the whole economic system. Above all, we now know that 
the great nineteenth century economic transformation had actually started in 
the eighteenth century as an intensification of the artisanal economy of the 
ancien régime (Kaufhold, 1978; Cermann and Ogilvie, 1996). From arsenals to 
textile workshops, well before the invention of the steam engine, production 
had increased and the number of workers grown, fuelled by a large-scale rural 
exodus and sparking off rapid urbanisation. In many cities, there were real ar-
tisanal factories that employed thousands of working men and women whose 
work complemented that of thousands of female workers working from home. 
In other cities, the number of traditional shops and stalls had increased to such 
a degree that they changed the scale of neighbourhoods devoted to artisanal 
production. Hence, as recent historiography has taught us, we should move on 
from the outdated image of the history of artisanal production that portrays 
it as an activity confined to small-scale production activities. The mechanisa-
tion made possible by technical progress came to affect sectors that had not 
remained traditional, as might be suggested by our image of ancien régime ar-
tisans, since—in the eighteenth century already—workshops in such sectors 
had become real factories. This was especially true for Britain, France, north-
ern Italy and Flanders. In the United States too, the link between the intensive 
artisanal development of the late eighteenth century and the industrial up-
swing of the nineteenth century has been established by economic historians 
(Dawley, 1976; Stott, 1996).
When mechanisation impacted on these workshops, it was not only the mas-
ters and their apprentices who were affected; thousands of workers also expe-
rienced this change at first hand. As proto-industrialisation had benefited from 
a large labour force, industrialisation and the mechanisation it entailed came 
as an even bigger shock. It was in this context that workers’ protests against 
mechanisation developed. Logically, it was Britain, where the replacement 
of the working masses by new tools occurred most rapidly, that was  affected 
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first—witness what is referred to as ‘Luddism’, a disparate movement that was 
nonetheless united in seeing machines as responsible for casting workers into 
poverty (Randall, 1986; Thomis, 1970; Winpenny, 1990).
For regions long regarded as peripheral, it is the whole relationship to Eu-
rope that has recently been rethought in line with this questioning of the 
timing and the nature of the Industrial Revolution; a new critical approach 
to the study of the roots of domination and inequality in development has 
flourished. Taking into account the nuanced views developed by specialists in 
European economic history, and distancing themselves both from the topoi 
inherited from the colonial era (and even from the Enlightenment) and from 
those that paradoxically emerged from a critique of those former views, many 
historians of economic and social systems have emphasised the complexity of 
the phenomena of economic transformation. They have shown, for example, 
that the dissemination of technological changes resulting from the Industrial 
Revolution was not just a phenomenon that spread from North to South, losing 
intensity at every step due to the supposed lesser capacities of local societ-
ies to incorporate progress (Raveux and Sanchez, 2010). They have also shown 
that economic domination and colonisation were inextricably linked. In many 
cities too, from the Mediterranean to India, there had also been a phase of in-
tensification of artisanal production in the eighteenth century. It is, of course, 
in the example of the Indian textile industry where historiography has made 
most progress in its analysis of the link between economic transition and the 
roots of colonial rule. In India, in fact, British colonial rule emerged in con-
junction with the seizure of control over the textile sector, through predation 
on the markets and the clash with a competition affected by the transforma-
tion of the production system (Tirthankar, 2007). As far as Africa is concerned, 
recent historiography has also proposed new modes of analysis. For example, 
Bayart, with his concept of extraversion, is resolutely opposed to Hegelian ste-
reotypes of an Africa rich in gold but still stuck in the early stages of exploiting 
its resources. Extraversion, for him, is typical of ‘a systemic global economy 
that existed before the growth of the market and the capitalistic expansion 
of the West’ (Bayart, 1999). Bayart disagrees with Rodney (1972) and Davidson 
(1969), according to whom it was changes in the European economy that led to 
the systems of historicity of countries that were thus relegated to the periph-
ery. Instead, he proposes that we focus on African economies for what they 
were, and seek the dynamics of their evolution. He sees the formation of a rent 
of dependency as the historical matrix of inequality. This position is connected 
with the broader trend in recent historiography to adopt a critical attitude to 
judgments regarding what has been called ‘modernism without modernity’—
that is to say, technical modernisation without social reform: something of 
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which, it is claimed, only the so-called peripheries would have been capable 
(Guillén, 2004). It is also connected to a critique of the narrative of economic 
evolution in what was seen as the peripheries, following the challenging of 
those ideas defended by Landes in The Unbound Prometheus (Landes, 1969) on 
the dissemination of transformations in production techniques from England 
to Europe and the rest of the world.
It is now accepted that ontological and civilizational types of language can 
no longer be used as such to explain discrepancies in development (Bryant, 
2006). In many cases, local dynamics pre-existed the intrusion of Europe and 
its technology, and this invites further reflection on the consequences of the 
penetration–imposition carried out by Europe and accompanied by a destabi-
lisation of previously existing balances. Following the lead of Latin American 
historiography (see for example Dependencia y desarrollo en América  Latina 
by Cardoso and Faletto, 1969), a whole new vein of similar ideas has been 
opened up.
An attempt must also be made to write a history of colonised and colonising 
societies that can take into account the multiple dimensions of the relation of 
dominance (Conklin, 2000; Mignolo, 2001). We should also embark not only 
on an exercise of ‘provincialising Europe’, as the salutary slogan suggested by 
Chakrabarty (2000) has it, but also on a discussion of all of the elements under-
lying the narrative and analysis of the history of the aforesaid peripheries, be 
they southern European, African, Ottoman, or more generally colonial.
For the Mediterranean, long considered in historiography as an indolent 
periphery of hard-working Europe, resistant to the industrial application of 
technological progress for reasons often reified in a static perception of local 
anthropology, it has been shown that the characters of proto-industrialisation 
were indeed present at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in 
the Iberian peninsula (Chastagnaret, 2000), in Italy, and even in the Balkans 
and on the southern coastline of the Mediterranean. The question of why in-
dustrial development over the following decades and centuries was—as has 
been noted—so tardy has shifted: the focus now is especially on the structures 
of investment and the development of logics of domination.
For the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
we must also move away from the interpretive framework of the simple di-
chotomy between the importing and exporting of solutions based on technical 
rationality, and from such general ideas as ‘Westernisation’ and ‘Europeanisa-
tion’. The reflections of Hamadeh (2004) on this subject are illuminating, as 
they encourage a certain scepticism towards the interpretive trend based on 
a skewed view of what is seen as inevitable Ottoman decline. The interpretive 
framework has thus been extensively revised. In contrast to inherited views 
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stemming from the 1950s and 1960s, themselves strongly marked by a powerful 
colonial and culturalist heritage, a vision of industrialisation has developed, 
in the Ottoman context, of its origins and its dead ends, that has advanced 
hand in hand with the progress in analytical methods in economic history that 
can be observed on several different fronts. The existence of the conditions for 
proto-industrialisation and of strong and dynamic trading networks has been 
demonstrated for the main cities of the Empire, from Istanbul to Trabzon and 
from Thessaloniki and Alexandria to Beirut or Crete. Ottoman receptivity to 
technological innovation has also been highlighted, and this has demonstrat-
ed the extent to which the Empire was integrated into international circuits 
of technical expertise. As for the crises experienced periodically in various 
sectors, they have been read in the light of the link between international re-
lations and local conditions. Stress has also been laid on the variety of local 
configurations and dynamics. But the Ottoman case is specific in that it pres-
ents a situation that was deteriorating as a result of European competition that 
was not only economic, and gradually becoming more capitalistic, but also in-
volved an element of interference in both diplomatic and military spheres, and 
often led to a violent occupation of the colonial kind. Development-related 
conflicts arising from industrialisation in the Ottoman Empire thus need to 
be interpreted in a specific light, combining the rapid economic, social and 
technological transformations that occurred with the pressures arising from 
an initially ambiguous relationship and then, clearly, from aggressive hostility. 
Quataert (1986) illustrates this intermingling of issues and levels with regard 
to Anatolia. Masters (1988), meanwhile, shows how early such ambiguities 
arose in the Ottoman Levant. For Egypt, the pioneering work of Fahmi (1954) 
demonstrates the depth of the transformation of the productive apparatus in 
Cairo in the eighteenth century and the extent of its social consequences in 
the nineteenth century—a mixture of intensification, mechanisation and cri-
sis. From the work of Faroqhi and Hanna, we also now know that the milieu of 
Ottoman artisans had, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
experienced profound changes characterised by huge growth in production 
and manpower and an upheaval in the guild-based management structures in-
herited from the ancien régime (Faroqhi, 2009; Hanna, 2011). This was followed 
by a real slump in economic affairs of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of both 
the ‘Great European Depression’ of the 1880s and what had by then become an 
asymmetrical relationship (Pamuk, 1984). European competition, the Ottoman 
slump, and vectors of domination were thus linked. New goods and the paths 
via which they were traded were often imposed by foreign consular networks 
in the Ottoman provinces. Patronage networks were created, that partly incor-
porated the economy of the ancien régime, with the so-called capitulations of 
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the Ottoman Empire, while changing its nature and intensity. The structures 
of the local artisanal system, structures that—far from being inert—had al-
lowed an intensification of production in the late eighteenth century were de-
stabilised. The textile sector crisis suffered by Tunis in the second half of the 
nineteenth century illustrates this logic and allows us to reflect on the links be-
tween economic change, foreign domination, and Ottoman imperial destiny.
3 The Crisis Experienced by Fez Manufacturers in Tunis:  
A Development-Related Conflict and a Symptom of the  
Emergence of Colonial Issues
In Tunis during the second half of the nineteenth century, fez manufacturers, 
and sometimes even their workers, were repeatedly driven to protest— protests 
that took the form of petitions—against mechanisation, unfair competition 
from abroad, and the lack of protection for their products on export markets 
when those products were faced with the desire of other nations with ambi-
tions to expand their own markets. The National Archives in Tunis house evi-
dence of many such initiatives, and an analysis of these documents lies at the 
heart of this chapter.1 Such an analysis enables the historian to perceive not 
only the actors of the conflict, their interactions and their arguments, but also 
the way in which they negotiated and constructed a form of consensus through 
conflict. These archives also help one develop a kind of micro-history of trans-
formations that are generally interpreted only via broad globalised narratives. 
In these archives (where conflicts also produce further archives …), underlying 
development-related conflicts are noticeable. The occurrence of such conflicts 
reflects the way in which the Ottoman Empire tried to implement major eco-
nomic reforms in what was then—since the loss of Algeria to French colonisa-
tion between 1830 and 1850—its westernmost province, in tandem with the 
administrative reforms that it also promoted. In view of the involvement of 
foreign consulates and foreign chambers of commerce in the economic life 
of the province of Tunis, these conflicts also reflect the increasing influence 
of European powers in the Ottoman province, which in 1881 led to its mili-
tary occupation and colonisation by France (Ganiage, 1959). The challenge for 
the entire economy of the Ottoman province of Tunis was, in fact, not only an 
economic modernisation linked to significant technical and capitalistic trans-
formations, but also its relationship with the Empire and foreign domination. 
1 ant (Archives nationales de Tunisie), Series H (silsila al-tarikiyya: Historical Series), box 72, 
files 857 to 860.
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The conflict that stirred the Tunisian textile sector in the 1860s and 1870s was 
indeed a development-related conflict: an entire sector revolted against the 
new conditions of production and integration into the international market, a 
major change by comparison to the previous economic situation in which the 
local economy had hitherto developed.
The fez had been produced in Tunis at least since the arrival of refugee arti-
sans from Spain in the fifteenth century (Teyssier, 1962; Ferchiou, 1971; Bakalti, 
1996; Ben Miled, 2010). Those refugees had fled the ethnic and religious cleans-
ing campaigns undertaken during the different phases of the Christian recon-
quista as it swept through al-Andalus; they then settled in various cities of 
North Africa, including Tunis (Abidi, 2016). They benefited from the leniency 
of the various local authorities and created their guilds anew. Some histori-
ans, however, think that the fez originated in the city of Kairouan. From here, 
they claim, the tradition passed into Muslim Spain, and then back to Tunisia 
(Bachrouch, 2008). Integration into the Ottoman Empire—confirmed in 1574 
but already largely effective, as regards trade, after the protection of the city 
against Christian attacks provided by the Ottoman corsair Barbarossa several 
decades earlier—comprised a favourable set of circumstances for the develop-
ment of the textile industry, and particularly the production of fezzes. At the 
beginning of the Ottoman period, artisanal activity in Tunis was structured, to 
a significant extent, around this booming activity, bringing together the man-
power of an entire region thanks to existence of then new outlets throughout 
the Ottoman world. Sheep rearing (fezzes are made of wool) also developed 
and provided additional prosperity to those living in the countryside. Much 
of the wool used was, however, still imported from Spain, as well as from Sicily 
and Sardinia. Urban infrastructure, including dyeing vats, was placed at the 
service of this sector. In Tunis, fez manufacturers were generally located in 
the medina, but also in the suburb of Ariana. During the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries, this activity came to represent a flagship economic sector 
for the Ottoman province. Each phase of production had a precise location 
either in town or in the surrounding area (Bachrouch, 2008). Boubaker shows 
that the export of fezzes to the entirety of the Ottoman Empire constituted the 
main manufactured item exported through the port of Tunis (Boubaker, 2003). 
The cities of the Levant, from Damascus to Aleppo and from Jerusalem to Bei-
rut, were reliable markets. But the same was also true of cities such as Smyrna 
or Salonica. The Ottoman army was also a major customer. Fezzes were also 
often bought and worn throughout Mediterranean Europe, as evidenced by 
numerous Sardinian and Sicilian engravings and descriptions. The fez was, 
in short, the main example of the Imperial Ottoman dimension of ancien 
régime trade and a certain globalisation of artisanal production throughout 
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the  Mediterranean. The term ‘artisanal’, however, should not mislead us as to 
the scale and nature of production activities that, even before mechanisation, 
was highly intensive. It has been calculated that around 5,000 workers were 
employed in fez factories in the medina of Tunis and adjacent suburbs in the 
late eighteenth century (Spring and Hudson, 2004). The French travellers Peys-
sonnel and Desfontaines estimate that between 15,000 and 20,000 people were 
employed as manual workers, artisans, or apprentices in 1724 (Peyssonnel and 
Desfontaines, 1838; Bachrouch, 2008). Production in 1760 is estimated to have 
been 660,000 units per year, double what it was in 1740 (Boubaker, 2003). With 
the monopoly Tunis enjoyed in the Empire, the margins on sales of this prod-
uct were, for the trading companies of Tunis, quite comfortable. Youssef Sahib 
al-Tabaa, active in the eighteenth century and influential in the spectacular 
growth of the sector at that time, is emblematic of the fortunes made by Tu-
nisian merchants engaged in the fez trade throughout the Ottoman Empire.
The milieu of the fez manufacturers was very hierarchical, from the workers 
and apprentices to the big merchants. But with industrial and proto-industrial 
development, the pyramid of skills and symbolic hierarchies changed. A grow-
ing number of workers filled the increasingly large workshops. Along with ol-
ive oil producers, fez manufacturers (the term as used here refers to the owners 
of these workshops and the organisers of this trade) thus formed a well-off 
class that had emerged from a guild that had not originally been one of the 
most noble, but that was well established in the urban environment and local 
society, and had connections throughout the Empire (Hadi Cherif, 1970). The 
elite of these fez producers was made up of some 300 masters (Tunger-Zanetti, 
1996).
But with the arrival of mechanisation, and new competition from Europe 
and other Ottoman cities engaged in an effort to modernise, the whole of the 
Tunis textile industry faced a major test that challenged not only the produc-
tion system, but also the existence of commercial opportunities and the en-
tire social system that depended on them, causing a significant drop in living 
standards for the working men and women concerned. The two phenomena 
were related but different: new competition emerged as new players entered 
the market, and as certain Tunis entrepreneurs tried to respond by mecha-
nising their activity they came into conflict with the traditional hierarchy of 
the guild. But the crisis had actually begun well before mechanisation took 
place. So it was, first, a crisis brought about by new and aggressive competitors 
breaking into a traditionally exclusive market. From the 1780s onwards, trading 
companies in Orléans, Lyon and Marseille managed to force the whole of the 
Ottoman Empire to accept the textile production of their respective regions, 
through a mixture of commercial dynamism, (pre-)industrial espionage and 
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diplomatic pressure exerted on the Empire.2 From this time onwards, Euro-
pean consuls brought pressure to bear on local authorities and the Empire, 
resorting to threats of military action if necessary, to force them to agree to 
revise the terms of former trade agreements. The intensification of artisanal 
production in Europe, which foreshadowed the Industrial Revolution, also cre-
ated unprecedented differences in cost prices. Even the fez sector, which had 
seemed to possess a cultural specificity that placed it beyond the reach of com-
petition from another continent, was affected by this transformation (Valensi, 
1969). To penetrate the Ottoman market, a veritable system of technological 
espionage was set up through the consular network, at a time when consuls 
were still generally merchants: dyes, weaving and crushing processes, trading 
posts, customs provisions, and transport arrangements: all were targeted for 
close observation by the new competitors in order to create similar products 
and ensure market penetration. Diplomatic efforts, requested by chambers of 
commerce, ensured that permission was obtained to import products into the 
Empire, if necessary by exerting a pressure that foreshadowed the more active 
interventions of the coming century. And European expansion into Tunisia, 
and the Ottoman Empire in general, was not unconnected to the transforma-
tions then taking place in the European textile and artisanal sector (and before 
long in the industrial sector too). The entire way the province of Tunis was po-
sitioned in the Ottoman market, and its relationship to the Empire, were thus 
rapidly undermined. This phenomenon was further complicated by the ap-
pearance of native Ottoman competition due to the development (desired by 
various reformers) of a fez industry in Cairo from 1825 onwards (Fahmi, 1954) 
and in Istanbul from 1827. Muhammad Ali’s government brought in experts 
from the fez-makers’ guild of Tunis to create a new production structure locally 
in Cairo. In the 1830s, fez-manufacturing workshops in Cairo employed more 
than 2,000 workers. The sale of fezzes, initially confined to the Egyptian army, 
was opened up to the general public and the export market in 1834 (Fahmi, 
1954). This development symbolised Muhammad Ali’s wish to see Egypt en-
ter a phase of economic transition that would lead it towards industrialisa-
tion (Thieck, 1992). In Istanbul, to deal with the order placed by the Ottoman 
army for more than 50,000 fezzes, Tunisian master hosiers were asked to set 
up manufacturing structures (Tunger-Zanetti, 1996). These initially mimicked 
the guild-based structure found in Tunis, but then moved towards a less rigid, 
industrial-type method of organisation. The figure of ʿUmar al-ʾAbrî, a dealer 




in fezzes who was close to the government in both Istanbul and Tunis, em-
bodied this transfer between 1829 and the 1860s. His networks in the imperial 
capital and the way he drew upon them to further his business interests natu-
rally led to arguments with the artisans of Tunis (Tunger-Zanetti, 1996). The 
conflicts discussed below also stemmed in part from a rivalry between, on the 
one hand, people from Tunis living both there and in Istanbul, who were keen 
on industrial modernisation (these included ʿUmar al-ʾAbrî and Yahyâ Arway, 
who were close to the reformer Khayr al-Dîn), and, on the other, the profes-
sion’s guild base.
Thus, in the mid-nineteenth century, the position of Tunis exporters had 
already become difficult due to the shrinking of the Ottoman market and the 
advent of European competition—but also because of emerging tensions in 
Tunis itself. The artisanal sector in general was facing an almost existential cri-
sis (Penec, 1964). And it was here where the first popular Maghrebi opposition 
to mechanisation occurred. Even if we cannot quite use the term ‘Luddism’, as 
the archives for Tunis do not directly record any acts of sabotage targeting the 
machines being introduced into the artisanal sector as it transformed into an 
industry, the rhetoric of protest against the replacement of the labour force by 
machines was clearly in evidence. First and foremost, the various players in the 
industry resorted to petitions in an attempt to express their grievances both to 
the provincial authorities and to those in Istanbul. In the Ottoman administra-
tive system of the ancien régime, the petition lay at the heart of the processes 
of mediation and of consensus building during phases of conflict (Lafi, 2012).3 
It also lay at the core of decision-making procedures: any petition entailed, 
both in Istanbul and in the province concerned, the opening of an official file, 
and the response to each petition involved an investigation, interviews, and a 
rescript—that is to say, the formalisation of the decision taken (Lafi, 2011). A 
summary of each petition was placed by the administration at the beginning 
of the file. Local chronicles—true civic annals—recorded the submission of 
petitions and provide evidence of their existence and kind.4 For fez makers, 
the submission of these numerous petitions points to a shared economic, so-
cial, civic and political awareness of the group as an urban and professional 
milieu faced by the economic adversity occasioned both by foreign competi-
tors and by Ottoman modernisers close to the Tunisian local government. 
These petitions are evidence of a collective mobilisation that aimed not only 
3 It also needs to be said that, in terms of mentality, this feature largely survived the modernis-
ing reforms of the era of the Tanzimat (Reforms), which—between the 1830s and the 1870s, 
and throughout the whole Empire—promoted a new bureaucratic rationality.
4 See the accounts in Bayram al-Khâmis (2000) and Ben Diaf (2004).
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to draw attention to a particular problem, but also to force the political system 
to respond and recreate the conditions necessary for a local consensus. They 
also reflected the way in which—at every level—local, imperial and geopoliti-
cal issues were interrelated.
The Ottomans and the Tunisian local government—in an effort to develop 
the province and the Empire and to ward off the new competition—decided, 
in the late 1850s, to mechanise the manufacture of fezzes. To do so, they called 
on various foreign experts, who offered to supply steam engines. The Ottomans 
also modernised the infrastructural framework by building dams to improve 
the supply of water to fez factories. The souks themselves were modernised in 
a similar way. All this took place in the context of the Tunisian province fol-
lowing the enactment of the Fundamental Pact in 1857, and the negotiations 
between the government, reforming ministers and foreign consuls that led, in 
1861, to the adoption of the constitution. Khayr al-Dîn played a decisive role in 
this movement (Van Krieken, 1976). The negotiations were largely concerned 
with determining the extent to which foreigners would be allowed to wield 
economic influence over the province. Reformers such as Khayr al-Dîn were 
proponents of economic modernisation aiming for industrial development 
that alone could free the province from foreign domination; they were also, 
in this modernisation process, the ambiguous partners of consuls, bankers 
and foreign investors. The rejection of mechanisation by the guild base, whose 
organisation was itself challenged by the reforms, was therefore both a rejec-
tion of the reformers (and the imperial and local Tunis-based economic circles 
close to them) and a rejection of foreign influence, already perceived as a ve-
hicle for domination, in the economy. The guild base had already, in support 
of its leadership, mobilised en masse a few decades earlier to prevent fezzes 
produced in Europe being sold in the Tunis souk: ‘In the past, Christians intro-
duced fezzes they had produced at home. They were forbidden to approach 
the Tunis souk as it would harm our industry’ (Bachrouch, 2008, 800). Several 
petitions submitted at the time had led to the banning of these imports and 
protected Tunisian production throughout the Empire. In 1860, in a context 
that had itself evolved due to the opening of the Tunisian market to foreigners 
following the Fundamental Pact and its various accompanying measures, pro-
tests against the import of European fezzes resumed, led by Hassûna al-Wazîr, 
the amîn (representative of the guild) of fez traders and producers: ‘Today we 
are seeing them launch a new offensive. If this goes on, we will completely lose 
our profession’ (Bachrouch, 2008, 802–803). The petition was ignored by the 
authorities. Hassûna al-Wazîr was not allowed to present his case to the min-
istry. None of the negotiating procedures normally instigated in response to a 
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petition was opened. The following year, faced with the worsening of the sec-
tor’s economic situation, and also with the prospect of modernisation  leading 
to increasing mechanisation—modernisation supported by the authorities 
themselves—the case took a new turn.
The main petition considered here was part of this context in which the 
leaders of the profession, and its base, mobilised against the local government 
of the province and against the entrepreneurs who, in their view, were siding 
with both modernisers and foreigners.5 The petition resides in an archive file 
that includes several petitions regarding the sector.6 It was probably addressed 
to the prime minister of the local Tunisian government (Sayyidnâ al-wazîr al-
akbar Adam Allah) in 1861.7 It was signed by 77 individuals who describe them-
selves, in the text, as members of the guild (arbâb al-sinâʾ) and as poor workers 
in the fez manufacturing sector (min al-fuqarâʾ al-mushtaghalîn bi sinâʾa al-
shâshiyya). The main demand of the petitioners was that measures be taken 
to ban the import of machinery for the manufacture of fezzes. For them, these 
machines were literally killing thousands of fez makers in Tunis (al-hâdira) 
and the rest of the country (al-watan). They pointed out—and this indicates 
how grave the crisis really was—that the situation no longer allowed the chil-
dren of the capital and of the nation, men (zukûr), women (anâth), widows 
(arâmal) and even orphans (aytâm), all working day and night (yachtaghilûna 
bihâ bil-layl wa al-nahâr), to survive. The use of these strong words, which con-
noted a koranic religious ethic that protected widows and orphans—an ethic 
to which sura 4 (al-Nisaʾ) of the Koran gives the most powerful expression, 
indicated a desire to force the administration addressed by the petition to face 
up to its social and moral responsibility:
If our Sayyid allows the import of machinery by foreigners (ajânib), he 
will be causing the abandonment (ihmâl al-ahâli) of all those people 
who have only their craft skills and their hands to work with, and of all 
those who depend on this work […] We weak people (nahnu al-duʾafâʾ), 
through our voices and by submitting this petition (bi saddad bathth al-
chikâyya), remind our Sayyid that his duty is to protect us and ensure that 
he does not open doors that will never close again.
5 ant, Series H, box 72, file 859, document 6.
6 ant, Series H, box 72, files 857 to 860.
7 The document bears no date. Its date can be deduced from a reading of the context and the 
other documents in the same file.
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The petition is written in the urban dialect typical of Tunis at the time, sub-
stantially different from the one we find in petitions submitted by notables 
from the civic councils, who were more familiar with this exercise (Lafi, 2005). 
These notables wrote in classical Arabic and deployed a finely honed adminis-
trative and legal rhetoric. Artisans and workers could quote the Koran in moral 
support of their demands, but they were obviously less familiar with the impe-
rial style of communication embodied by the petition. Still, they were profi-
cient in the essentials. Their insistence that they were ordinary working people 
could even be seen as a deliberate choice made to reinforce the impact of their 
petition. The petition does not directly include any large-scale economic argu-
ment: the emphasis is solely on the social consequences, at the local level, of 
decisions over which the petitioners have no control. The archive file shows 
that, before addressing the highest authorities, they had gone through the 
whole gamut of protest and mediation within the guild hierarchy, itself in 
the process of being reformed. But in the face of a stalemate, the artisans and 
workers exercised their right of petition to address the higher authorities di-
rectly. They were expressing the distress of a social group united in adversity. 
Because of their decision to focus on social issues, some of the main issues 
were not addressed in the petition: international competition, import taxes, 
measures to support artisans, general points about the industrialisation of the 
province. But in other petitions, and investigative files of the local and impe-
rial administration, these themes were sometimes addressed. Some petitions 
protested directly against mechanisation.8 Others were submitted by trades 
that represented the different phases of fez production, such as pressing.9 In 
fact, in those years—the 1860s—the whole artisanal sector was affected by 
this manner of threat and by the economic slump it induced, as illustrated by 
protests in the leather and dyeing sectors (Amîn al-dabâgha wa mâ yata ʾallaq 
bil-sinâʾa), whose petitions are to be found next to those of the fez producers in 
the archives.10 Throughout the 1860s, this type of agitation left its mark on the 
Tunisian social landscape and on the political debate concerning the opening 
up of the economy; this was when Khayr al-Dîn and the reformers were at-
tempting to modernise the province, attempts that were riddled with ambigu-
ity. The influence of European penetration was also starting to be perceptible: 
this involved competition and exemptions, and undermined Tunis’ market 
8 ant, Series H, box 72, file 860.
9 ant, Series H, box 72, file 857, 19 petitions and documents.
10 ant, Series H, box 59, file 658 (dyeing). Box 59, file 659 (tanners). See also Sebag (1959).
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share and the local and imperial responses to this new context. The reform of 
guilds, in the Empire in general and in Tunis in particular, was part and parcel 
of such reactions.11 It triggered a number of political and institutional debates 
that lasted for several years (Quéméneur, 1942; Louis, 1973).
These episodes show that the European influence in the Ottoman province 
of Tunis was fundamentally ambiguous from the outset and that Ottoman ef-
forts to bring about economic modernisation were already trammelled by an 
increasingly colonial situation. Faced with the industrialisation of Europe, the 
Ottoman Empire tried, in various contexts including that of fez production, to 
promote a transition to a mechanised, industrial-type economy. But during this 
transformation, which included multiple development-related conflicts over 
several decades, several elements merely intensified ambiguities and a grow-
ing dependency: the importation of technology, investment mechanisms, the 
redefinition of marketing channels, relationships with foreigners, and changes 
in social relations at the local level. Regarding this last dimension, the shock 
of the disappearance of guilds as such was a powerful blow in the Ottoman 
 context of the Tanzimat and their local variations in Tunis, from modernis-
ing economic reforms to the destabilising effects on the cohesion of the social 
milieu of production. These facts, if interpreted in the context of reflections 
on the overall history of development-related conflicts discussed here, sug-
gest that we go along with the suggestions of Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) on 
the high degree of pre-industrial productive development in certain areas, 
including—in this case—Ottoman Tunis, which historiography has tended 
to consider right from the outset as peripheral. But we should also see these 
suggestions as an invitation to compare and contrast different levels, from the 
local and social micro-level to the geopolitical level, to understand the mecha-
nisms that led to the gradual surrender to what was becoming a colonial order: 
the pressure to open up markets, the ambiguities of mechanisation, and the 
debates in local societies regarding how modernisation should proceed and 
the role of the state. In the context of Ottoman Tunis, the affirmation of mo-
dernity as a hegemonic paradigm was thus enacted through a seizing of power 
of the mechanisms of economic decision-making by circles situated outside 
the guild heritage, and resulted in an abrupt transition, the increasingly co-
lonial nature of which only served to increase its gravity. The social body of 
11 See ant, Series H, box  59, files 644–669, on the end of the corporations in the medi-
na  (dyers, tanners, potters, burnous makers, butchers, blacksmiths, etc.). Here too, the 
 petition turned out to be a fundamental vector of mediation.
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the former  productive milieus was dismantled in the process—as the petition 
studied here demonstrates.
4 Conclusion
With French colonisation, which was formalised in Tunisia in 1881 after two 
decades of progressive losses of Ottoman imperial sovereignty, a paradoxical 
swing occurred: it was now the colonial authorities who were responsible for 
defending Tunisian artisanal production on the international market. While, 
for several decades, it had been partly against the French that Tunis had had 
to defend its production and marketing conditions, French colonial admin-
istrators were now asked to intervene with regard to the issues affecting the 
 sector— requests submitted in the form of petitions, from 1882 onwards. This is 
the context in which, twenty years later, the archive file on which the research 
for this chapter has drawn was created: a French colonial official apparently 
asked, at the beginning of the twentieth century, for a file to be opened so that 
the issue could be studied, and we see, here and there, his comments added 
in pencil to the original documents. Papers dating back several decades were 
collected, taken out of their original archival context and compiled in a newly 
opened file.
From the mid-1880s, the situation continued to worsen for Tunis fez manu-
facturers. German and Austrian competitors entered the market, challenging 
the position of the Tunis manufacturers even more severely, and the situation 
became completely untenable. In 1895, Le Jacquard, a French journal of the 
wool industry, waged a negative campaign aimed—this time—at protecting 
Tunisia (now a French colony) from European competition, indicating that 
Austrian fezzes were available in Tunis for ‘even less than the cost of the actual 
amount of wool needed to make a fez […] Germany and Austria have managed 
to monopolise the exclusive sale of this item of clothing’ (Le Jacquard, 1895, 
345, our transl.). Tunisia was pushed right out of the international market. Fez 
production in Tunisia reverted to an artisanal stage that it had already out-
grown back in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and became almost 
irrelevant. Despite efforts by the Tunisian nationalists of the 1940s and 1950s, 
followers of Habib Bourguiba, to assert that the wearing of the fez was a form 
of cultural distinction and a political sign of support for independence, pro-
duction continued to decline. Cultural debates about the symbolism of the fez 
between the Tunisia of Destour and the Turkey of M. Kemal Atatürk (Doğaner, 
2009), regardless of how the hat itself developed, did not alter the economic 
reality of the sector and the social situation of those who had dedicated their 
skills and labour to it. Over the following decades, the fez gradually became 
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less central to the culture of Tunis, and was finally confined to the folklore of 
the souks in the context of tourist development. In terms of economic history, 
it became the symbol of a failed attempt to boost artisanal production in the 
industrial age.
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‘An Uphill Job Demanding Limitless Patience’.  
The Establishment of Trade Unions and the 
Conflicts of Development in Sudan, 1946–1952
Elena Vezzadini
Abstract
This chapter focuses on conflicts of development from the point of view of the 
entanglement between development, labour legislation, and labour conflicts during 
the time of decolonisation. It describes the origins of the trade union movement in 
Sudan, created after the Second World War, and covers the history of that movement 
up until 1952, the year in which its curve of radicalisation was stopped and it turned 
towards more conciliatory labour relations. Dwelling on internal sources emanating 
from the colonial government and the various labour attachés sent to Khartoum, the 
chapter aims to shed light on the reciprocal influences and feedback effect between 
the three main actors of these conflicts: the British government, whose agenda set co-
lonial labour welfare as a top priority; a reluctant Sudanese government accustomed to 
decades of laissez-faire in matters of labour; and the workers, who quite suddenly dis-
covered that they had the power to compel the government to listen to their demands.
1 Introduction
It is not enough to say that the Sudan is not capable of modern indus-
trial development and should therefore be left alone. […] It is certain 
that neither the world opinion nor a growing political consciousness in 
the Sudan itself will tolerate stagnation…; there must be, in the Sudan as 
elsewhere in the world, progress in standards of living, security, health, 
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 education and generally in those humane practices which go by the 
name of civilisation.1
Trades Unions would have been premature [in Sudan, that is] predomi-
nantly an agricultural country … Trade unions will not change the tra-
ditional ‘Arab’ contempt for manual labour; shop stewards and workers’ 
committees will not make sense in the conditions which are permitted 
and encouraged by popular opinion and the teachings of Islam.2
These two quotes, the first taken from the report of a Foreign Office resident 
minister in Cairo on the labour situation in Sudan, dated 1944, and the sec-
ond from notes written in 1946 by the Civil Secretary of Sudan, Robertson (the 
highest colonial authority after the Governor General), in response to London’s 
recommendations to begin to form trade unions in Sudan, are fascinating 
glimpses into the conflict of visions as to which role to assign to the colonial 
state. The first maintained that the state had to provide for welfare and de-
velopment for all. The second—in line with indirect rule—considered that 
state intervention had to be minimal because people were better governed 
by their own ‘traditions’, and thus that exogenous institutions such as trade 
unions should not be introduced. And yet, at the end of 1952, six years after 
Robertson had expressed such an opinion, there were as many as 99 registered 
trade unions in Sudan, representing an estimated 100,000 members.
This chapter will focus on the uncertainties, ambiguities and unpredictable 
outcomes spawned by conflicting visions of which role the state had to play 
in the lives of the colonised people, by studying one case in point—namely, 
the conflicts triggered by the new labour legislation of the late 1940s in Sudan. 
By choosing the theme of labour and development in the context of decolo-
nisation, the author is aware that she is on a well-trodden path, in two ways. 
First, the connection between development and the elaboration of a system of 
workers’ welfare (Cowen and Shenton, 1991 and 1996; Butler, 1999; Lewis, 2000; 
Havinden and Meredith, 2002; Burton, 2003; Constantine, 2005; Duffield and 
Hewitt, 2009; Seekings, 2011) and the political implications of labour conflicts 
in the era of decolonisation have received much scholarly attention (see for 
example Berman and Lonsdale, 1980; Freund, 1988; Shane 1989; Howe, 1993; 
Maul, 2012; Tijani, 2012; Teelucksingh, 2015); and all the more so following the 
1 The National Archives of the uk (tna): R. Peers, Labour in the Middle East: Sudan, Undated, 
1944. Enclosed in Peers to Robertson, 22.7.1944, fo 921/305, p. 10.
2 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Comments on Mr. Audsley’s Notes on His Recent 
Visit to the Sudan, JW Robertson, Civil Secretary, undated, included in Robertson to Speight, 
Khartoum, 4.6.1946, lab 13/479.
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influential studies of Frederick Cooper (to cite just a few: Cooper, 1992, 1996; 
Cooper and Packard, 1997). However, because of its atypical status as an Anglo-
Egyptian condominium, Sudan is usually left out of such scholarship.
Yet, in spite of the lack of dialogue with the rest of the continent, there exists 
solid scholarship on labour in Sudan. Authors such as Fawzi, Sikainga, Cross 
and many others have explored in great detail several aspects of labour con-
flicts that occurred on the eve of independence (Fawzi, 1957; Sikainga, 1996 and 
2002; Ali Taha, 1970; Cross, 1997; Curless, 2013). Such scholarship bears many re-
semblances to the angle of analysis chosen here: first because it focuses on the 
relations between labour, politics and the colonial state, and second because 
it mostly relies on the colonial archive. The primacy of colonial sources is not 
due to a lack of alternatives—such alternatives abound. Not only are many 
witnesses still alive, newspapers such as al-Saraha (Frankness in Arabic) and 
al-Shaab (the People), strongly sympathetic to the labour movement, reported 
on labour-related news for decades.3
Nevertheless, my choice here has been to mobilise colonial sources, because 
it is from these that the historian can perceive best the uncertainties, entangle-
ments, and unintended feedback effects generated by the interaction between 
three main actors: London’s Labour government, the Sudan colonial govern-
ment and the workers’ movement. In this way, this contribution aims to echo 
the main preoccupations of this special issue: the imbrication of development 
policies with stories of globalisation and market extension; the transforma-
tions of typologies of governmentality; the centrality of development in the 
formation of states, in particular in the context of decolonisation; and finally 
the fragmentizing impact of development plans, first as enacted by, and im-
pressed upon, a multiplicity of actors with different aims, and second as en-
tangled with social hierarchies and visions that the state had. Finally, the case 
of the conflicts triggered by the introduction of labour legislation in Sudan 
reveals how development plans were ridden with contradictions, between 
the universalism of their intentions, the implications of their norms—which 
carried a political, moral and emotional message about who were the ‘right’ 
actors, their ‘right’ attitudes and the modalities of the realisation of labour 
 negotiations—and the discriminatory way in which these plans were eventu-
ally implemented on the ground.
Because Sudan studies have long suffered from insularity (Sharkey et al., 
2015), I shall begin this chapter by inscribing development conflicts related to 
labour in Sudan into two entangled international stories, although narrated 
very sketchily: first, that of how British imperial development policy fostered 
3 These newspapers can be found at the National Records Office, Khartoum.
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the creation of trade unions in the colonies; second, the story of circulation 
and mutual learning among radical labour movements, and in particular be-
tween those in Egypt and those in Sudan.
2 Labour in Sudan, from Indirect Rule to the 1940 Colonial  
Welfare and Development Act
The most important event of the political history of Britain in the first half of 
the twentieth century was probably the coming to power of the Labour Party. 
This happened following a century-long process of sharp societal conflicts 
around questions of labour. From the end of the nineteenth century, heteroge-
neous radical groups and militant workers that had been, until then, hostile to 
the formal political arena finally agreed to participate in institutional politics 
and came to be absorbed into a labour coalition that coalesced into the Labour 
Party, officially founded in 1900. The party grew in strength and prestige, and 
became the main opponent of the Conservative Party, finally coming to power 
for the first time in 1924, and again in 1929–1931 (Howell, 1983). It was under 
the Labour party that the first act was passed concerning the duty of a gov-
ernment to develop its colonies not only economically, but also socially and 
politically—the British Colonial Development Act of 1929. The crisis of 1929 
left this act a dead letter for a decade (Constantine, 2005, 141–166).
In 1935, severe labour agitations were carried out by the miners of the Cop-
perbelt of northern Rhodesia, and between 1934 and 1939 the planters of the 
British West Indies went on strike. In the 1930s, while these mass strikes were 
occurring, the Labour Party remained in opposition. However, each of these 
episodes fed the party’s struggle against the Tory government, providing them 
with arguments to use in harsh attacks on their Conservative adversaries (Thor-
pe, 1997). As a consequence, systematic denunciations in political debates of 
cases of exploitative colonialism kept the issue of colonial workers’ welfare in 
the spotlight (Vickers, 2004; Worley, 2005; Corthorn and Davis, 2008).
Amid the struggles between the Conservatives and Labour was a third impor-
tant actor—the Communist Party. The Labour Party was soon confronted with 
the problem of how to avoid the defection of its more radical wings to commu-
nism, especially in light of the fascination that Soviet Russia held among leftist 
circles (Lilleker, 2004). When the Labour Party eventually returned to power 
in 1946 (remaining in government until 1951), it adopted a policy of pulling 
out all the stops on welfare and of co-opting the larger trade unions, notably 
through the Trades Union Congress (tuc) (Orr, 1966; Hobsbawn, 1967; Ravier, 
1981; Thorpe, 1998, 2000), also explicitly to counter communism.
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In the colonies too, trade unions and workers’ welfare ordinances were 
introduced also to defuse the drive towards communism and radical anti- 
colonialism. The administrators repeatedly noted the anti-colonial leanings of 
the strikers and the proximity between labour grievances and political radical-
ism. As Cooper and others have demonstrated in detail, it was in this context 
that the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act was approved (Cooper, 
1996). Development and the amelioration of the living conditions of workers, 
but also a solid labour legislation were meant to stop the drift towards anti-
colonial radicalism. Thus, one of the clauses of the Act stated that: ‘no territory 
might receive aid under [the Act’s] provision unless it had in force legislation 
protecting the rights of trade unions, and unless the works for which the aid 
was to be used were carried out under a contract that embodied a fair wages 
clause…’ (Zeilig, 2009, 72). The Colonial and Foreign Offices were duly instruct-
ed to supervise its implementation in the colonies.
In Sudan, the government adopted the new directives with a certain delay. 
In 1946 a five-year development plan was launched, followed in 1951 by a sec-
ond one, larger and more ambitious.4 The wording of the 1946 plan followed 
closely the guidelines of the colonial Act: to provide ‘the raising of the standard 
of living of the population by increasing the national income and by the provi-
sion of additional social services, education particularly.’5 In order to fully cap-
ture the novelty of this paradigm, it must be compared with native Sudanese 
policy prior to the 1940s. The country, an Anglo-Egyptian condominium from 
1899 on, was governed by a hybrid rule of two countries with the majority of 
powers held by the British. After a short failed essay at integrating the educated 
elites into the government, and as a backlash against the nationalist uprising 
of 1924, the administration had turned wholeheartedly to indirect rule. Its core 
principles had clear economic implications, at least in theory: according to in-
direct rule, economic needs were shaped by local culture and traditions and 
thus were very limited, as Sudanese were not accustomed to global economy. 
In reality, the opposite was true: Gezira, an irrigated territory as large as Great 
Britain between the Blue and White Niles, was devoted to the growth of cot-
ton for export, in a highly organised scheme run by the Gezira Plantation Syn-
dicate (Gaitskell, 1959; Bernal, 1991). The government supervised closely the 
4 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Sudan Five-Years Development Plan, enclosed in 
Huddleston, Khartoum, to British Ambassador, Cairo, 17.2.1947, fo 371/63063. Sudan Govern-
ment, Development Budget Estimates, 1951/56 Programme, 1st July 1951 to 30th June 1952, 
Sudan Pamphlet 10, Sudan Library, University of Khartoum.
5 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Notes on the Expansion of Colonial Production, 
Memo No. 17, enclosure in Butters to Riches, Dover House, Whitehall, 25.8.1947, fo 371/63064.
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 marketing of this commodity, and the same happened to other export prod-
ucts such as gum arabic, sesame and millet.6
The majority of state revenues were generated by agricultural exports, and 
depended on the mobilisation of a substantial labour force. Most salaried 
workers were employed either as farmhands, or in domains connected to trade, 
such as ports and railways. However, the scarcity of wage workers fostered high 
salaries (in comparison to living costs) during most of Sudan’s colonial history. 
This made workers quite an assertive group, perhaps the best evidence of this 
being the frequency of strikes. From the beginning of the condominium, work-
ers went on strike confidently, and often.7 It was common for employees to 
walk away from their employers in order to exert pressure for better conditions 
(be they salaries, food, lodging, or other improvements). On average, colonial 
administrators signalled a strike at least once per year. The strikes involved 
different categories of workers and geographical sites: for instance, employees 
of a ginnery at Sinkat, dockers at Port Sudan, tram drivers in Khartoum, Gezira 
cotton pickers, and so on. However, such strikes were dealt with locally and 
never generated country-wide debates. The local administration considered 
them to be spontaneous phenomena generated by the invisible hand of the 
market and by the ‘laziness’ of the Sudanese. More generally, the administra-
tion attempted to force certain specific categories of Sudanese into work (for-
mer slaves in particular (see Sikainga, 1996; Cross, 1997; Vezzadini, 2010), but 
with only limited success.
What is important to emphasise for the purpose of this chapter is that be-
fore the 1940s workers were invisible to the eyes of the state, both as economic 
6 How to control agricultural produce was vividly debated, as evidenced in the agenda and 
papers of the Board of Economic and Trade; see the following files: Civsec 1/53/144, Civsec 
1/53/145, Civsec 1/53/146, and Civsec 1/54/147 (Khartoum: National Records Office).
7 A few examples will suffice: in 1908, government workers went on strike seeking better pay; 
in 1909, the government noted the occurrence of a strike in the Kamlin estate and another 
in the Fadlab agricultural scheme; in 1910 labourers supplied by the Central Labour Bureau 
refused to work at the wage offered; in 1912, a wave of strikes aimed at securing better work-
ing conditions involved dockers in Port Sudan. It is probable that further industrial action 
went unrecorded. Other strikes were overtly political: in 1919, a large strike involving railway 
employees (at the time they were mostly Egyptians, enrolled in a corps—supervised by the 
military—known as the Railways Battalion) occurred in Atbara in support of the Egyptian 
Revolution (Vezzadini, 2015). Similarly, during the 1924 revolution several strikes took place 
in Atbara, Khartoum and Port Sudan in protest against the arrest of the leaders of the revolt. 
As for the 1930s, after a period of economic depression the number of strikes rose again. 
Their pace is described by Cross (1997, 236); see also Sikainga (1996, 90–91) and Perkins (1993, 
70–71).
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and as political actors. For instance, during the 1924 revolution the British be-
lieved that workers attended demonstrations because they were paid or ma-
nipulated to do so, and not because they had decided to attend (Vezzadini, 
2015, 234–254). All this was to change drastically after the Second World War.
Against this backdrop of indirect rule and of the lack of concern for waged 
workers, the disposition to simultaneously introduce general development 
plans and a labour legislation—both steered from London—were truly a sign 
of a new era for Sudan. In 1946, the Labour Board (renamed the Labour Branch 
in 1949) was duly instructed to begin to work under the aegis of the Civil Secre-
tary. That year, Edward H. Macintosh, a former Sudan Political Service employ-
ee, was appointed Labour Officer. In addition, in 1947 the Foreign Office sent—
from London—a labour expert, R. Brown, seconded directly from the Ministry 
of Labour, chosen because of his experience of the West Indian strikes; the 
same was the case for his successor, M.T. Cowan, who replaced Brown in April 
1948, and who had been a labour advisor in Jamaica from 1945 to 1948 (Cross, 
1997, 248). In 1949 the Foreign Office changed strategies and sent an indepen-
dent syndicalist from the tuc, D. Newman, in harmony with the new line of 
involving the tuc in settling colonial labour disputes (Weiler, 1984; Cross, 1997, 
248–249). In addition, the Sudanese government received at least three visits 
from Cairo from M.T. Audsley, a key figure of these years who was employed 
as labour counsellor at the British Embassy in Cairo and as Labour Adviser to 
the Middle East Office. His notes and reports include essential information on 
trade unions in Sudan.8
The number of envoys sent to advise the Sudanese government should not 
be missed, as it reveals the determination of London to supervise closely the 
labour question in the country. This level of involvement from the part of Lon-
don on internal Sudanese affairs was a radical change for Sudan’s government, 
which until then had enjoyed total freedom on matters relating to domestic 
policy.
The second story of entanglement I shall briefly discuss here is that of the 
labour movement in Sudan and the international workers’ struggles in the 
8 According to Beinin and Lockman (1998, 304), ‘Audsley was the chief architect of postwar 
British labour policy in Egypt’, who struggled ‘to promote a non-political trade union move-
ment.’ His reports are: Note on Visit to the Sudan, 25th February to 15th March 1946; Note on 
Visit to the Sudan from 10th to 20th March 1947 inclusive, fo 371/63088; Notes concerning the 
Sudan Railway Strike, M. Audsley, Cairo, 26.4.1948, fo 371/69235; Report on visit to the Sudan 
from 1st to 20th February 1951 inclusive, fo 371/90299; all in the The National Archives of the 
uk (tna). On the subject of Audsley, see also Labour Attache, Cairo, House of Commons De-
bate, 15 May 1950, vol. 475 (863–864), http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/
may/15/labour-attache-cairo (accessed on 21 August 2015).
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 empires, beginning with the influence of the Egyptian labour movement. 
British officials noticed such connections early. The commission on living 
standards of 1948 maintained, for instance, that: ‘The whole trend of world 
opinion is towards raising the wages and standard of living of the worker and 
the Sudanese worker does not intend to be left behind in this movement…’.9 
While the Second World War was raging in North Africa, information on trade 
unionism came to Sudan through various channels. There was, of course, Brit-
ish propaganda: as the historian Fawzi recounts, people came to know about 
trade unionism ‘in response… to the British Ministry of Information war pam-
phlets about the British way of life, one of which, on trade unionism, had been 
the subject of study by a discussion circle in the Atbara Technical school Old 
Boys Club’ (Fawzi, 1957, 38). As mentioned previously, from 1950 on, dedicated 
newspapers such as al-Saraha and al-Shaab carried news about international 
labour developments. In this sense they filled a gap, as the main Sudanese 
newspapers, such as al-Ray al-‘Amm or al-Nil usually did not cover such news. 
However, Sudanese most probably read about labour struggles even earlier 
through the Egyptian press.
Al-Saraha and al-Shaab watched the workers’ movement in Egypt very 
closely and exposed their readers to its communist, anti-imperialist language. 
Labour conflicts shook Egypt from the late 1930s through the 1940s (Vatikiotis, 
1969, 337–342; Beinin and Lockman, 1998). The scope of this chapter only per-
mits me to highlight the most salient of these events here. In 1932, a mission 
from the International Labour Organization exposed the scandal of the labour 
situation in Egypt, where most industries imposed fourteen to sixteen daily 
working hours, employed children, and ignored the most elementary forms of 
worker protection (Beinin and Lockman, 1998, 204–205). The introduction of 
worker protection measures advanced sluggishly, and strikes took place inces-
santly amidst difficult economic conditions connected to the 1929 crisis, with 
a government in constant oscillation between labour reforms and repression. 
For instance, in 1938 a general strike at one of the largest textile factories in 
Egypt, al-Mahalla al-Kubra, was violently repressed. In 1939, the leaders of the 
General Federation of Labour Unions staged a three-day hunger strike, highly 
popular and widely covered by the press. When martial law was imposed on 
the country because of the war, tramway workers challenged the decision, 
launching a strike in March 1940. In 1942, finally, the government officially rec-
ognised the syndicates and passed trade union legislation. More strikes were 
to follow after the war. In 1946 for instance, Egyptian industrial workers of the 
9 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry, 
Khartoum, 14.4.1948, fo 371/69235, p. 13.
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major textile industries walked out en masse, followed again by the tramway 
workers. Even the police, in Cairo and Alexandria, went on strike in 1948.
The political impact of Egyptian labour struggles on Sudan should not be 
overlooked. As with many other junctures in Sudanese colonial history, Egyp-
tian anti-colonial nationalism was a powerful inspiration for the Sudanese. 
In Sudan, Egypt had historically played the role of a counterweight to British 
 colonisation (Abdel-Rahim, 1969; Beshir, 1974; Warburg, 1978; al-Safi, 1989). For 
the Ashiqqa, the most important pro-Egyptian party in Sudan (yet connected 
to the largest Sudanese Sufi brotherhood, the Khatmiyya), unity with Egypt 
was a synonym of liberation from colonialism. But for Sudanese workers there 
was another reason for their closeness to Egypt: Egyptian workers were strug-
gling against the dominant classes as much as against British economic coloni-
sation. Like them, the Sudanese were waging a double war against the British: 
first as their colonisers, and second as their managers. In fact, the colonial 
government was the country’s largest employer and manager of the economic 
system.
3 The Workers Affairs Association and the Beginning of  
Trade Unionism
As already mentioned, in June 1946 Civil Secretary Robertson stated that there 
was no scope for creating trade unions in Sudan. And yet, in July 1946, some 
Sudan Railways craftsmen founded the Workers Affairs Association (waa) in 
the city of Atbara—home to the headquarters of the Sudan Railways Depart-
ment. The association was headed by Sulayman Musa, and al-Tayyib Hassan 
al-Tayyib. The two were no hotheads: quite the contrary, they were two artisans 
with long careers behind them as permanent employees of Sudan Railways 
(Curless, 2013, 806).10 The association was founded at the beginning to pro-
vide for social support (Fawzi, 1957, 38–39). As Cross notes, its statute made 
no reference to the strike as a weapon, excluded any political aims, and reas-
sured the reader that the waa would take ‘meticulous care to avoid any ac-
tion likely to cause the management any inconvenience or trouble’ (quoted in 
Cross, 1997, 241).
Simultaneously, the colonial Sudan Labour Board attempted to form Works 
Committees. These were to function as a link between employers and employ-
ees. In the words of the Civil Secretary, they represented a way for ‘the artisan 
10 The first was a supervisor, employed since 1926, and the second a pattern maker, em-
ployed since 1928 (Sikainga, 2002, 105).
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and labouring classes’ to ‘take an intelligent and constructive interest in the in-
ternal running of their business or department’ (Fawzi 1957, 26–27).11 However, 
the committees had no power to advise on matters directly connected to in-
dustrial relations, such as salaries and terms of service, matters that instead the 
waa wanted to debate. In August 1946, the waa asked to be recognised. The 
government refused on the grounds that the association was not adapted to 
such a role; but the waa did not let the issue rest. Following one entire year of 
fruitless talks, the waa decided to instruct all railway employees to stop work. 
The extent of the strike and its success made it an immensely popular event. 
From 17 to 23 July, the railway system was paralyzed.12 People throughout the 
country supported the activists in many ways, including by sending food (Si-
kainga, 2002, 107–108). Eventually, the waa succeeded in being recognised as 
the representative voice of railways workers.
Following on from this victory, the association confidently began to work 
on labour conditions. In October, it formulated demands that included an 
increase in salaries, annual leave for all workers, and the reduction of work-
ing hours.13 These demands were sent to railways management, but with the 
request that they be forwarded to Khartoum, thus expressing the idea that la-
bour negotiations were a governmental responsibility. The Sudanese govern-
ment gave a cold welcome to the demands, considering as ‘extravagant claims’ 
the waa proposal for a pay increase of between 25 and 40 per cent.14 However, 
it responded by raising the minimum basic wage and promised the establish-
ment of an independent committee of British and Sudanese experts to enquire 
into the situation of the railway workers. In January 1948, the commission had 
not yet begun its work, but by now the waa had understood the power of the 
strike as a weapon. A second general strike of railway workers was launched 
for 26–28 January, and a third, ‘indefinite’ strike on 16 March.15 On 4 April, Su-
layman Musa was arrested and charged with having given a ‘highly seditious 
11 Civil Secretary’s Circular No. CS/37, 19.8.1946, quoted in Fawzi (1957, 26–27).
12 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Correspondence about the strike is included in 
fo 371/63088. For a detailed account, see Sikainga (2002, 105–107).
13 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Strikes of Railway Workers in the Sudan, fo Min-
ute, 23.3.1948, fo 371/69235.
14 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Governor General of the Sudan, Khartoum to 
Foreign Office, London, 29.1.1948 (repeated for information to Cairo), fo 371/69235.
15 The National Archives of the uk (tna): The third strike was launched because the dead-
line announced by the government to publish the findings of the independent commit-
tee had not been respected. Sudan Government, Sudan Railways’ Employees, Report of 
the Independent Committee of Enquiry, Establishment Branch, Khartoum, 14.4.1948, fo 
371/69235.
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speech’ at the Atbara mosque.16 The sentence pushed the workers to extend 
the strike to include the first two weeks of April. Finally, Musa was given a fine, 
and was released on April 17. The strike ended on the following day, on his 
instructions.
It is worth pausing a moment to reflect on why the government gave up its 
plans so quickly and recognised the waa. It is possible to identify two main 
reasons: first, the dire conditions of salaried workers; second, London’s injunc-
tion to develop labour regulation.
Indeed, from the beginning of the Second World War on, Sudan had been 
experiencing an economic boom. With the outbreak of the Korean War remov-
ing Korean cotton from the market, the price of Sudanese cotton soared. Gov-
ernment revenues multiplied spectacularly, tenfold from 1939 to 1951, and the 
country was awash with cash. So much cash, however, triggered unprecedent-
ed inflation.17 The evolution of the cost of living index is eloquent: considering 
1938 as 100, the index soared to 170 in 1945, 229 in 1947, and 307 in 1949 (Fawzi, 
1957, 22; Daly, 2002, 312–313).18 The redistribution of such cash was uneven: af-
ter the war, a drought that hit the north provoked famine conditions in some 
rural areas, and grain had to be imported from abroad. Against this backdrop 
of extreme inflation, the independent committee of 1948, enquiring into the 
plight of the railways workers, did not note any severe signs of malnutrition 
or illness.19 It did, however, underline that the workers’ conditions were as bad 
as anywhere else in Sudan, and had never been good.20 Everywhere, in urban, 
working-class areas sanitary conditions were dire, lacking even the most basic 
16 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Telegram from Dakhlia, Khartoum, to Sudanol-
ogy, London, 4.4.1948, fo 371/69235.
17 To counter inflation, the government tried to protect at least its own employees by issuing 
special bonuses, called Cost of Living Allowances. These were increased every year and 
could be quite sizeable. In 1947 for example, they stood at 70 per cent of a salary. The waa 
still considered such bonuses to be inadequately matched to the cost of living.
18 Daly reports that at the end of 1948, dhurra (millet), the cereal used as a staple food by Su-
danese families had risen to a price 736 per cent higher than its price in 1938 (Daly, 2003, 
302–303).
19 ‘Statistics provided by the Medical Authorities for hospital admissions do not reveal that 
there exist in Atbara any industrial diseases directly due to conditions of work or to bad 
housing or sanitation… The Medical Authorities have no evidence to show that railway 
workers are suffering from malnutrition or an inadequate diet’. The National Archives of 
the uk (tna): Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry, Khartoum, 14.4.1948, fo 
371/69235, p. 11.
20 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Report of the Independent Committee of En-
quiry, Khartoum, 14.4.1948, fo 371/69235, p. 14.
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services (Fawzi, 1955; Lewis, 1962; Perkins, 1993, 99–122; Sikainga, 1996, 73–95 
and 149–183). From the government’s perspective, any refusal to improve such 
a debasing environment was deemed impossible in the framework of the Lon-
don directives, which—as we have seen—had made improvements in work-
ing conditions a precondition of development funding. Thus, Khartoum had 
no choice but to listen carefully to the demands for reform put forward by the 
workers.
But the divergence of opinion between London and Khartoum was only 
barely concealed. Bevin, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, accused the 
Sudanese government of not keeping up with the new ideas about develop-
ment and labour, while others in London considered the government as out-
right reactionary.21 Thus, it fell to the labour officers, people like Audsley and 
Brown, to mediate between these two visions and find a consensual narrative 
that would work on the ground. So, for example, in April 1948 Audsley pro-
vided the Sudanese Government with a functional way of interpreting the waa 
strike. He blamed the association, but with certain reservations:
[The leaders of the waa] … have had no experience of collective bar-
gaining and negotiation and there is an absence of tact, calmness in 
debate and discretion in argument; their oriental political mindedness 
and practice weight against them regarding, to us, normal Trade Union 
behaviour.22
Therefore—Audsley went on—the duty of the government was not only 
to elaborate legislation, but also to teach its counterparts how to negotiate: 
‘A heavy responsibility rests upon these officials to prepare the Sudanese for 
industrial self-government…’. Meanwhile, he was also suggesting how British 
officers should set their own emotional tone: trade unionists had to be treated 
‘with patience and helpful encouragement by the British officials.’23 This dis-
cursive repertoire is widely present in the sources. Another report on trade 
unions admonished British officers to attend to ‘the tender plant of mutual 
21 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Minute to Atlee, 7.7.1947, fo 371/62557, na, quot-
ed in Cross (1997, 246); Notes concerning the Sudan Railway Strike, M. Audsley, Cairo, 
26.4.1948, fo 371/69235.
22 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Notes concerning the Sudan Railway Strike, 
M. Audsley, Cairo, 26.4.1948, fo 371/69235, p. 3.
23 Ibid.
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confidence’.24 Cowan, the labour officer that followed Brown, expressed this 
concept eloquently: ‘It is going to be an uphill job demanding limitless pa-
tience on the part of all British officials, who are being constantly reminded 
that they are the representatives of an alien Government.’25
A tangible example of how labour attachés managed to reconcile Sudan’s 
administrators hostile to the new labour directives is the framing of the new 
Trade Union Ordinance in 1948 by R. Brown. A civil servant with extensive ex-
perience in labour conflicts, Brown perceptively understood that the Sudanese 
government had to be given some safeguards. While being almost a word-for-
word copy of the nineteenth century British Trade Union Act, the ordinance 
contained one fundamental difference: in order to be recognised, trade unions 
had to register, and to do so, they had to draft their statutes and submit them 
to a Registrar of Trade Unions, which would examine them, and approve—or 
not—the union. Despite this, Brown was more sympathetic than others to Su-
danese labour, and worked hard to convince the government to adopt a con-
ciliatory approach.26
Nevertheless, if one compares government statements with regard to labour 
and these statements’ concretisation on the ground, a great discrepancy clear-
ly emerges. When disincarnated and disembodied, the demands of the work-
ers were deemed to be just and reasonable. Documents show, unmistakeably, 
a consensus among government officials that the situation of Sudanese work-
ers had to be improved. And yet, the incarnations of the labour movement— 
including Sulayman Musa and, later, two other famous trade unionists, al-Shafi 
Ahmad al-Shaykh and Muhammad al-Sayyid Sallam—were systematically ha-
rassed and their statements criminalised. All spent quite some time in prison, 
and all were portrayed as opportunists pursuing personal gain. When the new 
Trade Union Ordinance was issued in late 1948,27 for example, the waa bitterly 
24 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Development of Trade Unions in Sudan, undated, 
unsigned, included in Robertson to Allen, 1.11.1950, lab 13/480.
25 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Cowan to Gee, Civil Secretary Office, Khartoum, 
15.2.1949, lab 13/480.
26 The National Archives of the uk (tna): ‘[we must] avoid giving any impression that Gov-
ernment is out either to break up the waa or ‘victimise’ its leaders… so that there can be 
no question of allegations that Government is using its powers as such, in furtherance of 
its interests as the employer.’ The Threatened ‘Indefinite’ Strike of the Railways, R. Brown, 
4.3.1948, fo 371/69235.
27 The National Archives of the uk (tna): The ordinance was issued together with a set 
of new labour laws: the Employers and Employed Persons (Amendment) Ordinance, 
the Workman’s Compensation Ordinance, the Regulation of Trade Disputes Ordinance, 
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criticised it.28 In the opinion of Cowan, this criticism was driven by the per-
sonal agendas of waa leaders:
When all is said and done, the waa have two objections to the Ordinance, 
unexpressed, but none the less real. These are -
1-  It gives freedom to all to organise and waa ‘leadership’ will in due 
course be challenged.
2-  They will have to account for their funds by responsible audit, whereas 
last year a substantial balance of some thousands of pounds sent down 
from Cairo quietly disappeared.29
In other words, for Cowan, the waa leadership opposed the ordinance because 
they were corrupt and power-hungry. But there was more: they had been ‘in-
oculated’ by communism, a fact that—for Cowan—was ‘amply confirmed by 
our meeting with them, and by the propaganda they issue’.30
Demonstrators suffered similar harassment. Demonstrations would typical-
ly take place after a strike, or in protest against the arrest of a union leader, and 
often ended with injuries to the participants. For example, during the strike of 
July 1947 a crowd of around 1,000 people marched to the office of the General 
Manager of the Railways;31 riots followed and dozens were hurt during clash-
es with the police. The army was sent in and 57 participants were arrested. 
During the strike of March–April 1948, when news of the arrest of Sulayman 
Musa spread, a series of demonstrations took place in Khartoum, Port Sudan 
and Atbara. Khartoum was the largest of these, attracting between five and six 
thousand people. Here too, the police was sent in, tear gas used, and people 
wounded, 59 being arrested.32 Such episodes were frequent.
What were the results of this ambiguity between disembodied govern-
ment fantasies regarding the patient taming of childlike labour militants, the 
and the Workshop and Factories Ordinance. Most of this legislation can be found at fo 
371/69235.
28 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Cowan to Gee, Civil Secretary Office, Khartoum, 
15.2.1949, lab 13/480.
29 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Cowan to Gee, Civil Secretary Office, Khartoum, 
15.2.1949, lab 13/480.
30 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Cowan to Gee, Civil Secretary Office, Khartoum, 
15.2.1949, lab 13/480.
31 Sikainga (2002, 106) gives a figure of 5,000 demonstrators.
32 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Telegram from Dakhlia, Khartoum, to Sudanol-
ogy, London, 15.4.1948, fo 371/69235, na. Telegram from Khartoum, unsigned, to Sudanol-
ogy, London, 14.4.1948, fo 371/69235.
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physical repression of the workers—and, in particular, their leaders—and the 
important concessions made to the labour movement? This oscillatory pat-
tern shaped the peculiar form of the labour struggles of the time. First, the 
workers’ movement began to make systematic use of strikes, because it had 
learnt that strikes worked. The waa went on strike in order to be recognised 
in the first place, and then to increase wages and to protest against the exist-
ing trade union regulations; they got it all, even if with certain reservations. 
Indeed, when in 1952 the workers’ movement broke down, it was not because 
strikes had lost their effect, but because the workers refused to go on strike. 
Second, the violent oppression of the government against the workers’ leaders 
generated a strong wave of popular sympathy, a wave which transcended social 
strata. For the workers’ movement, this lent strength and legitimacy to its strat-
egy of confrontation. For the colonial administration, such punctual violence 
neutralised and defused the image that the government was patiently trying 
to build for itself—as a development provider and benefactor of all workers.
4 ‘No bargaining with Employer, no Exemptions from Strikes’33
Even if, by 1949, the waa had learnt of the power of the strike and spoke a 
language that was more confrontational than that of 1946, its leaders limited 
themselves to discussions about labour and kept politics out. And it was from 
1949 that trade unions spread like wildfire among wage workers, for reasons 
that still remain unclear. The numbers are eloquent. After the promulgation of 
the Trade Union Ordinance at the end of 1948, the registration of new unions 
began. Their numbers rose from five in 1949, to 42 at the end of September 1950, 
and to 99 in 1952.34 In March 1949, the waa broke into two different organisa-
tions: the Sudan Railways Trade Union, which—by 1951—had 19,000 members 
and was by far the most powerful union in Sudan, and the Workers’ Congress, 
an umbrella organisation federating all unions, even if the government never 
recognised it officially.35
The British viewed the Workers’ Congress as a more moderate organ than 
the waa. The government found it easier to negotiate with it, and at the end 
33 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Sudan Political Intelligence Summary, December 
1951, fo 371/96846.
34 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Development of Trade Unions in Sudan, undated, 
unsigned, included in Robertson to Allen, 1.11.1950, lab 13/480, and Fawzi (1957, 92).




of 1950 its assessment was that it ‘had on several occasion exercised a wise and 
restraining influence.’36 Indeed, when the congress’s first elections were held, 
neither Sulayman Musa nor al-Tayyib Hassan al-Tayyib presented themselves 
as candidates (they were also close to pensionable age), and only four out of 
the 15 original leaders of the waa were re-elected. The role of the congress as 
an umbrella organisation whose leaders were trained to defend small unions 
was essential to the spread of unionism. Indeed, the number of unionised Su-
danese in relation to the overall number of waged workers—in spite of the un-
certainties inherent in such a calculation—is spectacular. In 1951, the number 
of union members was estimated to be between 70,000 and 120,000, set against 
a total number of salaried, urban workers estimated to be between 150,000 and 
200,000.37 By comparison, in Egypt in 1944 there were 350 registered unions 
with an estimated total membership of 120,000 (Beining and Lockman, 1998, 
293), but Egypt had twice the number of inhabitants and was much more 
industrialised.38 A list of registered Sudanese trade unions compiled in 1951 
included workers from the private and public sectors, and more specifically el-
ementary school teachers, employees of the Sudan Post and Telegraph, bakers, 
tailors and domestic servants, and the staff of private companies such as the 
Gellatly and Hankey (the main shipping company of Port Sudan) or Shell.39
In spite of the higher opinion that those in colonial ranks had of the Work-
ers’ Congress, the number of strikes and workdays lost increased. In January 
1950, the Workers’ Congress asked for a 75 per cent increase in basic salaries, a 
request defined by Robertson as ‘quite fantastic’.40 As their demands were not 
met, the Sudan Railways Trade Union took the initiative and organised a three-
day strike (5–7 March). In some places, including Khartoum, the call to strike 
was supported by 100 per cent of the workforce.41 Smaller unions launched nu-
merous other strikes. On 23 April, the workers of the Medical Dressers Union 
went on strike—to secure their demands for eight-hour shifts—and so did, 
36 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Development of Trade Unions in Sudan, undated, 
unsigned, in Robertson to Allen, 1.11.1950, lab 13/480.
37 Ibid. Note, however, that the census of 1956 estimates the number of urban, waged work-
ers to be 350,000; quoted in Cross (1997, 245).
38 The National Archives of the uk (tna): See also—fo 371/41380: Labour and trade unions 
in Egypt, and fo 371/41379, Labour and the Trade Union Question.
39 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Note on Trade Unionism in Sudan, D.H.J. New-
man, Trade Union Adviser, Khartoum, 26.4.1951, lab 13/480.
40 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Mayall to Allen, African Department, fo, London, 
3.3.1950, fo 371/80607.
41 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Telegram from Dakhlia, Khartoum, to Sudanol-
ogy, London, 6.3.1950, fo 371/80607.
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on the same day, the Workers Union of the Sudan Light and Power Company. 
In October the medical dressers went on strike again. It is to be noted that in 
all such cases the unions opted for strike even before attempting to negoti-
ate.42 Another general strike, from 5 to 8 August 1950, was organised in protest 
against a resolution passed in May by the Legislative Assembly—a Sudanese 
institutional organ set up to frame the steps that would take Sudan towards 
self-determination—for an increase in salaries and cost of living allowances 
that was judged inadequate. And yet, in November, Robertson still could assess 
the situation as ‘not wholly unsatisfactory.’43 He, like many others, was con-
vinced that such strikes were a necessary step along the way of learning how to 
conduct ‘right’ labour negotiations.
New elections at the Workers’ Congress consigned such hopes to bitter dis-
appointment. Between 15 and 21 November, 160 delegates of 48 unions elected 
two individuals considered to have radical leanings—namely, Muhammad al-
Sayyid Sallam as president and al-Shafi Ahmad al-Shaykh as secretary. They 
were described as ‘extremists using the Communist jargon’.44 Al-Shaykh had 
been a member of the waa steering committee, and he was the general sec-
retary of the Sudan Railways Trade Union.45 The Workers’ Congress moved its 
headquarters from Atbara to Khartoum and changed its name to the Sudan 
Workers Trade Union Federation (swtuf) (Fawzi, 1957, 103; Daly, 2002, 323).
With the swtuf, the language of labour rights merged, to an unprecedent-
ed degree, with anti-colonial, communist and pro-Egyptian discourses. Even 
for the labour advisor Audsley, who had several times defended the labour 
movement, the turn taken by the swtuf represented ‘an ominous develop-
ment,’ due to both the communist leanings of its leaders and the dictatorial 
tendencies of the federation, the leaders of which were ready to use their ‘pow-
er as they thought it fit.’46 The actions of the swtuf matched its radicalisa-
tion. While limits to the scope of this chapter make it impossible to describe 
here all the events of the period, outlining just a few should clearly illustrate 
this transformation. The new leadership immediately passed a resolution in 
42 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Telegram from Governor of Khartoum to all Heads 
of Department, Sudan Agent in London, Sudan Agent in Cairo, 22.4.1950, fo 371/80607.
43 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Robertson to Allen, Khartoum, 1.11.1950, fo 
371/80607.
44 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Development of Trade Unions in Sudan, undated, 
unsigned, in Robertson to Allen, 1.11.1950, lab 13/480.
45 Al-Shafi Ahmad al-Shaykh would be hanged by the Nimeiri regime in 1971 along with two 
other communist leaders of the swtuf, Abd al-Khaliq Mahjoub and Joseph Garang.
46 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Audsley, Report on visit to the Sudan from 1st to 
20th February 1951 inclusive, fo 371/90299.
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which they threatened a general strike unless the government revoked both an 
anti-communist decree (the Defence of the Sudan Ordinance) that appeared 
to be tailored against trade unions, and the expulsion of the students of Khor 
Taggat—a secondary school near El Obeid.47 The students had been expelled 
en bloc because they had gone on strike to protest against the bad conditions 
at the school, but in reality the government suspected that they were being 
‘infected’ by communist teachers.48 The link between Khor Taggat, the swtuf 
and the former’s communist sympathies was disturbing for the government. 
While negotiations continued back and forth between the government and the 
swtuf, at the end of 1950 railway firemen49 went on indefinite strike in protest 
against their working conditions.50 The ‘limitless patience’ of colonial officers 
had, by then, almost been used up. Audsley, who at the beginning of 1951 trav-
elled to Khartoum once more, stated: ‘Government continued its patient at-
titude but dealt firmly with the threats … [These threats] were withdrawn but 
veiled warnings … [were given] … as to what the Government could expect if 
the demands of the workers … were not conceded.’51 Dealing ‘firmly with the 
threats’ meant once again arresting the leaders: at the end of December, the 
Railways Management charged five railways union members and al-Shafi Ah-
mad al-Shaykh with ‘defamation’. They were tried and found guilty, and on the 
day of the sentence, railway workers called a sudden three-day general strike 
(27 to 30 December), although the call was not backed by the federation as it 
did not respect the 15 days of notice required.52 In total, 52 railway workers 
were arrested, even if they were quickly released.
47 The National Archives of the uk (tna): The protest of the students of Khor Taggat was 
fully covered by the press (see, for instance, the following issues of al-Shaab: 12, 20 and 
27 January 1951). In English: Political Intelligence Summary, January-February 1951, fo 
371/90108. Secondary literature on the strike is scarce, but see Daly (2002, 346). In total, 76 
of the 119 boys expelled were later readmitted to the school.
48 The National Archives of the uk (tna): The strike was covered by the leftist newspaper 
al-Saraha, issues of 3, 8, and 14 December 1951. It was also described in the Sudan Political 
Intelligence Summary, November-December 1950, fo 371/90108, and covered generally in 
fo 317/90229.
49 Stokers tending the fireboxes of locomotives.
50 The strike was fully covered in the Weekly Press Reviews of December 1950 (Khartoum: 
National Records Office).
51 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Audsley, Report on visit to the Sudan from 1st to 
20th February 1951 inclusive, fo 371/90299.
52 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Sudan Political Intelligence Summary, January-
February 1951, fo 371/90108.
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And yet, it was exactly at this moment that several unions under the  umbrella 
of the swtuf began feeling uncomfortable with the federation’s strategy. Two 
general strikes were called in three months—the first on 17 February and the 
second on 23 April 1951—both demanding that the government deliver the 
usual 75 per cent increase in salaries. However, the first strike was described 
by the British as ‘unpopular’53 creating severe tensions within the federa-
tion as many unions were against it,54 while with regards to the second, 20 
unions out of 43 bluntly refused to participate in the proposed industrial ac-
tion.55 This gave the government hope that the obdurate strategy pursued by 
the swtuf was losing ground and that finally moderate forces were raising 
their heads.
In the following months, the same pattern repeated itself: the government 
exerted force not on trade unions as a whole, but on specific individuals; it was 
‘firm’ with the heads and ‘patient’ with the members. Yet, this attitude led only 
to further mass protests. And the popular support generated for the federation 
as a reaction to government harassment further fuelled the swtuf’s drive to 
radicalism, without the federation realising that its members were apparently 
not ready to follow it in its politicisation.
In June 1951, the police went on strike (usually referred to as mutiny). The 
strike has been discussed in detail elsewhere (Berridge, 2011), and here it suf-
fices to mention that it became, for the government, a pretext for arresting 
the ‘communist’ leaders of the swtuf—Muhammad al-Sayyid Sallam and 
al-Shafi Ahmad al-Shaykh—despite the fact that they had not been involved 
in the decision to strike or its implementation. Their imprisonment on dubi-
ous charges triggered a new wave of popular protests. The swtuf organised a 
general strike from August 26 to 29, supported by two-thirds of the unions. In 
Khartoum the workers staged a silent protest, holding ‘placards carrying “Long 
live the struggle of the workers”’.56 This demonstration was momentous also 
for its female participation, even a British telegram noting ‘Nurses at  Khartoum 
53 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Trade Union in the Sudan, Allegations by the 
World Federation of Trade Union (Draft), included in Secretariat, Khartoum to African 
Department, London, 26.10.1951, fo 371/90230.
54 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Audsley, Report on visit to the Sudan from 1st to 
20th February 1951 inclusive, fo 371/90299.
55 The National Archives of the uk (tna): According to an intelligence report, the Executive 
Committee of the swtuf tried several times in May to pass resolutions regarding strikes, 
but these resolutions were defeated. Sudan Political Intelligence Summary, May June 1951, 
fo 371/90109.
56 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Sudan Political Intelligence Summary, July– 
August 1951, fo 371/90109.
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hospitals took part in the demonstrations. This is the first time in the history of 
the Sudan that women have taken part in public demonstrations.’57
By December 1951, the political radicalisation of the swtuf was complete. 
At the elections held between 16 and 21 December, the two arrested leaders 
were reappointed in absentia, and the federation adopted a new  constitution—
voted on by its members—the summary of which is worth quoting at some 
length:
Conference amended the constitution of the federation to permit politi-
cal activities and announced its programme as immediate termination 
of all forms of imperialism in Sudan and reservation of right of self- 
determination. The means of achievement were to be non-cooperation 
with any form of imperialism and formation of a common front with po-
litical organisations having similar objects … The demand for a general 
75% increase in all wages was reiterated and it was decided to stage a 
series of general strikes, one three-day, one four-day, one five-days, each 
separated by a fifteen day interval.58
Such statues explicitly contravened the Trade Union Ordinance—notably the 
clause on political activities. They convey the message that the scope of the 
federation was now the struggle against ‘imperialism’, a struggle to be pursued 
by means of strikes. This attitude was best expressed by the new motto of the 
federation: ‘No negotiation and the strike the only weapon.’59 At this juncture, 
the federation was incarnating possibly the worst-case scenario for the Brit-
ish, and indeed had become the opposite of what they had intended it to be: 
rather than being instruments of development, created to ensure the general 
betterment of society by teaching workers how to defend their interests and be 
good producers, unions had become political organs in the hands of a virulent, 
communist-inspired anti-colonial crew, who moreover saw development as a 
imperialistic ruse.
In early 1952, the federation began to apply its strategy of head-on confron-
tation by calling repeated, short general strikes. The first was called from 20 to 
23 January, and was fully observed by all the unions. The second was called on 
57 The National Archives of the uk (tna): For details of the female nurses’ demonstration—
ciphered message entitled: First Women Demonstrators, fo 371/90230.
58 The National Archives of the uk (tna): From Governor General, Khartoum, to Foreign 
Office, London, 20.12.1951, fo 371/90230.
59 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Sudan Political Intelligence Summary, September 
1951, fo 371/90109.
101‘An Uphill Job Demanding Limitless Patience’
<UN>
23 March, and again was ‘observed by nearly all government employees’, even 
if it was noted that it enjoyed less public sympathy.60 But when it came to the 
third strike things went wrong. Muhammad Sayyid Sallam was finally released 
from prison on 3 April, only to be arrested again on the charge of giving an in-
flammatory anti-colonial speech. Immediately the swtuf called for a general 
strike of an unlimited duration, to begin on 28 April. However, the Railways 
Union flatly refused to participate since the 15-day notice period had not been 
respected. The federation considered that there was no need to comply with 
the requirements of an imperialist ordinance, but not all the unions shared this 
position. That the swtuf seemed to have lost contact with the workers was 
also confirmed by further evidence: first, the strike had been called just before 
payday, meaning that the workers did not have the funds necessary to sustain 
an indefinite strike; second, the federation’s leaders had not consulted anyone 
before calling the strike—a fact that was deeply resented. Grudges with regard 
to the undemocratic tendencies of the federation had been around for a while, 
and the government had been careful to nurture them. Also, since the radicali-
sation of the federation had begun, the government had shrewdly courted a 
potential opposition element. For example, the arrest of Muhammad Sayyid 
Sallam, who was also the head of the Railways Union, opened the way for the 
election of ‘Abdallah Bashir, who was known both for his anticommunism and 
for his mild sympathies for the federation’.61
The strike of 28 April went ahead nevertheless. In retaliation, the police 
immediately arrested 12 members of the federation and carried out house-to-
house searches during which communist literature was allegedly found. This 
time, the colonial government did not hesitate to apply a heavy hand, broad-
casting a message in which it threatened that anyone who was not at work on 
the symbolic date of 1 May would be fired. By 30 April, the strike was over. On 
11 May, a further 17 members of the federation were arrested, of which 11 were 
sentenced to one-year jail terms. The failure of the strike  coincided with the 
rise of moderate forces among the unions, and the re-centring of the discus-
sion on labour negotiations.62 More importantly, following Najib’s coup d’état 
in Egypt in 1952, it became clear that Sudan would imminently gain its free-
dom. The politicians preparing the government of national liberation asked 
60 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Sudan Political Intelligence Summary, March-
April 1952, fo 371/96846.
61 See, for instance, The National Archives of the uk (tna): Political Intelligence Summary, 
September 1951, fo 371/90109.




the workers to collaborate and to suspend industrial action, and so they did, 
remaining mostly silent during the process of self-determination between 1953 
and 1956.
The last point I wish to analyse here, by way of a conclusion, is a sketchy 
close-up of the swtuf’s communism. It is important to note that while there 
is a tendency in the literature to conflate workers’ movements and commu-
nism, their stories do not coincide. The historian Nuri El-Amin (1986, 1987, 
1989, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997) has demonstrated at great length the influence 
of communism on intellectuals and secondary school students. However, this 
section of the population was quite different to that of salaried manual work-
ers. The difference was not necessarily based on literacy—highly skilled arti-
sans were literate—but rather on corporate identities and socio-professional 
categories. The founders and leaders of Sudan’s first communist organisations 
(such as the Sudan Movement of National Liberation, or smnl) were from the 
educated elite and not from the rank and file of the swtuf.63 In the first trial in 
Sudan of individuals accused of communism under the Defence of the Sudan 
Ordinance, in April 1951, 21 people faced charges; six were acquitted. One of 
those released was Muhammad al-Sayyid Sallam, president of the swtuf—as 
it was impossible to prove that he belonged to the Communist party.64 Other 
union leaders, instead, such as al-Shafi Ahmad al-Shaykh and Qasim Amin 
were, admittedly, communists. They had turned to communism, however, 
more because they were militant anti-colonialists than for a close adherence to 
a Marxist ideology. In the communist-inspired party they found a framework 
sufficiently radical and uncompromising to fit their views (Cross, 1997).
A remark of 1951 by Robertson is helpful to understand the sense in which 
the federation’s leaders were communists:
We seem to be in some anger of confusing the meaning of ‘Communism’. 
We have in the Sudan two types of Communism: the strictly theoretical 
and ideological types emanating from the higher schools and the igno-
rant inferiority complex type emanating from the ‘hates and fears fast 
over taking Africa’. I prefer to call the latter ‘revolutionaries’. The former 
63 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Note on Communist Activities in the Sudan, Secu-
rity, Civil Secretary’s office, Khartoum, 4.6.1951, fo 371/90125: ‘There is abundant evidence 
that the communist movement is led by teachers, and in particular those of them in Na-
tional Schools who have less attractive careers and prospects than their contemporaries 
in Government service’. See also: Daly (2002, 280) and El-Amin (1996a, 1996b, 1997).
64 The National Archives of the uk (tna): Extracts from Sudan Weekly Newsletters (Pub-
lished by Public Relation Branch, Civil Secretary Office, Khartoum, 21.4.1951, fo 371/90125.
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are the real ‘Communists’. We have them of course in various walks of life, 
but particularly as teachers in our schools… The latter type, the ‘revolu-
tionaries’, are persistently called ‘Communists’. I do not think them such 
unless a definite link is established either in funds or in statements with 
the former…’65
It was of course easy to mistake one communism for the other, and the above 
remark is one of the rare occasions on which such a distinction was made. The 
mistake was made easier by the fact that the language of the federation—as 
expressed, for example, in its statutes—with its strong anti-imperialist tone, 
appeared to be very radical, and thus similar to, and certainly inspired by, that 
employed by communists. However, the actual bridge between communist 
elite politicians and waged workers was an uneasy one, at least in the early 
1950s. In 1952, the federation’s leaders sought to connect politically with the 
smnl. However, the literature reveals that this was a strategic mistake, since 
union rank and file had little sympathy for the party. Even if more research is 
needed to understand why workers employed a radical language in labour ne-
gotiations, but when it came to vote they supported traditional parties, some 
hypotheses can be forwarded. The communist-inspired language was listened 
to very carefully when issues were connected to work. Many workers were em-
ployed by British or Europeans; they were experiencing hardship because of 
an international economy dominated by colonial powers; and they were living 
their lives in shanty towns where all services were lacking. But, perhaps, when 
these real-life concerns were expressed by an educated elite that had little or 
no connection with the life of the workers, it was harder for the workers to 
trust that elite.
5 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to paint a picture of the steps that led to the birth 
of the workers’ movement in Sudan. The re-conceptualisation of the role of 
the state in development entailed a real redefinition of the negotiating power 
of the workforce. Using a strategy of confrontation, the latter realised that it 
could force the state to listen to its demands. In this sense, the development 
paradigm had an enormous influence on transforming workers into legitimate 
political actors, for the first time in Sudan’s twentieth century history.




However, the focus here has been less on who the actors of the movement 
were and how it worked, than on the relationships and feedback effect be-
tween three actors: the Sudanese government, the Labour Party in power in 
London, and the workers’ movement. Because of the centrality of colonial 
labour debates to the identity and history of the Labour Party, London was 
determined to introduce labour legislation in Sudan, and subordinated the 
granting of development funding to the introduction of measures aimed at la-
bour protection. The Sudanese government was very sceptical of this, but was 
convinced by labour advisors sent from London that it was impossible to stop 
the march of development. But as events got out of hand, the workers’ move-
ment transformed into the worst thing the state had feared it could become—
a radicalised movement that struggled to secure the quickest possible end to 
colonialism.
The curve of the radicalisation of the workers’ movement described in this 
article must not be seen as something inevitable, but as the outcome of a vola-
tile situation. The richness of colonial sources consists precisely in their ability 
to show how this story was ridden with accidents and evolved in a manner 
unexpected by all its actors. Such uncertainties, which were kept confidential 
for fear of losing face with actors that the colonial British officers had no expe-
rience of dealing with, emerge clearly from the dense internal correspondence 
deposited mostly in the National Archives at Kew, London. The Sudanese la-
bour movement was founded by a moderate group whose only previous or-
ganisational experience had been to arrange cultural activities in an old boys’ 
club. It is true that the international situation, and in particular the Egyptian 
example, favoured confrontational attitudes, but as seen, by vocation and ide-
ology the waa was essentially moderate. And yet its interaction with the state 
generated a rapid and unplanned transformation, as a consequence of its lead-
ers feeling harassed, maltreated and not taken seriously by the government, 
and experiencing the state’s actions as incomprehensible and unjust.
And in a mirror-like manner, the government hardened its response because 
it saw the workers’ reactions as equally inexplicable: they were ungrateful and 
unmoved by the government’s ‘limitless patience’ in teaching them how to run 
good trade unions. Colonial officers that perceived themselves to be merciful 
and forgiving, patient and pedagogical, watched with stupor as each of their 
initiatives triggered more protests. And this in turn provoked self-defeating 
strategies such as the persecution of trade union leaders, which contributed to 
a great extent to the success of the movement beyond the wage workers.
Finally, the third unexpected development was the exhaustion of the work-
ers’ bellicose strategy. A series of blunders revealed that labour had ceased to 
105‘An Uphill Job Demanding Limitless Patience’
<UN>
be at the centre of the preoccupations of union leaders, and that those leaders 
had lost sight of workers’ basic needs. Eventually, a form of consensus emerged 
through these conflicts, with the elaboration of a status quo that lasted until 
the end of the 1950s.
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chapter 5
The Activities of Adl Wal Ihsane in the 
Neighbourhoods. How to Build a ‘Non-Legal’ 
Consensus from a ‘Tolerated’ Conflict
Merieme Yafout
Abstract
Based on observation of the activities of the female members of the Moroccan Islamist 
movement Justice and Spirituality (Al Adl Wal Ihsane, awi) at neighbourhood level, 
this chapter analyses the conception of development fostered by this movement and 
tries to answer the following questions: how do conflicting visions of development 
(those of awi, the authorities and other associations) live together in the same neigh-
bourhood, and what do the interactions between these different active participants tell 
us about modes of government on the local scale? If we view Islamists as agents of hu-
man development, and religious education and spirituality as important elements in 
this development, we see how complex the social and political relations are that the 
Islamist movement has with power and with society as a whole. The interactions of Is-
lamist movements with various local players highlight a dialectic between conflict and 
consensus based on a ‘Western’ hegemonic model of development. This dialectic allows 
other strategies to find expression—strategies that flourish in daily  activities—and 
other conceptions of what is seen as a ‘good’ way of conducting one’s life. Intentional 
or not, strategies of discharge, differentiation, discretion, competition or compliance, 
and the alternative modes of governance and conduct of life that this article highlights, 
show that the relationships between different players cannot be reduced just to conflict 
or consensus, and that their behaviour cannot be explained solely as a form of rejection 
or acceptance. The neo-liberal paradigm of development can comprise both a com-
mon ground and a place of conflict between quite different models of society.
1 Introduction
Assoc1 is a women’s association founded in 2006 that works in a poor neigh-
bourhood of Casablanca. The association operates an economic micro-project 
1 This is one of the women’s associations that I observed during field research I conducted as 
part of my doctoral thesis on the status of women in Islamist movements in Morocco (Yafout, 
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for local women who also benefit from literacy courses, awareness campaigns, 
and workshops that provide training in manual work. In addition to these ac-
tivities, Assoc provides extra classes for students of different ages and conducts 
other long-term activities such as health campaigns, legal awareness classes 
and lectures on women’s issues. According to one official from Assoc, all of 
these activities are meant to ‘help women evolve from their status as mere con-
sumers and gain financial independence and participate fully in development. 
Through these activities, we motivate women to emerge from their cocoons 
and attend various training courses that educate them to adopt a spirit of pro-
duction and productivity and, above all, a critical mind, which will prevent 
them from falling into the trap of Wahhabism.’2
In principle, these activities are no different from those of the majority of 
active women’s groups in poor neighbourhoods and rural areas. Literacy pro-
grammes, awareness campaigns, workshops giving training in manual work, 
and cooperatives are all part of the current hegemonic model of development 
consisting in particular of assistance to micro-projects, micro-credit, income-
generating activities, literacy, etc. Similarly, the vocabulary and lexicon used 
by Assoc are those of the dominant dogma with its references to economic ef-
ficiency, participation and individual responsibility. However, these activities 
can be seen in a quite different light if we take into account the fact that Assoc 
is forced to deploy an arsenal of precautions simply in order to exist, and in 
particular to conduct its activities in such a way that they are not prohibited. 
Indeed, two members of its governing bodies belong to the Islamist movement 
Justice and Spirituality (Al Adl Wal Ihsane, awi);3 a movement considered as 
2012). The research was conducted between 2008 and 2012. The data analysed in this chapter 
are mainly the result of participant observation of the activities of the women studied and 
of semi-structured interviews I conducted with them. To ensure the anonymity of the as-
sociation, neither its name nor the name of the neighbourhood will be cited. [The author’s 
pseudonymous name for this association is ‘Ass’, which I have replaced, passim, by the less 
equivocal name ‘Assoc’—translator’s note.].
2 Interview with one of Assoc’s officials; Casablanca, 23 January 2009.
3 The history of this movement is linked to that of its founder, Abdessalam Yassine, who in 
1974 sent a letter of advice to King Hassan ii. Following this act, he suffered a series of acts 
of repression. In 1982 he created the Islamic charitable association that in 1987 adopted the 
slogan Al Adl Wal Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality), and, until his death in 2012, led radical 
opposition to the Moroccan political regime. The position taken by this movement led to 
the imprisonment and repression of its leaders and many of its members. During the 1990s, 
the movement expanded dramatically in universities and then became the largest Moroccan 
 Islamist movement. Until now, awi has refused to engage itself in institutional political life 
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‘not legal but tolerated’.4 This proximity shifts the focus of the analysis from 
‘development’ to ‘development conflicts’, highlighting the competition, differ-
ences and alternative modes of government at the local level.
The history of the awi movement has been marked by its conflict with 
the monarchy. Indeed, since its birth in 1974 it has opposed the very bases of 
the latter: its hereditary character and its religious legitimacy.5 This is what 
explains its ambiguous status, reflected in the journalistic description of the 
movement as ‘semi-tolerated’. Having failed to establish a change from above 
by persuading the head of the regime to reform the country,6 this movement 
is in favour of a change of society from the bottom up and places the concept 
of tarbiya (education) at the centre of its programmes. In awi’s theory, this 
concept derives its meaning from emphasising the importance of the human 
being and his or her happiness in earthly life and in the hereafter, thus estab-
lishing the link between a spiritual dimension that aims to change individuals 
from within and the values of social justice and dignity. The primary purpose 
of education, it claims, is to help make the human being ‘free and indepen-
dent’, living ‘with dignity’—and this objective can be achieved only if human 
beings suffer neither poverty nor injustice (Yassine, 1998). It is on the basis 
of this logic that the movement campaigns for social justice and is critical of 
the neo-liberal policies adopted by the state, which in its view ignore the facts 
and are ineffective, alienating, elitist, and produce injustice. awi criticises the 
fact that the state accepts the ‘ready-made recipes’ imposed by hegemonic 
forces that consider the human being as a resource, as a ‘consumer’ and as 
a ‘market’ (Yassine, 1994, 189). However, this does not prevent the movement 
but advocates non-violence and gradual change through education. It was one of the key 
players of the 20 February movement, which was initiated in 2011 as part of the ‘Arab Spring’.
4 This expression is frequently used by the media to describe the legal status of awi. See, for 
example, the article in TelQuel (2015).
5 The monarchy in Morocco bases its religious legitimacy on the principle of the ‘Commander 
of the Faithful’—a traditional title reinvented during the reign of Hassan ii granting the King 
a double ‘mission’: the safeguarding of religion and the management of public affairs. See 
Tozy (1999).
6 Abdessalam Yassine, at the time a senior figure in education and training, a former follower 
of the Boutchichiya zawiya (a Sufi brotherhood), sent a letter to King Hassan ii requesting 
that he seeks redemption (attawba) and calling on him to ‘take the initiative in the authentic 
rebirth of Islam’. The King’s reaction was to intern Yassine in a hospital wing for tuberculosis 
patients, and then in a mental asylum for a total of three and a half years. Yassine is consid-
ered to have been one of the leading ideologues of Islamism (Tozy, 2009, 72) from 1973 to his 
death in December 2012; he wrote dozens of books setting out his project and his vision of 
Muslim history, of modern society and the state.
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from using the data produced by this dominant dogma. So it draws on inter-
national statistics and reports, including those that rank countries according 
to human development indices, to show the negative impact of these policies 
on the daily lives of Moroccans. The sectors of education and health, it claims, 
have been continually at risk since the adoption of structural adjustment pro-
grammes. Through the privatisation of several sectors, the opening up of the 
economy to international markets, internal economic liberalisation, and the 
increasing financial dependency of Morocco on investors and foreign lenders, 
these policies have, it is claimed, caused widening inequalities.
These critiques bring out the very different conception of development 
promoted by awi: it views the state as a central agent of development and 
therefore establishes an ideal-typical construction of the role of a ‘good gov-
ernment’ whose priority is to deconstruct dependency on the West and to 
adopt a strategy that takes into account local contexts, with their own norms, 
values and structures. As Abdessalam Yassine noted, a ‘good government’ 
should adopt an education policy that ‘frees us from alienation’ (Yassine, 1994, 
120), producing, in different areas including industry, skills that are essential 
for liberating Muslims from their status as ‘consumers, importers and debtors’ 
(Yassine, 1994, 182). So it is a reading of development focused simultaneously 
on Third World and nationalist values that emerges from these criticisms; a 
relatively interventionist conception of the state, different from the one de-
veloped by liberal Islamists of the Justice and Development Party (Parti de la 
justice et du développement, pjd).7 Thus, to a concept of development con-
sidered as superficial and alienating, the awi movement prefers a concept of 
education that puts human beings at the centre of all ‘real’ development by 
focusing on their spiritual, social and economic fulfilment.
However, the critical vision of state development policies adopted by the 
awi movement contradicts its earlier assessment of the Assoc association, 
even though Assoc is close to awi. Assoc pursues activities that are ‘mundane’ 
and ‘ordinary’ compared to what other associations do, and undoubtedly fits 
into the development policies and liberalisation reforms introduced by the 
7 The pjd is an Islamist party and has been in government since 2011, following the early elec-
tions held as part of the ‘Arab Spring’. It was created in 1996 following the integration of a 
group of members of the Islamist Movement of Unification and Reform (Mouvement de 
l’unification et de la réforme: mur) into the party of the Constitutional Democratic Popular 
Movement (Mouvement populaire démocratique constitutionnel: mpdc) created in 1967 by 
Abdelkrim Al Khatib. Under the colours of this party, members of the mur participated in 
elections for the first time in 1997, before the party changed its name, in 1998, to the Justice 
and Development Party (Parti de la justice et du développement: pjd) and continued to pre-
pare for its gradual entry into institutional politics.
��3The Activities of Adl Wal Ihsane in the Neighbourhoods
<UN>
 government at the local level. This assessment lies at the origin of this chap-
ter. Based on observation of the activities of the women members of awi at 
neighbourhood level, this chapter tries to show how the different view of de-
velopment fostered by awi is realised, how conflicting visions of development 
(those of awi, the authorities and other associations) live together in the same 
neighbourhood, and what the interactions between these different active 
participants tell us about modes of government on the local scale. The neigh-
bourhood will thus be considered as a place where the conceptions, activities, 
convergences, divergences and strategies of different active participants all fit 
together.
Thanks to its existence as ‘tolerated’ despite being ‘non-legal’, the awi move-
ment has, since the late 1990s, proceeded to create neighbourhood associa-
tions. These provide it with a legal framework in which residents can approach 
it without fear. However, the creation of an association by awi members must 
be achieved without the knowledge of the authorities and, for the association 
to exist and carry out its activities, a number of precautions and adaptations 
are necessary, as explained below. It is also important to note that community 
action is only complementary to other awi activities in the neighbourhood. 
Despite its status, the presence of awi in the neighbourhood is still based on 
the educational activities it carries out as an Islamist movement that sees it-
self as legal.8 Thus, the women members of awi studied in this paper act in 
the neighbourhood primarily as a branch of the national women’s section that 
conducts spiritual education work and ‘consciousness raising’. Then, depend-
ing on how closely they are controlled by the authorities, they act through one 
or more associations that provide development activities ‘like all the other 
associations’.
2 A Women’s Association Like All Others
While observing the various actions performed by women members of awi 
in the neighbourhood under consideration, I paid particular attention to the 
Assoc women’s association for social development. Of the seven members 
who form its executive office, two are members of awi while the five others 
are sympathisers. Aged between 25 and 35, they are conducting an economic 
micro- project that benefits almost forty residents in the neighbourhood. Early 
in the morning, certain women come into the association’s premises to bake 
8 awi members state that several verdicts pronounced by Moroccan law courts confirm that 
the movement is indeed legal.
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their own bread, while others prefer to do so at home and bring it to the asso-
ciation. At 11:30 a.m., they begin to sell these products in a small shop belong-
ing to the local association. ‘All the women who live in the surrounding streets 
buy our products; they know that it’s clean and it’s properly made’, says a young 
woman responsible for sales in the shop.9 Afternoons are devoted to the dif-
ferent workshops open to women of the neighbourhood. Thus, one of the four 
little rooms on the premises is used by women of various ages taking literacy 
classes provided by two young women, each of them supervising one group. 
Thirty-eight women benefit from these courses and, as only one room is avail-
able for education, the supervisors are forced to divide them into two groups: 
the first group is taught between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m.; the second from 4 p.m. to 
6 p.m. Soumaya, one of the supervisors, tells us that ‘the number of women 
who want to get involved in reading and writing keeps increasing but, unfortu-
nately, we have only one room. To solve this problem, the board members have 
managed to establish a partnership with a nearby school that opens its rooms 
from 6 p.m. onwards so as to cater for other women.’10
The second room on the premises is reserved for learning crafts. Three 
workshops are held jointly: a sewing workshop set up in a corner equipped 
with sewing machines; a glass painting workshop in another corner; and a ce-
ramic workshop in a third corner. The third room, meanwhile, opening onto 
the kitchen and equipped with a large oven, is intended for learning the culi-
nary arts: women come here to swap and prepare different recipes, and their 
products are also sold in the aforementioned shop: Moroccan-style pancakes 
(msemen, baghrir), rolls, cakes, etc. At night, from 7 p.m. onwards, extra lessons 
for children and teenagers are provided. Direct support from awi members is 
more important here: ‘The teaching “sisters” or “brothers”11 of the youth sec-
tion have access to the free extra lessons, while the parents of recipients pay a 
nominal fee to the association’, says the association’s president.12
In addition to these daily activities, the board of the association organ-
ises weekly or monthly activities: health campaigns, legal awareness classes, 
lectures on women’s issues, etc. Moreover, the treasurer of Assoc says that 
the association supports several women economically: in addition to the 
aforementioned forty women, there are also those who, thanks to various 
workshops, have set up small-scale sewing projects or bake cakes to order, for 
9 Interview; 23 January 2009.
10 Interview with an Assoc literacy teacher; Casablanca, 23 January 2013.
11 The terms ‘sister’ and ‘brother’ are part of the lexicon usually employed by the militants 
of the Islamist movement to refer to one another.
12 Interview with the president of Assoc; Casablanca, 23 January 2009.
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example. With the exception of the secretary, who is paid a small sum, the 
work of the board members and workshop supervisors is voluntary. Thus, the 
treasurer of the association explains that ‘the association earns ten santimat 
for each product sold in the store. This provides us with just enough to pay the 
rent for the premises and the local store and the various expenses: water, elec-
tricity […] As for equipment, such as ovens, tables, sewing machines, kitchen 
utensils and so on, they are usually donations.’13 In addition to the activities 
held within the association, others are organised from time to time in peniten-
tiaries or orphanages, and the board of the association partners with colleges 
and high schools to sensitise teenagers to the dangers of drugs and alcohol and 
prevent all forms of juvenile delinquency.
Volunteers are motivated by a wide range of ‘moral sentiments’: commit-
ment, altruism, self-sacrifice. But not these alone. Some are also driven by a 
love of community work or by the desire to occupy their free time, to commu-
nicate with others, to find work opportunities, and to feel useful. The associa-
tion represents a friendly and feminine space where everyone knows everyone 
else, including the beneficiaries. In addition, mothers like it there because the 
activities they carry out in this space do not conflict with their roles as mothers. 
On the contrary, their maternal role is facilitated. In addition, various financial 
resources ensure the survival of the association: the income from the sale of 
products covers the major expenses (rent, water, electricity) while donations 
from benefactors and partnerships provide free premises for literacy classes.
To complement these resources, the association’s board has prepared an ap-
plication for financial aid from usaid14 and other international organisations, 
as well as from the National Initiative for Human Development (Initiative na-
tionale du développement humain, indh). The latter is part of a social and 
solidarity policy that Morocco adopted in the late 1990s and is one of those 
projects that are given priority treatment and media coverage as they are asso-
ciated with the King (Bono, 2009; Catusse, 2011). Launched in 2005, this initia-
tive funds local development micro-projects in order to fight against poverty 
by providing the poor with the means of breaking out of poverty by themselves 
(Bono, 2010 and 2013). It likewise encourages charitable activity. If the activities 
carried out by Assoc are no different from those performed by other neigh-
bourhood associations, applying for funding from the indh and international 
13 Interview with the treasurer of Assoc; Casablanca, 23 January 2009.
14 The us Agency for International Development (usaid) says it supports projects in 
 Morocco in the fields of economy and employment, for participation in governance, 
education and social reforms as well as for gender equality. See https://www.usaid.gov/
morocco (accessed on 1 June 2016).
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agencies constitutes a tactic for obtaining additional resources and a legitima-
tion that does not necessarily amount to an endorsement of reigning dogmas. 
The fact remains that this strategy, which validates the compliance of Assoc’s 
activities with the hegemonic model so heavily criticised elsewhere by awi, 
constitutes an active participation in this model and, more generally, is a way 
of spreading this dominant paradigm.15
3 Strategies of Differentiation, Compliance and Restriction  
in the Community Field
While these programmes seem to converge with those of other associations 
active in the same neighbourhood, and with development policies more gen-
erally undertaken by public authorities and international organisations, in-
terviewees try to assign to them a different meaning, which in fact confirms 
the ideological link between members of the executive office of Assoc and the 
awi movement. Take literacy, for example; for these people, it assumes the fol-
lowing meaning: ‘For us, literacy is not limited to learning how to read and 
write. Indeed, through this operation, we transmit a body of knowledge whose 
primary aim is to know God […] This is for us a community framework that 
combines traditional programmes with an awakening of consciences and a 
spiritual education.’16
Literacy, then, becomes a means of inculcating a system of values in its ben-
eficiaries. One interviewee reveals that, at first, some women resort to the asso-
ciation ‘out of curiosity’ but that subsequently they may break off their activity 
with it because of family commitments or a certain fatigue, or simply due to a 
lack of motivation. To avoid this type of failure, the leaders of Assoc motivate 
participants by highlighting the Islamic model: ‘We motivate women to play a 
positive role in their circle by drawing on the historical models of the female 
companions of the Prophet, the Hadith [the words and deeds of the Prophet], 
and koranic verses: this makes them more easily convinced of the virtues of 
community action.’17
15 This constrained participation, which stems from opportunism, a tactic of recognition, 
or a strategy aiming at efficiency and a very specific goal, was already highlighted by 
 Weber (2006) and is very common in the world of development, given its bureaucratisa-
tion  (Hibou, 2012; Kemp and Berkovitch, 2013).
16 Interview with an Assoc literacy teacher; Casablanca, 23 January 2013.
17 Interview with an Assoc official; Casablanca, 23 January 2009.
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The awakening of consciences and the spiritual education mentioned by the 
interviewees recall the educational project sponsored by awi since the 1980s. 
According to this project, the individual must change from within to realise his 
or her spiritual journey to God. But change from within can only be achieved 
if the individual has not suffered from injustice. Thus, education is presented 
as a multidimensional process of change that acts first on the individual, pre-
sented as the main agent in the change, then spreads throughout society and 
reduces injustice. One of the basic mechanisms is coaching people with the 
aim of ‘awakening their consciences.’ This education ‘from below’ requires an 
awi member to ‘be ubiquitous among the people, in addition to being really 
close to all the social, economic and political difficulties the people are forced 
to suffer’,18 and ‘the awakening of consciences’ is achieved by coaching, spread-
ing the ideas of the movement, and acting as a role model. It is in this context 
that we must understand the community action and all the activities carried 
out by awi members in the neighbourhood, as well as the implications of their 
‘coaching’ the people.
For awi members, this difference in the meaning attributed to commu-
nity activities marks a move away from the hegemonic meaning imposed by 
Western players, which in their view is ‘superficial’.19 In the case of literacy, for 
example, while the hegemonic sense is limited to learning how to read and 
write, the implementation of a ‘broader’ meaning—insofar as it includes the 
behavioural and spiritual dimensions attributed to it by awi—sets it apart 
from other players in this sector. awi is, however, not the only body that works 
towards the education of women. In highly concrete terms, the movement fac-
es two types of competition that help to distinguish it. First, the state has taken 
a firm grip on this activity following the reform of its religious policy based 
on a bureaucratisation of the religious bodies managing mosques:20 in 2005, 
the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs began the feminisation of the reli-
gious bodies in charge of managing mosques. It proceeded to train Murshidat 
(female preachers)21 and female trainers who provide literacy classes for wom-
en in mosques. These trainers have the status of civil servants. Literacy classes 
18 These are the words of an interviewee; I spoke to her, together with a female awi member, 
in Casablanca on 28 May 2009 for my doctoral research.
19 In the words of the previous interviewee.
20 Tozy notes that this religious policy, based—inter alia—on the management and supervi-
sion of the use of mosques and the training of the technicians of worship, dates from the 
early 1980s (Tozy, 2009, 66), but that it has gained momentum since the terrorist attacks 
of 16 May 2003 in Casablanca (Tozy, 2013).
21 On Murshidat, see Yafout (2012).
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and sermons result in the creation of paid jobs. While these public policies un-
doubtedly increase the provision of literacy and thereby form part of a practice 
of development, they take on a particular meaning in the Moroccan political 
context: they express a desire to compete with Islamist movements, starting 
with awi, on their own ground; a strategy designed to restrict the audience for 
these movements by limiting the scope of their actions in this area.
At the same time, the community field is also a field of competition between 
different types of associations, whether they are affiliated with other Islamist 
movements or secular movements or are ‘independent’. For all these associa-
tions, including those that serve as local conduits between the people and the 
public authorities (Berriane, 2009, 183), literacy classes are a privileged way of 
winning women’s sympathies, creating propaganda for a local councillor (Berri-
ane, 2009, 173), or encouraging women to participate in demonstrations. Again, 
this competition points to the very different nature of associations linked to 
awi, which—while developing similar or even identical programmes—aim to 
instil in their offerings a different direction and occupy the ‘other’ dimension 
of development that they integrate into education programmes.
4 Between Compliance and Discharge: Strategies of Discretion  
and the Price to be Paid for Existing
For the interviewees, Assoc is an example of a ‘successful’ association. For not 
all associations manage to obtain authorisation or to carry out their activi-
ties, due to their proximity to awi and the fact that awi members belong to 
their governing bodies. The creation of associations is subject to control, and 
sometimes repression: an association receives its authorisation only once an 
investigation has been carried out into each member of its executive; and the 
experiences of the women members of awi that I interviewed suggest that if 
that investigation reveals that one or more members of an association have any 
connection with the movement, the association is not authorised. Interview-
ees say they face many challenges on this point: ‘We prepare our files properly 
and with respect for the law, and we deliver them to the authorities, yet they 
still don’t grant us authorisation. They don’t openly refuse; they keep telling us 
to come back some other time, until we finally understand that the authorities 
are indirectly refusing to grant us our authorisation…’22
When the authorities discover, only after granting authorisation, that a 
member of an association’s board is connected to awi, either they apply the 
22 Interview with an Assoc official; Casablanca, 23 January 2013.
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procedure of ‘arbitrary closure’ of the association, or they bring a set of pres-
sures to bear on that association’s activities. Interviewees refer to ‘the cancel-
lation without notice of our activities’ and ‘the categorical and unexplained 
refusal to let us use public places for our activities’.23 Faced with such repres-
sion and surveillance, awi members deploy what I call ‘strategies of discre-
tion’. The process of creation of Assoc reveals what this discretion consists 
of and the precautions that are taken. For example, awi members must con-
vince both the neutral and its supporters that community action is important, 
so it is they, and not the awi itself, who approach the authorities to file the 
application for authorisation. In addition, only one or two members of the 
movement—who should not be known to the authorities—join the executive 
board. The necessity of these precautions shows that the community field con-
tinues to be largely controlled by government bodies that are trying to limit 
the development of the network of community activities set up by their op-
ponents. Yasmine Berriane notes that control relies on a set of processes: a 
preliminary inquiry is held into potential executive board members prior to 
the authorisation being issued; each new activity and each demonstration is 
the subject of a report that must be submitted to the general affairs division 
of the prefecture; and the presence of a representative of the local authori-
ties is mandatory at all general assemblies (Berriane, 2009, 165). And in the 
case of associations linked to Islamism, Mohamed Tozy emphasises that ‘the 
state responds to the very dense community fabric created by the Islamists 
by restricting public freedoms’ (Tozy, 1999, 180). So these control measures 
also explain the above-mentioned strategies, both of adherence to dominant 
norms and, specifically, of compliance with hegemonic paradigms. Arguably, 
in the case of associations related to awi, the at least apparent compliance 
of their activities and their adherence to the orthodoxy of development is a 
‘strategy of discretion’ that makes them seem perfectly ordinary, allowing them 
to blend into a dense fabric of activities that do not distinguish them from 
other associations, do not make them particularly visible, and do not expose 
them to prohibition or pressure. This compliance is in large part forced, for 
financial reasons among others, since obtaining financial resources from the 
indh and international organisations requires compliance with formal rules, 
but also adherence to institutional structures that embody the great ideologies 
of the moment. The chairs of the local committees of the indh (often chairs 
of the local arrondissement) play an essential role in defining local needs and 
screening projects for funding (Berriane, 2009, 178). This means that any active 
participant who aspires to have his or her project funded must comply with the 
23 Interview with an Assoc official; Casablanca, 24 January 2013.
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definitions of needs  established by these local committees (Bono, 2009). Thus, 
the indh works ‘as an instrument for domesticating a micro-community field 
that is rapidly growing and difficult to control’ (Berriane, 2009, 187).
But this strategy of discretion only works because public authorities are 
willing to let it. And they ‘are willing’ partly because these associations fulfil 
certain duties and responsibilities of the state. This is the strategy of ‘turning a 
blind eye’ or ‘laissez-faire’, which is a classic example of indirect government: 
as in other types of developmental intervention, this strategy of letting social 
dynamics flourish, so long as they do not fundamentally interfere with the 
policies or visions defended by public institutions, is commonplace and easily 
accepted, as it allows the state to ‘discharge’24 its responsibilities onto others 
so as to achieve its goals.25 In fact, women’s associations have a dual function: 
by increasing the funding opportunities for development micro-projects at the 
local level, the various community players contribute to providing a sense of 
socio-economic security; by providing an association member with status and 
a more or less extensive network of connections, community action contrib-
utes to ‘hiding’ the problem of unemployment. What applies to associations in 
general also applies to those associations related to awi. This is true of Assoc: 
five out of the seven members of its board have university degrees (biology, 
English literature, Arabic literature and Islamic studies) and two hold tech-
nical diplomas. Only three have jobs—as teachers in primary or secondary 
schools. The other four, including the chair of the association, are unemployed. 
For these women, working for the association helps mitigate the impression of 
having nothing to do or of being useless.26 ‘Here, I can meet up with people, I 
can pursue different activities that give me a sense of relief even if I do them 
for free, and I feel useful.’27 The chair of the association says: ‘When I’m seek-
ing aid for the association or seeking to form partnerships, I go out to people; 
I meet important individuals (head teachers in schools, benefactors) and this 
gives me the opportunity to introduce myself and to demonstrate my skills, 
and it can also open up work opportunities.’28 So community action can be a 
gateway to the labour market thanks to the networks of relationships that it 
enables community workers to develop. Irene Bono calls community activity ‘a 
24 In Weber’s sense, as developed by Béatrice Hibou (Hibou 1999a and 1999b).
25 This idea, inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, is highlighted by Béatrice Hibou 
 (Hibou, 2011). See also Pereira (2009) and Meddeb (2015).
26 Many studies of community action agree that it helps to conceal the problem of unem-
ployment (Bono, 2010; Berriane, 2009).
27 Interview with a member of the executive board of Assoc; Casablanca, 23 January 2009.
28 Interview with the chair of Assoc; Casablanca, 23 January 2009.
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business card’ (Bono, 2010, 41). Be that as it may, this finding suggests strategies 
of ‘discharge’ since the Islamists of awi (though the same can be said of those 
of the Movement of Unification and Reform (Mouvement de l’unification et de 
la réforme, mur)) reject violence and support the sensitisation of young peo-
ple to the virtues of non-violence through spiritual education,29 to the great 
benefit of both social order and the public authorities.
The charitable and benevolent activities carried out by awi as an Islamist 
movement make another form of ‘discharge’ possible. Competition brought 
about by government intervention has not succeeded in excluding Islamists 
from the neighbourhoods, where they continue to have a presence and to in-
fluence everyday life.
Thus, the media report on the various charitable actions carried out and the 
assistance provided by awi in neighbourhoods and towns where the govern-
ment has clearly failed in its duty. This is the case, for example, with regard to 
the aid provided to those populations that, in February 2009, suffered from 
floods in the Gharb30 region and to the victims of a factory fire in a working-
class district in Casablanca, ignored by the authorities.31 These examples can 
be seen as reflecting a desire on the part of awi to embarrass the government 
by forcing it to face up to its shortcomings; but we can also see them as an 
opportunity seized by the authorities to discharge some of its responsibilities 
onto awi, even though the movement is opposed to the Moroccan regime. It is 
thus clear that not all outcomes are intentional, either on the government side 
(which in spite of itself legitimises awi), or on the side of awi (which unwit-
tingly contributes to a political order that it condemns).
5 Change the Individual to Change Society: The Different  
Senses Given to Education and the Conduct of Life
In the neighbourhood under study, women members of awi also perform 
activities of ‘spiritual education’ and ‘education of consciences’, acting as the 
29 On spiritual education, see the following section on changing the individual. On non-
violence, see Cavatorta (2006, 214).
30 The flooding occurred in the regions of Sidi Yahya, Sidi Kacem and Sidi Slimane. News 
organisations even revealed that the local authorities sought help from awi to rescue 
and support the people affected. See http://www.hespress.com/faits-divers/11125.html 
(accessed on 1 June 2016).
31 According to a community activist close to awi, interviewed in Casablanca on 13 April 
2009, awi came to the aid of the families of fire victims who had been abandoned both 
by the authorities and by the officials of the factory in question.
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female section of the movement. Unlike those activities promoted by associa-
tions open to all women in the neighbourhood, these activities primarily target 
members of awi.
These members follow an intense programme of spiritual activities: ‘sittings’, 
good advice and spiritual retreats. ‘Sitting’ is the translation of the Arabic term 
jalassates, commonly used by Islamists to refer to weekly religious education 
meetings that assemble a very limited number of members (not exceeding 
ten). The programme includes dhikr (litany); learning the Koran; and lessons 
that exhort participants to practise dhikr, citing its importance and benefits; as 
well as learning the basic practices of religion (ablutions, prayer). As for majlis 
annassiha (good advice), these are meetings that are held monthly and whose 
programmes are essentially based on dhikr and learning the ‘moral behaviour’ 
recommended by Islam, including ‘good behaviour’ such as kindness towards 
parents, neighbours, friends and people in general. Spiritual retreats are part of 
a journey towards God and are based primarily on dhikr, optional prayers, eve-
ning prayers, and so on. These programmes are part of a spiritual dimension of 
education that recalls the movement’s adherence to Sufism.32 Focused on con-
cern for the evolution of mankind and on mankind’s ultimate destiny, spiritual 
education consists of programmes that constantly remind the individual that 
there is a hereafter and that his or her earthly life is a continuous preparation 
for this. Thus, through this intense spiritual programme, members are sup-
posed to change from within and acquire strength and inner peace that will 
affect their daily behaviour and contribute to positive change around them, 
in accordance with the awi motto: ‘Change the individual to change society.’
Education is thus endowed with a specific meaning that derives directly 
from the connection it is supposed to have with the spiritual values present 
and put into practice in everyday life with the aim of changing behaviour 
and, thereby, of changing the ways we understand the social aspects of peo-
ple’s lives. In other words, following the Weberian analysis, education is un-
derstood by awi members as a social action meant to help guide how people 
conduct their lives through the values it conveys, and to shape ‘types of men’ 
or, in this case, types of women.33 We can now understand the conflicts con-
cealed behind the consensual perspective that views education as the engine 
32 François Burgat believes that the personal route followed by Abdessalam Yassine illus-
trates both the Sufi contribution to the Islamist outlook and the urgent need to move 
beyond the narrow paths of the tariqua (Sufi Muslim Brotherhood) if one is to gain access 
to that contribution (Burgat, 1995, 20).
33 On the importance of the notions of life conduct and ‘types’, see Weber (2006) and Gros-
sein (2006).
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of  development: the very special way in which awi activists conduct their lives 
reveal interpretations of the world, and especially practices based on these in-
terpretations, that are very different from those produced by associations of a 
secular persuasion, but also different from those of other Islamic associations 
and, of course, the government.
The spiritual education project promoted by awi does indeed strive to be 
different from the religious education offered by others; its difference resides 
in its multidimensional aspects. To begin with, its Sufi dimension promotes 
another facet of development—namely, the ‘change from within’ realised by 
the above programmes (dhikr and spiritual retreats) prescribed by a spiritual 
guide. Yet while awi adopts this Sufi-style approach, it differs from the latter 
by its ambition to supplement that approach with a struggle against injustice, 
which—the movement claims—can be successful only if the movement has 
a permanent presence among the people and provides them with support on 
a daily basis. It is in this sense, too, that awi’s specific character can be seen 
as regards development; ‘conflicts’ (or at least differences) with other social 
actors and groups on the Moroccan scene emerge: religious beliefs are made 
more ‘everyday’ and routine, and need to be placed at the service of economic 
and social practice and thus be more deeply embodied in the way one con-
ducts one’s life. It thus becomes easier to understand the place of ‘mentoring’, 
which involves another dimension of the educational project fostered by awi 
and combines good behaviour and activism in pursuit of sociopolitical rights. 
Education in virtue and morality must make the awi member into the very 
model of a good Muslim, who distinguishes him- or herself by good conduct; 
being constantly ready to help others, to defend their rights and to assist them 
on every level—economic, social and moral.
6 Meetings of the ‘Sisters for Eternity’: Islamist Feminism, 
Empowerment and Increased Conflict
At the neighbourhood level, women from awi also organise monthly meetings 
open to all women. Meetings of the ‘Sisters for Eternity’ make concrete the 
project begun by women from awi in 2000 to train women ‘alimates (theolo-
gians). Although they adopt the view that Muslim women are compelled to oc-
cupy a degrading position and forced to remain marginal, awi women believe 
that it is not Islam as a religion that is responsible for this situation but rather 
the restrictive readings of its texts, for many centuries, by an ulama, more in-
fluenced by the cultural context in which its individual members lived than by 
the liberating spirit of Islam. For the women of awi, the discriminatory nature 
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of classical jurisprudence vis-à-vis women is due in part to the male domina-
tion that has prevailed in the field of interpretation of sacred texts throughout 
the history of Islam: female scrutiny, which they consider necessary if the read-
ing of sacred texts is to emancipate women, having been almost completely 
absent. It is on this basis that awi women claim to take up the challenge of 
ijtihad (the effort to reinterpret and re-contextualise the sacred texts), seek-
ing to master the necessary knowledge and to develop the tools needed to ac-
complish this task of reinterpretation (Yafout, 2012). This project was directly 
encouraged by the thought of Abdessalam Yassine and his promotion of mul-
tidimensional renewal, especially his call for the emancipation of women and 
their mastery of the tools of ijtihad. Thus, the ‘alimates of awi organise month-
ly meetings of the ‘Sisters for Eternity’ in certain cities and neighbourhoods in 
order to study Koranic verses, the Hadith, and historical facts that have often 
been interpreted by classical jurisprudence in a way that marginalises women.
So here we find another point of convergence, at least apparent, with neo-
liberal hegemony: the ability to empower the suppressed (and especially 
women) and allow them to take control; something that echoes the notion of 
‘empowerment’ at the heart of the current dogma of international donors, but 
also of most development programmes in Morocco and elsewhere. Obviously, 
this ability is, in the case of Western developmentalist hegemony, linked to 
economic empowerment, while the empowerment referred to by the women 
of awi results from an intellectual and spiritual effort. It is in this latter sense 
that certain studies describe these meetings as spaces of ‘collective empower-
ment’ (Salime, 2005, 153). But in either case, we find the same emphasis on 
individual action in support of women to change the way in which they are in-
tegrated into society and the world. Indeed, awi women members reconsider 
the sacred texts in the light of the life of the Prophet (Sira) and the lives of his 
companions (men and women), but also in the light of the context in which 
these texts were revealed. They adopt a method that takes into account the cir-
cumstances of revelation (asbab annouzoul), the historical and social context 
of the text and the spirit of gradual change (attadaruj) conveyed by the koranic 
message. The objective of this work is to question any restrictive interpretation 
associating Islam with the subordination of women and to move away from 
any form of discriminatory theory. Thus, in the context of these meetings, con-
troversial jurisprudential concepts are challenged, including those that refer 
to the superiority of men over women, or others prohibiting co-education or 
permitting polygamy. The ‘alimates of awi deconstruct these concepts in order 
to develop new ideas based on the sacred texts and historical facts. In short, 
the meetings of the ‘Sisters for Eternity’ are spaces for reflection, meant to give 
women back their confidence and strengthen their self-esteem by presenting 
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them with the model of the emancipation of the women companions of the 
Prophet (sahabiyates). These companions, thanks to the place they occupied 
in original Islam, contributed to the construction of Muslim society through 
their commitment, alongside men, to supporting the Prophet and to building 
a new society.
Meetings of the ‘Sisters for Eternity’ are part of the political ‘education of 
consciences’ and ‘awakening of consciences’ discussed above in the context 
of a particular neighbourhood. The ‘women’ question thus involves religious, 
historical, and political dimensions: for the movement, the degradation of a 
woman’s condition is linked to the monopoly of political power over the in-
terpretation of religious texts. So we can glimpse a development conflict that 
opposes the movement to feminist groups and public authorities; a conflict 
that is hidden by the discursive consensus on the need to improve the position 
of women in Moroccan society.
In fact, these attempts at reinterpretation made by awi women represent 
a challenge to the rule established by official Islam in Morocco, which states 
that the rulings of the official ulama are the benchmark for ijtihad. Many inter-
viewees interpret the initiative of the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs 
to train mourchidates (female preachers) as a reaction to their own plan to 
train ‘alimates. Moreover, when it was launched, the mourchidates project was 
widely publicised and presented by the media—both Moroccan and inter-
national—as a revolution in the religious field and a great innovation in the 
Muslim world.34 Yet female preachers have played a real role, as volunteers, in 
Moroccan mosques since the 1970s (Yafout, 2012). The Ministry’s project has 
merely reorganised this role in a formal setting by offering mourchidates for-
mal training and granting them the status of paid officials. These mourchidates 
deal with the religious orientation of women in one or more mosques in every 
neighbourhood. However, mourchidates do not have the right to produce a re-
ligious interpretation or issue legal opinions, as this is the ‘exclusive role of the 
Majlis Al ‘Ilmi (scholarly council of the ulama)’, according to one mourchida in-
terviewed.35 When they explain the differences between their project and the 
Ministry’s, awi women members specifically mention the practice of interpre-
tation. For them, ‘alima and mourchida differ mainly on two levels: training, 
and the knowledge transmitted (Yafout, 2012). The ‘alimates have, in their view, 
reached an advanced level of knowledge through specialised and extensive 
training, while official mourchidates have attended only short courses. More-
over, the ‘alimates are able to produce scholarly knowledge, reinterpreting and 
34 See, for example La Tribune (2014).
35 Interview with a mourchida for my doctoral research; 9 May 2009.
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comparing religious texts, while the role of the mourchidates is limited to giv-
ing dourous (lessons/sermons). The latter therefore are confined to passing on 
a less sophisticated form of religious knowledge.
Conflict with the public authorities is not always hidden. While before 2005 
the meetings of the ‘Sisters for Eternity’ were ‘tolerated’, they were directly re-
pressed from that date onwards, and opposed by the religious policy of the 
Ministry of Habous. The interviewees report that, before 2005, the ‘Sisters for 
Eternity’ meetings attracted many women: awi members, sympathisers or 
those wishing to explore the movement’s ideas or to learn religious teachings 
from it; their number could reach up to a thousand in certain cities or neigh-
bourhoods. However, from May 2005 onwards, these meetings became the tar-
get of strong pressure from the authorities. They were interrupted by the police 
several times and the women running them were taken to the police station, 
questioned, and released late into the night. Faced with this situation, women 
members of awi have limited the extent of their meetings and reduced the 
number of beneficiaries, in a strategy meant to bypass constraints by taking 
more precautions and adapting their activities to the new security conditions 
prevailing.
Between awi and feminist movements too, the apparent consensus con-
ceals conflicts over the values promoted by those of one or the other orienta-
tion. In fact, like secular feminists, awi’s women members aspire to women’s 
empowerment; but, like Islamic feminists, they use the tools provided by the 
Islamic tradition. But they defend a ‘different feminism’, which advocates an 
analysis of the feminine condition combining historical, religious and political 
elements. Their reading of Muslim history links the degradation of the fem-
inine condition in Islam to the birth of despotism and defines the enemies 
of women’s emancipation as machismo and authoritarianism. However, awi 
women members do not define themselves as feminists. On the contrary, they 
differentiate themselves from this movement, which they believe is part of a 
story quite different from that of the marginalisation of Muslim women. In 
their view, while religion has been a factor of discrimination against women 
in the West, it is—on the contrary—a factor of emancipation in the Muslim 
world.
Moreover, the appropriation by awi’s women members of ijtihad, conceived 
as a field reserved for the official ulama, partly explains the pressure exerted 
on them; but it also explains the conflicts within the movement. Indeed, meet-
ings of the ‘Sisters for Eternity’ ceased in 2012 due to the resignation of most 
of the women who ran them, following differences with certain of the move-
ment’s leaders. These leaders were often hostile to the autonomy enjoyed by 
the women in the movement, both in the conception and the execution of 
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their projects. Also, the male leaders of the movement view the interpretation 
of sacred texts as an exclusively male field, despite the personal position of the 
founder of awi, who always, in both his theory and his practice, encouraged 
the female dynamic by supporting the militancy of his daughter, Nadia Yassine. 
The gradual withdrawal, due to illness, of the founder of the movement from 
2007 onwards allowed the male leaders to begin the process of marginalising 
women within the movement; a process that led to these women’s resignation 
in early 2012, a few months before the awi founder’s death. Here, development 
conflicts are directly related to the gender positions and stratifications that 
shape power relations in Moroccan society.
7 Conclusion
The example of the practice of ‘development’ proposed and implemented by 
awi and its female institutions allows us to glimpse the great number of pro-
cesses that are at work. Through this prism, the presence of awi in the neigh-
bourhoods is first manifested in community work, in spiritual education and 
the education of consciences, which results in the transmission of a vision of 
women’s emancipation based on Islamic tradition.
The first point that emerges from this analysis is that we can only under-
stand the ideas and actions of awi if we take into account the complex encoun-
ter between two historically constituted matrices: firstly, the Muslim matrix, 
which understands development in terms of reforms (islah), but also of inter-
pretation and contextualisation (ijtihad); and secondly, the Western matrix in 
the neo-liberal mode that characterises it today. Only thus can we understand 
that there are both formal similarities with development projects inspired by 
the prevailing doxa and implemented by the public authorities and other local 
players, and divergences in the meaning given to these same actions; a mean-
ing which, for awi, resides in an ‘added spiritual value’ combined with a quest 
for social justice. Which brings us to a second point: behind the consensus on 
the importance of development, especially education, and behind the appar-
ent consensus on the very aims of educational action (to foster development, 
progress and well-being), and behind the consensus on the techniques, insti-
tutional structures, and even practices of development—a consensus partly 
constrained by the rules governing the funding of projects—many conflicts lie 
concealed; conflicts in which some strive to establish themselves in the terrain 
that is society in the face of competition from state actors as well as other types 
of actors, both Islamist and secular. There are also internal conflicts within awi 
over the place of women in society. And, above all, conflicts over values, which 
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reflect differences in the ways of living in society, as well as in the world and in 
the Hereafter, are envisaged; and related conflicts over lifestyles and how one 
should conduct one’s life.
Education enables one to gain a deep understanding of a society, in this 
case Moroccan society, and to question the most widespread vision—one 
that sets system against anti-system. This is the third point one can make on 
the basis of an observation of awi’s efforts in the sphere of women’s educa-
tion: the complexity of relations rules out binary visions such as alignment/
repression, convergence/divergence, and competition/cooperation, although 
Abdessalam Yassine’s movement is considered the fiercest opponent of the 
‘system’ and sees itself as such. Thus, religious education is also fostered by 
other participants of society. Islamists from mur, the pjd’s religious wing, also 
organises religious sittings, including programmes ranging from those urging 
morality, to learning the Koran and the Hadith, to an introduction to Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh). They even carry out ad hoc ethics campaigns, employ-
ing caravans that visit cities denouncing moral depravity and calling for re-
ligious teachings to be respected.36 In mosques managed by the Ministry of 
Habous and Islamic Affairs, the mourchidates also teach women about their 
religious obligations and how to organise their daily conduct in accordance 
with religious principles. Since the 1980s, religious education has been a field 
in which the various Islamist movements compete against the official religious 
authorities. The latter, especially since the 2005 reform, intervene in mosques 
via imams and preachers and exclude any imam propagating views opposed 
to their own,37 starting with the imams and mourchidates close to awi. But 
this strategy of control and repression, implemented by enforcing competition 
in projects for development and education (both religious and non-religious 
education), is combined with a laissez-faire approach that allows the public 
authorities to discharge some of their responsibilities, voluntarily or not, and 
shapes existing collaborations even when the active participants themselves 
are unaware of this. As we can see, awi’s radical political position triggers the 
bans imposed by the authorities and a range of competitive strategies meant to 
curb the movement’s influence; but at the same time, the laissez-faire attitude 
of the authorities allows the movement to make an undeniable contribution 
to solving problems at the micro-local level. Similarly, awi continues to refuse 
to nominate candidates for election and will not support established policy—
but it is nonetheless an important political player because of the activities of 
36 On the mur’s and pjd’s campaigns to improve public and private morality, see Zeghal 
(2005, 235).
37 In this respect, Tozy mentions the dissident imams of the 1980s and contemporary imams 
such as Sheikh Nhari (Tozy, 2013, 148).
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 proximity in which it engages. According to awi, these activities carry a differ-
ent meaning and make real the way in which Islamism is viewed as a form of 
daily presence among the population.
Thus the sphere in which awi conducts its community and activist work 
highlights the complexity of the relationship between development and con-
flicts, and thus of ‘development conflicts’. This is the fourth and final conclu-
sion of this chapter. Far from conflict and pacification being seen as opposites, 
they are interwoven in everyday practices. The commitment of awi members 
to education also explains their ability to organise demonstrations and to mo-
bilise (Cavatorta, 2006), as was seen in the 20 February movement (Bennani-
Chraïbi and Jeghllaly, 2012). This ability—which also brings with it a significant 
potential for conflict—fosters the pacification of social relations and enables 
some support to be given to the moral and political order. The uses of the term 
‘education’, in its behavioural dimension, make this explicit: the word is of-
ten mentioned by awi supporters, who say, ‘they are well-educated people’ 
(hadouk nas mrabyine). In its behavioural dimension, the term is central to 
the daily lives of Moroccans and is far from being typical of the movement’s 
supporters alone. To describe the conduct of persons, use is often made of ex-
pressions such as mrabbi (well educated), ma mrabbiche (not well educated) 
or naques trabi (he lacks education). This ambivalent use of the term is also 
evident in the relations between awi members and those around them, again 
highlighting the fuzziness of the meanings involved. If supporters use it in a 
positive way, attributing a great capacity for mobilisation to awi members, 
it becomes, in other cases, a barometer to judge their conduct. ‘Is that edu-
cation?’ (hadi hiya tarbiya?) is an expression used by individuals and groups 
when they encounter what they believe to be an inappropriate attitude in an 
awi member; as if to judge such people by turning their own terminological 
corpus against them.
These four points converge to illustrate the importance of the idea of de-
velopment in certain movements of contemporary Islamism. The local ap-
proach used in this chapter brings out an element too often overlooked. In 
fact, by focusing almost exclusively, in the case of the urban environment, on 
economic players and on political and community players linked to the secular 
world (Catusse, 2011), and, in the case of rural areas, on village development 
associations and migrants’ associations (Lacroix, 2005), and by endeavouring 
to apprehend the reality (or not) of the ‘social state’ through its public policies, 
development studies in Morocco do not take Islamism into account.38 As a re-
sult, religious education and spirituality are simply not seen as playing any part 
38 One exception are Tozy and Hibou (2015); however, these authors focus on the relative in-
fluence of the intellectual matrix of political Islam on daily economic practices when this 
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in development, because development is linked to a form of economic ratio-
nality, including when it takes the form of ‘human development’. This chapter 
has tried, instead, to show the richness of these dimensions and the important 
role they are granted both by Islamists and by the powers that be; a role that 
thus affords them an important role in development.
These four observations suggest another point of convergence: consider-
ing awi as an active local participant in development, the analysis presented 
here has shown the complexity of the social and political relations that the 
Islamist movement has with power and with society as a whole. Taking into 
account its interaction not only with the authorities but also with the populace 
in general and with other local players in particular, what we see is a dialec-
tic between conflict and consensus based on a hegemonic ‘Western’ model of 
development. This dialectic gives expression to other strategies that flourish 
in daily activities and other conceptions of a ‘good’ way of conducting one’s 
life. Intentional or not, the strategies of discharge, differentiation, discretion, 
competition, or compliance, and the alternative modes of government and life 
conduct that this chapter has highlighted, show that relationships between the 
various active participants cannot be reduced to conflict or consensus, and 
these participants’ behaviour cannot be explained solely as a form of rejection 
or acceptance. As Irene Bono and Béatrice Hibou show in their introduction 
to this volume, the neo-liberal paradigm of development can be both a com-
mon ground and a place of conflict between quite different models of society. 
Conflicts relating to the concept of development (economic development ver-
sus human and spiritual development) can generate consensuses that force 
each other to coexist in the same space, to use the same institutional struc-
tures and resort to the same models and even the same donors, and to achieve 
some of their goals while sacrificing others. An approach that focuses only on 
awi’s oppositional and political dimensions, where awi’s positions are seen 
as totally antithetical to those of the government and anti-hegemonic vis-à-
vis the West, can shed light only on the movement’s oppositional dynamics. 
Such is the case with those elements of the literature that analyse only the 
vertical relationship between awi and power, or with those that see the hori-
zontal relationship with other political movements, particularly with secular 
movements, as solely and necessarily conflictual and polarising. This perspec-
tive leads analysts to study only the repression suffered by this movement or 
the attempts to co-opt it made by a government obsessed with its desire to 
maintain control over a rapidly growing and oppositional Islamism (Burgat, 
2008, 310–311). Much of the literature focuses on awi’s dissident character and 
tendency is in power, and not, properly speaking, on their conceptions of ‘development’. 
However, they do point to the importance of the ‘relation to values’ (Weber, 2006).
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particularly its challenge to the religious legitimacy of power: the relationship 
between awi and the latter is then analysed as a struggle between counter-
projects and control (Burgat, 2008; Zeghal, 2005; Tozy, 1999, 2009). Other analy-
ses, or sometimes the same ones, also show the relationship between awi and 
social movements (whether secular or inspired otherwise by Islam) as arising 
from conflict; whether this concerns a monopoly of political protest, strategies 
of appropriation of the discourse of social justice, or the control of campuses 
(Burgat, 2008; Zeghal, 2005; Cavatorta, 2006). awi is not the only association 
to be studied in such Manichaean terms. It is clear that Islamist movements 
in the mena region are most often presented as domesticated and co-opted 
movements (Zeghal, 2005, 193), as victims of the powers that be (Burgat, 2008), 
or—conversely—as a threat to the powers that be and the West (Kepel, 2000). 
This chapter has tried to show that beyond this threefold interpretation, while 
movements such as awi—presented and presenting themselves as radicals 
in their position vis-à-vis power—continue to enjoy a strong following and a 
great capacity for mobilisation, this is partly because of the leeway that exists 
concretely, in everyday life, between conflict and consensus. This leeway al-
lows each of the protagonists to achieve some of their objectives without hav-
ing to yield to a domesticating consensus or a violent conflict.
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chapter 6
War and State (Re)Construction in Afghanistan: 




Foreign aid provided for the (re)construction of the Afghan state since 2001 has, para-
doxically, intensified the ‘ethnicisation’ and sectarianisation of economic and political 
relations, contradicting the criteria of good governance advocated by donors. Conflicts 
apparently related to tradition and identity have become more common and indeed 
point to more fundamental contradictions between the culturalist representation of 
Afghan society and the effects of the country’s integration into the world capitalist 
economy. Thus, viewing Islamic radicalisation, ethnic polarisation or tribal atavism 
as responsible for the social and political violence in Afghanistan gives an incomplete 
picture of the situation as it ignores transformations in society and the new challenges 
of this supposedly traditional conflict.
1 Introduction
On 20 January 2014, a fight broke out between three people in the main thor-
oughfare of the bazaar of Bamyan, near the Azizi Bank. Before long, a hundred 
men had become involved in this altercation: they included inhabitants of the 
city but there were also men from surrounding areas—Asiyab, Shahidan, and 
Jagrakhil—and Fatmasti, the home town of the three protagonists located 
ten minutes’ drive away on the road to Shashpul. What were they quarrelling 
about? Presumably a bag of money that one of them was taking to deposit at a 
bank. But as the subject of the dispute has vanished, and no one seems to want 
to talk about it today, it would be better to ask why the conflict intensified in 
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the days that followed, when ever more men gradually arrived, spoiling for a 
fight, from Yakawalang, Kabul, Baghlan, and Mazar-i Sharif. To restore calm, 
at least momentarily, the prefecture (wilayat), the Council for Peace (Shora-i 
Solh) and the High Council of Ulamas (Shora-i Ulama) had to intervene jointly 
to impose, on the party held responsible for the renewal of violence, relatively 
high financial damages. It was stipulated that if any family took the initiative 
in reviving hostilities, it would be definitively deprived of any political and ad-
ministrative positions it held. Although this agreement was based on the Ko-
ran, few residents of Bamyan thought that the case had been settled once and 
for all. Indeed, it was only the latest episode in a 30-year conflict that had cost 
the lives of 74 people. ‘The same grandfather (padar kalan), the same mosque, 
the same religious membership, the same cemetery—except for five of the vic-
tims who were interred in another town in an attempt to heal the wounds’, as I 
was told. Despite this, the dispute could still at any moment lead to a massacre.
The small town of Fatmasti is home to some 300 families. Since the 1970s, it 
has been the scene of 74 tragic deaths—martyrs for some, victims of murders 
for others—often within the same family, involving a series of vendettas. The 
residents of Fatmasti sometimes call themselves Hazara and sometimes Parsi-
wan, and claim they are Sabzevari from Iran. Their story is mentioned in the 
mausoleums of Mir Hashem Agha and Seyed Ali Yakhsuz Bamyan, the two main 
pilgrimage sites in the city. ‘The Hazaras are descendants of Genghis Khan the 
Mughal, but our origins date back to the dynasty of Key, a dynasty of aria (Ary-
ans),’ says Khalifa Aziz,1 the babeh kalan (the grandfather of the place), who 
no longer lives in Fatmasti and has lost most of his family in conflicts between 
cousins (mama and khala). Most of these violent deaths occurred during the 
jihad against the Soviets and the ‘war of the commanders’ (1992–96), during 
which his family split between supporters of Hizb-i Nasr—later absorbed by 
the Hizb-i Wahdat of Mohammad Ali Mazari—and the Hizb-i Harakat-i islami 
of Ayatollah Asef Mohseni. But the intra-family conflict was rooted in land de-
marcation (polvan), a process that has usually involved placing brothers-in-law 
(baja in Dari or yazna in Pashto) in competition with one another. The gen-
eral opinion was that it was intensified by two factors specific to this time of 
war: the flow of arms and the political exile or economic emigration that were 
forced upon the men. So this was a war between cousins, fuelled by marital 
disputes. Tellingly, the men were the protagonists of the violence, but women 
cast an ubiquitous shadow. They contributed, indirectly, to the production of 
the society and its conflicts.
1 Personal observations, 2014 and 2015.
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Be that as it may, the division of Fatmasti between the two main Shi’ite po-
litical forces involved in the jihad was grafted onto older rifts. According to the 
young men in the village, who now longed to flee from it, residents had not 
been able to enjoy ‘a single quiet night’ since the mid-1980s. Fatmasti provided 
the jihad with its share of qumandan, but after 2001 it also provided the ad-
ministration of the Karzai government with many of its local officials, whose 
decisions in turn fuelled resentment and vendetta. This war in Fatmasti was 
a small-scale replica of political life in Bamyan. In June 2015, the tumultuous 
appointment of the new prefect was a reminder of the persistent disputes be-
tween the Hazaras and among the Shi’ites, divisions inherited from jihad and 
a more ancient local history. This event also reawakened another dimension 
of the social history of Afghanistan: that of the arbaki. These ‘protectors’, who 
often created the need for the very protection they were supposed to provide, 
re-emerged in the form of proxy militias of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (nato), which Fatmasti supplied in great number.2
The village of Fatmasti, then, is a compendium of the complex social affili-
ations and political issues in contemporary Afghanistan, especially the central 
region of the Hazarajat on which we will be focussing. We will see that for-
eign aid provided since 2001 for the (re)construction of the Afghan state has 
paradoxically intensified the ‘ethnicisation’ and sectarianisation of economic 
and political relations, in total contradiction with the criteria of good gover-
nance advocated by the donors. Conflicts apparently related to tradition and 
identity have become more common, and indeed point to more fundamental 
contradictions between the culturalist representation of Afghan society and 
the effects of the country’s integration into the world capitalist economy. Thus, 
viewing Islamic radicalisation, ethnic polarisation or tribal atavism as respon-
sible for the social and political violence in Afghanistan gives an incomplete 
picture of the situation, as it ignores transformations in society and the new 
challenges of this supposedly traditional conflict. In addition, donors often use 
a naive language, trapped within general models and paradigms disconnected 
from the reality of the country whose problems they are attempting to solve.
2 The Primordial Experience of War
History, then, is essential if you want to understand Afghanistan. Ethnicity, 
 language, tradition and even Islam cannot be considered as explanatory cat-
egories in themselves. We will start from the premise that the problems of 
2 Personal observations, 2014 and 2015.
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 Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction are part of the old, if constantly up-
dated logics of which they are echoes, and into which they largely merge. And 
this is true even if the fight against the Taliban, the neo-liberal zeitgeist, and 
globalisation have given the military actors, non-governmental organisations 
(ngos) and the diaspora an important role, in addition to or instead of govern-
ments and their public agencies of cooperation.
Before getting to the heart of the matter, it is worth mentioning the histori-
cal context in which foreign intervention in Afghanistan, one of the least de-
veloped countries in the world, has occurred. In 1978, the People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan fomented a coup that helped overthrow the government 
of President Dawood Khan and triggered a Soviet occupation that lasted until 
1989 (Andishmand, 2009; Roy, 1985). Since then the country has been shaken 
by a civil war (1989–96)—including the Battle of Jalabad in 1989 and the suc-
cessive battles of Kabul ( jangha-ye kabol) between 1992 and 1996 (Qhodus, 
2009; Azimi, 2012–2013; Dorronsoro, 2000)—and by foreign interventions. Af-
ghanistan holds a sad record: in the 1990s, the country produced the highest 
number of refugees in the world.
On Afghan soil, poverty and the presence of weapons have combined to 
exacerbate land issues, intensify urbanisation and swell migration. Since 2002, 
the problems arising from this conjunction, far from being resolved, have wors-
ened, especially when it comes to property (Adelkhah, 2013). The Karzai Ad-
ministration has merely endorsed the overlapping and layering of laws and 
regulations handed down from prior periods, pragmatically using, to its ad-
vantage, the local balance of power between institutions, between social and 
ethnic groups, and between commanders. In reality, over and above the make-
believe discourse presented to foreign donors, this policy has led to a centrali-
sation of the land allocation process and then to land-grabbing on the part of 
those in power and their clientele, in their own names (or those of their fami-
lies) and in the name of the state. From this point of view, the general relations 
maintained by both the dominant political class and the state with the mass 
of the population—especially with residents in rural, sedentary or nomad 
zones—is probably more important than the extent of interethnic or religious 
relationships, although they are often two sides of the same coin. The only ma-
jor legislative reform in this area was passed in 2008 and aimed at the opening 
of the land market to foreign investors. Even if its application is still limited, 
this reform has created more problems than it has solved. It has absolutely 
not broken with the logics of accumulation of the national ruling class that 
controls the granting of agricultural and mining concessions, since this class 
still holds the keys to the market and the signing of contracts. If these foreign 
investments are indeed made, they will trigger the alienation of considerable 
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amounts of land, to the detriment of small farmers and shepherds. Similarly, 
after the trauma of the destruction of the Bamyan Buddhas in 2001, ‘cultural 
heritage’ has been turned into a matter of creating sanctuaries: this measure, 
however laudable, was imposed by the government on powerless populations. 
Among its side effects, we can mention the fact that the Tajik lands in Bamyan 
can, because of this ‘sanctuarisation’, no longer be cultivated or built on even 
though the mountainous nature of the region does not make it possible for this 
land to be exchanged for other arable plots.3
Despite the superposition of texts, the heterogeneity of proofs of ownership, 
the coexistence of often contradictory legal legitimacies, the fragmentation of 
the land, the tangle of ethnic identifications, and the extreme diversity of ag-
ricultural situations, this development has now been well documented, both 
by academic research and by experts (Adelkhah, 2013; Alden Wily, 2013a).4 But 
it is largely seen as a failure in ‘post-conflict’ management or as the result of 
the evanescence of a state that, in the absence of any ‘national sentiment’, is 
now ‘bankrupt’, succumbing to the dual pressures of a ‘corrupt’ political class 
and ‘tradition’. Certainly, the responsibilities of Afghan actors are substantial. 
However, had not the rot already set in because of the inconsistencies of for-
eign intervention? The basic problem lies, perhaps, in the idea or in the very 
principle of the aid in the name of which Afghan actors interact. The legacy of 
the violence of the years 1979 to 2001 and the painful memory they left did not 
miraculously disappear thereafter. The war is still very present in the minds 
of Afghans. It continues to provide the grammar and even the lexicon of day-
to-day social life. In fact, it has formed the matrix of present-day Afghanistan, 
as a result of the population movements and the destruction and transfer of 
property that it caused. In addition, it has shaped the social consciousness 
of Afghans, who continue to zigzag between past and present in their daily 
conversations, if only because of the still visible traces of the battles of the 
1980s and 1990s or the transformations of the landscape—especially in terms 
of urbanisation—that the conflict caused. The landscape has a mnemonic 
function and the war remains the great founding narrative of contemporary 
Afghanistan. It is all the more an active presence in that the belligerents were 
not abstract geopolitical entities such as communism, Islam, or the nation, 
but flesh-and-blood actors bound by close, and even intimate relations arising 
3 Personal observations, 2014 and 2015.
4 See also the publications of Integrity Watch Afghanistan (http://iwaweb.org, accessed on 
16 June 2016), the Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (http://appro.org.af, ac-
cessed on 16 June 2016) and the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (http://www.areu 
.org.af, accessed on 16 June 2016).
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from neighbourhood (shafa’a) or kinship (owdourzadegi), either politically or 
economically constructed (qawm) (Roy, 1985; Alden Wily, 2004, 27). Of course, 
war brings violence, destruction and death. But the experiences of Afghans 
cannot be reduced to this tragic dimension. From the political and social point 
of view, war is also an existential experience. The Islamic intellectual Azizullah 
Royesh5 admirably sums up this idea in his book bogzar nafas bekasham (Let 
Me Breathe). In particular, he says that it is through war that we learn about 
life: ‘War is everything, it is life, work is war, home is war, thought is born of war, 
relationships proceed from war. Feelings, the understanding of conviction and 
religion, all this is war. Men breathe for war, work for it, think for it, pray for it 
and… they die for it’ (Royesh, 2013, 130, our transl.).
3 The Invention of Ethnicity in the Hazarajat
This chapter is based essentially on two field surveys conducted in 2014 and 
2015 in the central region of the Hazarajat. To the extent that the name of this 
region refers to the idea of the Hazara ethnic group, it should be noted at the 
outset that ethnicity refers less to objective groups of belonging, with an origin 
and a clearly defined territory, than to categories by which actors define them-
selves (or are defined).6 According to Olivier Roy (1985), the war was a crucial 
vector of ethnic consciousness in Afghanistan. It endorsed our major groups 
that cannot be defined according to objective and unambiguous criteria: Pash-
tuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. By definition, these categories are historically 
situated. They are contextual, relational and relative: you are a Hazara in rela-
tion to the Pashtuns, the Tajiks, and the Sayyids, at a given historical moment 
that refers to a more or less distant and more or less traumatic past as well 
as to completely contemporary issues interpreted using the yardstick of this 
memory. Following Richard Tapper (1983), and in agreement with Olivier Roy 
(1985) and Alessandro Monsutti (2004 and 2005), we therefore disclaim any 
primordialist definition of ethnicity. Today, this definition stems in particular 
5 Azizullah Royesh is a Shi’ite and Hazara reformer who has been greatly influenced by the Ira-
nian philosopher Ali Shariati. As the founder and director of the pioneering Marefat school 
in Kabul, he was ranked—in the context of its Global Teacher Prize—by the Varkey Founda-
tion among the top ten teachers in the world in 2015.
6 Afghanistan has been a hotspot of the problematisation of ethnicity inspired by the found-
ing work of Fredrik Barth (see especially Tapper, 1983, and Digard, 1988). This approach has 
been adopted by Adlparvar (2015). For a scholarly overview of ethnicity in Afghanistan, see 
Centlivres (1991).
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from the relation to the state, via war and also via political parties. The Hizb-i 
Wahdat, more especially, had a decisive role in the ethnicisation of the social 
consciousness of the Hazara, while this despised minority group saw itself 
forced to face the challenge of life after the Soviet departure in 1989. However, 
though we will be paying attention to the political economy of this form of 
social consciousness in a context of civil war, this should not lead us to re-
duce it to a purely material struggle, a contest fuelled by greed and grievances 
between rational actors eager to maximise their profits, in accordance with a 
rightly criticised paradigm (Marchal and Messiant, 2002; 2003). Nor should it 
lead us to forget the extreme fluidity of feelings of belonging and thus solidar-
ity in everyday life, on both collective and individual levels. The lines of iden-
tification are manifold and subject to negotiation. And it is not uncommon for 
different parties or factions to come together in the same qawm. In this regard, 
Alessandro Monsutti (2005, 99) mentions in particular the existence of ‘a veri-
table strategy to diversify affiliations as a way of providing some assurance in 
the event of unfavourable political and military developments’.
Important as it is, the ethnic dimension should not be exaggerated. It is 
significant only through its inclusion in the political dimension, whether or 
not this is militarised. It is also mixed with the linguistic dimension that in 
many ways relativises it and opens new fields of conflict, especially between 
Dari speakers and Pashtun speakers. But the language dispute at least has the 
advantage of blurring or even diluting the binary inter-sectarian antagonism 
between Sunnis and Shi’ites, as well as interethnic oppositions.
From the nineteenth century onwards, the modern Afghan state was formed 
on the basis of an Anglo–Russian agreement creating a buffer state between 
the two empires, on a vector of Hanafi rite Pashtun and Sunni elements to 
which the other ethnic groups and Islamic legal schools (Nizari and Jafari) 
were subordinated, not to mention the Hindus and Sikhs, who were complete-
ly marginalised or expelled after the breakup of the British Raj in 1947. The 
Hazaras, Shi’ites of the Jafari rite, were the big losers in this process until 1979, 
and the Hazarajat became the cursed land of their subjection in the 1891–93 
war—even though Kafiristan (now Nuristan), in the east, and Turkestan, in the 
north and north-east, were also conquered by force and colonised by the new 
Pashtun dynasty (Ghobar, 2011, 483ff. and 490ff.).
The Hazarajat is a historical area that has never been an administrative unit.7 
Until the constitutional revision of 1964, it was essentially divided between 
7 I have used the following translations of Afghan administrative terms: prefecture (wilayat) 
and prefect (wali); sub-prefecture (woluswali) and sub-prefect (woluswal); district (ghariya). 
The term manteqa (literally region, locality) has no official administrative significance, but 
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four of the five wilayat of the country: Herat, Turkestan, and— especially—
Kabul and Kandahar. Today, it covers ten or so territorial entities that are home 
to the Hazaras (Arez, 2003). The city of Bamyan is the historic heart of the Haz-
arajat, though it was never exclusively Hazara and Shi’ite. Today the wilayat 
of Bamyan and Daikundi are the two parts of the country in which Hazara 
Shi’ite populations predominate, although since 2003, the addition to the Ba-
myan prefecture of the sub-prefectures of Saighan and Kahrmard of the wilay-
at of Baqlan—with Sunni Tajik populations of, respectively, 63 per cent and 
82 per cent—has relativised the demographic and religious domination of Haz-
ara Twelver Shi’ites. In addition, the Hazarajat is home to most of the Ismailis 
of Afghanistan and a minority of Sayyid Twelver Shi’ites. The title Sayyid refers 
to a lineage indicating descent from the Prophet’s family, but some of them are 
of course Sunni Sayyids. Alessandro Monsutti (2005, 91) calls this a ‘religious 
aristocracy.’ The Qizilbash group is distinguished by its Turkish origins and its 
claim to descend from the entourage of the Persian ruler Nadir Shah, who in-
vaded Afghanistan in 1738. In 2010, it was estimated that the population of the 
sub-prefecture of Bamyan comprised 75 per cent Hazara, 15 per cent Sayyid, 10 
per cent Tajiks and 0.5 per cent Qizilbash. Furthermore, out of a population 
of 86,550 inhabitants, the woluswali today numbers 8,345 people who settled 
there between 2002 and 2012, having returned from exile or from other parts of 
the country; this is a little less than 10 per cent of the total population.
Before the ‘iron rule’ of Abdurrahman (1880–1901), the founder of modern 
Afghanistan, the Hazarajat had never been politically unified and was ruled 
by tribal leaders (amir). From the reign of Sher Ali Khan (1863–79) onwards, 
the so-called Kuchi Pashtun nomads raided the region to lead their flocks in 
transhumance to the high mountain pastures. Under the pretext of fighting the 
‘heresy’ that existed in this region, Abdurrahman decided to conquer it, after 
driving its population to revolt in 1891 by subjecting it to an intolerable tax bur-
den and plundering its land and herds, carrying out many arrests and deport-
ing part of its population to Kabul. This military campaign of 1891–93 resulted 
in massacres, but it also had serious consequences for the future of this region, 
colonised through the almost total deportation of the Pashtun Kuchi Ghilzai. 
The Hazaras who survived and remained in the Hazarajat—many of them took 
refuge in the Iranian city of Mashhad, in the city of Quetta in the British Raj, 
and in Russia—were enslaved and stripped of their land, including pastures. 
indicates the basic unit of territorial consciousness, which encompasses several villages in a 
clearly identified area of land, below the ghariya. This level of territorial belonging played a 
decisive role in the war and constitutes a factor of solidarity just as important as the principle 
of lineage and community associated with the principle of qawm.
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They have therefore been forced, until today, to farm in a mountainous country 
with long winters where arable land is sorely lacking. Abdurrahman’s succes-
sors—Amir Habibullah Khan (1901–19) and Amanullah (1919–29)—brought 
the reign of terror in the Hazarajat to an end. They abolished slavery, withdrew 
some of the measures discriminating against Hazaras, and restored to them 
some of their rights by granting titles to their leaders (amir), though this exacer-
bated the rivalries between these leaders and involved additional exploitation 
of the peasantry (Ghobar, 2011, 484). Later, the reigns of Nadir Shah (1929–33) 
and Zahir Shah (1933–73) put the seal on the Pashtun and Sunni domination of 
Afghanistan and the relegation of Hazara Shi’ites to the position second-class 
subjects. The great famine of 1971–72, with its accompanying drought, was ter-
rible. During the tenure of President Dawood (1973–78), the subjugation of the 
Hazaras was intensified; land-grabbing by the Kuchis was encouraged under 
cover of the 1970 law on pastures, a law that recognised the state ownership 
of all land suitable for forage production—not just high mountain pastures—
and prohibited the conversion of pasture land to cropland. But the Kuchis’ in-
terests were not limited to their pastoral activities. Over these decades during 
which the Hazaras were excessively exploited, they developed shops and trans-
port companies, which guaranteed their economic stranglehold on the region, 
especially as usurers. In the wake of the great disaster of 1891–93, the Kuchis 
therefore seized the few land rights that had been preserved by the vulnerable 
Hazara peasantry, using debt as a means. (De Weijer, 2007; Alden Wily 2013b; 
Tapper, 2008; Mousavi, 1998; Monsutti, 2004 and 2005).
Only after the Soviet invasion—which, despite the presence of a small gar-
rison in the town of Bamyan, left the Hazarajat virtually unaffected, as this 
deprived region offered little of interest and the resistance there was strong 
and immediate (Mohaghegh, 1984)—could the Hazaras begin to free them-
selves from the Pashtun, Tajik and Sunni yoke. First, they were able to inter-
act with the central government thanks to the appointment as Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers of Babrak Karmal (1981–88), Mohammad Najibullah 
(1989–91) and finally Soltanali Keshtmand, a Hazara from Fouladi, a woluswali 
from the wilayat of Bamyan, whose parents had been deported to Kabul by Ab-
durrahman (Keshtmand, 2009). In 1987, under the influence of Tehran, armed 
groups claiming to be acting more or less for the Islamic Republic of Iran—the 
Sazman i-Nasr group, close to Ayatollah Montazeri, and the Sapah-i Pasdaran 
group, close to the Revolutionary Guards—united as a Council for the Alliance 
(Shura-i ittifaq), based in the district of Yakawlang, and this eventually gave 
birth to a political party. The Hizb-i Wahdat was created in Bamyan in 1989 
and its presidency was entrusted to the charismatic Abdul Ali Mazari (Dorron-
soro, 2000, 158ff. and 240ff.; Monsutti, 2005: 92ff.; Roy, 1985; Mo’aseseye farhangi 
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 Saghalain, 1999). Most Tajiks and almost all Pashtuns then left the area, leaving 
the Hazaras in a position to recover their land and property. They took control 
of the new bazaar of Bamyan, though the Tajiks remained commercially active 
there through land and property leased to the Hazaras and the excellence of 
their connections with Kabul, Mazar-i Sharif and Baghlan. They also specu-
lated on land by selling, as plots of sharak (residential area), properties belong-
ing to Pashtuns from the village of Dasht-i Issa Khan on whose territory the 
airport was built. Upon the fall of the communist regime in 1992, Hizb-i Wah-
dat became the champion of the Hazara Shi’ite cause in Kabul. But during the 
battle that devastated the capital in 1993, it failed to prevent the massacre of 
Afshar, perpetrated in the western districts. During this episode, hundreds of 
Hazaras were killed, officially by the Tajik and Pashtun troops of Commander 
Ahmed Shah Massoud and President Burhanuddin Rabbani but the complic-
ity or betrayal of Hazara elements could not be excluded.8 Having retreated to 
the Hazarajat, the forces of Hizb-i Wahdat nevertheless succeeded, after hard 
fighting, opposing in 1995 attempts made by Ahmad Shah Massoud’s move-
ment to conquer it (Dorronsoro, 2000, Chapter 7).
After the assassination of Abdul Ali Mazari by the Taliban in 1995, Hizb-i 
Wahdat split into two factions. One, led by Abdul Karim Khalili from Behsud 
(Wardak), joined the Northern Alliance of Commander Dostom; the other, led 
by Mohammed Akbari from Waras (Bamyan), allied with the Taliban but also 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The two sides confronted one another until 
1998, when the Taliban conquered the Hazarajat after subjecting it to a harsh 
economic blockade. They quickly entrusted the administration of the region 
to the supporters of Mohammed Akbari. But Abdul Karim Khalili’s men con-
tinued to resist, launching an unsuccessful offensive on Bamyan in May 1999. 
The fighting claimed many lives and led to the destruction of almost one-fifth 
of the city’s buildings, including the bazaar. Almost all of the population, some 
13,000 families, fled, and Tajik traders took over the bazaar. Building on the 
victory of the Taliban, the Kuchis returned to the region to try to recover their 
property and land rights. In January 2001, fighting duly resumed in the district 
of Yakawlang, causing a new exodus of the Hazaras under the pressure of Tali-
ban reprisals—a mass killing (qatl-i ‘am) that remains intensely present in re-
gional memory.
In November 2001, the Hazarajat moved on to a new stage in its history. 
The Taliban left the area following the us intervention, giving the Hazaras 
8 This version of events is disputed by the Hazaras themselves, who place the blame on fac-
tional rivalries between Hazara commanders and even on the Sayyids (interviews in Bamyan 
and Kabul, 2014). See also Royesh (2013, 139 ff.).
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the opportunity to gain access to the Kabul government through Abdul Karim 
Khalili, who had become the second vice-president alongside Hamid Karzai in 
2004. They also challenged the interests (including property interests) of the 
Kuchis and Tajiks who had taken advantage of the Taliban regime while not 
being marginalised by the coalition that emerged from the Bonn agreement, 
signed in 2001. This new context, though more favourable to their interests, did 
not allow the Hazaras to unite politically. We can at present identify four trends 
within the Hizb-i Wahdat: that of Abdul Karim Khalili and his Hizb-i wahdat-i 
islami; that of Mohammad Akbari and his Hizb-i wahdat-i islami-i Afghani-
stan; that of Mohammad Mohaghegh and his Hizb-i wahdat-i islami-i mar-
dom-i  Afghanistan; and that of Erfani Yakawalangi and his Hizb-i wahdat-i 
islami-i mellat-i Afghanistan. In 2015, the tumultuous appointment of Tahar 
Zohair to the post of prefect by President Ashraf Ghani, with the support of 
Abdul Karim Khalili, showed that the antagonisms were still intense. Four Haz-
ara mps, including Mohammad Akbari, opposed the appointment by organis-
ing a sit-in outside the prefecture lasting sixteen days (7 to 22 June). On 19 June, 
young academics organised a counterdemonstration. The arrival of Tahar Zo-
hair on 1 July did not calm matters as the protesters locked the premises of 
the prefecture while the supporters of the new prefect marched by holding 
bouquets of flowers.9
Within a century, the formation of the state and the social phenomena that 
came with it—such as urbanisation, emigration, and the confiscation or re-
distribution of land—had resulted in the sorrowful construction of a Hazara 
identity seen as an ethnic, even racial fact. Since the late nineteenth century, 
the Hazaras had indeed been considered Mongols by Tajik, Pashtun and Sayyid 
elites, and some of their physical characteristics, such as their flat noses, had 
been the subject of daily jokes. Various factors contributed to this ‘invention of 
ethnicity’. First, the Shi’ite religious awakening of the 1960s, related to the Iraqi 
and Iranian holy places and under the influence of Ayatollah Mir Ali Ahmad 
Hojjat10 and Sayed Esmael Balkhi.11 Second, the flowering in Iran of a Hazara 
literature of resistance (Olszewska, 2009). Third, a musical renaissance, pro-
moted by Radio Hazarahgi in Quetta from 1975 onwards. And lastly, the fact 
that in 2002 the us military intervention paradoxically allowed the  celebration 
9 Personal observation, 2015.
10 Mir Ali Ahmad Hojjat was the main Afghan Shi’ite authority and founder of the first re-
ligious school of this branch of Islam in Kabul, in the district of Chandawul. He died in 
1974.
11 Sayed Esmael Balkhi was the founder of the modern Shi’ite Islamic movement, and is 
known as the father of the Hazara movement for political autonomy. He died in 1968.
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of Nowruz and the public commemoration (publicised in the media) of Ashu-
ra to be resumed in Afghanistan—these rituals had been perpetuated by Haz-
aras living in Quetta or in Iran (Monsutti, 2007).
De facto, the formation of the state also turned the Shi’ite branch into the 
subordinate religion in an Afghanistan that was presumed to be Sunni, although 
the constitution did not mention any religious distinction and confined itself 
to making Hanafi Islam the state religion. Since 2008 and under the new 2004 
constitution, the law on personal status—ahwal-i shakhsiya—has allowed 
Hazaras to resort to fiqh jafari when both parties are Shi’ites.12 Nevertheless, 
the ethnicisation of the Hazaras is now undergoing an interesting develop-
ment that tends to separate it from Shi’a Islam. Indeed, some Sunni Hazaras, 
assembled in council, demand this dual ethnic and religious affiliation and are 
now—surprisingly—well received by Shi’ite Hazaras pleased to see their ranks 
being swelled in anticipation of an ethnically connoted electoral competition 
and to have one foot in the camp of the majority religious affiliation, which al-
lows them to interact with other identity groups on equal terms (Bouda, 2015). 
Ethnicisation is therefore a process whose outcome is less a well-defined Haz-
ara than a ‘Hazarification’ of heterogeneous or hybrid populations such as the 
Hazaras of Pashtun culture or the ‘mixed’ or ‘mixed race’ (doraga) Hazaras.13 In 
all ethnic groups, then, a distinction is drawn between original Hazaras (asli) 
and those to whom Hazara identity is ascribed (wasli), which makes it possible 
for the ‘authenticity’ and ‘native status’ of families to be claimed or contested.
Hazaras and Shi’ites do not constitute a homogeneous group. Beyond their 
different backgrounds and inequalities in terms of education, wealth, and gen-
der, they have been divided politically since the 1978 coup. As we have said, 
some joined the Sazman-i Nasr of Mohammad Abdul Ali Mazari while others 
supported the Hizb-i harakat of Ayatollah Mohseni (Mohaghegh, 1984), thus 
leading to the break-up of the Hizb-e Wahdat a few years after its establish-
ment. After the split, some made their peace with the Taliban or even joined 
them (Alden Wily, 2004, 23), while others supported the Hizb-i harakat, includ-
ing many Sayyids, Qizilbash or Ismailis (Mo’aseseye farhangi Saghalain 1999, 
190ff.). These internal political differences which have led to military confron-
tation for three decades, to conflicts over land and real estate, and to com-
mercial and financial quarrels, fuel distrust and animosity between Shi’ites, 
12 This is the law relating to marriage, divorce and inheritance, http://www.bsharat.com/
id/16-f-h/01.html (accessed on 16 June 2016).
13 See Yazdani (2011, 267 ff.). The author is convinced of the existence of ‘true’ Hazaras, while 
stating that matrimonial alliances may have altered their physical characteristics and that 
there are ‘Pashtunized’ or ‘mixed’ (dorageh) Hazaras.
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especially between Hazaras and Sayyids, the latter often accused of taking 
advantage of Taliban domination (or, under the monarchy, of having compro-
mised with the Pashtun ruling class). In some ways, the war gave the Hazaras 
an opportunity to emancipate themselves socially from the domination of the 
Sayyids, as well as from the Pashtuns and the Tajiks. This process followed a 
pattern partly comparable to that observed in Lebanon, in that Abdolali Maz-
ari, its ideologue, was close to Chamran, the Hizbollah leader, and absorbed 
this experience alongside other Iranian or Palestinian anti-imperialist fight-
ers.14 Since 2002, reconstruction has followed the lines laid out by this eman-
cipation, but it is complicated by rivalries between the Hazaras who remained 
in the provinces during the war (watani), those who chose exile, especially in 
Iran (zawari), and returned fortified by their diasporic experience, and those 
who had come from other parts of the country15 to settle in the Hazarajat, now 
perceived as the land of the Hazaras by definition.16
4 Reconstruction of the State, Development Aid and  
the Invention of Ethnicity
The Western military intervention of 2001, and the ‘reconstruction’ of the state 
that ensued, reproduced and extended the process of the invention of a Haz-
ara Hazarajat and the ethnicisation of the Hazaras. The foreign presence, the 
financial flows it generated, the economic opportunities it opened up, and the 
institutional patterns that it established intensified the ethnicisation and/or 
sectarianisation of Afghan society, as well as the return of refugees and mi-
grants, investments from the diaspora, and urbanisation. And this happened 
even though, politically and ideologically, aid for reconstruction was meant to 
transcend these divisions inherited from the past, these incarnations of ‘tra-
dition’ allegedly behind the political crisis into which the country had sunk 
since the 1970s. Inspired by the experts of the International Security Assistance 
Force (isaf), the 2004 constitution also drew on a primordialist vision of eth-
nicity and sectarianism to explicitly recognise the rights of ethnic groups, who 
found themselves reified as a result. The fact that the theory of nationalities 
(mellat) proposed by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (1978–79) 
14 Interviews with Saleh Aliyar, Chairman of the Peace Council, and Mostafa Makarem, di-
rector of the television channel Rahe-e-Farda (Kabul, 2014 and 2015).
15 These Hazaras came in particular from Ghazni, the historic stronghold of intellectual 
elites thanks to its links with Pakistan.
16 Personal observation (2014–15); Adlparvar (2015, 152 ff.).
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and the Soviets (1979–89) has re-emerged under the ‘umbrella’ of nato is an 
irony of history. ‘Reconstruction’ was conceptualised in an ethnic and sectar-
ian fashion, and on that basis laws were enacted, funding awarded, ministerial 
and administrative posts allocated, voters mobilised and property or matrimo-
nial disputes voiced. Given their historical subordination, the Hazaras, now 
for the first time the objects of affirmative action rather than of discrimina-
tion, were the major beneficiaries of this policy of allocating public resources 
on an ethno-sectarian basis, while continuing to experience this policy in a 
sorrowful way. As we know, they achieved the legitimisation of the Jafari le-
gal school through the 2004 constitution and the ahwal-i shakhsiya law passed 
in 2008. But their age-old rivals, the Kuchis, were also given the status of an 
ethnic group in their own right; a group whose living conditions and educa-
tion the constitution seeks to improve (Tapper, 2008). The double reification of 
these ‘complementary enemies’ is of course fraught with potential dangers, as 
has already been shown by the bloody clashes between Hazaras and Kuchis in 
Wardak in 2010, and in Nahoor, in Ghazni, between 2010 and 2012, and the sub-
sequent ethnopolitical activism of Hazara and Pashtun mps defending their re-
spective clienteles as the general elections approached.17 The fact that the post 
of prefect (wali) of the wilayat of Bamyan was given to a Hazara for the first 
time in history is one of the most eloquent illustrations of the ethnicisation of 
the reconstruction of Afghanistan under the aegis of foreign aid. This position 
was successively occupied by Mohammad Rahim Aliyar in 2003, Habiba Sarabi 
in 2005—the first woman to hold a position of this significance in the country, 
Gholamali Vahdat in 2014, and finally, not without difficulties, Tahar Zohair in 
July 2015. Similarly, and by way of example, a dozen low-ranking officials of the 
sub-prefecture of Shibar, in the wilayat of Bamyan, are Hazara Twelver Shi’ites, 
while the administrative district includes 30 per cent Sunni Tajiks and many 
Ismailis (almost half of the population in Shibar are Shi’ites).
These appointments were followed by the recruitment of Hazara officials 
and administrative officers, chosen in accordance with the ethnic logic of 
the spoils system—or even in accordance with party or faction, as the above-
named prefects are all close to the Hizb-i Wahdat, of the Khalili/Mohaghegh 
tendency. These appointments have therefore had an immediate impact on the 
policy of land allocation, the recognition of land rights and the allocation of 
state resources in favour of Hazaras and to the detriment of Tajiks and Sayyids 
(Adlparvar, 2015, Chapter 5). Beyond politics and administration, ethnicisation 
17 See the relevant press articles (in Persian), including: http://kabulpress.org/my/spip 
.php?article10066 (accessed on 16 June 2016) and http://urozgan.org/Clear/fa-AF/print/
article/print/1604/ (accessed on 16 June 2016).
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has thus been extended more clearly to encompass the economic sphere, in-
cluding the issue of land and the control of the bazaar of Bamyan, which now 
counts only a small minority of Tajik traders instead of the 2,500 or so who 
ran the old bazaar at the foot of the Buddhas in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, 
Hazara consumers buy only from Hazara traders. ‘The Hazara does not eat the 
bread of the Tajik’ is an oft-heard remark.
The political economy of ‘reconstruction’ has inevitably grafted itself into 
the ethnopolitical memory of the war and prior periods, in a country where 
the traceability of property is a highly contradictory matter, depending on the 
nature of the evidence adduced (political, legal, customary, scriptural or oral), 
thus giving a contemporary, conflictual character to any reference to the past 
(Alden Wily, 2004; Monsutti, 2008). When elections take place, Afghans can 
immediately identify among the candidates the fighters who resisted the So-
viet occupation—those who, in Afghanistan, are referred to as jihadis—and 
the migrants who have returned home (mohajer). Similarly, they distinguish 
economic actors depending on the origin of their fortunes and their projects. 
Everyone is familiar with the career of a given hotel owner, residential develop-
ment promoter (sharak) or bazaar trader.
The ethnic and religious identity of entrepreneurs and recipients of devel-
opment aid is thus self-evident and foreign actors adapt to it when not ex-
ploiting it. For example, the influx of ngos with Western and Japanese finan-
cial support in the prefecture of Bamyan, anxious to meet the needs of one of 
the poorest regions of the country and to rescue its women, was immediately 
configured in accordance with interethnic and inter-religious relations as the 
war had redefined them (Anjoman-i nevisandegan-i Bamyan, 2011). The armed 
resistance of Abdul Karim Khalili to the Taliban offensive from 1996 to 1998, 
and his political rise under President Hamid Karzai, consummated the pro-
cess of the ‘Hazarification’ of a province previously dominated by Tajiks and 
Sayyids (though the former continued to exert economic and financial con-
trol from Kabul, Baghlan, Mazar-i Sharif and Kunduz), and of a population 
that previously perceived itself as Shi’ite rather than the ethnic mode favoured 
by the structure of military resistance in political parties—in this case by the 
Hizb-i Wahdat, or rather by its four branches. In return, most foreign aid ac-
tors have taken for granted the essentially Hazara nature (the ‘Hazarity’) of the 
Hazarajat. And after 2004, the Hazara themselves came in great numbers from 
Ghazni, Balkh, Herat and other locations favoured by the diaspora, hoping to 
profit from the windfall of aid, claiming they were ‘returning to their roots’. Ab-
dul Karim Khalili encouraged this movement in order to strengthen his elec-
toral base as the 2003 presidential election approached—an election in which 
he supported the candidature of Hamid Karzai—which involved  mobilising 
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women’s suffrage, to the great satisfaction of the ngos of international civil 
society. So, the ethnicisation and sectarianisation of a region can sit comfort-
ably alongside the priorities of development aid and the ‘reconstruction of the 
state’. Similarly, by seizing on ‘runaway marriages’ (izdiwaj farari) between, for 
example, a young Hazara man and a young Sayyid woman according to a bu-
reaucratised and judicialised logic of identity that is completely different from 
the former procedures for conflict resolution between families or qawm, the 
Independent Commission for Human Rights in Afghanistan, the un Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan and women’s rights ngos reify matrimonial relation-
ships by combining them within ethnic categories (Adlparvar, 2015, 138; weekly 
Sada-I Shahrvand-i Bamayn, 1, jawza 1393/2014, 1). Conversely, international aid 
sometimes produces ‘negative’ ethnic identities, especially when it abandons 
its attempt put down roots in radical or conservative areas deemed too danger-
ous, including the Tajik-dominated provinces of Sayghan and Kahmard, Shi-
bar, or the south of the country, which is in the hands of the Taliban.
But these processes cover more complex lines of division. As we have seen, 
the Hazaras in Bamyan are divided. Indigenous Hazaras (watani) now live to-
gether, in a state of some tension, with Hazaras who came from Ghazni, Herat 
and Mazar-i Sharif after the fall of the Taliban to enjoy the windfall of the Haz-
arajat, as well as with the zawari Hazaras back from Iran. Like other ethnic 
groups in the country, the Hazaras as a whole are ultimately driven by progres-
sive internal divisions that are less part of identity in the abstract sense than 
of social inequalities, starting with inequalities in gender and education. As 
shown by the case of the village of Fatmasti, the situation is even more com-
plex on the micro-local level of historical lands. In this fragmented social land-
scape, generally governed by the twin principle of lineage (qawm) and locality 
(manteqa), Olivier Roy (1985) was among the first to demonstrate the need to 
keep in mind that the ethnicisation of Afghan society is a fluid process, situat-
ed historically and politically constructed, at least since the centralising reign 
of Abdurrahman. The nature of this process has been confirmed by Alessandro 
Monsutti’s research on the Hazaras (2004 and 2005). This ethnicisation is not 
based on a territorialisation of tribal membership which might be explained 
by one of those notorious (and improbable) ‘ethnic cards’. It rests instead on 
population movements that are either voluntary and motivated by economic 
interest, or constrained by central government initiatives—as we saw in con-
nection with the Hazarajat, by the convulsions of land reform (1976–79) or by 
war (1979–2001).
It is thus necessary to combine the issue of the local and segmental with 
that of population mobility in the context of transhumance—but also of 
seasonal migration, emigration, and membership of the diaspora—and with 
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that of the fluidity and fungibility of ethno-sectarian identifications. It is also 
essential to give a central place to a third principle, that of neighbourhood 
(shafa’a) between residents and between ethnic groups; a principle that is the 
source of conflict and compromise, of competition and solidarity (Mumtaz, 
2013; Monsutti, 2008).
5 The Political and Moral Economy of Ethnicity
‘Reconstruction’ is only one moment among many in this long history, an 
episode that is changing its direction thanks to the extent of the resources 
pumped into the country and the introduction of representative institutions 
conducive to the ethnicisation of political life through elections. From this 
point of view, foreign intervention has, since 2001, deemed it politically correct 
to promote the integration of the ‘minority’ par excellence—that is to say, the 
Hazaras—into the Afghan political system, at the cost of the ethnic reification 
of their identity but without bringing them out of their socio-economic sub-
ordination, including in the Hazarajat, a particularly deprived area for mainly 
geographical reasons. In the regions, the bulk of land speculation focuses on 
plots that would have little market value outside this mountainous country, as 
they are located on steep terrain, are hard to sustain and are exposed to rain-
water run-off, erosion and landslides.
Favoured by the securitisation of land ownership, the territorialisation of 
ethnicity strengthens the community bias of development aid. Sometimes 
donors exploit this for strategic, religious or cultural reasons of their own, as 
is the case with Iran (which promotes the Hazaras), Pakistan (the Pashtuns), 
Turkey (the Uzbeks) and the Aga Khan Foundation (the Ismailis). But beyond 
these political approaches, the operational requirements of the land are self-
evident. While most foreign actors endeavour to remain politically correct by 
recruiting several Hazaras, they must in all cases rely on Pashtuns to work in 
the south, or Tajiks or Uzbeks in the north. Of course, the same reasoning ap-
plies to the Hazarajat, where it is essential to use Hazaras. Despite this, the 
ngo labour market initially benefited the Sunnis, if only because they form the 
majority and are often better trained and more commonly English-speaking.
Ethnic networks, meanwhile, are endeavouring to tap into the flow of de-
velopment aid and the foreign presence. Thus, the Hazaras benefit from 
institutions or projects connected with human rights, and the Tajiks from sci-
entific and cultural cooperation: the former focus on commissions for women’s 
rights, the latter on think tanks and the media. As for Pashtuns, they are ir-
replaceable in the crucial area of telecommunications, for obvious reasons of 
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security—only they can travel confidently in Pashtun areas—and because 
they trained in Pakistan while in exile during the 1980s and 1990s.
Since 2002, the diaspora, development aid and the foreign troops and ngos 
in the territory have pumped substantial funds into Afghan society. These 
funds have caused a sharp increase in prices in certain sectors, including real 
estate, hotels and restaurants, airlines, car rental companies, and the consump-
tion of international products and certain local services, such as the provision 
of must-have items for wedding venues. But this influx of money was grafted 
onto existing social relations, especially in families, and transformed their bal-
ance and even their very nature. This resulted in a complex mixture of tradi-
tionalisation and monetisation of one’s kin. In all social circles, as the dollar is 
king, the father does not so much give his daughters away in marriage as trade 
them, sometimes at a very high rate, and sometimes right from the cradle.18 If 
an interesting offer comes along, a farmer may for example be compelled to 
give away his child. But the head of a good family whose reputation triggers 
tantalising financial proposals from suitors who wish to climb up the social 
ladder can proceed in just the same way. At this point, complex social strate-
gies intervene and usually contribute to dowry inflation. For instance, a father 
wanting to reserve his daughter for one of her cousins can try to turn away, 
without offending him, an inopportune suitor by demanding a very high dow-
ry (or ‘milk price’, pul-i shir). But if the ploy fails, as often happens, the increase 
is considered effective. The marriage market has thus become judicialised as 
a result of its monetisation and the intervention of the Independent Commis-
sion for Human Rights in Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission 
in Afghanistan and ngos concerned to defend the condition of women and 
the cause of rights. In return, this judicialisation has led to an acceleration of 
the monetisation of this market in a context where the courts, which not only 
need payment but are also, it is said, lured by the smell of money, continue 
to promulgate financial decisions relative to the amount of the dowry or to 
blood, which follow the exponential curve of the cost of living. The combina-
tion of money, legal system and custom tends to extend, reify and dramatise 
the practical exercise of the last of these, for example in the shape of marriage 
exchanges of the compensatory type intended to avert or stop the ‘evil’ (bad 
or badal)—that is to say, violence between families, clans and ethnic groups. 
Some might even seek, these days, to trigger a family or marital conflict, hop-
ing to reach an agreement of this type. The idea of antagonism is immediately 
associated with that of the profit that might be drawn from it, which induces 
a form of intentionality: thus, the complainant will be suspected of having 
18 This is called gahvara bakhshi (making a gift from the cradle); see Ghazali (2013).
�55War and State (Re)Construction in Afghanistan
<UN>
 provoked a dispute so as to avoid having to pay a dowry (similar practices make 
it possible to consolidate the legal status and securitisation of land).
The distortions introduced within Afghan society by the foreign  presence—
and by the influx of money, the land speculation, and the ideological disso-
nance it generates—come with a high human cost. First and foremost, they 
lead to a split or even a generational divide. The youngest people are often 
better educated and more familiar with international practices, and their 
command of English allows them to benefit from professional and economic 
opportunities that are more or less beyond the reach of their elders. This im-
balance has led to the widespread destabilisation of social status: the young 
suffer from not holding decision-making power that is proportional to their 
skills in what is still a patriarchal and tribal society; older people believe that 
the success of their juniors is a challenge to their authority. Added to this is a 
destabilisation of conjugal roles, evident for example when a woman has her 
own income, for example because she works for an ngo, while her husband 
is unemployed or has to settle for the meagre rewards of the normal Afghan 
economy. In addition, women are beginning to express their demands with 
regard to inheritance rights: this is an explosive development from the point of 
view of customary law and Islamic law. Moreover, development aid and its col-
lateral effects are intensifying intra-generational and intra-family rivalries, fan-
ning ‘competition among peers, or even between cousins’ (sayal dari or sayal 
shiriki) or even rivalry between the descendants of brothers (owdourzadegi). 
So a woman may have to pay a significant amount of rent to her husband in 
order to turn a room in the family home into a nursery. A young man who 
organises a too lavish wedding can create a bad precedent for his brothers, 
cousins or friends, who may not have the same financial means as he does and 
will see their reputations suffer accordingly. Women working for ngos should 
be careful not to tarnish the honour of their colleagues. If they were to separate 
from their husbands, they would not only lose their social status but also their 
jobs, and find the chances of them being elected significantly limited, if they 
are thinking of getting involved in this sphere. Should they be obliged to go to 
court to see their rights enforced, or simply see their demands recognised, the 
process will cost them around usd 8,000.
Generally, the multiple lines of division and conflict running through 
Afghan society are amplified by its extremely fragmented character and the 
tangle of landholdings, ethnic and religious memberships, and clan and fam-
ily allegiances. Any allocation of resources, especially investment, involves a 
choice in favour of one locality and therefore at the expense of others. This 
phenomenon is evident in the field of rural engineering: water supplies, the 
charges that determine their use, the waiting time required to obtain access to 
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them, and their sometimes unwanted consequences on the natural environ-
ment all create a new field of conflict in which the violence between villages or 
towns (ghariya) finds expression. The financial and consumerist bubble that 
has been constantly swelling since 2002 is causing devastating social disrup-
tion. Those in power give free rein to their sexual predation, exerted at gun-
point or with the aid of great sheaves of money and of college qualifications. 
The individuality of women who have returned from abroad—from the West, 
or from Iran or Pakistan—and the independent spirit of those who have been 
educated triggers the brutality of husbands, fathers or brothers who refuse to 
accept that these women might be any different from others. Marital jealousy 
can also play a part—a feeling all the more dangerous as it is supposed to ex-
press family honour. The human toll of these tensions is appalling. Many wom-
en even commit suicide by atrocious means (self-immolation or swallowing 
pesticide or rat poison), or suffer senseless corporal punishment, such as hav-
ing their nose, ears or lips cut off; the press has described these abuses exten-
sively as occurring in Bamyan, Daikundi and Hera. If we stick to these sources, 
the cases seem, curiously, to be less numerous in the Pashtun, Tajik and Uzbek 
areas, even though these are reputedly more conservative.19 As shown by the 
murder of the young woman poet Nadia Anjoman, 26 years old, in Novem-
ber 2005, the physical elimination of women deemed to have made a nuisance 
of themselves has become commonplace. But deadly violence is also the rule 
when it comes to settling land disputes and quarrels of a romantic, inter-famil-
ial, ethnic or sectarian nature. The overt militarisation of this sphere, on the 
initiative of the commanders, is only the most extreme example of the use of 
force as a mode of social regulation.
Rightly or wrongly, the population holds the providers of aid responsible for 
the uncontrolled circulation of firearms: Provincial Reconstruction Teams sent 
out to rebuild the provinces are left without means of defence, and are there-
fore unable to sell weapons on to Afghans, especially as the searches carried 
out by us troops in private homes have prompted many households to pro-
vide themselves with the tools necessary to protect their privacy and safeguard 
their honour. The massive recruitment of local police (polis-i mahalli)—some 
30,000 of them—plays a part in the militarisation of Afghan society, as these 
security forces are readily viewed by the population as arbaki, those swash-
buckling figures who controlled the neighbourhoods and played a central role 
in social violence and civil war (Dorronsoro, 2000, 127). In other words, aid and 
19 See in particular these articles (in Persian): http://www.afghanirca.com/newsIn 
.php?id=22126 and http://www.afghanpaper.com/nbody.php?id=68734 (accessed on June 
16, 2016).
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widespread armed violence feed on one another and are part of a spectrum 
that extends from private confrontation to civil war—the very same civil war 
that the foreign presence is supposed to avert.
One final factor needs to be considered. The self-proclaimed return to peace 
following the us intervention in 2001 and the formation of an elected govern-
ment has delegitimised Afghan emigration in the eyes of foreign countries, 
particularly Western states and Iran, which are now trying to hamper such em-
igration since it no longer seems to involve refugees and asylum-seekers in the 
strict sense of these terms. Nevertheless, the work of Alessandro Monsutti has 
long since dismantled any excess rigidity in the classification of the mobility of 
Afghans, including Hazaras. Hazaras do indeed live as ‘travellers’ (mosâfir), as 
members of an age-old diaspora that has always circulated according to cycles 
and migration patterns that stem successively or simultaneously from political 
exile, from flight in order to survive, from professional expatriation, from study 
abroad or time spent abroad for religious reasons, and from seasonal migra-
tion. Travel is a means of protection as well as a means of livelihood or enrich-
ment, but it is also a way of confirming one’s maturity, and a veritable lifestyle 
in itself. In addition, the remittances of migrants are essential to the develop-
ment of this country, under considerable pressure as it is from demographics 
and land-related issues (Monsutti, 2004 and 2009; Gehrig and Monsutti, 2003). 
The Hazarajat alone apparently receives approximately usd 200 million per 
annum from Afghans working in Iran (Monsutti, 2009, 102, note 37). There is a 
glaring contradiction between the display of good intentions and the real ef-
fectiveness of the policies implemented. Afghan teenagers who slip across the 
borders of Iran, Turkey, the Balkans and eu countries only to see their hopes 
stagnate, or who try and make a new life for themselves by hanging around the 
Gare du Nord in Paris or the approach roads of the Channel Tunnel in Calais, 
are the pathetic illustration of the side-effects of the territorial approach to 
reconstruction when applied to mobile populations.
6 Conclusion
The sometimes dramatic distortions introduced into Afghan society by West-
ern intervention stem from a scissor effect. First, donors, foreign institutions, 
and ngos remain prisoners of a cultural, if not an orientalist approach to the 
country; a country that they are helping to traditionalise and particularly to 
ethnicise. They will, for example, be the first to invoke ‘custom’ (rawaj) and 
to seek the opinion of the ‘elders’ in order to implement their projects. They 
set aside the fact that the advice they are given is sometimes motivated by 
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 material interests or factional alignments and is likely to exacerbate social 
conflicts, in particular over land, in which they play a part, and neglect the 
contradictions between ‘customs’ that favour men over women, brothers over 
sons, the elderly over the young, and the rifle over mere paper documents and 
their own empowerment objectives with regard to subordinate social groups, 
especially women, and the construction of a rule of law that would be legal-
rational—that is, bureaucratic in nature. Similarly, foreigners take for granted 
the Islamic nature of Afghan society and its local law, whereas this society is 
not systematically Islamic, especially in terms of land and inheritance, which 
are not governed by fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).
Second, development aid is just as likely to destabilise this so-called tradi-
tional society by ignoring its mysteries, dreaming of forgetting the past, accel-
erating its monetisation and commercialisation, encouraging a securitisation 
of property that undermines the rights of joint ownership and the historical 
compromise of neighbourhood (shafa’a), creating new minorities while being 
unable to guarantee their safety, providing education and employment to a 
tiny fraction of women and young men, thereby giving them the resources to 
challenge their social subordination and, finally, by bringing in or consolidat-
ing new repertoires of political or professional legitimacy, most often at the 
expense of the authorities of ‘custom’.
This series of contradictions inherent in development aid brings social, 
political and even military conflicts in its wake. However, the complex logic 
behind these conflicts is rooted in the mysteries of the locality (manteqa) and 
‘segmentarity’ (qawm) that are closed books to foreign governments and do-
nors as well as ngos, readable only through the distorting, outrageously re-
ductive prism of the culturalist construction of Afghan society. By simplifying 
and reifying this society, disguising it in the deceptive features of tradition and 
ethnicity, this prism totally neglects the radical transformation that Afghan so-
ciety has experienced as a result of war and emigration.
The foreign providers of development in Afghanistan, pressurised by the 
calendar of the civil year, which controls their budgets, and dependent on in-
termediaries chosen for their ease of access, command of English, and interper-
sonal and managerial skills, move like bulls in a china shop. Even worse, they 
burden society with unprecedented conflicts over land issues, trade, banking, 
wages and education. The three pillars on which Afghan society still rests—
zan (woman), zar (money) and zamin (land)—are, more than ever, factors of 
competition and confrontation. Development, economic growth and the in-
ternationalisation of trade conflicts stoke conflict as a result of the resources 
they generate and the desires they arouse. At the same time, the rational- legal, 
bureaucratic rule of law, if indeed it has the political and financial resources 
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necessary to emerge, does not appear to be best placed to peacefully resolve 
social disputes, particularly over land. Informal arbitration procedures be-
tween protagonists, at which the Taliban excel, are probably better suited to 
the concrete conditions of the country, at least in the countryside, even though 
they tend to reproduce social domination (Sadeghi, 2013; Baczko, 2013; De 
Lauri, 2013). In addition, ‘capitalism’ will not easily resolve the crucial issue of 
coexistence between shepherds and farmers, and any exclusive securitisation 
process of arable land or commercialisation of pastures will have devastating 
consequences (Alden Wily, 2013b). On the ground, those involved are demand-
ing property deeds, which alone, in their eyes, can guarantee any protection 
(even illusory) for their property, while demanding respect for customary law, 
particularly that of the neighbourhood (shafa’a), as these laws convey an ethic 
of collective responsibility.
Furthermore, such a mountainous and arid country as Afghanistan cannot 
expect an endogenous socio-economic take-off in a context where the scarcity 
of arable land adds to the demographic pressure. For decades, the mobility 
of populations has been the primary means of their survival, and sometimes 
their relative enrichment. For thirty years, remittances from emigrants have 
constituted a real lever for the transformation of society. Conversely, any ob-
struction to this movement of human beings aggravates internal tensions. In 
the late 1940s, the independence of Pakistan, for example, hindered the cross-
border transhumance of the Kuchis, bringing extra pressure to bear on the pas-
tures of the Hazarajat. There will be no development in Afghanistan without 
international mobility for Afghans. Funding and policies that fail to reflect this 
reality will bring neither social change nor economic growth, and will not even 
manage to ‘fix’ populations in their place, as Western states and Iran hope.
For fifteen years, the world has been scared of the extremism of the Taliban 
and the threat it poses to the international system, and has seen Afghanistan 
only through the reductive prism of jihadi threat. At the same time, the coun-
try has tried to send a different message to Europe, one that Europe has re-
fused to hear—a message whose urgency and complexity are currently being 
revealed through the influx of refugees: how can one shape a state that follows 
the rule of law and is consistent with international standards while generating 
a basic minimum of economic growth and social justice, and take into account 
people’s imperative need to be mobile and interact with the several million-
strong diaspora? It would be unreasonable to deny all merit to the foreign in-
tervention of 2001. The new regime has undoubtedly created a political space 
in which all the so-called ethnic groups in the country can discuss sharing the 
external financial windfall, if not on an equal footing at least in an atmosphere 
conducive to effective competition and compromise (in this specific case, the 
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influx of resources plays a role comparable to that of tax in Western states). 
Given the history of Afghanistan over the last two centuries, such an evolution 
is a real breakthrough. But this mode of development is still hampered by im-
balances and uncertainties.
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Chronology
1880–1901: ‘Reign of Iron’ of Abdurrahman, the founder of modern Afghanistan, under 
British tutelage
1891–93: ‘Three-year War’ in the Hazarajat
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1928: Major reforms of the constitutional King Amanullah (1919–29)
1933–73: Reign of Zaher Shah
1973: Coup of Mohammad Dawood Khan, the King’s cousin and former Prime Minister 
(1953–63), and proclamation of the Republic
1978: Coup of the People’s Democratic Party
1979–89: Soviet occupation
1992: Fall of the pro-Soviet regime
1992–96: Coming to power of the Mujahideen, who resisted the Soviet occupation, and 
the ‘War of the Commanders’
1996–2001: Taliban regime, overthrown by US military intervention
2001–14: Karzai Administration
Since 2014: Coalition government of Abdullah Abdullah–Ashraf Ghani
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chapter 7
Resisting Neo-Liberal Skylines: Social 
Mobilisations and Entrepreneurial Urban 
Development in Tel Aviv
Adriana Kemp and Talia Margalit
Abstract
The article examines recent social mobilisations against the planning and building of 
towers in Tel Aviv to address ongoing debates over the impact of social activism on 
the neo-liberalisation of urban development in times of neoliberalism’s ‘legitimation 
crisis.’ Contrary to binary views of ‘neoliberalism vs. resistance’ prevalent in scholarly 
debates, we look into the uneven ways in which urban mobilisations are conditioned 
by local configurations of neo-liberalisation, and how, in their turn, they affect neo-
liberal practices as they oscillate between resistance and integration. Based on em-
pirical analysis, we argue that while recent mobilisations introduced novel claims and 
tactics against the institutional methods and decisions that produce urban space, and 
succeeded in politicizing towers as the flagship of neoliberal urban development, their 
actions have been reinserted in the deepening neo-liberalisation of the city. Our find-
ings raise broader insights about the ways in which neo-liberalisation processes sit 
inside society and not above it, as they shape the actors concerned, their positions, and 
their visions of development.
1 Introduction
In summer 2011 expensive residential towers in Tel Aviv became visibly synony-
mous with social injustice when thousands of demonstrators waved mocks-
ups of the flashy towers that were sprawling across the city, while marching 
to protest against the high cost of food, housing, health and education. This 
massive protest was the first to highlight the popular local struggle against the 
changing skyline of Tel Aviv as a symptom of broader social discontent with 
the ‘trickle-down’ promises of neo-liberal development.
The young leaders of the protest, and the thousands that joined them in 
numerous tent cities, identified the sharp escalation of urban accommoda-
tion costs as the main social crisis of their generation: since the late 1970s, 
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the  government had stopped building affordable housing and the reservoir of 
public housing had dried up. No laws protect tenants, and many fear of being 
pushed out of the city’s apartments, and of jobs, and of society itself (Alfasi 
and Fenster, 2014; Margalit, 2014; Marom, 2014). Like in other contemporary 
‘Occupy’ campaigns worldwide, protesters denounced the symbolic and ma-
terial links between the building of elitist towers and the ongoing political 
agendas that, in recent decades, have forcefully promoted the narrow set of 
interests of a small elite (see Peck et al., 2013; Aalbers, 2013; Sklair and Gherardi, 
2012) while neglecting other groups’ pressing needs (Schipffer, 2015).
Inspired by the 2011 ‘social justice’ protests, and leveraging the momentum 
that those protests created towards bolder and more politicised forms of activ-
ism, several groups of residents, activists and planning professionals organised 
opposition to the planning and building of towers as the flagship of urban de-
velopment in Tel Aviv. In this paper, we analyse two of these mobilisations as 
a starting point for addressing ongoing debates on the impact of social activ-
ism on the neo-liberalisation of urban space in the current moment of neo- 
liberalism’s ‘legitimation crisis’.
Broadly speaking, critical scholarship on urban development and the ‘right 
to the city’ (Purcell, 2003) underscores how the subordination of urban space 
to speculative profit making at the expense of use values, social needs, and 
public goods has resulted in a rise in the regularity with which the political 
legitimacy of neo-liberal policies is challenged (see Burningham and Thrush, 
2001; Ellis, 2004; Dixon 2010). Central to these approaches is an emphasis on 
the counter-hegemonic power of urban mobilisations against corporate mar-
ket rule, especially since the Occupy and 15-M movements diffused into many 
of the urban strongholds of neo-liberalism. However, much of this scholarship 
also tends to overlook how social movements’ struggles may actually advance 
neo-liberalisation or remain trapped in its sweeping logic (for such a critique, 
see Blokland et al., 2015). Conversely, political economy approaches highlight 
the structural market forces underlying the neo-liberal towering skylines, but 
largely disregard the significance of social protest and how it is being trans-
formed (Fuller, 2012).
Contrary to celebratory portrayals of current mobilisations claiming rights 
to and through the city (Nicholls and Vermeulen, 2012), but also to agonistic 
diagnoses of the overriding power of neo-liberalism as a coherent project, we 
suggest going beyond binary views of ‘neo-liberalism vs. resistance.’ Follow-
ing Margit Mayer (2013), we offer a more nuanced and contextualised analysis 
of the mutually constitutive relations between actual existing mobilisations 
and urban neo-liberalisation as a starting point for rethinking the dialectics 
between development (as an ideological project, a form of governance, and a 
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form of social action) and conflict. According to Mayer (2013), the unfolding 
of the financial and political crisis in the Global North and South has created 
new tactics, broader redistributive claims, and more heterogeneous coalitions 
between the ‘discontented’ urbanite middle classes and ‘dispossessed’ social 
groups (Marcuse quoted in Mayer, 2013, 4) than the ‘new social movements’ 
and professionalised mobilisations of preceding decades. Yet, as she points out, 
despite general trends, we are yet to uncover the uneven ways in which these 
mobilisations are conditioned by local configurations of neo- liberalisation 
and ensuing visions of what is possible or even desirable, and how, in their 
turn, social mobilisations affect neo-liberal practices as they oscillate between 
resistance and integration (Künkel and Mayer, 2012, 3).
Drawing on the understanding that neither neo-liberalisation nor its chal-
lenges are uniform or external to each other (Peck et al., 2009), this chapter 
compares two types of mobilisation that emerged with respect to towers in 
Tel Aviv amid the context of broader social protest: the first concerns two tow-
ers that were planned close to a gentrified, upscale neighbourhood (Yitzhak 
Elhanan Projects);1 the second concerns the privately-owned public spaces 
(pops) built around towers throughout the city. We chose these mobilisations 
because, unlike previous nimby- and aesthetics-related objections, they posed 
principled challenges to core dimensions of entrepreneurial urban develop-
ment policies: the financing of public services through the exaction of side 
benefits, case-deal negotiations with private developers and the privatisation 
of public spaces.
To examine the types of challenges to urban development that are emerg-
ing, we ask the following questions: Who are the challengers in terms of their 
social positions? Which policies are they challenging and by what means? How 
do they frame the conflictual aspects of urban development? And what coun-
terclaims do they raise? Finally, to understand the type of ‘crisis’ they are al-
luding to, we analyse current social mobilisations in the context of the longer 
history of socio-economic restructuring in which they are embedded. There-
fore, we examine current forms of resistance as building upon, reiterating, or 
1 Empirical data on both cases are based on personal interviews with key activists and on the 
systematic tracking and analysis of a variety of documentary sources: newspapers’ publica-
tions, court petitions and court verdicts, planning authorities’ protocols, personal e-mail cor-
respondence between the activists (in the case of Yitzhak Elhanan), and activists’ Facebook 
pages and blogs (in the case of pops). The empirical analysis is part of wider joint research 
into objections to, and justifications of, planning decisions, and social stratification in eight 
different cities situated across the socio-economic and ethno-national spectrum of Israeli 
society—research funded by the Israel Science Foundation (isf 1080/13).
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challenging those previous repertoires of mobilisation that evolved during re-
cent decades in the wake of new forms of deep neo-liberalisation of urban 
development.
Based on our analysis, we suggest that while recent mobilisations have in-
troduced novel claims and tactics against the institutional methods and deci-
sions ‘that produce urban space’ and have succeeded in politicising towers as 
the flagship of neo-liberal urban development, their actions have remained 
trapped in the fragmented dynamics of neo-liberalisation. By failing to con-
nect discursively and strategically the conflicts created by entrepreneurial 
development, we argue, current mobilisations tell more about the particular 
crises of the social groups that they represent than they do about the systemic 
crisis of neo-liberalism itself. In that sense, our findings raise broader insights 
into the ways in which neo-liberalisation processes sit inside society and not 
above or against it, as they shape the actors concerned, their positions, and the 
ways in which they imagine what development is or can be.
The chapter is organised as follows: first, we introduce a critical analysis of 
urban entrepreneurial development, the institutional justifications of towers, 
and their critiques; the second section examines the path-dependent course of 
urban neo-liberalisation and tower planning and building in Tel Aviv; the third 
section analyses our case studies of counter-mobilisation. In the final section, 
we discuss the implications of our study for current debates on conflicts in and 
about urban development.
2 Neo-Liberal Urban Development, Institutional Justifications of 
Towers, and Their Critiques
Neo-liberalisation is a shorthand description of processes that deepen market-
oriented behaviours, institutions and regulations (Brenner et al., 2010). At the 
urban level, neo-liberal or ‘entrepreneurial’ development represents a mode 
of socio-economic regulation that incentivises market agents to invest, de-
velop, and create workplaces, infrastructure, and social and spatial amenities 
(Harvey, 1989; Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Enright, 2014). The preliminary push to 
urban entrepreneurialism came in the 1970s, as municipalities in the us and 
uk faced bankruptcy due to the severe cutbacks of federal aid (Tasan-Kok, 
2008; Theodore et al., 2011). To support public budgets and encourage private 
investment, municipalities both privatised centrally located public land and 
advanced megaprojects (Fainstein, 2008; Sagalyn, 2007). In the following de-
cades, the linkage between privatisation, flexible planning, expensive devel-
opment and urban finances became common to many cities, together with 
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the ‘trickle-down’ promise that liberation from state interference would lead 
to optimal economic operation and benefit all parts of society (Harvey, 2005). 
In this context, a family of planning methods gained importance. It included 
flexible, local spot-zoning amendments to statutory planning schemes, made 
with the purpose of advancing site-specific projects and public–private (pp) 
ventures. To this end, authorities strike specific planning ‘deals’ with private 
actors that allow the exchange of public goods and tasks—‘side benefits’—for 
extra floor rights (Fainstein, 2008; Tasan-Kok, 2008; Alfasi, 2006; Sagalyn, 2007; 
Margalit, 2014; Fox-Rogers and Murphy, 2015).
The increase of high-rise ventures designed for local and international 
elites (Sklair and Gherardi, 2012) was intimately linked to entrepreneurial par-
adigms of urban growth and development. Famously defined as ‘a machine 
that makes the land pay more’ (the architect Cass Gilbert, 1901, in Willis, 1995, 
19), more tall towers have been planned in recent years than at any time previ-
ously in Asia, the America and Europe (Leiper and Park, 2010). The systemic 
preference for high towers has been legitimised by an array of ideological and 
practical  justifications that invoke the master frame of ‘the public interest’ 
( Alexander, 2002). Advocating the belief that ‘market and business rationality 
can be made to operate as effectively in the public interest as it does in secur-
ing private interests’ (Sager, 2011, 153), planning and municipal authorities offer 
spatial and economic incentives for building expensive projects as a means 
of urban revival and beautification. As new hubs ‘of a radiating renaissance’, 
these projects are said to facilitate increases in land values to adjacent areas 
(Loftman and Nevin, 1995, 300) and the ‘trickle down’ of prosperity to the local 
economy (Fox  Gotham, 2001, 14). Entrepreneurial practices are further legiti-
mised as a social must in an era of global intercity competition, with the argu-
ment that ‘corporations today have the economic and political power to take 
their  investments elsewhere should local officials not prove compliant’ (Fox 
Gotham, 2001, 16).
The ‘flexibilisation’ of planning and its subjection to market rule is also jus-
tified by public officials’ need ‘to get things done’, thereby signalling economic 
success and political efficiency to different constituencies (Stone, 1993). This 
agenda is vindicated in terms of past failures, mostly related to the failed out-
comes of ‘rigid’ Keynesian direct public spending on urban redevelopment 
and housing programmes (Aalbers, 2013). In this way, municipal authorities 
extend generous building rights to private developers in exchange for the fi-
nancing of public tasks such as affordable housing, open spaces, heritage 
preservation, infrastructure and the like (Sagalyn, 2007; Tasan-Kok, 2008). 
This semi-opaque practice of striking deals with private developers is justi-
fied by the need to compensate communities for the disruptions incurred by 
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the building of megaprojects and the need to cover the costly infrastructure 
required while keeping back public funds for other, less profitable areas and 
tasks (Alterman, 1990). Thus, urban communities are said to enjoy, in practi-
cal terms, side benefits channelled through budgetary and spatial reallocation, 
even if their involvement in the details of the negotiations is mostly minimal 
(Tasan-Kok, 2008).
Entrepreneurial policies have sparked several academic critiques for deep-
ening uneven spatiality and socio-economic inequality. Urban theorists have 
criticised pp ventures for ‘reclaiming’ public spaces only for groups who pos-
sess economic value (Heeg and Rosol, 2007; Sager, 2011), and distancing them-
selves from areas where needs are great but the probability of value extraction 
is slight (Weber, 2002). Instead of activating other plans and redistributing in-
vestment, this project-based growth strategy extends the easing of regulation 
to attract more massive and expensive projects. According to Fainstein (2008), 
as such projects are the only ones that can generate the profits needed to 
finance complex municipal demands, smaller, less expensive or long-term pro-
grammes are postponed. One of the results of this is the creation of ‘prosperity 
clusters’, socially and economically segregated from nearby neighbourhoods 
and from wider urban society (Graham and Marvin, 2001, 222).
Another line of critique goes against the claim that flexible planning 
methods accelerate the bureaucratic process and avoid political favouritism. 
Scholars note that far from the illusion of free market competition, entrepre-
neurial  ventures intensify political intervention and arbitrariness (Aalbers, 
2013), as governments often facilitate one set of agents in market transactions, 
identifying them as the sole engine of urban growth and wealth (MacLeod, 
2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Likewise, spot-zoning techniques in-
formed  by  individual  decisions (Booth, 1995) benefit mainly large investors 
and large projects by singling them out ‘for preferential treatment’ (Culling-
worth, 1993, 49).
Finally, critics also point to the power differentials that shape the negotia-
tions between the developer and the ‘public’. These negotiations are managed 
by local government, which plays the double role of regulator and economic 
stakeholder (Sagalyn, 2007; Gielent and Tasan-Kok, 2010), and is often eager 
to maintain a ‘good business’ atmosphere by making compromises that work 
mostly for the benefit of private developers (Margalit, 2013 and 2014; Fox- 
Rogers and Murphy, 2015). Negotiating public goods is even harder when flex-
ible planning and ‘deal-making’ are used as commercial assets for municipal 
governments’ global competitive agendas (Tasan-Kok, 2008).
With no alternatives offered, the business logic of neo-liberalisation has be-
come ‘doxic “commonsense”’ that utilises flexible development to  foster its own 
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institutionalisation (Keil, 2009; Peck et al., 2013, 1094). Yet, the  entrepreneurial 
city and its growing vertical architecture have ignited broadening waves of 
urban social protest across the globe. Scholarship on social mobilisations in 
urban settings stretching from Saint Petersburg (Dixon, 2010), through Buenos 
Aires (Crot, 2006) and Tokyo (Saito, 2003), to cities on the Pacific Rim (Marshall, 
2003), demonstrate that towers are increasingly interpreted as a spatial signi-
fier of corporate power, gentrification and inequality (see Burningham and 
Thrush, 2001; Grubbauer, 2014). The case of Tel Aviv-Jaffa exemplifies these dy-
namics of deepening neo-liberalisation and mounting discontent. Yet as we 
will now show, the local case has some particularities, as both the development 
of ‘entrepreneurial’ towers and the critiques against it have followed their own 
path dependency, pointing towards the hybrid nature of neo-liberal urban de-
velopment but also towards the contextual nature of counter- mobilisations as 
part of a longer history of neo-liberalisation.
3 ‘Entrepreneurial Centralism’ and the Politics of Towers in Tel 
Aviv-Jaffa
Contemporary Tel Aviv-Jaffa with its 400,000 residents is the centre of a ‘met-
ro region’ inhabited by three million people. The city is historically divided 
along clear socio-economic and ethno-national lines, with most of the affluent 
quarters located to the north and settled by mainly European Jews, while the 
poor quarters remain the southern quarters and in those in Jaffa where Arabs 
and Jews originating from the Middle East and North African countries live 
(Marom, 2014). The vertical socio-spatial divisions have evolved since the 1950s 
and have gradually magnified the uneven local socio-economic cartography. 
Today, mid-height constructions (three–six floors) compose most of the urban 
built fabric, with dotted enclaves of higher constructions (eight–14 floors) and 
taller towers (15–50 floors) mainly located in the affluent northern quarters, 
and some ‘high-end’ central locations (Margalit, 2013, 377).
Although projects are spread out across the urban layout and appear to be 
isolated, they are the result of a complex structure of entrepreneurial meth-
ods and policies that have been layered through dozens of spot-planning deals 
struck by consecutive urban regimes. Indeed, since the establishment of the 
state of Israel and the creation of the national Israeli Land Administration 
(ila), a foremost particularity of the urban development scene in Tel Aviv (and 
more broadly in Israel) has been its ‘entrepreneurial centralism’. While in the 
us and Western European countries, post-Keynesian restructuring resulted in 
a significant decrease in central land management and centralistic– hierarchic 
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planning, the Israeli land and planning regimes combine a high degree of spa-
tial management centralisation and market entrepreneurialism. ‘City Hall’ 
and the national bureaucracy continue to play a leading role in the develop-
ment regime as, simultaneously as landowners, entrepreneurs and regulators, 
while at the same time adapting state-of-the-art tactics of extraversion such 
as pp ventures, case-and-deal making, and private financing of public tasks. 
The map of high-rises in Tel Aviv reflects this particularity. An examination 
of their development in the city shows that, with almost 70 per cent of the 
urban land assets in Tel Aviv–Jaffa centrally managed and owned, the seeds of 
entrepreneurial planning were planted in the 1950s, when the socialist Labour 
Party led both the national government and the city (Margalit, 2013). Until the 
1990s, plans for high-rises were mainly issued for plots owned, managed and 
planned by either the ila or the Tel Aviv Municipality and then assigned by 
the city and/or the government to private entrepreneurs through a combina-
tion of ‘flexible’ practices (Margalit, 2013). These practices are still dominant in 
the planning of towers today, along with the encouragement for large private 
landowners to build high-rise towers, mainly for affluent citizens or large com-
panies, or as hotels.
Throughout the 1990s, as several flashy projects of historic preservation and 
the urban renewal of the old Central Business District (cbd) were advanced 
by city planners, the methods for achieving side benefits and the obligations to 
finance and develop public spaces were extended (Margalit, 2014). Since 1998 
to date, Mayor Ron Huldai’s administration has solidified these practices al-
beit in many more and much higher tower schemes, and presented preserva-
tion, open spaces, and infrastructure improvements as the leading elements 
of towers developers’ obligations. The side benefits are channelled mainly to 
urban beautification, and tower ventures have been justified as beneficial to 
the public in terms of ‘the actual design and the supply of public spaces for 
the neighbourhood residents.’2 In this manner, dozens of site-specific schemes 
were negotiated as specific planning deals, where planners obligated devel-
opers to finance and execute spatial improvements in exchange for extended 
heights and building rights in prime locations.3
2 Tel Aviv Regional Planning Committee, decision protocols for schemes no. 3753 and 3853; 
http://mavat.moin.gov.il/MavatPS/Forms/SV3.aspx?tid=3 (accessed on 28 July 2016).
3 See for example scheme no. 2650a. Following the nomination of the White City of central 
Tel Aviv as a World Heritage site in 2003, the scheme encouraged the owners of historical 
buildings to sell air rights to developers. Such transactions were explained in the statutory 
documents by ‘the need to preserve this building and assure its usage for tourism.’ http://gisn 
.tel-aviv.gov.il/iview2/ (accessed on 28 July 2016).
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Currently, the planning and construction of towers in Tel Aviv dramatically 
exceeds earlier cycles in terms of the number of buildings, their height and 
their price. With an average of 30 stories per tower, this new cycle has changed 
the residential landscape and the levels of real estate prices, and has surpassed 
the previous scale of high-rise construction.4 At the same time, a strip of only 
500 metres separates the most fashionable tall hubs of the city from the south-
ern neighbourhoods that most locals see as the city’s backyard (Kemp and 
Raijman, 2004), and only a ten-minute drive separates them from the poor 
Arab and Jewish neighbourhoods in Jaffa. There, despite sprawling gentrifica-
tion and beautification efforts (mainly along the beachfront areas) (Marom, 
2014; Monterescu, 2009), most residents still rank lower on all socio-economic 
and environmental indicators, and planning projects hardly materialise in this 
area (Marom, 2014; Margalit and Vertes, 2015).5
The local situation thus echoes the conflictual side of towers and other 
neo-liberal megaprojects in other contexts where towers are seen as trans-
forming  space into prestige sites that generate both financial and cultural 
capital (Vicario and Monje, 2003), erasing urban diversity through the cre-
ation of homogeneous spaces that serve a limited area and the particular 
interests and visions of elite groups (Saito, 2003; Crot, 2006), marginalising 
alternative uses of space closer to the needs of everyday existence (Dirlik, 
2005),  triggering identity struggles (Dixon, 2010), and non-democratic megalo-
mania (McNeill, 2002). Moreover, we find that as the scope of entrepreneurial 
practices in Tel Aviv expanded, the semantic field of ‘public interest’ consider-
ably narrowed to align itself with the particular aesthetics and needs of afflu-
ent and cosmopolitan city dwellers, tourists, and wannabe Tel Avivians. What 
has nonetheless changed in the current phase of neo-liberal development 
is the emergence of broader social protest denouncing the ways of ‘getting-
things-done’ through tower construction. In the following, we analyse these 
contestations.
4 The Huldai Administration has so far issued 53 site-specific spatial schemes for 118 high- 
standard residential towers, of which 50 have already been completed or are under construc-
tion. For comparison, between the mid-1960s and 2002, only 46 high-standard residential 
towers of 15 floors or more were built in the entire city, 18 of which were built in the centre, 
with the luxury facilities now common (Margalit, 2013). In addition, many proposed office 
towers and hotels received permits and were built, and a large new northern suburb was built 
with mid-height, upscale residences along the seashore.
5 The southern quarters rank lower on all socio-economic and environmental indicators than 
the rest of the city (Margalit and Vertes, 2015).
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4 Two Types of Mobilisation, Two Legitimation Crises?
The planning and building of towers in Tel Aviv have been the objects of criti-
cism and objections throughout the years.6 When the municipality tailored its 
policies with regards to tower construction to the historic cbd and the beach 
strip in the late 1990s, criticism escalated but those policies typically focused 
on specific locations and schemes that aimed to utterly alter the old cbd area 
(Hatuka and Forsyth, 2005). Although some journalists criticised the elitist 
inclinations of municipal politicians, in the following decade local commu-
nities mostly proceeded by objecting to particular planning schemes in their 
areas. For years, the limited scope of objections and the ways in which they 
were framed mirrored the entrepreneurial method of development: based on 
‘not in my back yard’ (nimby) and heritage preservation arguments concern-
ing specific ventures, these protests reflected the fragmented nature of spot-
zoning and case-deals policies, while leaving intact institutional convictions 
about the virtues of entrepreneurial development for the ‘public interest’. It 
was not until the upsurge of the massive social protest in 2011 that urban mo-
bilisations began to address the systemic elements of tower planning and to 
demand alternatives.
According to Mayer (2013), one of the legacies of the period following the 
2008 financial crisis has been that demands with regards to ‘the right to the city’ 
in the global North, have refocused from professionalised and  consumer-based 
claims into counter-hegemonic forms of resistance against the institutional 
methods and decisions ‘that produce urban space’ (Purcell, 2003, 577). This 
qualitative shift was enabled by the fact that austerity policies and deepening 
socio-spatial polarisation within cities are affecting not only the marginalised 
urban ‘outcasts’ but also societies’ youth, students and the middle classes 
(Mayer, 2013, 10–11). These groups have created the possibility of new coali-
tions, bolder mobilisation strategies, and a reframing of the apolitical rhetoric 
of the consumer and professional citizen into broader claims for social redis-
tribution (see also Bodnar, 2015). Nowadays, Mayer observes, ‘urban activism 
on both sides of the Atlantic finds itself surrounded, in some places inspired, 
periodically swept up in and often supported by movements like the Indigna-
dos or Occupy. These groups pose new practical and political challenges as well 
as opportunities’ (Mayer, 2013, 6).
6 For examples of critiques published in local newspapers (in Hebrew), see A. Ayalon, Ha’aretz, 
February 23, 1962; I. Vinkler, Ha’aretz, April 11, 1971; A. Erlik, Ha’aretz, September 9, 1975; 
E. Dotan, Ha’ir, March 7, 1997.
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We take Mayer’s observations as a starting point from which to examine 
what dimensions of urban development are challenged nowadays in Tel Aviv, 
by whom, and how. How do they relate to the local version of ‘centralised en-
trepreneurialism’ and to previous repertoires of resistance? Which types of 
justification are mobilised and to what extent do they depart from the insti-
tutional justifications? Finally, what type of ‘crisis’ are they alluding to, and to 
what effect?
4.1 The Yizhak Elhanan Towers: Old Strategies, New Claims,  
Gentrifiers’ Crisis
Scholars of social mobilisations argue that the ‘judicialisation’ of social protest 
during the 1990s has resulted in it becoming increasingly disciplined and de-
politicised (Scheingold and Sarat, 2004). Our first case study shows, however, 
that the law—as an institutional mechanism and type of discourse—can be 
also mobilised in ways that challenge the core of the local neo-liberal devel-
opment project where other mobilisation channels and strategies have failed.
This case concerns the high-rise ventures built around the historic neigh-
bourhood of Neve Tzedek. Ever since these ventures had been planned, the 
neighbourhood’s residents consistently objected to the towers, claiming that 
they would disregard the historic cityscape, create environmental hazards, and 
overload the already poor public facilities and infrastructure of the area. These 
claims were repeatedly rejected by municipal and regional planning commit-
tees, which maintained that the ventures advanced the positive urban regen-
eration dynamic.7 However, as we will show next, it was the official rejection of 
this nimby type of claim that led the residents to reframe their grievances and 
challenge the legitimacy of spot-zoning policies and the pp transactions that 
would lead to the building of the towers, through the courts.
These citizens were a mixed group: upper middle class and professionals of 
the creative class who organised themselves into the ‘Neve Tzedek Association’ 
and the neighbourhood’s ‘Parents’ Group’ but also residents from adjacent 
districts inhabited historically by lower-class Oriental Jews. Equipped with 
know-how regarding planning practice and with legal representatives, the first 
group played a leading role in the mobilisation. The driver for the residents’ 
discontent relates to a major shift in the planning of the area and concomi-
tantly in the privileged position that they had enjoyed until then in the socio-
spatial regime. In the 1980s, the municipality encouraged the preservation and 
7 The head of the regional planning committee, in a letter to the Neve Tzedek residents’ as-
sociation, 18.11.2010; Regional Planning Committee decision regarding objections to planning 
scheme 2615 (Yizhak Elhanan) b and c 13.7.2011, 14.7.2011.
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 renovation of historical districts with small, old, family houses. These efforts 
gave rise to a bold gentrification process in Neve Tzedek. The neighbourhood 
became one of the upscale areas of the city, but still suffered from a lack of 
public and education facilities because the district’s schools had been trans-
formed into cultural and artistic centres that aligned with the boho rebranding 
of the area. The well off newcomers demanded time and again that a school be 
built and infrastructure improved, but to no avail.
In 2006, the struggle against the encroaching wave of luxury towers planned 
for the area escalated. These towers constituted a new wave of ‘plutocratic’ 
gentrification that threatened to displace the upper middle classes’ rights to 
and privileges in the city. The first tower built in the area—the ‘Nechushtan’ 
tower—was completed in 2007, boasting 44 floors. The residents’ environmen-
tal and aesthetic objections to it were rejected and their demands for infra-
structure went unanswered. As the head of the municipal planning team for 
the central area explained to a real estate journalist in June 2009: ‘In reality, 
the city does not have the money to buy lands for public uses. These parcels 
are occupied and the purpose of towers’ planning is to create public spaces.’ 
(Margalit, 2014, 79).
This tower became emblematic of future struggles as the construction of 
several other high-rises in the area was approved or planned in the following 
years. In May 2009, the local planning committee approved the construction 
of a high-rise on the site of a former chocolate factory south of Neve Tzedek 
(Shiloh, 2011). Residents objected and though a judge’s decision supported 
their arguments, he noted that the court cannot rule in planning matters. In 
2011, plans for the Yitzhak Elhanan Projects pushed the conflict surrounding 
towers in the area one step further, tying them more clearly to the entrepre-
neurial deals made by the municipality. These projects were advanced through 
a series of complementary schemes. The A Plan (2615a) was intended to 
‘strengthen  the  residential area’ between Neve Tzedek and adjacent historic 
neighbourhoods (Tel Aviv Regional Committee, 2006, plans objectives, 1), and 
to transform Yitzhak Elhanan Street into the main commercial thoroughfare 
between the cbd and the beach. The plan included a 29-floor tower with 
spacious apartments and private leisure facilities. In exchange, the develop-
ers  were to create spaces for a kindergarten, a small synagogue and a small 
public garden.
In the same period, the spot-zoning plan Yitzhak Elhanan B (2615b) was 
drafted ‘to encourage cbd use and urban renewal’ in the area located between 
the Yitzhak Elhanan A tower and the cbd (Tel Aviv Regional Committee, 
2006, 2). The scheme included a 28-floor tower, half of which was designated 
for luxury apartments. Public side benefits included the partial widening of the 
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street and the preservation of one historic building. One of the architects that 
planned these projects explained that, as Tel Aviv is becoming denser, Neve 
Tzedek is becoming a low-density ‘island in an urban ocean’, adding ‘Residents 
of Neve Tzedek enjoy low-rise construction, but they cannot force themselves 
on the entire city. To preserve spaces and nature around the city, one has to cre-
ate density and therefore turn the relatively low-rise construction of the past 
into taller building’ (Shiloh, 2011).
Following the ‘deal logic’ of entrepreneurial centralism, planners drafted 
two additional schemes that designated additional floors to towers ‘A’ and ‘B’. 
In exchange for 11 more floors for the latter, they demanded from the developer 
the evacuation of a public lot in order to build the public school that the neigh-
bourhood residents had been demanding for so many years (Tel Aviv Regional 
Committee, 2015). At this point, the neighbourhood committee submitted its 
objections to the regional planning committee arguing against the spot zoning 
and the deals that the municipality strikes with developers. ‘The city approves 
high-rise after high-rise due to pressure from developers and the improvement 
taxes the projects generate,’ argued one of the organisers of the Neve Tzedek 
residents’ association, ‘It’s already been decided that the Neve Tzedek Tower 
was a horrible mistake, yet they’re continuing to plan additional towers’ (Shi-
loh, 2011). In response, the district planner said that those who were objecting, 
who were generally well off and had the means to fight  developers, must un-
derstand they are just one of a number of legitimate interest groups (Shiloh, 
2011). Finally, the planning committee gave in to the appeal and ‘recalculated’ 
the developers’ costs and benefits, lowering the height of the tower by three 
floors. It was at this point that the residents’ committee decided to go to court, 
this time enlarging both the scope and framing of their claims.
In claims submitted to the regional court in September 2011, the committee 
argued that measuring public benefits against floor ratios was illegitimate and 
that it was the state’s obligation, and not the private developer’s, to provide 
public goods. In its response, the municipality argued that such transactions 
are indispensable for effective urban regeneration.8 In 2013, the regional court 
accepted the residents’ claim arguing that according to the Israeli Planning 
and Building Law, the creation of financial engines for public tasks is not under 
planning institutions’ jurisdiction and that municipal tasks are mandatory and 
their provision should not be conditioned on being subsidized by the taxes 
exacted from developers.




The legitimation issues raised in this case were thus novel in that they 
brought into a court, for the first time, what had been the cornerstone of  local 
planning’s doxic common sense—namely, developments’ side benefits and 
the exactions made to ‘compensate’ the public for the erection of massive and 
expensive new towers. However, long durée entrepreneurial ‘habits’ and power 
relations cannot be easily undone. The municipality appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Justice arguing that all spatial development is based on the principle 
of exactions from pp ventures, that pp planning as a method for increasing 
municipal revenues is a just means to an end, and that they can grant the extra 
floor permits and decide what would be the side benefits.9 Finally, the court 
declined to discuss the appeal; the Elhanan Projects have been built to their 
full height, and are showcased as part of the municipality’s efforts to offer 
housing solutions.10 Neve Tzedek’s affluent residents did not get their school. 
However, their appeal against ‘the way of getting things done’ set a court prec-
edent and pioneered a debate on the (legal) legitimacy of pp practices—and 
on the jurisdictions, criteria, and duties of planning in the city—that has wider 
repercussions.
4.2 pops Group: New Strategies, Old Claims, Professional Crisis
The second case relates to a group of young architects and planners who 
focused their activism on pops. pops are one of the oxymoronic recipes 
advanced as side benefits of pp ventures for public space ‘regeneration’ and 
‘securitisation’ (Bodnar 2015, 2096). The group crystallised in 2014 when archi-
tect and web journalist Naama Riva published a survey showing the low usage 
levels and pedestrian traffic in local pops, and then invited her Facebook fol-
lowers to join her in picnics in the sanitised and unwelcoming pops located 
next to luxurious towers (Riba, 2013). The aim of the group was to mobilise 
public awareness against the poor service these spaces offer the public and, in 
the spirit of the 2011 nationwide ‘social protest’ that inspired the group, to raise 
the question ‘who is getting what and why’ in the city.
‘These ventures [the towers] gain extended building rights. To ‘compen-
sate’ the public for this, the developers are obligated to give presents […] The 
local planning milieu let entrepreneurs shape it, in manners that only serve 
their clientele in expensive towers.’ With their picnics they thus aimed ‘first, to 
make the public realize that these spaces are theirs by law. Second, to advance 
the understanding of bureaucrats, planners and the wider public that open 
9 Municipality’s appeal, no. 1366/11, submitted to the Supreme Court on February 19, 2013.
10 Kerem Israel, In the heart of Tel Aviv, http://www.kerem-israel.info/new_projects/white 
-city (accessed on 2 December 2016).
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spaces are significant for the city, and that they are threatened by this practice’ 
(Naama Riva interviewed by Noifeld (2014a), our transl.).11
Therefore, alongside the picnic events, the group also launched a public 
campaign via the conventional media and several blogs, to explain the ob-
scure technical language used by planners and expose how planning decisions 
that produce unfair spaces are made. The name of the group, Hana’a B’zika, 
was a successful gimmick that simultaneously hinted at the members’ profes-
sional expertise and criticised the incomprehensible professional jargon that 
replaced traditional land expropriation through the usage of new ‘public– 
private’ terminology. In Hebrew, the name means literally ‘joy in a pops’, and 
also—with its elements transposed—Zikat Hana’a, the legal term for that part 
of a private plot designated for public passage and usage.
Social activism among young planners and architects like those who cre-
ated the pops group is relatively new in Israel. Throughout the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, professionals created several non-governmental or-
ganisations (ngos) that contested development and environmental policies 
through advocacy, litigation, and consultation activities (Yacobi, 2007; Alfasi 
and Fenster, 2014). These organisations opened the way for a discourse with 
regard to planning that challenged the self-assured language of ‘professional 
knowledge’ used by planning authorities (see Margalit and Kemp, 2015) and 
their constant reference to a ‘phantom public interest’ (Bodnar, 2015, 2098). 
Likewise, the pops activists viewed the planning establishment as submissive 
to the restraints imposed on it by market-led governments, and at the same 
time patronising. In Riva’s terms, the local municipal planning discourse is 
‘almost confidential, with very little public exposure’, while ‘they actually 
function as interior designers or rubber stamps’ to market demands (Noifeld, 
2014a). However, in contrast to the ngos that preceded them, which intro-
duced new critiques but also ‘NGOised’ the field of activism with regards to 
planning (Yacobi, 2007), pops activists aimed at reaching broader publics, by 
using bolder strategies of direct action and social media.
The pops group’s critique of the planning establishment and its search for 
new forms of activism expressed its members’ sense of personal and profes-
sional crisis as young planners trying to make an impact on the public space 
and, simultaneously, to afford to remain in the expensive city. Inspired by the 
Occupy and Indignados movements in Tel Aviv and elsewhere, the activists 
focused on ‘hacking’ the urban space, reclaiming it for uses that defy its under-
lying, dominant entrepreneurial logic (Bodnar, 2015, 2100). The actual picnics 




took place over six consecutive weekends during the winter of 2014–15 and cre-
ated the atmosphere of an ‘urban guerrilla’ happening (see Lugosi et al., 2010). 
The organisers asked participants to ‘bring tables and folding chairs and also 
a smoking barbecue’ to disrupt the complacent calmness of the pops.12 Activ-
ists made frequent allusions to the ‘cold’ sterility of the towers, emphasising 
their estrangement from the humming streets of the surroundings: ‘We consid-
ered setting on fire the wooden benches’, one of the organisers wrote jokingly, 
‘I fully understand young kids that vandalize the benches in public gardens 
and set them on fire. The planning of the public space in (most) Israel is meant 
to repress the soul of human beings. We’ve been doing this only for two weeks 
and we feel already like burning something.’13
The picnics were held in central locations where they could attract crowds 
and media exposure. The first and second events took place near busy com-
mercial areas, where the mere gathering of participants demonstrated how 
deserted the pops usually were. The third event was much bigger, and the 
police intervened. The site, near the Neve Tzedek Tower, had bred much lo-
cal resentment throughout the planning process concerned (see above). The 
picnic clearly surprised the tower’s residents, who called the police, earning 
the group widespread media coverage. When the organisers explained the 
pops designation of the site—with the help of Knesset member (and former 
city council member) Tamar Zandberg, who attended the event—the officers 
promptly left. On a later prime-time tv show, Zandberg praised the picnickers’ 
efforts, explaining that while the government is supposedly working to solve 
the housing crisis, many more plans for isolated towers and pops are actually 
shaping the urban future.14
Up until this point, the organisers had intentionally focused on issues re-
lated to the design of pops rather than on wider problems of neo-liberal de-
velopment. They claimed that, unlike well-designed pops elsewhere, the local 
designs minimise public use and create empty areas in the middle of dense 
neighbourhoods. As Riva explained: ‘Instead of making a nice garden or pleas-
ant piazza, they use uncomfortable materials and unwelcoming outlines’ 
(Noifeld, 2014a). Yoav Lerman, another organiser, attributed the poor func-
tion of pops to the lack of public political representation: ‘The city council 
12 Naama Riba, https://www.facebook.com/naama.riba?fref=ufi (accessed on 2 December 
2016).
13 Yoav Lerman, https://www.facebook.com/yoav.lerman?fref=uf. (accessed on 2 December 
2016).
14 mako, http://www.mako.co.il/news-channel2/Economy-Newcast/Article-4e1fb3584e7144 
1004.htm. (accessed on 2 December.2016).
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 members […] are also responsible for these failures […] Reading the councils’ 
protocols teaches us that they only consider pops sizes, asking developers, 
‘Please give me 600 square meters of empty concrete, or 800 square meters.’15
Nevertheless, following criticism from participants, the locations of the 
subsequent picnics were chosen to somehow expand the original mission of 
the group. The last picnic was in Jaffa, near the Andromeda Cluster, a mid-
sized gated community built in the 1990s as a Jewish gentrified enclave in the 
heart of the local Arab community (Monterescu, 2009). By this time, several 
individuals had invited the picnic group to mobilise in their neighbourhoods 
and cities, but the group was running out of steam. It was partly rejuvenated a 
year later through an online community named tlvPOPS, via which Riva and a 
computer expert, collect and share pops information.
5 Concluding Discussion
In this chapter, we set out to examine the ways in which the legitimation crisis 
of neo-liberalism and its deal logic of the city and its people affect current 
contestations regarding one of the boldest spatial symbols of entrepreneur-
ial development. The reconfigured urban settings in which neo-liberal ideas 
and policies have been the subject of experiment and practice worldwide 
have been crucial to the successful adaptation and reproduction of neo-lib-
eralism (Kunkel and Mayer, 2012, 3). In this context, politicians and pundits 
promote luxurious towers and megaprojects as a major driver for urban eco-
nomic  development and regeneration (Grubbauer, 2014), a precondition for 
global entrepreneurial competition (Sklair and Gherardi, 2012), and a means 
of making private money ‘work’ in the public interest (Enright, 2014). How-
ever, as we have shown, these towers have become both a site and a medium 
of social contention. Conflict around towers has accentuated in the current 
phase of neo-liberalisation, shaking the apolitical apathy of consumer- and 
professional-based urban claims characteristic of previous phases. As Mayer 
(2013) observes, movements like the Indignados and Occupy have created a 
window of  opportunity for the politicisation of current forms of urban  activism 
15 Yoav Lerman (2014) ‘Another Blog from Tel Aviv’, 5 February, http://tlv1.co
. i l / 2 0 1 4 / 0 2 / 0 5 / % D 7 % 9 0 % D 7 % 9 5 % D 7 % 9 B % D 7 % 9 C % D 7 % 9 9 % D 7 % 9 D -
%D7%90%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%96%D7%99%D7%A7
%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%90%D7%94-
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%D7%91%D7%A6%D7%94/ (accessed on 28 July 2016).
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in many of the affluent urban nodes, by introducing new strategies, claims and 
coalitions.
Our case studies largely confirm that the ‘spectre’ of crisis hovers over cur-
rent mobilisations in Tel Aviv; it does so, however, following the particular 
assemblages of local neo-liberalisation. The local version of urban entrepre-
neurialism in Tel Aviv involves a strong centralism that is supported by insti-
tutionalised power settings and justified by the side benefits of pp ventures for 
urban regeneration and beautification. Side benefits and pp negotiations have 
thus become the main object of current local contestations. Yet, as we have 
shown, contestations have also been shaped by the actors concerned, their po-
sitions, and the ways in which they imagine what development is or can be.
Regarding the actors, their modes of mobilisation and positions, we found 
that, equipped with financial and social capital, the Neve Tzedek residents 
used conservative means of judicial mobilisation while radicalising previous 
nimby claims against towers. Their struggle was conducted from the position 
of upscale gentrifiers who, in the past, had benefited from the privileges of 
urban development but had now lost faith in the system and its distributive 
politics. The pops youngsters resorted to creative means of mobilisation by 
physically reclaiming public space across the city. Occupying space and ex-
plaining how it is produced, they aimed to distinguish their professional selves 
from generations of older planners working for the establishment and private 
firms. In the activists’ view, these older professionals have betrayed their mis-
sion by becoming mere ‘interior designers’ or ‘rubber stamps’, submissive to 
market-rule and governance.
The language of current contestations also showed continuity with the ‘so-
cial justice’ protest of 2011. The grievances in Neve Tzedek began way before 
the social protest; nevertheless, the neighbourhood committee’s appeal on the 
Yitzhak Elhanan Projects aligned with the broader redistributive claims raised 
by the popular protest. Thus, they reframed their claims in universalising 
terms of urban citizenship, arguing that the law mandates ‘City Hall’ to provide 
public services and infrastructure directly to citizens and not through condi-
tional ‘side benefits’ issuing from pp negotiations. The pops group was created 
a couple of years after the local tent camp protest had been dismantled. Nev-
ertheless, the pops activists presented their mobilisation as part of the wider 
struggle for the right to urban spaces and for more equitable planning. In that 
sense, both mobilisations addressed the same crucial questions—who gets 
what, and why, and how public decisions are made—seeking to disclose the 
systematic ways in which uneven and non-democratic development is created.
Nevertheless, our case studies also showed the fragmented and limiting dy-
namics that struggles for rights to the city and against market rule often  display. 
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As Blokland et al. argue, ‘whereas the organising of citizens for their right to 
the city constitutes a counterforce against corporate and ethno nationalistic 
influences on urban policies, such claims […] are often strikingly specific re-
garding their thematic focus and the groups they speak for’ (2015, 656–657). 
Our case studies show that raising overall claims to public space and denounc-
ing the corrupting market logic of urban policies often obscure rather than 
overcome the multilayered conflicts of urban development and inequality. 
Gentrifiers in Neve Tzedek reclaimed their ‘republican’ rights to public services 
as discontented urban citizens endowed with a clear sense of deservedness 
(Marcuse, 2009). Yet they limited their claims to the methods of producing 
‘side benefits’ through towers, without touching upon the harsh dividing im-
pacts neo- liberal development has on the undeservedly dispossessed in the 
city (Marcuse, 2009). Their appeal did indeed produce a meaningful judicial 
precedent, but its impact on later schemes has so far been minimal, as policy-
makers continue promoting the competitive agenda with promises of future 
‘trickle-down’ impacts for other ‘legitimate’ interest groups.
Similarly, when the pops organisers strategically chose to focus their mes-
sage on the ‘design’ of the pops, they actually set the parameters of their pro-
test: ‘It seems impossible to fight the major economic forces now working in 
Israel’s urban centres, especially in Tel Aviv,’ explained Riva, ‘It is possible, 
though, to reject the destruction of the street level’ (Noifeld, 2014a). When 
participants challenged them to address broader issues of segregation and ar-
gued that on-site actions cannot ignore the history of a place and its former 
residents, these challenges were disregarded. ‘Perhaps in the war on tycoons, 
Huldai and luxury towers, we should cooperate with Palestinians […] and Miz-
rachim (Oriental Jews),’ stated one of the participants in the picnic held in an 
exclusive enclave of towers built on the remains of a Jewish slum and a for-
mer Palestinian village, ‘after all, their slums are also in danger of takeover.’16 
But the idea of creating broader coalitions was rejected on the grounds that 
‘there is no difference between former Jewish, German, or Arab lands, what 
drives the building of towers in Tel Aviv and Israel, is only one thing. Money.’ In 
this manner, their critique of the ‘power of money’ as erasing the public space 
was based on the erasure of the many class, ethnic, and national divisions that 
make up the public and that public’s different demands and needs in Tel Aviv-
Jaffa (see Marom, 2014).
A similar dynamic of universalised claims to rights to the city that misrec-
ognise the particularities of the activists involved (Harvey, 2005) was manifest 




in the group invocation of a binary image of the ‘rich’ tower dwellers and the 
general and largely indifferent ‘public’, waiting to be enlightened: ‘People have 
little interest in planning matters, which they also hardly understand, we need 
to explain and focus their attention’ (Noifeld, 2014a). In that sense, the pops 
discourse remained closer to the planning milieu’s discourse—on a ‘general 
public interest’—that it set out to challenge, and it thus undercut the activists’ 
radical potential and actual impact.
Moreover, similar to the self-limited critique of their Neve Tzedek coun-
terparts, the pops group avoided dealing with the deeper troubles of local 
neo-liberalisation. While they exposed the methods that privatise the right 
to urban space, the alternatives they proposed relied on the ‘new urbanism’ 
idea that ‘good’ urban design is the best means of achieving social mixture 
and social justice (Alfasi and Fenster, 2014). In this manner, both groups clearly 
challenged the ethos and modus operandi of entrepreneurial development as 
a form of socio-economic redistribution, yet to a large degree their critique 
remained trapped in the fragmenting dynamics that feeds neo-liberalisation as 
an ongoing form of ‘dividing and ruling’ society while re-engineering its mul-
tilayered social divisions.
Looking at urban development through the prism of its challengers thus 
brings insight into the non-binary articulations between conflict and de-
velopment. A close-up look into the politics of contention regarding urban 
development—the mobilisation strategies of challengers, the ways in which 
they frame what are the wrongs of development and what ought to be 
done about them, and the social position from which they articulate their 
discontent— reveals that contestations can actually highlight the deeper lay-
ers of consensus that make neo-liberalisation processes so resilient, even when 
the latter are allegedly experiencing a ‘legitimation crisis’.
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This chapter examines conflicts of development focusing on the 2015–20 Development 
Plan for Casablanca, which was the subject of a broad consultation process initiated 
and implemented by the Wali of Casablanca, the King of Morocco’s direct represen-
tative. The study highlights the competing visions, power relationships and struggles 
that led to the completion of a hundred or so development projects. Unlike studies on 
urban development in Morocco, which mainly focus on opposition and protest against 
development projects, or on engendered loyalties and alliances, this chapter highlights 
the tactical alliances and various mediations that helped define the development 
plan. This encourages us to understand the state not as a ‘referee’ but as an ‘arena’. The 
Casablanca development project represents a period when the balance of power and 
the competing forces at work in Morocco—the interconnected relations of state and 
 society—could be brought up to date.
1 Introduction
It was a speech made by the King to Parliament in October 2013 that placed 
a development plan for Casablanca on the agenda. At the opening of the 
parliamentary session—which every year begins with a royal speech, King 
 Mohammed vi focused on the irresponsibility of politicians in carrying out 
their mandate. To back up his argument, he pointed to the lack of develop-
ment in Casablanca, its ‘glaring’ inequalities and the weakness of its public 
facilities. ‘Mismanagement’ by elected officials, said the monarch, was ‘the 
source of problems’ that had led to ‘this city, one of Morocco’s richest’ being 
‘the city of the most glaring social disparities, […] the finance and business 
centre, but also a centre of poverty [and] unemployment’.1 The King did not 
1 Address by His Majesty the King at the opening of the first session of the third legislative ses-
sion of the ninth Parliament, 11 October 2013 (map, 2013).
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restrict his remarks to a list of problems but also called for change: he voiced 
his desire for people to come up, ‘as a matter of urgency, [with] a diagnosis to 
identify the origins of the problem and the means to remedy it.’ He drew up 
the terms and called for the participation of all the inhabitants of Casablanca. 
Finally, he stated the goal of the changes: the ‘transformation of Casablanca 
into an international financial hub.’
This disavowal of the political class was not in itself anything new under 
the reign of Mohammed vi. It was rooted in the crisis concerning political bro-
kerage and the difficulties the political class was experiencing in renewing its 
ranks (Iraki, 2005; Zaki, 2009; Tozy, 2010). These difficulties were preventing 
elected officials—at both the national and the local levels—from assuming 
the function of ‘intercession’ between the monarchy and the people, a  function 
assigned to them by the Moroccan political system (Tozy, 1991). However, the 
October 2013 speech was distinguished both by the explicit reference to the 
elected officials of Casablanca and by its development imperative. A brief 
summary of the place occupied by development in the modes of government 
employed during the reign of Mohammed vi will highlight the reasons for the 
King’s demand for change.
The use of the vocabulary and repertoire of developmental is emblematic 
of the authoritative discourse with which Mohammed vi marked a break with 
the old order. His reign, which began in 1999, has been marked by the rise of the 
developmentalist agenda in the exercise of power. The monarch decided on 
and launched various ‘programmes’, ‘initiatives’ and ‘visions’ of development; 
these continued to punctuate the first fifteen years of his reign.2 In the context 
of the state’s economic and institutional transformation, the figure of the King 
as developer has encouraged the reconfiguration of the repertoires of state 
action (Catusse and Karam, 2009): the ‘managerial’ turn in modes of govern-
ment (Jobert, 1994; Ogien, 1995; Hibou and Tozy, 2002), in line with the rising 
importance of donors on the public agenda, has furnished the measures neces-
sary for this change to occur; the multidimensional nature of developmental-
ist action, meanwhile, has created many new areas for state intervention. As 
a ‘Builder King with social concerns’ (Catusse and Vairel, 2010), the monarch 
has continued to promote the technocratic and economistic concerns that 
have distinguished public action since independence. The social  dimension 
2 As a brief overview: the ‘policy on major infrastructure projects’ for land development, the 
‘slum-free city’ programme and the ‘major projects’ policy for urban development; the na-
tional initiatives for ‘Human Development’ and for ‘Social Development’; and sector-specific 
visions for economic development, such as the ‘Plan Azur’ for tourism, the ‘Plan Maroc Vert’ 
for agriculture and the ‘Emergence’ programme for new world businesses.
�9�A ‘Time’ to Act
<UN>
may indeed set Mohammed vi’s developmentalist project apart from others, 
but it also carries over the same apolitical understanding of change. The re-
sult is that social action is ‘technologised’ and the political dimension of in-
equality remains largely ignored. Thus, efforts in the domain of public action 
have focused on correcting the effects of social and regional inequalities, not 
their causes: this ‘myopia’ (Bec, 2014), despite leading to significant techni-
cal and material advances,3 has hampered action to reduce the inequalities 
constitutive of the social and political status of individuals. These inequalities 
have instead been intensified by the neo-liberal orientation of the economy 
and by its ‘financialisation’ (Bono et al., 2015). The unequal nature of the way 
benefits have trickled down to the population has been the subject of violent 
protests, but the localised nature of the demands expressed, along with their 
geography—confined, as they have been, to marginal regions—have limited 
their scope (Bennafla and Emperador, 2010), leaving largely unaffected the na-
tional consensus on the development model. In the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ of 
2011, the creation in Morocco of the February 20 movement, a motley coalition 
of Islamist sympathisers, human-rights activists and hard left parties (Smaoui 
and Wazif, 2013), has given a high profile to these challenges, which had previ-
ously remained scattered. During the ‘sit-ins’ or big marches that took place in 
February and March 2011, the political violence of the slogans employed ad-
mittedly spared the person of the monarch (Tourabi and Zaki, 2011), but the 
concentration of the demonstrations in the major cities of Casablanca, Tangier 
and Marrakesh, where the central government was highly active and where 
the new King could most effectively showcase his modernisation project, gave 
them a particular resonance (Hibou, 2011a). The socio-economic dimension 
of these demands, expressing a desire for greater equity in the distribution of 
the fruits of development, brought to light the limits of the model’s capacity to 
integrate disparate groups, and thus called the consensus into question, how-
ever implicitly.
Thus, the royal speech of October 2013 seems to me to be part of the wider 
dispositif set up in response to the demonstrations of 2011: like the address 
of 9 March 2011, which called for constitutional reform and the holding of 
fresh legislative elections (Dupret and Ferrié, 2011), the October 2013 speech 
positioned the King as ‘the’ agent of change—in this case, both economic and 
social. This allowed the monarchy to maintain the initiative and to define its 
3 Figures with regard to properly equipped households and home ownership have experienced 
marked growth over the past fifteen years, as shown by the general census of population 
and housing in 2014, which can be found at http://www.rgph2014.hcp.ma/Presentation-des-
principaux-resultats-du-RGPH-2014_a374.html (accessed on 20 June 2016).
Alaoui�9�
<UN>
terms. This reading is confirmed by the launch, by the King a few weeks earlier, 
of a development plan for Tangier (Atlas Info, 2013; Morocco, 2014), an initia-
tive that was repeated for Marrakesh in January 2014. In addition, the national 
dimension given to Casablanca by the King—whose demand for change was 
uttered within the very precincts of Parliament—drew on the unique symbolic 
position that the city occupies in the economic geography of the Kingdom and 
in the historical geography of Moroccan social movements, which gives any 
public action in the economic capital a national character. The time difference 
between the social unrest of 2011 and the ‘economic and social’ response to 
it explains the decision to resort to the artifice of urgency: the ‘critical state’ 
of Casablanca, as set forth in the royal speech, revives the link between, on 
the one hand, the desire for change on the part of social actors, and, on the 
other, the monarch’s ability to listen and understand (Le360, 2013a). The sense 
of urgency in the royal speech—given the central role of the monarch in de-
fining the political dimension and its lexical content4—imposed the need 
for action at a time when the discredit of local officials had disqualified their 
participation in advance, thus opening a ‘time’ for state interventionism. This 
took the shape of the launch of a broad consultation on the definition of a 
five-year development plan, initiated and implemented by the Wali of Casa-
blanca, the King’s direct representative in these territories. This process, which 
lasted nearly a year, bore fruit in September 2014 when around one hundred 
projects were placed on the agenda and eur 3 billion mobilised through cross-
financing involving the state, local authorities, public and private operators 
and major patrons from Casablanca.
This chapter will be devoted to a study of the consultation process, the 
terms of its implementation, and the conditions of the production of the 
measures and actions of development that have been settled on, in order to 
grasp what ‘development’ means in the Moroccan context. It thus highlights 
the ‘battlefield’—to use the term employed by Béatrice Hibou and Irene Bono 
in the Introduction to this volume—in and through which the development 
plan has been ‘shaped’ (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992). This is a field in which 
conflict, the balance of power, and resistance are expressed in statements that 
mask them. This way of rendering the political dimension invisible thus places 
development within an area of consensus whose hidden face covers the deeply 
4 The press editorials that followed the speech are enlightening: ‘Gouvernance de Casablanca: 
incompétence sur toute la ligne’ [Governance of Casablanca: incompetence all down the 
line], L’Économiste (2013); ‘Discours royal: Halte à la mauvaise gouvernance [Stop bad gov-
ernance]’, L’Observateur (2013) and ‘L’état critique de Casablanca au cœur du discours royal’ 
[The critical state of Casablanca lies at the heart of the royal speech] Le360 (2013a).
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asymmetrical and inegalitarian nature of the resources mobilised by actors in 
the negotiations that, in Morocco, shape the actions of ‘development’.
This chapter is based on research conducted as part of the preparation for 
my PhD thesis, which is dedicated to the figure of the wali and his practices of 
government. It is based on a combination of research tools and techniques: 
first, participant observation, which led me to join the focus group set up by 
the state’s representative and participate in the work of the ‘Mobility and 
Public Space’ committee and the drafting of its proposals; an ethnographic 
approach, which enabled me to observe the development plan ‘in the mak-
ing’, and involved, during the eight months over which the process was spread, 
many different observation sites (various working groups, public meetings and 
official ceremonies, meetings of the city council, etc.); I also conducted, further 
along in the process, a dozen interviews with community figures, administra-
tors, and politicians so as to capture the way key players understand and inter-
vene in the process; and, finally, I collected and analysed various kinds of data 
(correspondence, documentation, and grey literature) circulated in the course 
of the process.
2 The Wali, Actor of the Royal Demand for Change
The day after the royal speech of October 2013, the King’s demand for change 
led to the appointment in Casablanca of a new Wali. The setting of the stage 
for the appointment of Khalid Safir, along with his intrinsic qualities, led— 
elliptically—to this regional representative of the state being positioned as the 
individual responsible for taking action.
As the main state authority in the region, the Wali represents both the King 
and the government in the region, a singular status that duplicates the dual 
nature of Moroccan power. As a devolved authority of the Ministry of the In-
terior, the Wali occupies a ‘crucial’ place in the modes of government of the 
region (Moujahid, 2009): his role can be considered equivalent to that of the 
Préfet (prefect) in France before the decentralisation of 1982.5 However, un-
like the functions of the Prefect (Bouabid and Jaidi, 2007), the tasks and the 
skills of the Wali are not explicitly recognised from the legal and institutional 
perspective.6 Beyond the statement of his kingly functions, making him the 
5 Until the passing of the law on regionalisation in January 2016, the Wali was the executive of 
the regional council and the prefectural council of the Greater Casablanca Region; until that 
date, these authorities’ scope for intervention was limited to the conurbation of Casablanca.
6 On this subject, see Morocco, (2005).
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guarantor of public order and respect for the law, the Wali has little author-
ity of his own (Bahi, 2005); the authority he does have is limited to coordi-
nating the state’s services in the region and facilitating private investment.7 
Conversely, the activities authorised by the Ministry of the Interior (which su-
pervises local authorities), the delegation of government power, and his formal 
status as representative give the Wali several different positions in the local 
politico-administrative field and place him at the centre of gravity of local af-
fairs. The low degree of institutionalisation of the Wali’s function (Akhmisse, 
2004), however, means that the capacity for action and initiative of this repre-
sentative of the state repose on essentially immaterial resources, such as the 
prestige accruing to him as representative of the King. The terms of appoint-
ment of Khalid Safir in Casablanca, following the royal speech, highlight this 
dimension. At the time of the speech, the post of Wali in Casablanca was in 
fact vacant: a few weeks earlier, the appointment to the Ministry of Finance 
of the regional representative then in the post meant that the Wali was not 
liable for negligence in regional governance. In addition, the King’s appoint-
ment of Khalid Safir, without prior recourse to the decision of the Council of 
Ministers, violated the new rules established by the constitution adopted two 
years earlier, which made such consultation obligatory. This means of appoint-
ment thereby strengthened the perception of a direct link between the sover-
eign and the new representative of the state, thus symbolically conferring the 
power of action upon the new Wali. As a senior figure in the Infrastructure, 
Finance, and Interior ministries, Khalid Safir combined, at the age of 47, differ-
ent registers of expertise that reinforced the impression of his ability to ‘act’: he 
had been educated at the prestigious École polytechnique, and embodied the 
technocratic power upon which Mohammed vi relied in order to establish his 
reign; in addition, as a former prefectural governor in a district in Casablanca 
between 2006 and 2009, he was both an expert in ‘regional’ affairs and in the 
community fabric of the city.
As an actor ‘designated’ from above as being responsible for implementing 
change, the Wali intervenes only indirectly in the definition and implementa-
tion of local public policies: he ensures the coordination of local authorities, 
which control institutional, legal and financial resources (there are three of 
these in Casablanca—namely, municipality, prefecture, and region), the cen-
tral administration of the Ministry of the Interior (the supervisory authority), 
and various government entities. Coordinating public action is difficult in Cas-
ablanca due to the dispersed nature of the city’s government: the urban fabric 
is institutionally fragmented and divided among a myriad of institutions and 
7 The Wali is the authority in charge of regional investment centres.
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authorities, competing or complementary depending on the case (La Vie Éco, 
2003). Thus, there are ‘114 politico-administrative units’ and ‘60 technical units’ 
(Kaioua, 2015), consisting of public and private operators, active in Greater 
Casablanca. These structures are not fully autonomous and are functionally 
interdependent: they each operate as a core or as an enclave interconnected 
with, or in competition with, others so that they constitute a link in a chain via 
which localised decisions coexist with centralised decisions. The weakness of 
the municipal budget,8 the subordination of local taxation to state taxation,9 
and the very low level of devolution of departmental budgets turn the central 
government into a key player in the definition of local public policies. This 
dispersal of power centres gives a significant role to mediation—and this func-
tion is specifically assumed by the Wali, whose many and varied positions at 
different levels of public action and the authority conferred on him by the state 
place him in a privileged position when it comes to holding negotiations with 
all decision-making centres, which is an indispensable condition for the mo-
bilisation of resources. However, economic transformations in the state and 
changes affecting management (de Miras, 2005) and decentralisation (Iraki, 
2010) in city government have rendered more complex the modes and working 
conditions of negotiation. First, the technique of five-year planning, through 
which resources for services and amenities were once mobilised (Zair, 2007), 
was finally abandoned—after a brief renaissance—in 2000; this deprived the 
state of a ‘time’ for organising a consultation by simultaneously bringing to-
gether dispersed power centres. Furthermore, planning by projects, of the sort 
now underway, has increasingly regionalised the planning of public action. But 
at the local level, the space established by the state for consultation—namely, 
the prefectural technical committee (which brings together around the Wali 
the regional administration, the external services of the state, and elected of-
ficials), has proved ineffective in the face of the many varied power centres. 
Indeed, the implementation, at the beginning of the new millennium, of the 
‘triptych of institutional decentralisation + the privatisation of public services + 
the participation of civil society’ has ensured the rise of new actors and new 
dispositifs of government, and this has increased the dispersal of decision cen-
tres. Following his appointment, the first consultations undertaken by Kha-
lid Safir with political and administrative leaders specifically highlighted this 
8 The budget of the city of Casablanca is mad 3 billion, of which mad 2 billion is reserved for 
operating expenditure, mad 200 million for investment, and mad 800 million for compul-
sory expenditure.
9 The city of Casablanca is apportioned only 16 per cent of its tax revenues, which are accumu-
lated centrally before being redistributed by the state.
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 dispersal. The consultations aimed to ‘identify the projects being planned and 
the potentially available resources.’10 A first list was drawn up, bringing togeth-
er actions that had been scheduled, those that had been budgeted for and were 
awaiting additional funding and, finally, those that had been scheduled but not 
budgeted for; it highlighted a need for funding to the tune of mad 13 billion. 
Placing these projects on the agenda required negotiation: on the one hand 
there was a need to hierarchise priorities and, on the other, a need to mobilise 
funding resources dispersed between many people and groups in the region. 
By drawing on the royal dimension of his appointment and the unifying nature 
of the concept of development, the Wali took the initiative. Two months after 
his inauguration, he launched extensive consultations for the scheduling of a 
development plan for Casablanca, which simultaneously placed an entire set 
of forces in a position to negotiate with the state representative, thereby giving 
the latter the means to act.
3 The ‘Enlarged Think Tank’, An Expression of Consensus with  
Regard to an Apolitical Vision of Development
Consultation for the definition of the development plan took shape with the 
forming of a focus group, the ‘enlarged think tank’, and in the subsequent es-
tablishment of six ‘administrative commissions’. In total, between January and 
September 2014, the date of the presentation of the finalised development plan 
to the King,11 this consultation involved nearly ‘800 people’12— community 
 figures, private and public agents, experts, regional and central officials and 
local politicians. The operationalisation of the consultation process and its 
technical nature turned the think tank into a standardised tool whose forms 
of bureaucracy aided its depoliticisation and facilitated consensus with regard 
to its implementation, ensuring that highly fragmented social, economic, po-
litical and administrative forces formed an alliance around the development 
project.
The instrumentation of the consultation resulted in the deployment of a 
scheme designed and implemented by the state’s representative, which led, 
firstly, to a division of labour within the focus group. Thus, the think tank was 
10 Interviews, wilaya, city council, Casablanca, January 2015.
11 The ‘Plan de développement de Casablanca 2015–2020’.
12 Figures published by the Wali. Discours de Monsieur Khalid Safir, le Wali de la région du 
Grand Casablanca, Gouverneur de la Préfecture de Casablanca, meeting to report back on 
the work of the think tank, 16 January 2015. The speech can be read online: http://www 
.casainvest.ma (accessed on 20 June 2016).
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organised into eight groups defined by development themes and each group 
was divided into subgroups—the ‘committees’.13 From January to April 2014, 
these groups worked on defining proposals and on finalising a deliverable 
for the Wali. Subsequently, a ninth group—the ‘oversight committee’—took 
over: this was responsible for synthesising all the proposals and linking up with 
the six administrative commissions set up in parallel. Placed under the respon-
sibility of senior government officers from the Ministry of the Interior—the 
governors—these commissions were charged with ‘structuring the proposals’ 
of the focus group, ‘retaining the “most realistic” of them’ and ‘studying their 
financing options.’14 Secondly, working procedures were defined and a ranking 
of participants in the focus group carried out; this was formalised in a letter of 
‘general purpose’15 addressed by Khalid Safir to the eight leaders of the think 
tank. Each working group would be composed of a ‘chair’, a ‘secretariat’, ‘sev-
en permanent members’ and ‘six or seven temporary members.’ Khalid Safir 
co-opted the chairs of the working groups, chosen from the ranks of the elite 
members of the community and from the Casablancan economic milieu, and 
approved the appointment of members within the various working groups, 
leaving the flexibility for each group chair to incorporate new members—the 
‘temporary members’—in answer to ‘specific needs’. In addition, the guid-
ance letter ‘proposed’ working stages—four in total—so as to ‘structure the 
agenda’ of the groups; the letter also prescribed the ‘methodology of simple 
consensus’—that is to say, of creating one ‘deliverable per working group’. And 
finally, the role of chair, held ‘responsible for running the working groups, the 
schedule and the effective participation of members’, was formalised.16 This 
system was completed, at the setting up of the think tank in January, by the 
organisation of a ‘harmonisation meeting’ in the wilaya, with all the members 
of the working groups present, in order to identify the working areas for the 
committees that comprised these groups.
The administration of the think tank was entrusted to the Regional Invest-
ment Centre (Centre Régional d’Investissement: cri), a regional public body 
that depends administratively and hierarchically on the Wali. A secretariat was 
13 Groupes de travail dans le cadre du Think tank élargi: présentation de Monsieur le Wali du 
Grand Casablanca, dinner to launch the activities of the working groups, Wilaya du Grand 
Casablanca, internal document, 9 December 2013.
14 Discours de Monsieur Khalid Safir, 16 January 2015.
15 Lettre de mission générale destinée aux présidents des groupes de travail: réflexion sur la 
stratégie de développement du Grand Casablanca, internal document, 2 December 2013.
16 Lettre de mission générale destinée aux présidents des groupes de travail: réflexion sur la 
stratégie de développement du Grand Casablanca, internal document, 2 December 2013.
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made available to the focus group; it was responsible for running the sched-
ule of working group meetings, organising meetings with regional officials 
at the request of members of the working groups, and assisting the oversight 
committee in the shaping of the various deliverables submitted by the eight 
working groups. Thereafter, this secretariat ensured coordination between the 
oversight committee and the administrative commissions and assisted the 
Wali in writing and editing the various reports published during the process. 
The director of the cri liaised between the Wali and the members of the focus 
group; he was responsible for the formal exchanges that took place between 
the Wali and the participants.
While the think tank was working, the Wali intervened directly in March 
2014 by organising a study day devoted to international experiences17 in order 
to ‘inspire the model for transforming the metropolis of Greater Casablanca’. 
The finalisation of the development plan was preceded by meetings in the 
summer of 2014 between the Wali and the chairs of the working groups.18 The 
process was also punctuated by several official meetings whose ceremonial 
nature, protocol, and introductory addresses made by the Wali all served to 
underline the royal dimension of the proceedings. In this manner, the launch 
of the consultation with civil society was the occasion, in December 2013, of a 
formal dinner in the presence of the Wali and members of Casablanca’s vol-
untary sector elite; the handing over of the deliverables created by the eight 
working groups were the subject of ceremonial sessions at the wilaya through-
out the month of April, in the presence of the Wali, officials of the regional ad-
ministration and local political representatives. Furthermore, the completion 
of the development plan was celebrated in September 2014 with a royal closing 
ceremony at the Palace of Casablanca during which the ten financing agree-
ments between the local authorities, government departments, private del-
egates and sponsors from Casablanca, who made it possible to mobilise eur 3 
billion, were officially signed. Finally, the official dissolution of the think tank, 
in January 2015, one year after it had been set up, was marked by a ceremonial 
event at the wilaya at which the creation of an observatory of civil society was 
announced, in line with recommendations from the working groups.
The launch of the consultation on ‘developing Casablanca’, and its imple-
mentation, thus enabled the state’s representative to act on time and space. 
The consultation process would indeed form a ‘space-time’ for the negotia-
tions, simultaneously bringing together a set of players available to deal with 
17 Expériences nationales et internationales pour inspirer le modèle de transformation de la 
métropole du Grand Casablanca, workshop, Club Attijariwafa Bank, 8 March 2014.
18 Interviews, Chairs of focus groups, Casablanca, July and October 2014.
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the state’s representative. This space-time would be divided into different ne-
gotiating venues: the groups and subgroups of the think tank and the adminis-
trative commissions would comprise formal arenas for consultation, bringing 
together community figures, economic operators, and administrators, with the 
Wali at the centre. This manufacturing of alliances makes use of the consensus 
as to the apolitical nature of development; in so doing, it eventually led to the 
exclusion of local officials from the formal consultation, moving the scene of 
political negotiations to the informal spaces opened up in the margins by the 
formal dispositif of consultation.
4 Schemes of Participation and the Establishment  
of Formal Arenas for Reflection
The concept of development and its multiple meanings, economic and techni-
cal, opened up room for manoeuvre for the establishment of the think tank 
and formal consultation arenas, which in turn helped to unite the diverse forc-
es making up Casablancan society.
The definition of the think tank’s working themes drew, first, on a plural-
ity of imaginaries and representations of the way Casablanca could be trans-
formed, as evidenced by the statements issued by the eight focus groups: ‘Casa, 
a place of economic prosperity’, ‘Casa, a place for living’, ‘Casa, a city for all’, 
‘Casa, a city of leisure, culture and history’, ‘Casa, a city of dreams’, ‘Casa, a 
model of devolution and decentralisation’, ‘Casa, a city in the vanguard’ and 
‘Casa, a city of knowledge.’ The pluralist field of development thus gave the 
think tank an opportunity to marry together the diversity of voluntary associa-
tions in Casablanca, allowing it, for example, to bring together the representa-
tives of 120 Casablanca’s associations. General themes were then classified into 
‘working areas’, which in turn gave rise to subgroups (committees) which thus 
created more formal arenas for consultation: the group ‘Casa, a place for liv-
ing’, for example, was divided into six committees—‘Housing, urban planning, 
infrastructure’, ‘Mobility and public space’, ‘Security and solidarity’, ‘Health and 
emergencies’, ‘Environment’ and ‘Administrative Services’—in which partici-
pants were brought together because they belonged to the same profession or 
were members of the same community association.
Secondly, the economistic understanding of development established a 
fundamental position for representatives of the economic base and allowed 
experts from consulting firms, new actors on the public stage (Leaders, 2015), 
to be appointed to the working committees. In this way, senior executives 
of multinationals or large private companies in Morocco, senior figures in 
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 consulting firms and employees of international companies were the vital 
core of those co-opted members of the working groups, as was the case, for 
example, with the majority of the 30 participants of the group ‘Casa, a place 
for living’, of which each subgroup had ‘its own’ expert. The prospect of ‘de-
veloping Casablanca’ certainly had an impact thanks to its moral and civic 
character,19 but this is insufficient to explain the attraction of the think tank; 
three years earlier, a similar (albeit less developed) initiative on the part of the 
mayor of Casablanca had left the local economic scene largely indifferent.20 
The participatory momentum generated by the Wali found its strength in the 
‘constellation of interests’ (Hibou, 2011b, 26) through which the relationship 
between individual actors and the state is formed: the participants most ac-
tive in the working groups were simultaneously engaged in certain economic 
interests and professional or social logics that made it opportune for them to 
be close to the government. The group ‘Casa, a place for living’ and two of its 
committees—‘Mobility’ and ‘Security’—were an emblematic case: the experts 
who worked on formalising the proposals of the ‘Mobility’ committee won 
major contracts with the Ministry of the Interior, including the restructuring 
of the public transport bus system in Casablanca;21 one of the most dynamic 
members of the ‘Security and solidarity’ committee (a property developer in 
Casablanca) and, less visibly, the chair of the group ‘Casa, a place for living’ 
(an owner of land on the outskirts of Casablanca) were both engaged in land 
recovery operations that put them in direct contact with the regional govern-
ment, which held dispensational power with regard to urban planning.22 Also, 
the quest for positions as senior civil servants was another incentive, as in the 
case of one of the active members of one of these two committees, whose pro-
file (as an engineer from a major French college) fitted in with the social trans-
formations of the state and its elite.23 The logic of ‘notables’ was another of the 
19 Public-spiritedness constituted, at least in the language used by members of the think 
tank, a form of legitimation. The text published on the Facebook account of the chair of 
the group ‘Casa, a city for all’, spoke volumes: ‘When the Wali contacted me to suggest I 
joined the “Think Tank for Casablanca” that he was setting up […] I admit that I did not 
hesitate […] because, given my activist ethics, I do not believe that we can evade our re-
sponsibilities when our Country is appealing to us—in however modest a way.’
20 The newspaper L’Économiste (2010), close to Casablanca’s economic circles, gave a scep-
tical reception to the announcement of this municipal development plan: ‘Yet another 
development plan for Casablanca: what for?’.
21 ‘Analyse du contrat de gestion déléguée’, Valyans-M’dina Bus: accompagnement à la défini-
tion du plan de redressement de la société, July 2008, Partie ii. Documents confidentiels.
22 Interviews, Casablanca, 2014.
23 Interviews, Casablanca, 2014.
�0�A ‘Time’ to Act
<UN>
driving forces making the think tank so attractive, including for the chairs of 
certain working groups, who, faced with the prospect of the establishment of 
an observatory of civil society, started competing with one another for the Wa-
li’s favour. It was not that, in the decision-making process, the local level alone 
was decisive in strategies of self-promotion and of company growth; the royal 
dimension of the process too was a more general factor in the attractiveness 
of the think tank, and the Wali constantly reminded people of this when he 
was interacting with participants. This is what explains the lively participation 
of all those attending official meetings: their presence displayed the extent of 
their co-optation, and—even more so—their proximity to the state. While ev-
eryone undoubtedly attached a specific meaning to this proximity, it is certain 
that for many this relationship had its roots in a political economy in which 
positions of influence and positions of accumulation overlapped.
The establishment, in the wake of the think tank, of six administrative com-
missions opened up arenas for consultation, this time connecting the Wali with 
officials of the regional administration and external services of the state. The 
technical nature of development legitimised the central place of the regional 
administration, whose expertise had been the historic engine of its expansion 
in the region. The names and the working themes of these commissions this 
time took the administrative categories on the basis of which development is-
sues could be discussed,24 thus emphasising the importance of infrastructure 
and urban development issues. In addition, the schemes implemented when 
the commissions were set up allowed the Wali to involve the thirteen gover-
nors then in post in Casablanca through the principle of the co-chairmanship 
of committees. Indeed, given the absence of hierarchically established links 
between these governors and the Wali,25 their mobilisation (which was essen-
tial both administratively and operationally), would have been made difficult 
or at least complicated without their presence on these committees.
In a bureaucratic environment characterised by the tendency of govern-
ment bodies to split, the unifying character of development has certainly con-
stituted a powerful resource for mobilising the regional services of the state in 
these commissions. But here too, the reactions triggered by the appointment 
of Khalid Safir following the royal speech and his proximity to the King were 
instrumental in mobilising local bodies; it is indeed significant that, in the 
24 Thus, these commissions were constituted under the themes ‘Major structural projects’, 
‘Highways and road infrastructure’, ‘Housing and urban regeneration’, ‘Mobility and urban 
transport’, ‘Human development’ and ‘Governance and local public services’.
25 While the Wali coordinates and supervises the activity of governors, the relationship—in 
terms of authority—between the governors and the Wali is not institutionalised.
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 corridors of power, the Wali was given the nickname ‘the post-speech man’.26 
Conversely, the involvement of regional authorities in the development plan 
was effectively staged, as was evident at the dozen or so public meetings that 
took place with members of the focus group, thus demonstrating that the state 
was unified behind the Wali and thus also behind the King, of whom the Wali 
was the envoy for the implementation of the development plan.
5 The Exclusion of Elected Officials and the Opening up of Non-
Formalised Forums for Consultation
The preparation of the development plan was, however, marked by the exclu-
sion of local elected officials from the formal consultation forums. While they 
did play a part before and after the process at public meetings, they were not 
members of the focus groups. Nor were they incorporated into the administra-
tive committees that were drawing up the development plan. Nor were they 
even consulted by the think tank participants in their roles as elected politi-
cians. When they were consulted, it was in an individualised manner, or was 
the result of formal representational protocol. This exclusion, however, did not 
mean that elected representatives did not play a part; simply that they were 
relegated to the margins of the formal process. Negotiations with city council-
lors actually took place outside the formal dispositif of consultation, in non-
formalised places and spaces that connected the Wali, politicians, and policy 
makers of the central government.
The technical and apolitical nature of development made it possible to re-
move local representatives from the consultation process. They were initially 
sidelined by the ‘negative’ and ‘accusatory’ character of the King’s speech, 
which imposed a form of silence. The interpretations of the royal address 
by officials of the Ministry of the Interior strengthened this silencing effect, 
with the announcement, the day after the speech, of the ‘launching of an au-
dit’ (Le360, 2013b) of the accounts of the city council. The exclusion of elected 
representatives was also partly the result of competition between community 
representatives and local politicians, who, at the local level, tussle over the 
legitimacy of the implementation of public action (Benidir, 2010). Only in a 
very exceptional case did the chair of the focus group ‘Casa, a place for liv-
ing’—whose association had, three years earlier, been put in charge (alongside 
the administration) of a programme to renovate the medina of Casablanca—
take the initiative to consult with a representative of the city council, unlike 
26 Interviews, wilaya and central government, 2014, 2015.
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what  occurred in other groups. The dimension of ‘expertise’ underlying the 
concept of development, and the way it is interpreted apolitically, naturalised 
the  absence of elected officials within the working groups of the think tank, 
 especially as this very negative view of the political dimension and of politi-
cians in Morocco is shared by social actors; it characterised many of the debates 
that took place within the group ‘Casa, a place for living’, where the manage-
ment of local elites was regularly denounced and the lack of communication 
with local politicians was completely taken for granted. The elected officials, 
in their turn, interpreted this isolation in different ways, depending on their 
positions, their trajectories and their characters, leading some to adopt silence 
for fear of sanctions, and others to flaunt their non-participation, interpreting 
it as a badge of resistance, while yet others developed a certain indifference, so 
that exclusion came to be seen as a form of voluntary self-deposition of elected 
officials.27
At all events, these different logics of exclusion prevented local officials from 
claiming loudly and clearly any formal role in the consultation process. Instead, 
the situation meant that these officials were placed in a bargaining position es-
sential for the continuation of the process. Ultimately, after all, it is the elected 
officials who have the legal resources necessary for the adoption of  local public 
policies: the measures taken and announced as part of the development plan 
require the approval and the vote of the Municipal Assembly. And it became 
necessary to submit matters to the vote of councillors early in the consultation 
process because of the dispositifs on which the financial and institutional ar-
chitecture of the development plan rested. Such was the case with mixed local 
development companies (ldcs), whose capital came from the city council and 
the state, thus necessitating the vote of the municipal assembly. It was thus to 
this space of negotiation that the relationship between the Wali, the regional 
and national governments, and the elected officials shifted.
The creation of ldcs was a result of the first consultations undertaken by 
the Wali after his arrival in the wilaya.28 These instruments made new financial 
schemes possible, in particular lifting the constraints related to the underfund-
ing of the region. A further advantage was that they circumvented the obstacle 
of the dispersal of power centres when projects were implemented by con-
solidating local and central decision-makers on their boards. The negotiations 
initiated by the Wali for the legal creation of these instruments and for their 
effective implementation opened up, in the course of the negotiation process, 
forums for negotiation with elected officials. In such a context, the elected of-
ficials drew firstly on the provisions relating to the holding of the municipal 
27 Interviews, city council, 2014 and 2015.
28 Interviews, wilaya, January 2014.
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assembly and, secondly, on the instability of the majority on the council, as il-
lustrated, for example, by the municipal assembly of 27 March 2014, which was 
meant to vote on the creation of three new ldcs. Postponed three times for 
want of a quorum of councillors, the vote—during the meeting of 27 March—
marked a significant move on the part of the state’s representative, who used 
his influence and the supervisory role he exerted over the city council. Through 
the regional administration, the Wali intervened to support the chair of the 
city council in mobilising elected officials and ensuring a majority of favour-
able votes (L’Économiste, 2014). Each governor was made responsible for mo-
bilising the chairs of each of the political groups represented on the council. 
The drafting of the agenda for the council session, submitted in advance to the 
Wali’s for his approval, also made it possible to negotiate with the mayor (the 
chair of the council) over the order of priorities for the vote. Under pressure 
from the Wali, the mayor himself became very active, bringing together at his 
home on the day before the vote all the council’s political forces so as to ne-
gotiate a majority of votes for the items on the agenda.29 When the assembly 
was convened, conditions thus seemed ripe for the adoption of the ldcs listed 
under item 2 of the agenda: the elected officials who had been mobilised were 
confident and the majority had been assured. But after having ensured that 
the administrative point that directly concerned him had been dealt with, the 
mayor halted the session, on the pretext of an altercation with a member of the 
opposition, and postponed voting on the provisions relating to the creation 
of ldcs to a later meeting. The establishment of these ldcs was deferred for 
an entire month based on the decision of the municipal executive, which did 
not adopt the principle of creating new companies until 28 April (Le Matin du 
Sahara, 2014), after cancelling the meeting of the municipal assembly three 
times. And it was not until seven months later, during the October session, 
that the legal provisions for ldcs were definitively adopted, obliging people to 
act—while the development plan was being defined—‘as though’ they existed, 
but to manage ‘without them’ all the same.
In addition, the close financial supervision exercised on the city council by 
the General Management of Local Groups (Direction générale des collectivités 
locales, dgcl) opened up room for manoeuvre for the central government, 
which enabled it to influence, during the process, the relationship between the 
city council and the wilaya in a discreet, non-formalised manner. The financ-
ing for projects, even those approved by the city, required—if these projects 
were to be effective—prior negotiations with the dgcl as the dgcl adminis-
tered the funds generated in the form of vat, funds which were redistributed 
29 Interviews, regional administration, city council, March 2014.
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by the state to local communities. This arrangement contributes 70 per cent of 
the investment budget of the city council and is, for example, the main source 
of capital provided by the council for the creation of ldcs. ldcs were viewed 
with suspicion by the central government, as the strengthening of regional 
decision-making instruments would entail a reduction of its own influence in 
the region. The negotiations with the city council for the vote on ldcs thus 
enabled the central government to influence how they would be made up and 
thus negotiate its place in how they would be structured.
Political negotiation thus moved to the margins of formal spaces for reflec-
tion, shifting into individualised spaces where the administration and politi-
cal representatives are brought together, which has led to the concealment of 
conflict, power relations, and, in short, of politics. It also explains why, faced 
with a process of consultation that had excluded them, elected officials often 
preferred to choose silence rather than protest, while exercising their power, if 
only to create difficulties.
6 The Concealment of the Political Dimension
The political dimension, then, is expressed at different levels in the consul-
tation process, but the dispersed architecture of the dispositif leads to the 
concealment of this political dimension, hiding power struggles over the def-
inition of development policies. The consensus around an economistic and 
technical vision of development upon which the consultation was built does 
not, in fact, remove the political dimension. It prevents neither the coexistence 
of divergent and conflicting visions of the choices, solutions and priorities of 
development, nor competition with regard to the definition of target popula-
tions and regions to be developed.
The shifting of political negotiations to the margins of the formal arenas of 
the dispositif of consultation is one way in which the political dimension is 
concealed. Using their institutional and legal prerogatives, as I have mentioned, 
the elected officials who were excluded came back into the fray by increasing 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis the regional and central administrations. This 
repositioning led to a placing of the political dimension within the invisible 
sphere of negotiation, masking its highly individualised and asymmetric char-
acter and favouring political actors able to negotiate with the state, such as 
those in a position to influence how elected city councillors would vote. This 
explains why the only occasion on which the consultation process undertaken 
by the Wali was the subject of public criticism from local councillors was pre-
cisely the eve of the first municipal session during which ldcs were put to the 
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vote. By using a press conference (Média 24, 2014) to denounce their exclusion 
from the process, some thirty or so elected officials30 marginalised by the may-
or tried to join the negotiations opened with the mayor and the administration 
to obtain a majority in the assembly’s vote by highlighting their capacity to cre-
ate difficulties. The political bargaining power of local elected officials can be 
understood only if we remember their role in the Moroccan political system: 
they primarily have a function of intercession, in that they are meant to ‘raise’ 
the social demands of various segments of the population (Tozy, 1991). This 
function—and thus the negotiations related to it—is individual in character: 
negotiations materialise through officials’ haggling in the electoral context and 
their seeking positions of power and accumulation that help strengthen their 
electoral base. Thus, for one influential member on the city council whom I 
observed during the process, what was at stake in the negotiation with regard 
to the vote on ldcs was a place on their boards, so as to subsequently ‘have the 
means to influence’ the implementation of projects.31
The central government, meanwhile, drew on its ability to mobilise—or 
not—financial resources in order to influence the definition of the develop-
ment plan; its masterly inactivity resulted in the political dimension being 
concealed in a second way. The elevated rail service project is undoubtedly 
the most explicit example. As a technical solution advocated by the mayor, 
and adopted in principle by the city council a year earlier, the project was 
met with reluctance on the part of the central government, which preferred a 
less expensive, technological option—the development of a Bus Rapid Tran-
sit System (brts). The lack of technical and financial assistance proffered by 
the central government in the context of the steps taken by the mayor during 
the consultation process, when he approached foreign donors to finance the 
elevated rail service, limited his room for manoeuvre given the weakness of 
the municipal budget. The difficulties of reconciling the divergent views of the 
administration and the mayor were resolved thanks to an alliance between 
the Wali and the mayor when the council voted on the development plan’s 
specific measures at the end of the process. This alliance ensured a compro-
mise that involved, on the one hand, the extension of the tram line instead 
of the  creation of a brts and, in return, on the other hand, the abandonment 
of the elevated rail service project.
In formal consultation forums—that is to say, the think tank’s working 
groups—the political dimension was redeployed in the economic, technical 
30 The city council has 147 councillors from 16 districts backed by the city council. In total, 
the city has 500 local councillors.
31 Interviews, city council, 2014.
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and normative spheres, leading to a third way in which the political dimension 
itself was concealed. The work of the committee ‘Mobility and public space’, in 
which I took part, is particularly illuminating in this respect. The nature of the 
members co-opted led to urban transportation issues being addressed solely 
from the viewpoint of mobility. Thus, when defining working guidelines,32 the 
vast majority of participants at the meeting were managers or employees of 
large companies, with no one representing the captive population of public 
transport users in Casablanca. The participants’ concerns were solely focused 
on the proper functioning of the city’s economic activities, and the interna-
tional examples used as benchmarks by the experts from the consultancy 
Valyans, which ran the meeting, were selected in view of the economic and 
developmental challenges they involved.33 Regional inequalities in access to 
public transport were indeed denounced, but only on the basis of the needs of 
new business centres and residential neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Casa-
blanca. The needs of populations marginalised by the high cost of public trans-
port, which largely explain the massively informal nature and the dysfunctions 
of this sector, went largely ignored. Thus, the consultation gave voice to an 
essentially economic approach to mobility and the public transport service; 
this is itself a highly political position, being based on social class. In addition, 
the meetings organised with public service operators and administrators34 to 
provide material for the committee were a pretext for each to defend compet-
ing visions for the development of urban transport, but the operational and 
technical dimension of those involved always came first, which resulted in 
any controversy being confined to purely technical statements. Lastly, when 
finalising the proposals of the committee, consensus was built on the unques-
tioned authority of the experts who had drafted the final report submitted to 
the Wali: in the actual functioning of the committee, only two members—two 
employees from the private sector—took any action to identify concrete pro-
posals. These proposals went back and forth between them and the leader of 
the group ‘Casa, a place for living’, before being submitted for discussion to all 
its members at the last meeting of the focus group. The proposals provoked a 
32 Feedback meeting of the focus subgroup ‘Mobility and public space’, Regional Investment 
Centre, Casablanca, 29 January 2014.
33 Transport systems in the cities of Bristol, Bucharest and Kaunas were presented. The Bris-
tol system was chosen for its organisation of freight, the Bucharest system for its fight 
against pollution, and the Kaunas system for its intelligent transport service.
34 I was instructed by the committee to conduct interviews with the delegate from the bus 
transport service, the public operator in charge of the trams, the municipal official in 
charge of highways, and the regional official in charge of traffic management; I was then 
asked to summarise the situation for all the participants.
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lively debate that revealed the contradictory visions of the participants as to 
the ‘best’ transport solutions to present to the Wali. By proposing that the ex-
perts from Valyans be entrusted with drawing up the details of the final deliver-
able, ‘in the form of a harmonious and easy-to-digest PowerPoint’,35 the chair 
of the working group was able to put an end to the debate and avoid arbitra-
tion, shifting that decision to the question of formatting. This, which he was in 
charge of, concealed the political choices that had been made, giving way, in 
the final document, to the options preferred by the consultants.
The avoidance of the political dimension was not just a mechanical effect 
related to the architecture of the process. It also resulted from the Wali’s ef-
facement in the face of the conflict, which can be understood as a fourth way 
in which the political dimension was made invisible. The schemes set up by 
the state’s representative, and his whole way of acting, testify to a desire to 
‘defuse’ the expression of the political dimension. Thus, the methodology of 
‘simple consensus’ set out by the Wali—that is to say, the creation of one de-
liverable per working group, limited the controversies within the think tank. 
The segmentation of the feedback process for the proposals of the eight work-
ing groups also prevented any confrontation between these groups over their 
choices and differing proposals, even though they sometimes found them-
selves working on the same themes. In addition, during the process the ways 
in which deliverables were to be submitted to the Wali assumed a character 
that did not lend itself to controversy. One of the first feedback sessions of 
one of the eight working groups, for example, took place in the hall of the city 
council in the presence of its elected members. The meeting was an occasion 
for intense polemics, which however were aimed not at questioning the appro-
priateness of the proposals submitted, but at allowing each elected official to 
defend ‘his or her’ territory, or ‘his or her’ population.36 This explains why sub-
sequent meetings with the other working groups were held in camera in the 
wilaya, in the presence of senior officials from the Ministry of the Interior and 
representatives of elected bodies alone, in order of rank, giving these meetings 
a ceremonial and solemn nature not conducive to controversy. The study day37 
organised during the process, which brought together all the local political 
representatives, regional officials, and members of the think tank—that is to 
35 Mustapha Mellouk, chair of the working group ‘Casa, a place for living’, at the meeting to 
finalise the deliverables of the group ‘Casa, a place for living’, Hôtel des Arts, Dar Bouazza, 
16 March 2014.
36 Interview, think tank members, April 2014.
37 Expériences nationales et internationales pour inspirer le modèle de transformation de la 
métropole du Grand Casablanca, workshop, Club Attijariwafa Bank, 8 March 2014.
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say, nearly 500 people—certainly opened a space for debate (the only one that 
took place during the process) even though the visibility of the focus group in 
the public space and the sidelining of elected officials created tensions. But the 
debates, dedicated to the study of models of development in other countries, 
focused on what was driving the transformation of foreign capitals,38 thereby 
setting aside the issues related to the Casablanca development plan and ipso 
facto defusing controversy with regard to the plan’s definition. Conversely, the 
staging of the day’s events, chaired by the Wali and including all the traditional 
codes and symbols of the state, showed that it was under the aegis of the state, 
and around its emblematic figure, the Wali, that harmony and unity were es-
tablished between widely dispersed forces.
If the way in which he embodies royal power gives the Wali power of action, 
it still weakens him: it makes any form of protest and criticism potentially de-
stabilising since ‘to challenge the approach being made and the negotiations 
to which it has led mean challenging royal authority’ (Bono, 2010). Question-
ing, in any way, the preparation of the development plan thus comprises a po-
tential threat—or at least is perceived as such by the state’s representative. 
This aversion to the ‘political’ dimension thus positions the Wali not as an ac-
tor in the conflict, but as an actor situated in an ‘elsewhere’ of the conflict, in 
the space of consensus that is built in the context both of the asymmetry of 
power relations between actors and of the asymmetry of the resources each is 
able to mobilise when faced with the state.
7 The Blur of the Concept of Development—The ‘Adjuster’  
of Conflicting Temporalities
The conflicts that arose were not only linked to negotiations over the defini-
tion of public policies, they also had a time dimension. The preparation of the 
development plan, indeed, involves several dispositifs for action: the state of 
‘urgency’ that imposes the need for action, the royal order authorising the ac-
tion of the state’s representative, the concrete imperatives of development that 
 require consultation and, finally, the participation that expands the circle of ne-
gotiations. Although they are all implemented in order to serve ‘development’, 
these dispositifs produce disjunctions because of their different  relationships 
with the ‘time’ of public action, whether the short ‘time’ of urgency, the long 
38 The study day was structured as six panels, each dedicated to a ‘metropolitan transforma-
tion model’ and including presentations from a representative of a major foreign consul-
tancy firm and a political leader from the city in question.
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‘time’ of development (which is the ‘time’ of results), the intermediate ‘time’ 
of negotiation with decision-making centres and the pre-intermediate ‘time’ of 
consultation with civil society or, finally, the uncontrollable and discontinuous 
time of the King, a time that cannot be discussed and is punctuated by accel-
erations and expectations.
Because of his central position in the process, the Wali finds himself at the 
intersection of these temporal requirements, whose overlap produces ten-
sions. So the ‘short time’ of urgency comes into ‘opposition’ with the ‘long 
time’ of development (Callens et al., 2007): the language of urgency employed 
by the King puts the population in the position of expecting immediate solu-
tions and forces the Wali into a position where he needs to meet this expecta-
tion. Thus one can understand how, during the consultation process, a ‘Plan 
of priority action for the short term’ was implemented, the measures of which 
were subsequently integrated into the development plan. Furthermore, the 
royal dimension of the development plan requires the state’s  representative 
to meet the expectations of the King, whose monitoring of regional public 
action is embodied in royal visits (Goeury, 2014): these are the object of the 
Wali’s temporal expectations, disturbing the temporality of public action. The 
prevailing  perspective during  royal sojourns has thus resulted in moments 
of  acceleration and  intensification in the pace at which the development 
plan is drawn up.39 The temporal stakes of the royal visits act both as a con-
straint and as a  resource with regard to the actions of the state’s representative. 
On the one hand, they strengthen the negotiating power of elected officials, 
who  themselves are not responsible for the conduct of the process. Such was 
the case throughout the months of March and April, during the negotiations 
on the creation of ldcs; the delay in which fuelled the King’s discontent-
ment and  led to the cancelling of his stay in Casablanca (Panorapost, 2014). 
On the other hand, the planning of the ceremony at which the development 
plan would be presented to the King accelerated negotiations with the central 
government.40
The synchronisation of the times for negotiation is, in turn, hampered 
by the dispersal of decision-making centres: political time (that of the city 
39 The prospect of a royal visit in March 2014 first led to the hasty finalising of the proposals 
of the working group ‘Casa, a place for living’; thereafter, the date for reporting back on 
the group’s work was subject, throughout the month of March, to successive schedule 
changes: the meeting at which progress would be reported, scheduled for 20 March, was 
postponed to 27, then to 28 March, finally being held on 11 April, the day after the cancel-
lation of the royal stay in Casablanca.
40 Interviews, regional and central governments, Casablanca, 2015.
���A ‘Time’ to Act
<UN>
 council), administrative time (that of the Ministry of the Interior but also that 
of government entities), and the time of technical entities (the companies to 
which local public services are entrusted, and on which the financing of ur-
ban infrastructure mostly relies),41 subject negotiations to many different log-
ics. To these, the process of consultation with civil society adds a further time 
requirement since it presupposes the adoption of measures or projects that 
result from these consultations. But the simultaneity of consultation with civil 
society and negotiations with those centres that possess financial and legal re-
sources means that either what is able to be approved by the central, regional 
and municipal administrations or what will be proposed as a result of the con-
sultation must be anticipated. In addition, the time of consultation with civil 
society comes into conflict with the time of the King: the royal agenda made it 
necessary, in extremis, to bring forward by three weeks the official ceremony, 
originally scheduled for the end of October, at which the development plan 
would be presented, which led to the cancellation of the consultation sched-
uled with officials from the think tank for the ‘finalisation’ of the development 
plan, and thereby to the presentation of the plan as the result of consultation 
when this was not in fact the case.
The interweaving of these different times was facilitated, first, by the par-
ticipatory schemes that created the think tank, the rhetoric and instruments 
of which were the same as those advocated by international donors: the ‘strat-
egy of extraversion’ with regards to participation (Bayart, 2009, xxv) provided 
the means to supervise very closely the consultation with civil society, which 
facilitated its synchronisation with the time constraints imposed by the  other 
 political and technical dispositifs. Thus, the co-option by the Wali of the lead-
ers of the working groups and his proximity to the vast majority of these  leaders 
have allowed him to influence the nature of the proposals and the pace of their 
development. The constraints affecting the Wali’s actions were, for example, 
fully internalised by Mustapha Mellouk, head of the working group ‘Casa, a 
place for living’, in his report to the participants: the ‘urgency’, ‘the need to 
formalise proposals very quickly, to identify quick wins’ and to be ‘ realistic’ in 
the definition of proposals are all injunctions which use, verbatim, the guide-
lines and the lexicon used by Khalid Safir. Similarly, Mellouk’s hesitation with 
regard to the issue of the elevated rail service reflect the Wali’s indecision with 
regard to how to schedule it within the development plan, an indecision it-
self caused by the unfinished nature of the negotiations between the central 
41 In Casablanca, at the turn of the new millennium, water management, sanitation, the 
supply of electricity, transport and waste collection were entrusted to private companies 
in the form of public–private partnerships.
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government and the mayor. This also explains the choice, made by the head 
of the working group, not to formalise his position on the subject in his final 
proposals.42 In addition, the experts involved in the think tank were—without 
their knowledge—important intermediaries for the Wali’s actions: co-opted 
because of the expertise they had managed to acquire previously through 
their professional practice, consultants have a detailed knowledge of what is 
possible in terms of public policy, as I observed in the case of the ‘Mobility’ 
committee and its largely conservative proposals. The ‘areas for improvement’, 
‘target models’ and ‘priority projects’ proposed by the committee drew on the 
knowledge acquired by Valyans while working alongside the central adminis-
tration of the Ministry of the Interior, which had entrusted the consultancy 
with numerous studies on urban transport. The proposals submitted to the 
Wali therefore stuck to the projects being planned or studied by the Minis-
try of the Interior as the regulator of urban transport.43 Finally, the combina-
tion of ‘hybridisation with genuine creativity’ (Bayart, 2009), upon which the 
schemes of  participation were based, provided the instruments of persuasion 
that enabled the Wali to exercise his authority and ensured that he was able 
to influence the pace and content of the consultation; the participatory di-
mension was thus harmlessly combined with the repertoire of administrative 
authoritarianism, as evidenced by the lexical content of the ‘General  Letter 
of Mission’,44 ‘proposing’ the working stages and the methodology of con-
sensus, or—indeed—the ‘harmonisation meeting’,45 ‘supervising’ the think 
tank’s guidelines and accompanied by the Wali’s recommendation to ‘work in 
complete freedom and think without taboos’. The dimension of participation 
also managed to combine with the unquestioned character of the state’s au-
thority and that of its representative, who provided the flexibility to change 
the agenda and the modalities of consultation and to adapt them to various 
time constraints.
Second, the blurring of the concept of development has opened up room 
for manoeuvre when it comes to adjustments imposed by the disjunctions 
42 Meeting to finalise the deliverables of the group ‘Casa, a place for living’, Hôtel des Arts, 
Dar Bouazza, 16 March 2014.
43 The proposals recommended the implementation of a target model for the organisation 
of the transport system, the adoption of a fund for urban transport and the profession-
alisation of large taxis, measures that had either already been adopted or were being 
planned.
44 Lettre de mission générale destinée aux présidents des groupes de travail: réflexion sur la 
stratégie de développement du Grand Casablanca, internal document, 2 December 2013.
45 Procès verbal de la réunion d’harmonisation avec le groupe Casa-Lieu de Vie, internal docu-
ment, 16 January 2014.
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between the time requirements of different dispositifs for action and those 
 related to the realisation of the development plan. The segmentation of the 
times of development, between short term, medium term and long term, au-
thorised the implementation of a ‘plan of priority actions for the short term’, 
which was accompanied throughout the process by a readjustment of the lexi-
con surrounding consultation, now refocused on defining development actions 
for the ‘medium term’ and the ‘strategic’ dimension. In addition, the indeter-
minate nature of development provided some elasticity for the articulation of 
the time of negotiations for both the short times of urgency and the long times 
of development. Thanks to their multiple meanings, all public action measures 
could be described as a ‘development project’. Thus, the negotiations over the 
priority action plan focused on ‘immediately financeable actions’46 or projects 
that were already planned and budgeted for, and whose implementation was 
hastened by the simultaneous negotiations that took place in the centres of 
power during the process, bogged down as they were in the tangle of channels 
of decision-making and funding.47 A similar type of adjustment prevailed for 
the actual scheduling of the development plan: discussions focused on mea-
sures ‘that were achievable’48—that is to say, on actions already announced 
and others that were scheduled and awaiting funding. The process, however, 
allowed for the hierarchising of priorities, the redefining of the modalities of 
implementation through the creation of new local development companies, 
and the mobilisation of financing to the tune of eur 3 million. In addition, 
conflicting temporalities reinforced the strongly ‘managerial’ dimension of de-
velopment: the central place given to the planning of infrastructure, roads and 
the urban fabric has removed the oppositions between the notions of urgency 
and development. The fact that such projects are now underway or, in some 
cases, the fact that work resumed and was intensified following the adoption 
of the priority action plan or the development plan have thus made visible the 
active will of the state and its power to transform the city.
Third, the material nature of the media’s presentation of the development 
plan has opened up room for manoeuvre to cope with constraints on the vis-
ibility of the action of transformation undertaken by the state. The presenta-
tion of the development plan has assumed different shapes, has taken place 
under different rubrics and has been prefaced by different ‘introductory 
46 Interviews, regional government, Casablanca, January 2015.
47 Programme global et actions prioritaires pour la mise à niveau de la région du Grand Casa-
blanca, press dossier, 10 February 2014.
48 Interviews, regional administration, Casablanca, January 2015.
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 paragraphs’ and thematic ‘statements’,49 all of which have made it possible to 
interweave the different times of public action with the time constraints of the 
requirements for ‘publicising’ the process. The expectations raised by the royal 
statement, indeed, led the Wali to increase the number of public meetings: 
between November 2013 and December 2014, four press conferences50 were 
devoted to the action taken by the state’s representative, forcing the disclosure 
of actions and projects as yet uncertain because of the negotiating process. 
The royal ceremony that was held in order to deliver the development plan to 
the King also marked the symbolic moment at which the negotiation process 
ended, making it necessary to formalise the development plan when negotia-
tions were still incomplete for certain projects. Thus, the replacement, in the 
supporting materials, of the heading ‘urban transport’ by the much vaguer 
term ‘urban mobility’ made it possible to include urban highway projects while 
concealing the fact that consultation with regard to the elevated rail service 
project had been abandoned, though it had been announced during the first 
conferences.51 Similarly, the formatting of the report presented to the King in 
September 2014, describing four ‘development poles’, made it possible to keep 
quiet the details of projects not yet finalised, even if the deadline imposed by 
the date of this royal ceremony made ‘results’, with regard to these projects, 
necessary. Such was the case with the elevated rail service, whose unfinished 
state was hidden by a convoluted formulation that evoked future transit lines 
in ‘capacity mode’, without specifying the nature of the ‘capacity’ solution de-
cided upon. In addition, the priority actions of the ‘emergency plan for the 
 period 2014–15’ were indistinguishable from those that fell within the longer 
term of the preparation of the development plan, but were nonetheless pre-
sented as the fruit of consultation.
49 Programme global et actions prioritaires pour la mise à niveau de la région du Grand Casa-
blanca, press dossier, 10 February 2014; Plan de développement 2015–2020, rapport présenté 
lors de la cérémonie royale, 26 September 2014; Plan de développement 2015–2020, press 
dossier, 22 December 2014; Discours de Monsieur Khalid Safir, le Wali de la région du Grand 
Casablanca, Gouverneur de la Préfecture de Casablanca, meeting to report back on the 
work of the think tank, 16 January 2015.
50 The press conferences of 12 November 2013, 11 December 2013, 10 February 2014 and 22 
December 2014.
51 During the press conference of 11 December 2013, the plans for an elevated rail service 
were announced; the conference of 10 February 2014 reported the completion of technical 
studies and the ongoing finalisation of the necessary financial package. Then, during the 
ceremony at which the development plan was presented to the King, the development of 
a dedicated transport system was announced, without specifying its nature.
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8 Conclusion
As a manifestation of the royal speech cited at the opening of this chapter, 
the development plan took shape via the meanings that the various actors as-
signed to the royal words, based on their understanding, their position, their 
behaviour and the resources they could mobilise in order to participate in 
and  to influence the process. The Casablanca Development Plan was thus 
achieved in and via a tangle of interests, logics, power relations and compe-
tition. The space-time opened for the process of negotiation was an arena 
in which, in singular forms, expression could be given to conflicts that were 
 either directly related to the definition of the projects, or connected with 
 competition that went well beyond that process of definition. The analysis 
of the process of the definition of the development plan has highlighted the 
 conflicts that make up the plan; it has also led to progress in the understand-
ing of the nature of those who drive  development projects in Morocco. My 
study has thus tried to fill a gap in the major works on the development of 
major urban projects; works which affirm, more than they question, the royal 
dimension. Based on this premise, these works primarily focus attention on 
the objections and protests aroused by the implementation of development 
projects or the loyalties and alliances that form around the allocation of these 
projects. Such relatively Manichean readings present development as an ‘in-
strument’ outside society, placed at the service of building the consensus by 
which the   monarchy  perpetuates its hegemony. I have instead tried to show 
that the development plan is not so much the instrument of consensus as it 
is its ‘object’ and its ‘product’. This consensus is affected by the practices and 
political struggles that traverse society. It is formed in the asymmetry and 
unequal power relations that constitute it. The process of constructing the 
 development plan  highlights  the strength of the interpenetration between 
the state and  society, and the many forms it takes, whether that be through 
the  dependencies, the competition, the workarounds or the ‘resistances’—as 
shown more specifically in the chapter by Adriana Kemp and Talia Margalit 
in this volume—that have led the players to shape it. The arrangements, al-
liances, and various mediations that have helped to define the development 
plan thus suggest that we view the state not as a ‘referee’ (Waterbury, 1975), 
but as an ‘arena’ (Aymes et al., 2015): the ‘development’ of Casablanca, mark-
ing the  start of a ‘time to act’, thus comprised, first and foremost, a time in 
which the balance of power and the competing forces at work in Morocco— 
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chapter 9
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘Virtuous society’ and 




The rise of Islamists in Arab countries has often been explained by their capacity to 
offer an alternative path of development, based on a religious vision and on a paral-
lel welfare sector, challenging post-independence developmentalist states. Taking the 
case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and building on ethnographic fieldwork, 
this chapter aims to contribute to this debate, exploring how conflict and cooperation 
were deeply intertwined in the relationships between this movement and Mubarak’s 
regime. Rather than postulating any structural polarisation, or—in contrast—any 
simplistic authoritarian coalition, the author argues that the vision of two models of 
development opposing one another unravels when we move from abstract approach-
es towards empirical studies. On the ground, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
former regime elites participated in what the author calls the politics of ‘goodness’ 
(khayr), which she defines as a conflictual consensus built on entrenched welfare net-
works, and on an imaginary matrix mixing various discursive repertoires of state de-
velopmentalism and religious welfare. The chapter also elaborates an interpretative 
framework to aid understanding of the sudden rise and fall of the Brotherhood in the 
post-2011 period, showing that, beyond its failure, what is at stake is the breakdown of 
the politics of ‘goodness’ altogether.
1 Introduction
Islamists’ momentum in Arab countries has often been explained by their ca-
pacity to offer an alternative path of development, based on a religious vision 
and on a ‘shadow and parallel welfare system […] with a profound ideologi-
cal impact on society’ (Bibars, 2001, 107), through which they challenged post-
independence developmentalist states (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, 1999). In 
Egypt, which has been considered a model for both state developmentalism 
and Islamism, members of the Muslim Brotherhood (mb) used to be analysed 
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as counter-elites, building on this parallel Islamic welfare sector to advance 
their own politico-religious agenda (Wickham, 2003). Their legitimacy would 
then derive from their ability to provide for a counter project to the state’s fail-
ure in development terms, and from the mobilisation of Islamic values against 
the regime. Yet, in the Egyptian case as in others, a contrasting explanation 
holds that the mb was granted space to expand through welfare activities, in 
the frame of tacit cooperation with the incumbent regime in order to main-
tain so-called stability. Accordingly, they were therefore said to be part, though 
unofficially, of the authoritarian coalition leading the former regime before 
Mubarak’s fall in 2011.
The sudden rise and fall of the Muslim Brothers in the course of the Egyp-
tian revolution has given a new actuality to this debate. The mb’s dramatic 
trajectory began with their victory in the parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions of 2011/2012 and, after one year in office, ended in the ousting of President 
Mohamed Morsi by the then General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s military coup, fol-
lowing mass mobilisations in June-July 2013. This fall has been variously inter-
preted as the result of the structural polarisation opposing the mb to the elites 
of the former regime (including the military), or as the breakdown of the long-
standing coalition between them.
This chapter aims to contribute to this debate, exploring the tension be-
tween the conflictual challenge and the authoritarian coproduction that the 
mb at  once embodied under Mubarak’s rule. The chapter also elaborates 
an interpretative framework with which to understand the mb’s trajectory 
 during the current revolutionary process. Rather than postulating any struc-
tural  polarisation, or—in contrast—any simplistic coalition, I argue that 
conflict and  cooperation were deeply intertwined in the relationships be-
tween  Mubarak’s regime and the mb, and that the vision of two models of 
development opposing one another unravels when we move from abstract 
approaches towards empirical studies. On the ground, both the mb and the 
former regime elites shared similar beliefs and practices with which to devel-
op society. They participated in what I call the politics of ‘goodness’ (khayr), 
which I define as a conflictual consensus built on entrenched welfare net-
works, and  on an imaginary matrix mixing various discursive repertoires of 
state developmentalism and religious welfare. The politics of goodness was 
therefore a competitive, yet common, ground for the mb’s vision of a ‘virtuous 
society’ and for the Egyptian state’s mythical representation as the main agent 
of social development.
First, I will show how the myth of state developmentalism has been trans-
formed in the course of the neo-liberal period, and how it has been relocat-
ed in different welfare practices. Second, building on an ethnographic study 
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 conducted in Cairo between 2005 and 2010,1 I will reflect on the Muslim Broth-
ers’ imaginary of ‘virtuous society’ and explain how it entrenched into state-
promoted practices and beliefs. Finally, I will put forward an explanation of 
how this conflictual consensus turned to open conflict in the post-2011 period. 
I will show that beyond the confrontation between the mb and former incum-
bents, deeper changes have transformed, and challenged, the politics of good-
ness in the new socio-political configuration.
2 The Paradoxical Imaginary of State Developmentalism in  
Neo-Liberal Times
Central to Western societies, where it was born and consolidated, the belief 
in development has strongly shaped the political economy of Middle Eastern 
societies—and how they have been studied. As Myriam Catusse points out, 
the emergence of the ‘developmentalist scheme’ in the 1950s framed ‘the for-
mation of Arab states and their organisation around a model of auto-centered 
development, designed as a tool for decolonisation and for state (and nation) 
construction’ (Catusse, 2006, 218, author’s transl.). The state was conceived 
as the ‘architect of structural transformation’ (Richards and Waterbury, 1996, 
234), whose purpose was to reshape society and fight the multiple features of 
‘backwardness’, hence closely binding economic, social, cultural and politi-
cal issues as facets of a same fundamental problem. Nasser’s Egypt (1952–70) 
was emblematic of this state-led model of development, for the newly inde-
pendent regime engaged in well-known socio-economic reforms (agrarian 
redistribution, import-substituting industrialisation, growth of the public sec-
tor, enlarged access to education …). Yet, neither Sadat’s infitah policies of 
economic liberalisation (1970–81), nor the neo-liberal turn witnessed during 
Mubarak’s era (1981–2011), in the post-Washington Consensus context, came to 
terms with the representation of the state as being charged with the develop-
ment of society—in spite of the economic shift from the public to the private 
sector from the 1990s onwards, cutbacks in state expenditure and declining 
state welfare provision (Harrigan and El Said, 2009; Abdelrahman, 2015).
The imaginary of state developmentalism, together with the ongoing per-
ception of Arab countries through the lens of the ‘developmentalist scheme’ 
(see for example Achcar, 2013; Farah, 2009), actually survived the  progressive 
1 I mostly investigated the southern, working-class suburb of Helwan and the middle-class dis-
trict of Madinat Nasr. Supplementary fieldwork was carried out in December 2012, December 
2013-January 2014, summer 2014 and November 2015.
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 disappearance of Nasser’s developmentalist state. Three factors account for 
such a discrepancy, which itself paves the way for the politics of goodness. 
First, institutional legacies from the state-led industrialisation of the past 
continued to characterise the Egyptian economy through to the first decade 
of the twenty-first century (Soliman, 2004; Adly, 2013): the growth pattern re-
mained dependent on oil and natural gas exports, over which the state still 
held a quasi-monopoly.2 Hence, the state kept being a main provider in the 
economy, drawing its own revenues from external rents, which were used to 
subsidise constituencies among business elites and other social groups. The 
second factor, related to the first, concerns the practices of patronage. On 
the one hand, the state nurtured a ‘crony capitalism’ (Sadowski, 1991) made 
of alliances with big capital holders (helping them to build oligopolies) and 
arbitrary control of business activities (Gobe, 1999; Sfakianakis, 2004). On 
the other hand, packages of public subsidy were made highly visible, keep-
ing alive the image of the redistributive state personified in the presidential 
figure, although the actual beneficiaries lay significantly outside the adver-
tised social targets. Energy subsidies, which amounted to about 18 per cent 
of total state expenditure in 2000–10, were a disguised means of reward-
ing big private industries as major recipients of this policy (Adly, 2013, 110). 
As for food subsidies, they decreased through the 1980s and 1990s, and were 
moreover considered to be missing many of the poorest Egyptians. However, 
Mubarak’s regime wisely handled this policy, employing gradual contractions 
and allowing sudden increases when needed (as was the case a little over a 
decade ago, when inflation rates and international food and energy prices 
rose) (Adly 2013, 208). The National Housing Program (nhp) also offers a good 
example of these illusive social packages—especially as the building of infra-
structure was long seen as the hallmark of Mubarak’s regime. As researcher Ya-
hia Shawkat shows, two ambitious, publicly subsidised housing schemes were 
launched as Mubarak’s personal promises to Egypt’s youth and the needy—
Iskan Mubarak lil-shebab (1996–2005) and Iskan Mubarak al-qawmi (2005–12). 
But, relying ‘on a legal definition of low income that completely ignored eco-
nomic data’, the nhp actually ‘excluded all those who have informal jobs, and 
embedded middle-income government employees, [National Democratic 
Party (ndp)] parliamentarians, and governors into the  allocation system—
allowing these regime supporters to  profiteer as middlemen between  those 
who did not meet nhp criteria’. The policy was  therefore ‘deceiving the public 
into  believing that the nhp was affordable to the poor’: ‘pictures of Mubarak, 




 governors and other  officials  handing over deeds to beneficiaries filled the 
front pages of newspapers for a few years and kept up the hopes of hundreds 
of thousands families for affordable housing’ (Shawkat, 2014, paras. 63, 64, 67). 
Finally, the hope and   belief  in  state developmentalism were maintained by 
the virtual  upholding of a 1964 law that provides all graduates of vocational 
secondary and  university degrees with employment in the public sector—a 
provision still perceived as a ‘right’ (Beinin and Duboc, 2014) but which had 
come to a complete halt by the 1990s, when most public enterprises started to 
be privatised.
Both factors explain why the myth of state developmentalism was still vivid 
in spite of the neo-liberal turn induced by twenty years of the International 
Monetary Fund-sponsored Structural Adjustment Program. As shown by the 
nhp example, a third factor must be underscored, though it is too often ignored 
by studies in political economy. Nasser’s model of the state as an architect of 
development also redefined the notion of politics. In 1952, the dissolution of 
all political parties and voluntary associations was not only aimed at contain-
ing any kind of opposition; it also related to the vision of politics as a divisive 
threat to the nation, a threat that had to be replaced by the direct and fusional 
relationship between the leader and the nation, the corporatist and functional 
organisation of society, and the active role of the army in national protection 
and social modernisation (Waterbury, 1983; Bianchi, 1989; Fahmy, 2002). In this 
context, political institutions, such as the parliament, were subsumed by the 
developmentalist mission of the state. Former political elites, most of whom 
were notables and big landowners, were partly deprived of access to elected 
assemblies, and new strata of state bourgeoisie were promoted as Members 
of Parliament. Yet, rather than being political representatives of the nation—
which the supreme leader alone was entitled to be—they were defined as 
middlemen between the state and society, their role being to redistribute pub-
lic resources among local populations (Ben Néfissa and Arafat, 2005). Hence, 
the notion of politics was both broadened—the state and political institutions 
would now belong to the whole nation—and dissolved in the idea of public 
‘services’ (khidma pl. khadamat).
Since then, the definition of the good representative—a member either of 
parliament or of the local council—as ‘the one who serves people’ (elli beyekh-
dem al-nas) has been strongly anchored in the political imaginary. While this 
can be classically described as a clientelistic pattern of political exchanges, 
not unique to Egypt, the public and collective dimension of these exchanges 
seems quite specific and compliant. mps are expected to deliver, above all, ser-
vices that will benefit a whole community, and not just individuals (building 
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a school or dispensary, having an area connected to the electricity supply or 
sewage system …) and to rely on public resources rather than private wealth. 
Therefore, when traditional notables got back into parliament under Sadat’s 
rule, or when wealthy businessmen showed up in politics in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, they had to comply with these requirements—which 
Patrick Haenni rightly summed up as ‘the spirit of services’ (l’esprit de service) 
(Haenni, 2005a)—in order to secure legitimacy. This is how Mubarak’s ndp 
attracted aspirant political elites, as ndp membership was a necessary condi-
tion to having access to state resources. However, with the contractions of state 
expenditure, even ndp elites were urged to find other sources to be redistrib-
uted, all the while sticking to the public and collective requirements of the 
spirit of services. This is how many became involved in various local structures 
of what Egyptians call ‘public work’ (al-‘amal al-‘amm): either state-sponsored 
organisations such as ‘community development associations’ (gam‘iyyat li-
tanmiyyat al-mugtama‘), youth centres, social clubs, solidarity cooperatives in 
the workplace (gam‘iyyat ta‘awuniyya) and labour unions, or societal organisa-
tions such as voluntary charitable associations (gam‘iyyat khayriyya), popular 
justice assemblies (sulh), and mosque-linked zakat committees (in charge of 
collecting Islamic alms).
Far from being a detail, this micro-level spirit of services framed, for large 
parts of the population, their everyday relationships with the state, which they 
encountered in the form of elected representatives, perceived as administration 
intermediaries and agents of the state’s developmentalist mission. The percep-
tion of ‘who serves’ (beyekhdem) and ‘who does not serve’ (mabeyekhdemsh) 
stood as a determining criterion in the popular judgement of political elites. 
These judgments were often expressed in the moral terms of goodness (khayr), 
which the regime encouraged as it boiled down politics to public work, service, 
and even charity—a breeding ground for deconflictualisation and for respon-
sibility discharge onto the local state intermediaries. The politics of goodness 
thus appears as the low-cost version of the developmentalist myth: keeping 
alive, through these local encounters, the image of a state in charge of develop-
ment, while effectively ‘relocating welfare’ (Ismail, 2006) in charitable actions 
and individualised relationships.
In this process of welfare relocation, the network of Islamic social institu-
tions largely intertwined with the regime’s own networks. While the Muslim 
Brothers mobilised Islamic values to promote a model of ‘virtuous society’ 
through their welfare practices, this model did not stand as a counter-project 
of development. It was embedded in a matrix of mixed imaginaries to which 
the regime largely contributed.
Vannetzel��6
<UN>
3 The Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘Virtuous Society’: A Pious Road Inside 
the State3
The entrenchment of mb and regime networks first relates to the historical 
conditions of the Brotherhood’s re-emergence starting from the 1970s, when 
its leaders were gradually released from jail after Nasser’s era of repression.4 
How Sadat’s policies contributed to this re-emergence, incidentally or not, is 
well documented. While the mb never recovered its legal status as an organisa-
tion, it was informally granted margins of tolerance within which to redevelop 
its activities. Drawing from the register of religious legitimacy, the regime en-
couraged the expansion of Islamic social institutions to alleviate the effects of 
economic liberalisation. Egyptian entrepreneurs who had migrated and made 
a fortune in the Gulf, some of whom were Muslim Brothers,5 were urged to 
invest in the country, especially in real estate. They were granted tax privileges 
provided they reserved parts of buildings they constructed for the creation of 
private mosques, run by charitable associations and often hosting social, health 
and education services. Such large ‘Islamic complexes’ multiplied exponential-
ly (Ben Néfissa, 1995). mb businessmen coming back from Gulf countries relied 
on the support of important ‘brokers’6 inside ruling economic circles.7 Pro-MB 
brokers were found, as well, inside the prestigious institution of al-Azhar, com-
prising the major mosque in Egypt, a large university, and several other bodies 
that exert authority on religious affairs. While this institution represents state 
Islam, some of its influential ulama profited from  Sadat’s emphasis on religion 
3 This refers to Utvik (2006).
4 The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood was initially founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna as 
a charitable association, but it soon became a mass political movement. It supported the 
Free Officers Movement and coup in 1952, and briefly benefited from special treatment, 
escaping the dissolution that was to be the fate of all other groups, associations, and parties. 
However, the relationship with Nasser deteriorated quickly, and in 1954 the regime cracked 
down on the Brotherhood and dissolved it, arresting and sometimes condemning to death its 
leaders and numbers of activists.
5 Between 1954 and 1970, many members of the Brotherhood escaped repression by fleeing 
to the Arabian Peninsula’s states. Saudi Arabia welcomed the mb refugees, with whom the 
Saudi royal family shared a common enemy—Nasser and pan-Arabist socialism. These fa-
vourable conditions enabled many Muslim Brothers to start what later became flourishing 
businesses.
6 On the notion of passeurs de scène or ‘brokers’ in the context of Islamists’ relationship to the 
state, see Camau and Geisser (2003).
7 Examples include multimillionaire ‘Uthman Ahmed ‘Uthman, and the al-Sharif and Mar‘i 
families (al-Awadi, 2004).
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to become vocal and push for increased social and legal  re-islamisation 
(Zeghal, 1996). Al-Azhar also operates a huge network of primary and second-
ary schools situated all over the country, which welcomed some of the now 
numerous mb teachers. Additionally, the regime favoured the development of 
‘Islamic clubs’ (gama‘at islamiyya) in universities, in order to counter leftist 
movements. A generation of young activists, placing reference to Islam at the 
core of their discourse and practices, emerged and gradually connected with 
the Brotherhood’s released leaders. During the 1980s and 1990s, the movement 
recreated a broad, cross-class social base, pursuing its actions through univer-
sities and charities, but also through the professional syndicates of doctors, 
engineers, pharmacists, etc., which the generation of young activists came to 
lead. This social involvement sustained the mb’s— unofficial but important—
participation in legislative and local elections under Mubarak’s rule. They 
achieved electoral gains in the 1980s and, most importantly, in 2005 when they 
managed to win 88 out of 444 seats in parliament—that is, around 20 per cent.
The Islamic social sector was thus anything but detached from the state: 
it lay at the centre of the regime’s economic and political policies of welfare 
relocation. While the mb’s implantation into this entrenched Islamic sec-
tor was effective, this does not mean that the regime’s supporters were not 
also present there. Many pious local ndp notables founded and ran Islamic 
charitable associations, or ran the boards of mosques, zakat committees and 
so on. Moreover, a large number of charitable organisations or government-
affiliated community development associations (cdas), although not centred 
on a mosque or not claiming explicit religious motivations, would offer Islamic 
activities such as readings from the Koran. In fact, religious activities perme-
ated many spaces: for example, every administrative unit or public company 
would have its own zakat committee or pilgrimage association. Conversely, my 
fieldwork among the lower- and middle-ranked members of the Brotherhood 
showed that many of them were active inside state-sponsored public work 
structures, such as youth centres, cdas or solidarity cooperatives in the work-
place. This was especially the case of the mb candidates in elections, in line 
with the spirit of services defining the role of the elected representative (Van-
netzel, 2016).
During their 2005–2010 mandate, the mb Members of Parliament promoted 
as their motto: ‘Together, we bring goodness to Egypt’ (ma‘an, nahammal al-
khayr li-Misr). This encapsulated both the mb’s compliance to the idea of the 
spirit of services defining the role of Members of Parliament, in line with the 
regime’s strategies, and the pivotal role of religion in the politics of goodness, 
hence showing how the imaginary of state developmentalism was, in its turn, 
influenced by the mb’s discursive repertoire.
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This is not to say that the Muslim Brothers were spared from repression. 
Following their 2005 electoral success, they were subjected to a campaign of 
arrests, asset seizure and military trials. And this was not the first time their re-
lationship with Mubarak’s regime had significantly deteriorated. Earlier, in the 
1990s, the government had intended to contain the mb’s rising profile, which 
was at the time especially supported by the vocal professional syndicates. 
These syndicates were officially ‘frozen’ (i.e. not dissolved but internal elec-
tions and several activities were forbidden) and the regime cracked down on 
prominent figures of the movement who were tried in military tribunals. The 
regime also strengthened its control over charitable associations, dismantling 
some of those that appeared to be obviously affiliated to the Brotherhood. 
Around 1,400 assumed Brotherhood members, ranging from national leaders 
to local activists, were arrested during the 1995 legislative elections. From then 
on, illegality and semi-clandestinity increasingly shaped the complex mecha-
nisms of the movement’s social embeddedness.
Paradoxically, these constraints furthered the entrenchment of local social 
networks. As long as the mb’s presence was not that visible, it was tolerated—
although the margin of visibility allowed varied in time and space. mb activists 
would then participate as mere members with no leading responsibilities, in 
‘normal’ associations (i.e., those not obviously affiliated to the mb), explic-
itly Islamic or not. In some cases, they reportedly acted as informal leaders 
alongside associations’ official boards run by non-MB individuals who could 
be sympathisers, friends, relatives or simply neighbours. Boards could also in-
clude, among their ‘non-mb’ members, low-profile activists, not known to be 
Muslim Brothers by either the security services or by the people around them. 
Another strategy consisted in setting up charitable endeavours without a legal 
framework, such as ‘medical caravans’ (groups of physicians present in an area 
for a day or two and providing medical consultations for free in the rooms of a 
friendly association, mosque, or school …) food distribution programmes dur-
ing religious festivities, the provision of clothing or school supplies, or collect-
ing zakat in the neighbourhood, outside of any formal structure.
All of these activities were implemented without explicit mention of the 
term ‘Muslim Brotherhood’. Only very rarely did activists declare that they 
were mb members. Usually, they were active in such structures without being 
directly identified as Muslim Brothers by the people they worked with (even 
if the security services knew of their affiliations, they would let them work as 
long as they kept a low profile). This enabled the mb to connect with many lo-
cal figures who were also active in the charitable sector, including figures who 
might happen to be ndp members. They could then, for example, participate 
together, as colleagues, in the zakat committee or pilgrimage association of 
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their workplace. An association could be run by local notables, more or less 
close to the ndp, and include among its members one or several mb activists. 
A businessman wishing to give alms to the poor could go to a neighbour, known 
for his or her involvement in charitable work—guessing or not that he or she 
was a member of the mb—who would play the role of intermediary, selecting 
needy families and transmitting to them the gifts of their generous benefac-
tor. In fact, the pervasiveness of the Islamic social network, which permeated 
many spheres of life in Egypt, and the low-profile nature of ‘mb identity’ made 
connections easier between Muslim Brothers and pious individuals willing to 
share (for reasons of personal interest or not) in khayr—that is, in goodness. 
Most of the time, people would just identify a mb, at first, as a good person, 
serving people and God, doing khayr.
The sector of khayr was, then, a diffused network of blurred identities and 
crossed cleavages.8  However, it was clearly not immune from conflicts, which 
we can analyse through two patterns: repression by uncertainty on the one 
hand, and imputation struggles on the other. Apart from episodes of direct vio-
lence, such as the 1992–95 and 2006–08 waves of arrests, repression was usual-
ly exerted through indirect, non-systematic and unclear means, as is often the 
case in authoritarian contexts (Hibou, 2006). The margin of tolerance granted 
to the mb was continuously renegotiated at national and local levels alike. For 
example, submitting associations, whether linked to the Muslim Brothers or 
not, to a ‘pending registration’ status for many years was a well-known means 
to prevent them from securing their activities: it gave authorities the legal right 
to dissolve them at any time. In spite of their legal position as elected rep-
resentatives, mb deputies were themselves confronted with uncertainty on a 
daily basis when they organised social activities in public: ‘Sometimes the state 
security forces come at the last minute and take away all the chairs and the ma-
terial we have set up in order to prevent the event from happening’, explained 
one member of a local team, ‘then we have to quickly find another solution, 
like using the deputy’s office, even if it is too small’.9 Punctual detentions also 
constituted a permanent and arbitrary threat: I recall how the son of a deputy 
was arrested in the street, just in front of his father’s office, for no obvious rea-
son, while the latter was left to freely do his job—even if parliamentary im-
munity could easily be removed. In summer 2007, two mb deputies had their 
parliamentary immunity rescinded and were indicted for trying to reconstitute 
8 The current difficulties that Marshal al-Sisi’s regime is meeting in response to its efforts 
to eradicate the mb’s social services is further evidence of this situation of entrenchment 
(Brooke, 2015).
9 Interview, July 2009, Helwan, Cairo.
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the forbidden organisation of the Muslim Brothers. But the conflicts were not 
limited to the predatory practices of the security apparatus. Repression by un-
certainty took place against the background of wider imputation struggles—
that is, the competition to be perceived as ‘the one who serves’ and to enjoy 
the symbolic benefit of social actions. While the mb activists I met repeated at 
length that ‘we have no problems if the ndp tried to imitate us and steal our 
ideas’, they strove to distinguish themselves in the manner in which they de-
livered their own services. Although they could not say, for reasons of security, 
that they were Muslim Brothers, they deployed great efforts to let beneficiaries 
understand, or believe, that the aid came from the mb—even when it actually 
came from the budget of an association in which a Muslim Brother was only 
active as an individual. Reciprocally, in local associations where both mb and 
ndp notables were active, the latter would deny that any of the members was 
a Muslim Brother (Vannetzel, 2016).
Two cases illustrate perfectly the various combinatorial modalities of the 
conflictual consensus framing the politics of goodness. The first is the Islamic 
Medical Association (ima), founded in 1977 by certain well-known Brothers, 
which ran 22 hospitals and several specialised medical centres, considered as 
khayri because low-cost fees or even a policy of free care were applied for low-
income patients. While the association was obviously affiliated with the mb, 
it was spared dissolution because the government could not afford to deprive 
the population of such a range of medical services. However, in spite of the 
tolerance granted at the national level, the mb were eager, at the local level, to 
include many who were not mb members as members of staff or of the boards 
of the hospitals and health units. In al-Hadi hospital of Helwan, in a southern 
suburb of Cairo, only 5 per cent of the staff were Brothers, some doctors were 
ndp members, and the board included non-Brothers, according to its director: 
‘This is because the Brothers don’t just want to mix with each other; on the 
contrary they want to cooperate with all the elements of society […] There is 
nothing inside the hospital that would suggest it belongs to the Brothers. But 
people know this doctor or that is a leader of the Brothers, because they saw 
him during the elections’.10 Hence, the ima was both a vector of entrenchment 
and of gratitude imputation for the mb. The second case is that of the Sharia 
Association (Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, gs), one of the oldest and biggest Islamic 
charitable associations and active throughout Egypt. Sarah Ben Néfissa shows 
how, under Sadat’s regime, this association had become a para-public organ-
isation and how the regime instrumentalised it in order to implement ‘the new 
social policy [of] charity “on behalf” of Islam’ (Ben Néfissa, 2003, 222, authors’ 
10 Interview, August 2009, Helwan, Cairo.
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transl.). The mbs were allowed to deeply integrate into the regional and local 
offices of the association, until 1990. In that year, their victory in the elections 
to the central board led to a change in the attitude of the regime towards this 
situation, and the board was suddenly dissolved. However, many mb activists 
remained active in the numerous local branches, and were often among the 
founders. But far from being reserved exclusively for the mb, the gs was also a 
place for local figures, including those close to the ndp, who sought to prove 
their spirit of service. It was, then, a place for interactions that cut across politi-
cal identities.
The gs example is also illustrative of the second argument I would like to 
make here: namely, that the mb’s model of ‘virtuous society’ is embedded in 
an imaginary matrix of faith-based developmentalism to which other groups 
and institutions, including elements of the state, contribute. The relationship 
between the visions of development promoted by the mb on the one hand and 
the regime on the other should, then, not be analysed being as extraneous, but 
as being ‘intertextual’ (Bayart, 1985, 355).
4 The Intertextuality of Faith-Based Developmentalism
One of the most famous programmes run by the gs, which accounts for much 
of its popularity, was established under the leadership of the Muslim Broth-
ers: the ‘Orphan project’ (Kafalat al-Yatim). It consists in identifying people 
(‘godfathers’) who wish to sponsor one or more orphans in their neighbour-
hood. The ‘godfather’ pays a monthly sum to the gs, which passes it on to the 
mother or guardian of the child, who must know nothing of the sponsorship. 
As Ben Néfissa explains, quoting from internal documents of the association: 
‘This sponsorship is a form of contract between the [gs] and the godfather 
[…]. The aim is “to correct the relationship between the orphan and his or her 
entourage. Instead of having relationships with individuals who assist him, he 
must have a relationship with Muslim society at large, which becomes directly 
responsible for him”. The unknown godfather is therefore a kind of “symbol” or 
representative of this Muslim society’ (Ben Néfissa, 2003, 244, author’s transl.). 
To complement this sponsorship, the gs also contacts members of the local 
community, asking craftsmen, merchants, doctors of all specialisms, phar-
macists, bakers, hairdressers, butchers, etc. to provide—according to their 
means—food, care, medicines, school supplies, clothes, etc. to the orphans. 
The project’s presentation document states that ‘the project is in itself an act of 
preaching, a link between members of society, rich and poor, and a vitalisation 
of solidarity and mutual aid as explained by Islam […] the project’s goal is not 
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only to support the orphan but to involve people in this support’ (Ben Néfissa, 
2003, 245, author’s transl.).
A similar pattern was at work in other charitable projects run by the Mus-
lim Brothers, such as ‘medical caravans’ or collective weddings for poor or or-
phaned youths who could not afford to marry. Local physicians, citizens and 
merchants were solicited to help with gifts and services, according to their 
means and to ‘their conscience and conviction’ (Ben Néfissa, 2003, 245, au-
thor’s transl.). In these three examples, the gs and the mb sought to act as 
the organisers of local mutual aid, solidarity and individual conscious involve-
ment, which should define—from their perspective—‘virtuous Muslim soci-
ety’ (al-mugtama‘ al-muslim al-salih). In this model, conveyed through daily 
practice and talks, which I observed during my fieldwork, the individual is de-
fined by his inner moral ‘positivity’ (igabiyya), which is latent in each person 
of faith. Every Muslim will possess—because of his or her faith—the seeds 
of positivity, which may grow. The individual is responsible for developing 
this latent disposition to virtue through the accomplishment of virtuous acts 
(a‘mal saliha). Virtuous acts are the product of this inner strength, but it is also 
by engaging in virtuous acts that one manages to develop this strength. This 
personal striving for moral transformation is seen as the cornerstone of social 
reform and development. The role of the mb is therefore to detect individu-
als and encourage them to become positive elements in society. Programmes 
like the ‘Orphan project’, ‘medical caravans’ or collective weddings are not only 
aimed at relieving poverty, they also urge individuals to fulfil their roles as ‘vir-
tuous citizens’ (muwatinin salihin), responsible for the social, economic and 
political order. This was, ultimately, the meaning of the traditional slogan of 
the Brotherhood, ‘Islam is the solution’.
This model of ‘virtuous society’ is, of course, directly inspired by the mb’s 
ideological corpus. According to Hasan al-Banna’s text of reference, quoted at 
length by the activists and in the Brotherhood’s publications even today, the 
‘mb method’ (al-minhag) consists in shaping the Muslim individual, then the 
Muslim family, then Muslim society and finally the Islamic government, state, 
caliphate and nation (umma). This method, referred to as the ‘guidance of so-
ciety’ (irshad al-mugtama‘), assumes that the moral transformation of the self, 
thanks to faith and piety, is instrumental in building a good, sound and strong 
society, which, in turn, ensures the moral preservation of human souls. Hence, 
it is claimed to be a method for successful social development, to be applied 
in every domain of human life, with a focus on both individual behaviours and 
collective, institutional frames (Utvik, 2006).
If this model of development owes much to Hasan al-Banna’s heritage, 
the idea of ‘virtuous society’ should not be isolated from other discursive 
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 repertoires to which it refers, and which add various layers of significance. 
We have already seen its centrality in the gs tradition. Saba Mahmood, in 
her ethnographic study of the mosques movement in Egypt—a movement of 
 female preachers and pious women, which has emerged since the 1970s, with 
no organisational link to the Brotherhood—also showed how the notion of 
‘virtuous acts’ was core to the conception of piety promoted by the movement 
(Mahmood, 2005). To these women, faith lay, first and foremost, in the daily 
performance of virtuous acts. They referred to the doctrine of al-Azhar ‘alim, 
Shaykh Sayyid Sabiq (who had been both a companion of Hasan al-Banna and 
a minister under Nasser) whose Fiqh al-Sunna stands as an authoritative vade 
mecum for virtuous actions. More generally, al-Azhar actively disseminated 
the conception of Islam as a virtuous behaviour that should be accomplished 
in all human activities. During my fieldwork, I often noticed that sympathis-
ers of the Muslim Brothers had attended the Azhari school system, and they 
even  used to draw an explicit link between the ‘Islam they had learnt from 
al-Azhar’ and the ‘Islam promoted by the mb’. One of them expressed it in the 
following way:
‘The Muslim Brothers seek for goodness (khayr) and I love khayr, I strive 
for khayr. They are virtuous citizens, and I hope to be a virtuous citizen as 
well. I am not a member of the Brotherhood, but I am just like them, I love 
Islam and I understand Islam like them. […] Since primary school, I was in the 
Azhari system. And al-Azhar’s thought is the same as the mb’s thought. We 
have learnt the correct comprehension of Islam. Islam, religion, is a behavior 
(mu‘amala).’11
The emphasis on virtuous behaviour has also found a new and powerful 
formulation since the late 1990s. Indeed, the mantra of ‘Development through 
faith’ has been praised by Egyptian preaching ‘superstar’ Amr Khaled,12 and 
his association ‘Life Makers’ (Sunna’ al-Hayat), which has dramatically spread 
throughout Egypt and across the mena region. Calling on ‘Muslims to be-
come pious and entrepreneurial subjects’, Khaled ‘uses management science 
and self-help rhetoric to promote entrepreneurial activities as religious, with 
an emphasis on the role that voluntary work plays’ (Atia, 2012, 809). Khaled’s 
vision has built likewise on the idea of piety as a source of social positivity, 
11 Interview, August 2009, Madinat Nasr, Cairo.
12 Amr Khaled is one of the ‘new preachers’ (al-shuyukh al-gudad) who have gained mo-
mentum in Egypt since the late 1990s and who have created a new form of preaching, 
focused on inner spirituality, self-fulfillment, individual emotions and efforts to ensure a 
successful life (see Haenni, 2002).
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but compared to the mb’s ‘virtuous society’ it has focused much more on the 
values of productivity, efficiency and economic success. As Patrick Haenni 
underlines, this rhetoric has resonated perfectly with the model of ‘pious 
neo-liberalism’ (Atia, 2012, 811) directly inspired by the United States’ ‘compas-
sionate conservatism’ and promoted by the neo-liberal ‘new guard’ of the ndp 
(Haenni, 2005b).
As such, despite its various formulations by state Islam’s official institu-
tion  (al-Azhar) and by the neo-liberal wing of the ndp, the discourse on 
‘virtuous individuals’ exhibiting ‘good behaviour’ as a positive element for 
khayr  and  the development of society could be interpreted as a counter-
narrative to the state developmentalist myth. However, it was actually close 
to a model that had been actively promoted by Mubarak’s regime as part of 
the politics of goodness: the model of ‘al-maghud al-dhati’—literally, ‘effort 
on oneself’. It was propagated from the 1980s onwards, when the state began 
cutting  social service   provision.  This was also the time when international 
 development agencies were shifting their focus to poverty alleviation, which 
was embodied, in Egypt, by the establishment of the Social Fund for Devel-
opment in 1991: the fund embraced microlending as a main strategy, behind 
which ‘stands the supposition that devolving development down to “the 
people” is not only a good thing but also a moral imperative’ (Elyachar, 2002). 
In 1988, the notion of ‘al- maghud  al-dhati’  was introduced into law through 
a   reform of  the state  local-level  administration (Law No. 145 of 1988): in or-
der to compensate for weak local taxes and a decrease in budget allocation, 
the law indicates that  administrative units have to appeal to the ‘spontaneous’ 
efforts of local  populations in order to fund public projects, such as the build-
ing or repairing of post offices, police stations, medical centres, youth centres, 
public parks, and the state’s local service departments, etc. (Ben Néfissa, 2009). 
Local communities often have no choice but to participate in such endeav-
ours. Hence, the maghud al-dhati appears as a constraining ‘spontaneous’ ef-
fort, closely organised and controlled by the state. In fact, the Muslim Brothers 
directly referred to this notion as well, when they were charged with politi-
cal mandates as Members of Parliament or while sitting on local councils. It 
was actually coupled with the notion of ‘virtuous society’, and reframed as a 
faithful endeavour in which the mb would be in charge of organising ‘posi-
tive efforts’, not against the state but, more often than not, in tacit cooperation 
with it.
In Helwan, there were many examples of cooperation between the mb 
Member of Parliament and local administrative units, for the funding of cer-
tain projects in the name of al-maghud al-dhati. These examples illustrate 
how imaginaries—from al-maghud al-dhati to virtuous participation as in the 
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‘ Orphan project’—framed both a competitive and a common ground on which 
actors evolved. One member the mp’s staff explained:
The officials of the Ministry of Education came to see us to ask if we 
would finance the furnishing of a new office space they were given. As 
a teacher, I know them a little so I was in charge of the case. I suggested 
that the deputy could make an official request to the governor, but they 
refused. They didn’t want it to be so visible—they wanted hidden coop-
eration, they wanted us to find them private donors, using our network as 
members of the Brothers. I will help them because I can’t let them sit on 
the floor, they don’t even have chairs! We will go to see the furniture mer-
chants we know, ask for some chairs from one, shelves from another … 
They will give them to me if they can, because they know I am not doing 
this for myself; it is voluntary work, and they may want to make a dona-
tion. Normally though, there should be a budget for this, since it is not 
always possible to count on the maghud al-dhati …
Asked why the mp’s staff would cooperate with representatives of the regime, 
this activist answered:
Our role is to give them ideas so they can find solutions to problems. Our 
goal is to cooperate in helping to reform the country, because it is our 
duty, according to Islam, to our morality, and to our love for the nation. 
[…] What is important is that work be done. Maybe we, as Muslim Broth-
ers, won’t benefit from this work; but it is done and it serves people, and 
this is part of our religion. Serving people is like praying and loving God. 
Our prophet (Prayer of God be upon him and peace) said that if on the 
Day of the Last Judgement you find a seed, you must plant it. This is a core 
value of Islam.13
‘Doing khayr’ is supposed to be an act that one is engaged in for moral mo-
tives, for the service of the people, and for the development of the country, not 
for political reasons. Politics were burdened with the delegitimising picture 
sketched by Nasser’s regime. It was considered a potential source of instabil-
ity. The combination of khayr, development (tanmiyya) and stability (istiqrar) 
was central to the regime’s rhetoric for limiting political opposition (Makram-
Ebeid, 2012). However, it was also nurtured by the mb itself. The activists I met 
insisted that their aim was that, ‘services be provided and good actions done, 
13 Interview, January 2009, Helwan, Cairo.
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no matter who did it’. They also refrained from engaging in open clashes with 
the regime, claiming that ‘clashes provoke instability, which is not good for the 
country’. However, this was not only a strategy with which to protect them-
selves from repression; and nor was it obvious proof of their involvement in 
the authoritarian coalition. It was more deeply in line with their vision of poli-
tics as the moral reform of behaviours. As one member of a mp’s staff, put it: 
‘I cannot lump together all the members of the ndp or the representatives of 
the regime; I don’t judge the institutions, I judge each one’s behaviour. I cannot 
say “this institution is not good”, I say “this behaviour is not good”.’14
Therefore, the politics of goodness distanced itself from clashes and fa-
voured a steady but subtle battle to put forward one’s ability to be of service 
and one’s moral exemplarity. While political conflicts were regarded as damag-
ing to development and stability, moral distinction was understood, by the mb 
and the regime alike, as a ‘positive’ way of achieving goodness. This euphemis-
tic form of politics was heavily undermined during the 2011–2013 period.
5 ‘Goodness’ in Dire Straits: The Breakdown of Local Politics and the 
Radicalisation of Conflicts
The politics of goodness under Mubarak’s rule had, to summarise, three de-
fining features. It was, first, a relocation of the state developmentalist myth 
into the micro-level of the spirit of services, placed on the shoulders of local 
elites. Second, it was a configuration made of overlapping networks of public 
work and charities, in which political identities were often blurred. Lastly, it 
was a conflictual consensus in which political antagonisms were understated. 
My argument is that the three components of this politics of goodness were 
challenged after Mubarak’s overthrow in February 2011. Although such an argu-
ment does not account, alone, for all the dynamics of conflictual radicalisation 
that the period 2011–2013 witnessed, I will begin by focusing on the local level, 
which has been less commented upon.
The foundations of local politics were upset by the revolutionary turmoil. 
Parliament and local councils were dissolved, as was the ndp, following an 
order issued by the Supreme Administrative Court in April 2011. The reach of 
these dissolutions went far beyond the spectacular burning of the former gov-
erning party’s headquarters in downtown Cairo. In concrete terms, it meant 
that tens of thousands of local elites were deprived of their positions. Many 
of them, fearing prosecution, also suspended their public work activities and 
14 Interview, January 2009, Helwan, Cairo.
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opted to adopt a low profile for several months. These local elites therefore 
stopped acting as the everyday interfaces of the state. The micro-level spirit 
of services broke down and ceased to play the role of a substitute for state in-
tervention. This was cruelly felt by large parts of the population who suffered 
from growing poverty and who now even lacked informal access to patronage, 
adding to the fact that many state administrative units had ceased functioning. 
While local councils remained dissolved with no elections in sight, high ex-
pectations were placed on the parliament that was to be elected at the end of 
2011. For many people, struggling on a day-to-day basis for survival, the return 
of parliament meant the return of a potential source of material aid, which— 
although seemingly negligible—did matter in this economy of survival.
It came as no surprise when the Muslim Brotherhood, followed by the Salaf-
is, both perceived as being able to meet these expectations (Masoud, 2014), 
won the 2011 parliamentary elections, while those parties that embodied the 
spirit of the revolution did not do well. However, it seems that mb Members of 
Parliament turned their backs on local services and charities, and— rather—
tried to dedicate themselves to legislative work: work that most of them were 
not used to conducting and for which they certainly lacked the requisite com-
petences. Moreover, the chamber was caught up in an institutional battle, 
as the High Constitutional Court, supported by the interim military govern-
ment, threatened to dissolve it—eventually succeeding. Anticipating this dis-
solution, mb deputies were eager to pass laws securing their presence in the 
 Constitutive Assembly that was to be formed. They also focused on passing the 
Political Isolation Law, which banned officials who had served in top posts un-
der Mubarak from running for election. Although the law was eventually sup-
pressed when the chamber was dissolved, a related article was later included 
in the Constitution that Morsi introduced in late 2012.
This move from khidma to legislation allegedly led to much disgruntlement 
among voters, who deplored the mb’s neglect of local demands. It also sparked 
anger among former ndp notables who considered the Political Isolation Law 
a potential threat, while many expected the mb to be as cooperative as it had 
showed itself to be towards the military and high-ranking businessmen of the 
Mubarak era. A fear of the ‘Brotherhoodisation’ of all institutions—whether 
reasonable or not—became rampant. Former ndp notables worried especially 
about local councils—which used to be their sanctuaries—the elections for 
which were constantly postponed while parliament drafted a new law with 
which to govern them. Many believed this to be a sign of mb manipulation, an 
effort to assert complete hegemony, and began mobilising against the Brother-
hood (Hamdy and Vannetzel, 2014). Hence, the blurred local environment of 
overlapping networks and identities unravelled and gave way to sharpening 
Vannetzel�38
<UN>
cleavages. A dramatic shift in the local landscape added to this growing polari-
sation: while the ndp disappeared as a structured organisation, conversely, the 
Muslim Brothers suddenly appeared more prominently in the public sphere 
leaving their clandestinity behind. At this time, many people suddenly discov-
ered who in their entourage was a member of the mb. As one inhabitant of 
Helwan, where the mb was deeply rooted, put it: ‘Before, the Muslim Brothers 
were like fish under the water. And then suddenly they came to the surface. My 
neighbour, my relative … We discovered that they were Brothers. They showed 
themselves, saying “we are here; we are strong”.’15
The breakdown of former local politics—that is to say, the rupture of pa-
tronage and the increasing dissociation and conflictualisation of political 
identities and cleavages—intersected with several national and international 
dynamics and temporalities of radicalisation. Among them, two contributed 
to undermining the legitimacy both of the politics of goodness and of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood.
First, the 2011 uprising, and before and after it the thousands of social pro-
tests that have spread throughout Egypt in the last decade or more, indicate 
that khayr is contextually not enough to sustain the paradox of ‘state devel-
opmentalism without a developmentalist state’. More precisely, though these 
protests are not a mere consequence of a so-called lack of development, they 
are moments in which the politics of goodness is variously questioned, criti-
cised, and reinterpreted, and—at least partially—rejected. Protests shed a 
crude light on the contradiction between the developmentalism myth and 
the deregulation of social protection, and have made that contradiction, in 
Egypt as elsewhere (Catusse et al., 2010; Allal and Bennafla, 2011), obvious and 
unbearable for a growing proportion of the population. The last decade, in-
deed, has seen the conjunction of endless protests, the wide scale privatisa-
tion of public companies, a rapid rise in the precariousness of labour (even in 
what remains of the public sector) (Makram-Ebeid, 2012), and the vertiginous 
rise of food prices due to the international financial crisis that began in 2008 
(for which abovementioned state subsidies were not enough to compensate). 
Meanwhile, the vocal, neo-liberal wing of the ndp, gathered around Gamal 
Mubarak whose longing to become president has caused much resentment 
(Hassabo, 2012) and has given a new face to the regime; a face that clearly fails 
to fit the image of the protective state, and thus has unmasked the aforemen-
tioned paradox. The relocation of welfare into goodness is thus strongly put 
in question, in these times of rising demand for genuine social justice (‘adala 
igtima‘iyya) and for radical change in distributional policies.
15 Interview, June 2014, Helwan, Cairo.
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Second, in this context, social expectations of protection from the state are 
particularly high. They are incidentally supported by a currently powerful in-
ternational trend, sponsored by political and financial organisations, which 
reasserts the need for strong state leadership, able to prevent the collapse of 
institutions and to eradicate the threat of ‘terrorism’ (Nay, 2013) while con-
tinuing to deregulate economies. In Egypt, social aspirations of security and 
welfare have focused on the two major symbols of historical Egyptian state 
developmentalism—that is to say, the army and the president. While the im-
age of the president as za’im and saviour of the nation was being revived by 
those expectations of state protection, Mohamed Morsi was cast in this role 
and did not manage to fit in it. Some judged Morsi was a ‘good man, but he was 
a loser’ (ragil kwayyes bes fashil): he was unable to govern ‘a state that is too big 
for him’, as a former Morsi voter told me. Beyond his lack of charisma, the ab-
sence of an economic programme, or the neo-liberal agenda, all of which have 
been commented on and denounced at length, I argue that this is also because 
khayr, of which the mb was the local champion, just did not meet the renewed 
demand for genuine state intervention. Others considered Morsi a real threat 
to the Egyptian state: he was quickly depicted, in the media, as the puppet of 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership office—the ‘Guidance Office’—which 
many feared would thus take control of the state. Behind the very irreverent 
nickname, ‘al-kharouf” (the sheep), given to him by the press, there was more 
than the politicisation of a body of journalists against the mb: there was the 
idea that the mb was weakening the autonomy of the state, submitting it to the 
will of their own organisation.
6 Conclusion. Conflicts and Consensus of Development in al-Sisi’s 
Egypt
To conclude, what is at issue in post-Mubarak Egypt goes far beyond the fail-
ure of the Muslim Brotherhood. Neither can it be defined as a clash between 
two opposite models of society—that is to say, the Islamist model versus the 
legacy of Nasser’s state. The common vision of a conflict of development in 
which Islamists would oppose regime incumbents, and would be relegated to 
a separate field of religious philanthropy, has been deconstructed. State- and 
faith-based discourses, beliefs and practices, aimed to ‘develop’ society, used 
to be deeply entangled. The biggest contradictory tension was to be found be-
tween the survival of the imaginary of state developmentalism and the effec-
tiveness of neo-liberalisation. In the space created by this tension, the politics 
of goodness was deployed, involving actors from the former regime and the 
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mb alike. Behind the consensus around khayr as an illusive avatar of state de-
velopmentalism in neo-liberal times, those actors struggled to secure positions 
of power on both political and moral grounds. What we are now witnessing 
is the crumbling of this consensus. Not only have the former micro-networks 
of khayr been dismantled with the reshaping of local political elites (in 2015, 
inexperienced supporters of al-Sisi supplanted former ndp members in parlia-
ment; and the mb has, so far, not been granted any margin of tolerance); but 
the local and national dynamics of the politics of goodness—that is to say, the 
relocation of welfare in the spirit of services and the survival of the develop-
mentalist myth—have broken down.
The radicalisation of conflicts during the revolutionary period has highlight-
ed the contradiction of neo-liberal state developmentalism and, in the course 
of time, altered the equation of conflict and development. In emic and aca-
demic discourses alike, open conflict has widely been seen as a hindrance to 
stability, and stability has consensually been linked to development. Through-
out 2011–2012, recurrent street demonstrations, organised by groups of young 
revolutionaries, were thus harshly dismissed by the political elites—the mili-
tary, the mb, and all the so-called civil political parties—by the media, and by 
large parts of the population tired by a lack of security (infilat amni) and by 
economic paralysis. Demonstrations, seen as chaotic expressions of conflict, 
were more and more seen as damaging to the ‘wheels of production’ (‘agalat 
al-intag), a metaphor which became an overwhelming and formidable weap-
on that could be used to discredit anyone. Once elected, members of the mb 
were soon decried as the spanner in those wheels. While the struggle against 
incumbents to occupy positions of power intensified, they were accused of, 
and seen as, hurting the state itself, and consequently seen as breaking the mo-
tor of development from within. The revolt against Morsi, framed as a positive 
conflict with the goal of saving the state and relaunching the ‘wheels of pro-
duction’, had the strong effect of refocusing expectations with regard to welfare 
on the state at the national level—away from local khayr practices.
The new consensus that emerged around al-Sisi was largely a consensus 
around this announced relocation of development to the state itself, with the 
army as guarantor. However, two years after Marshal al-Sisi’s election as presi-
dent, it is clear that the new regime has advanced neo-liberalisation further by 
cutting energy subsidies and has relocated the economy, rather than develop-
ment, into the military, rather than into the public, sector. Military holding com-
panies now monopolise the benefits of al-Sisi’s policy of ‘grandiose projects’, 
causing much anger, both among private businessmen and among the working 
classes, who see no improvement in their conditions. Even the attempt to revive 
the glorious myth of state developmentalism with the  pharaonic  construction 
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of the New Suez Canal, entirely overseen by the Egyptian armed forces, seems 
unable to cope with the asymmetries of accumulation and their conflictualisa-
tion. As a precarious worker, employed in a private textile factory in Helwan, 
told me angrily, addressing al-Sisi one year after having voted for him: ‘The Suez 
Canal—you did it for you, yourself! But what have you done for us, so far?’ As 
consensus crumbles around al-Sisi and the army alike, conflicts—on the rise—
might begin to be seen as the necessary formula for development.
References
Abdelrahman, M. (2015) Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings 
(New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis).
Achcar, G. (2013) The People Want. A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles: University of California Press).
Adly, A. (2013) State Reform and Development in the Middle East. Turkey and Egypt in the 
Post-Liberalization Era (London, New York: Routledge).
Allal, A. and K. Bennafla (2011) ‘Les mouvements protestataires de Gafsa (Tunisie) et 
Sidi Ifni (Maroc) de 2005 à 2009. Des mobilisations en faveur du réengagement de 
l’Etat ou contre l’ordre politique ?’ Tiers Monde, Hors-série, pp. 27–46, DOI: 10.3917/
rtm.hs01.0027.
Atia, M. (2012) ‘A Way to Paradise: Pious Neo-liberalism, Islam, and Faith-Based Devel-
opment’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 102(4), pp. 808–827, 
DOI: 10.1080/00045608.2011.627046.
Al-Awadi, H. (2004) In Pursuit of Legitimacy. The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–
2000 (London: Tauris).
Bayart, J.-F. (1985) ‘L’énonciation du politique’, Revue française de science politique, 
3, pp. 343–373, http://www.persee.fr/doc/rfsp_0035-2950_1985_num_35_3_411322 
( accessed on 5 June 2016).
Beinin, J. and M. Duboc (2014) ‘Mouvement ouvrier, luttes syndicales et processus révo-
lutionnaire en Égypte, 2006–2013’, in M. Camau and F. Vairel (eds.), Soulèvements et 
recompositions politiques dans le monde arabe, (Montréal: Presses de l’Université de 
Montréal), pp. 121–142.
Ben Néfissa, S. (2009) ‘Cairo’s City Government: the Crisis of Local Administration and 
the Refusal of Urban Citizenship’, in D. Singerman (ed.), Cairo Contested, Gover-
nance, Urban Space and Global Modernity (Cairo, New York: The American Univer-
sity in Cairo Press), pp. 177–197.
Ben Néfissa, S. (2003) ‘Citoyenneté morale en Égypte: une association entre Etat et 
Frères musulmans’, in S. Ben Néfissa et al. (eds.) ONG et gouvernance dans le monde 
arabe (Paris, Le Caire: Karthala/CEDEJ).
Vannetzel�4�
<UN>
Ben Néfissa, S. (1995) ‘Les ligues régionales et les associations islamiques en Egypte: 
deux formes de regroupement à vocation sociale et caritative’, Tiers Monde, 36(141), 
pp. 163–177, DOI: 10.3406/tiers.1995.4951.
Ben Néfissa, S. and A. Arafat (2005) Vote et démocratie dans l’Égypte contemporaine 
(Paris, Le Caire: Karthala/CEDEJ).
Bianchi, R. (1989) Unruly corporatism, Egyptian associational life in the 20th century 
(New York, Oxford: OUP).
Bibars, I. (2001) Victims and Heroines: Women, Welfare and the Egyptian State (London, 
New York: Zed).
Brooke, S. (2015) ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s social outreach after the Egyptian coup’, 
Brookings Institution Working paper, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/
Files/Reports/2015/07/rethinking-political-islam/Egypt_Brooke-FINALE.pdf?la=en 
(accessed on 30 May 2016).
Camau, M. and V. Geisser (2003) Le Syndrome autoritaire. Politique en Tunisie de Bour-
guiba à Ben Ali (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po).
Catusse, M. (2006) ‘Ordonner, classer, penser la société: Les pays arabes au prisme 
de l’économie politique’, in E. Picard (ed.), La Politique dans le monde arabe (Paris: 
 Armand Colin), pp. 215–238.
Catusse, M., B. Destremau and E. Verdier (eds.) (2010) L’État face aux débordements du 
social. Formation, travail et protection sociale (Aix, Paris: Iremam-Karthala).
Elyachar, J. (2002) ‘Empowerment Money: The World Bank, Non-Governmental Orga-
nizations, and the Value of Culture in Egypt’, Public Culture, 14(3), pp. 493–513, DOI: 
10.1215/08992363-14-3-493.
Fahmy, N. (2002) The Politics of Egypt: State-society relationship (London, New York: 
Routledge).
Farah, N. (2009) Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development (Cairo: 
American University Press in Cairo).
Gobe, E. (1999) Les hommes d’affaires égyptiens. Démocratisation et secteur privé dans 
l’Egypte de l’infitah (Paris: Karthala).
Haenni, P. (2005a) L’ordre des caïds. Conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire (Paris, Le 
Caire: Karthala-CEDEJ).
Haenni, P. (2005b) L’islam de marché. L’autre révolution conservatrice (Paris: Seuil).
Haenni, P. (2002) ‘Au-delà du repli identitaire … Les nouveaux prêcheurs égyptiens et 
la modernisation paradoxale de l’islam’, Religioscope, http://www.religioscope.com/
pdf/precheurs.pdf (accessed on 30 May 2016).
Hamdy, M. and M. Vannetzel (2014) ‘Egypte, la politique au village: le surprenant iti-
néraire d’un feloul’, Orient XXI, 24 March, http://orientxxi.info/magazine/egypte-la 
-politique-au-village,0548 (accessed on 5 June 2016).
Harrigan, J. and H. El Said (2009) Economic Liberalisation, Social Capital and Islamic 
Welfare Provision (Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
�43The Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘Virtuous society’
<UN>
Hassabo, C. (2012) La stabilité du régime Moubarak à l’épreuve d’une “situation de suc-
cession prolongée”: les limites de la consolidation autoritaire, PhD thesis (Grenoble: 
Institut d’études politiques).
Hibou, B. (2006) La force de l’obéissance. Economie politique de la répression en Tunisie, 
(Paris: La Découverte).
Ismail, S. (2006) Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters. Encountering the Everyday State 
(Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press).
Mahmood, S. (2005) Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press).
Makram-Ebeid, D. (2012) Manufacturing stability: Everyday politics of work in an indus-
trial steel town in Helwan, Egypt, PhD thesis (London: The London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science).
Masoud, T. (2014) Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press).
Nay, O. (2013) ‘Fragile and failed states: Critical perspectives on conceptu-
al hybrids’,  International Political Science Review, 34 (3), pp. 326–341, DOI: 
10.1177/0192512113480054.
Richards, A. and J. Waterbury (1996) (eds.) A Political Economy of the Middle East, Boul-
der (Oxford: Westview Press).
Sadowski, Y. (1991) Political vegetables? Businessmen and bureaucrats in the develop-
ment of Egyptian agriculture (Washington: Brookings).
Sfakianakis, J. (2004) ‘The Whales of the Nile: Networks, Businessmen and Bureaucrats 
during the Era of Privatization in Egypt’ in S. Heydemann (ed.) Networks of Privilege: 
Rethinking the Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan).
Shawkat, Y. (2014) ‘Mubarak’s Promise. Social justice and the National Housing Pro-
gramme: affordable homes or political gain?’ Égypte/Monde arabe, 3(11), http://ema 
.revues.org/3318 (accessed on 30 May 2016).
Soliman, S. (2004) Argent de l’Etat et politique. La difficile sortie de l’Etat rentier en Egypte 
sous Hosni Moubarak, PhD thesis (Paris: Institut d’études politiques).
Springborg, R. (2012) ‘Gas and Egyptian Development’, in R. Looney (ed.), The Hand-
book of Oil Politics (London, New York: Routledge).
Sullivan, D. and S. Abed-Kotob (1999) Islam in contemporary Egypt: Civil society vs. The 
State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
Utvik, B. (2006) The Pious Road to Development. Islamist Economics in Egypt (London: 
Hurst).
Vannetzel, M. (2016) Les Frères musulmans égyptiens. Enquête sur un secret public (Par-
is: Karthala).
Waterbury, J. (1983) The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: the Political Economy of Two Regimes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Vannetzel�44
<UN>
Wickham, C. (2003) Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt 
(New York: Columbia University Press).
Zeghal, M. (1996) Gardiens de l’Islam: les oulémas d’Al Azhar dans l’Égypte contempo-
raine (Paris, Presses de Sciences Po).
 Chronology
2014 (28 May) Marshal al-Sisi elected President.
2013 (3 July) The military, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, ousts President Mor-
si from power.
2013 (30 June) Massive demonstrations all over Egypt demand Morsi’s departure, one 
year after he takes office.
2012 (17 June): Muslim Brother Mohamed Morsi wins the presidential election, while 
parliament is dissolved on the order of the High Constitutional Court.
2011 (December–January 2012) Parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice Party wins around 47 per cent of seats.
2011 (March) The Supreme Council of Armed Forces, in its role at the head of the in-
terim government, organises a referendum on constitutional amendments, with 
the support of the Muslim Brotherhood.
2011 (25 January) Beginning of the uprising on Tahrir Square and in other places in 
Egypt, leading to President Mubarak’s resignation on 11 February.
2005 In the context of an increasing number of social and political protests, and inter-
national pressure, Mubarak authorises the country’s first direct and multi- candidate 
presidential election (and in August is re-elected); the Muslim Brotherhood wins 20 
per cent of seats in relatively transparent legislative elections in November.
2003 A broad programme for privatising public companies is launched.
1992 Wave of repression against the Muslim Brotherhood. Implementation of the IMF 
Structural Adjustment Program begins.
1981 Hosni Mubarak becomes President following Sadat’s assassination by a jihadi 
group, tolerating the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in legislative elections.
1973 President Anwar al-Sadat allows margins of tolerance for the Muslim Brother-
hood, releasing its leaders from jail. Economic liberalisation begins; a multiparty 
system is allowed from 1978 onwards.
1952–1970 Nasser and the Free Officers seize power from the monarchy, establish im-
portant social reforms, nationalise most of the economy, and dissolve all parties 
and associations. Harsh repression targets the Muslim Brotherhood from 1954 on.
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on the Conflicts Arising from the Commodification 
of Collective Land in Morocco
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Abstract
This chapter analyses the links between development and conflict in the context of the 
protest movements that have arisen in response to the increasing commodification 
of collective land in Morocco. The transfer of this land, a transfer accompanied by a 
discourse linking the economic development of collective land to human and social 
development promoted by the state, renders visible—by exacerbating them—the in-
equalities inherent in the land tenure system introduced in the colonial era. Among 
the many forms of inequality, those relating to women’s rights have become particu-
larly important on the political scene thanks to action taken by a particular women’s 
protest movement. This movement has managed to forge status for itself as a legiti-
mate protest movement and is also contributing to the (re)creation of social boundar-
ies based on the rhetoric of autochthony and on the politicisation of social inequalities 
based on tribal affiliation.
1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of the links between development and 
conflict in the context of the protest movements that have arisen during the 
last decade in response to the growing commodification of collective land in 
 Morocco. This land is subject to a particular form of land tenure that forms 
the basis of the collective property rights granted to ‘tribes, fractions, vil-
lages and other ethnic groups’,1 and is governed by the 1919 dahir, a royal de-
cree introduced in colonial times. Collective land extends over an estimated 
area of 15 million hectares and is home to 60 prefectures and provinces and 
1 Excerpt from Article 1 of the 1919 dahir regulating collective land in Morocco.
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4,600  communities.2 This is one of the main reserves of land still available in 
Morocco. These areas of collective land, described by the authorities as ‘real 
levers of local and national socio-economic development’, attract investors 
and major economic projects (Mrabi, 2014). The interest shown in these areas 
leads to their increasing commodification and privatisation. The national de-
bate on collective land, held in 2014 in order to better develop such land and 
to launch the legal and institutional reforms necessary for this development to 
take place, illustrates the current craze for this category of property. However, 
the fact that this debate did not produce a conclusive result shows the com-
plexity of the problem and the many issues and conflicts inherent in the land 
tenure institution and, in particular, its reform.3
Examined from the ‘development’ point of view, the conflicts inherent in 
the institution that is collective land in Morocco often appear to be an obstacle 
to its effective exploitation, to human development and even to the mainte-
nance of social cohesion.4 This approach places more particular emphasis on 
‘unresolved or inadequately resolved’ conflicts within and between commu-
nities (El Alaoui, 2002, 61)—conflicts that are increasing, particularly due to 
the weakening of traditional authorities and the failure of those authorities 
to adapt to changes in the market and society, but also because of the over-
exploitation of resources, the ineffectual measures taken by the state, and the 
inadequacy of the legal framework. To overcome these obstacles (and thus 
to move away from a ‘time of conflicts’ and enter a ‘time of development’), 
various options have been considered: legislative reforms, privatisation and 
registration of communal land, the revival of traditional authorities by their 
2 These are the figures published by the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior on its web pages 
devoted to collective land: www.terrescollectives.ma (accessed on 31 May 2016).
3 Following five regional meetings that took place between March and May 2014, the ministry 
responsible announced that a conference would be organised in the summer of the same 
year to present the results of these deliberations and propose a reform of the dahir of 1919. 
This final conference did not take place. The debate on the legal and institutional reform of 
land tenure has since been revived at the Conference on State Land Policy (9 and 10 Decem-
ber 2015).
4 As Bouderbala notes, ‘the economic critique of the status of collective land’ dates back to 
the years 1980–90, a time of ‘[the] return to liberalism and [of] the implementation of struc-
tural adjustment programs’ (Bouderbala 1999, 343) (our transl.). As for those prospects that 
present collective land ‘as a dangerous obstacle to national integration’, they are particularly 
rooted in the ‘political ideal’ established by national movements during the consolidation 
of postcolonial states, an ideal that contrasts ‘state centralisation with balkanisation, na-




‘upgrading’, the organising of communities into cooperatives or development 
associations, and the establishment of deliberative bodies likely to encourage 
participation.5 All these measures have the advantage of offering solutions to a 
situation that is, to say the least, complex, but they rarely take into account the 
conflicts inherent in the ‘development measures’ proposed and the inequali-
ties that the latter embody or emphasise. This chapter aims to illustrate the 
link between development and conflict by showing that ‘development’ (under-
stood as a multidimensional process) can both be liberating and bring about 
inequalities and even social divisions. This two-pronged approach will also 
enable us to look in a somewhat different way at the contrast usually drawn 
between, on the one hand, culturalist representations of ‘tradition’ focused on 
local characteristics seen as a source of conflict and, on the other, a ‘modernity’ 
considered superior in terms of economic and managerial rationality, social 
justice and universal rights.
Property relations, the commodification of land, and the political move-
ments related to it, lie at the crossroads of a great number of political and so-
cial issues. This area thus lends itself particularly well to an examination of 
the link between development and conflict. As noted by Jacob and Le Meur, 
the body of work on these issues has grown considerably over the past thirty 
years, ‘in a new context characterised by a complex dialectic between tenden-
cies towards deterritorialisation and the commodification of the world, the 
rise of environmental concern and a renewed affirmation of forms of belong-
ing and identity’ (2010, 5, our transl.). Of these inquiries, those conducted in 
Africa deal more specifically with processes that can be observed south of the 
Sahara, and analyse the link between ownership conflicts on the one hand and 
the formation of the state and political identities on the other (Lund, 1998 and 
2011; Boone, 2014). These same processes are still understudied in North Africa.
Apprehended from the point of view of the transformation of the institu-
tion of collective land, the issue of ‘development’ has many meanings, on sev-
eral levels (economic, legal, political, and social). In this chapter, ‘development’ 
refers first to the issue of the expansion of the land market in a global context 
marked by an increasing commodification of land. Second, the notion of de-
velopment means the economic programmes implemented by states to ‘make 
better use’ of these territories and to the legal and administrative reforms that 
accompany, regulate, and make possible this accelerating commodification. 
Lastly, the issue of ‘development’ also refers to the protest movements that 
5 Many analyses discuss collective land from the ‘development’ point of view and offer ideas 
about the solutions that need to be implemented in order to remove the obstacles observed. 
On this issue, see for example Mahdi (2009), El Alaoui (2002) and Bouderbala (1999).
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have arisen in response to the inequalities created by the development of the 
land market, and that put into practice the lexicon of equality, social justice 
and human rights. These so-called universal reference points were given a 
prominent place in the Millennium Development Goals set out and promoted 
by major international organisations that place human development at the 
heart of their actions and objectives.
The work of Karl Polanyi (2001 [1957]), presented by Ayşe Buğra in this vol-
ume, encourages us to think of these different meanings of development si-
multaneously. In the context studied, they are constitutive of the same process, 
the development of a land market in a neo-liberal context marked by increased 
investments and land-grabbing in countries of the South (Bush et al., 2011). 
While the development of this economic sector appears as ‘disentangled’ from 
the political, it still remains dependent on the implementation of institutional 
reforms, and therefore on political interventions. Moreover, the expansion of 
this land market is accompanied by what Polanyi calls ‘countermovements’. 
These stem from society and seek to regulate and limit the potentially dev-
astating effects of this expansion. Therefore, the increasing commodifica-
tion of collective land, the implementation of institutional reforms, and the 
emergence of protest movements will be discussed below as three intrinsically 
linked meanings of development that suggest an interpretation of the demon-
strated interrelationship between development(s) and conflict(s) on different 
levels. What form does the interrelation between these processes take in the 
case of the current commodification of collective land in Morocco? What are 
the conflicts and inequalities that this commodification makes visible and/or 
generates? What are the countermovements that develop in this context?
To address these issues, I conducted a documentary survey (letters, reports 
on meetings, press articles), carried out ethnographic observations, and— 
finally—held unstructured interviews, between 2011 and 2015,6 with different 
participants in the province of the Gharb (in Qasbat Mehdia and the environs 
of Kenitra) and near the cities of Meknes, Fez and Ifrane.7 These data under-
score the fact that in Morocco the transfer of collective land is accompanied 
6 In 2011 and 2012, data were collected in collaboration with Fadma Ait Mous as part of the anr 
ANDROMAQUE project on the anthropology of law in the Muslim world. Between 2013 and 
2015, I pursued this research alone, with the support of the Centre for Modern Oriental Stud-
ies (Zentrum Moderner Orient, zmo) in Berlin, the University Research Priority Program 
‘Asia & Europe’ of the University of Zurich, and the Centre de Recherche Economie, Société, 
Culture (cresc) of the University of Mohammed vi Polytechnic, Rabat.
7 This collective land is not far from an urban area. It differs from collective land of the pastoral 
type, for example land located in steppe zones. For a description of the different types of col-
lective land see Lazarev (2014, 36–44).
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by a discourse associating the economic development of this land with the 
human and social development promoted by the state. This rhetoric of de-
velopment calls on the state to implement legal and institutional reform by 
presenting so-called customary regimes and the traditional representatives of 
communities—both of which were institutionalised in colonial times—as the 
main obstacles to a fair and optimised use of collective land. This discourse 
draws, albeit selectively, on the protest movements that have arisen due to the 
exacerbation of tensions and inequalities within communities and families 
owning collective land, tensions that exacerbated as the result of the intensifi-
cation of land commodification.
By focusing my research on one of these conflicts (between women and 
the representatives of their community), I will show that, among the multiple 
forms of inequality inherent in the status of collective land, those relating to 
women’s rights have become particularly important on the political scene. The 
struggle for women’s rights has indeed demonstrated its capacity to advocate 
a vision of development that is both ‘consensual’ and similar to the vision 
currently promoted by the state. By referring to elements related to gender 
equality in the Constitution and the international conventions to which the 
country is a signatory, this movement has forged a status for itself as a ‘legiti-
mate movement’ on the national public stage. However, this process of effec-
tively including women on the lists of land beneficiaries has also strengthened 
social boundaries based on a rhetoric of autochthony and the politicisation 
of social inequalities based on tribal membership. If this process illustrates 
the conceptualisation of what many authors call ‘local citizenship’ (Jacob and 
Le Meur, 2010, 9–17; Lund, 2011), it also highlights the existence of many other 
inequalities and asymmetries that the women’s movement and the demands it 
is voicing both conceal and (re)produce.
2 ‘It’s all the fault of custom’: Collective Land and the  
Rhetoric of Development
Since its creation in colonial times, the legal status of collective land was 
meant to allow for the necessary economic, social and political development 
of the country.8 The administration of the protectorate passed the 1919 decree 
8 See Bendella (2016) for a reflection on the different participants involved in the creation of 
the legal category of ‘collective land’ during the protectorate and the adaptation of this cat-




to oversee land that did not belong to the state or to individuals. Presented as 
a serious obstacle to economic development and the establishment of a mod-
ern state, the management of ‘tribal areas’ characterised by a ‘use [of land] as 
required’ following flexible rules was replaced by a collective mode of property 
based on the principle of ‘permanent and exclusive occupation’ under the su-
pervision of the state (Bouderbala, 1996, 145–152, our transl.). The introduction 
of this new status was coupled with a process by which certain tribal entities 
were associated with specific territories, resulting in ‘a mixing of the notions of 
entitlements to land and being an indigenous resident’ (Aderghal and Simenel, 
2012, 60, our transl.). This type of organisation was articulated in opposition to 
that in force in pre-colonial Morocco, a period during which ‘localisations of 
tribal entities, including nomads’ were fluctuating and ‘the relative openness 
of lineage structures of nomadic and sedentary groups always helped to render 
impossible the correlation between ethnic identity and a specific space’ (Ad-
erghal and Simenel, 2012, 55, our transl.).
Moreover, the new land regime has contributed to the institutionalisation 
of ‘custom’, freezing a number of practices and power relations that had pre-
viously been flexible and based on the principle of ‘group consensus’ (Boud-
erbala, 2013, 190).9 The 1919 decree gave ‘customary law’ a central role in the 
daily management of land use. The definition and application of these ‘habits 
and customs’ were entrusted to the ‘traditional representatives’10 of each com-
munity (nouâbs), whose mission was to resolve local conflicts, distribute land 
and provide an interface between the group (or jmâa) and representatives of 
the ministry responsible—namely, the Ministry of the Interior. Depending on 
the case, representatives from the communities concerned were also asked to 
develop new norms (Tozy and Mahdi, 1990). This form of government allowed 
the development of ‘a free and separate area of rights where other participants 
[could] be freely active without challenging the state’s monopoly’ (our transl.), 
while relieving the state of the responsibility for managing conflicts within 
communities (Bendella, 2009, 292).
While subjecting much of the territory to a codified legal status, the insti-
tutionalisation of collective land thus strengthened the political control of the 
9 This phenomenon has also been observed in other parts of Africa where the colonial 
administration has preserved previously flexible customs by codifying them, creating a 
conflict between the institution of customary law and positive law (Mamdani, 1996).
10 ‘Nouâbs’ are generally described as ‘traditional representatives.’ The way this social insti-




central government over those territories now placed under the tutelage of the 
state and therefore weakened the sovereignty of communities over the land 
they used for their own needs. Moreover, the introduction of this legal status 
was also intended to protect collective land from a massive private colonisa-
tion by making it ‘unseizable,’ ‘inalienable’ and ‘indefeasible’. The restrictions 
introduced by the 1919 dahir have actually allowed this form of property to 
remain to this day. But they have not slowed down the commodification and 
privatisation of a great deal of this land, which—in the colonial period—came 
under the control of settlers and of rural and urban notables (Bouderbala, 1996, 
152–155), since the new tenure also fixed and codified the rules of the regulated 
transfer of land endowed with this legal status.
The commodification of collective land is not new, but it has been expand-
ing since the late nineties with many new major economic projects such as 
the ‘Plan Maroc Vert’ in the field of agriculture, the ‘Plan Azur’ in the tourism 
sector, and the development of the extraction of raw materials such as phos-
phate (Mahdi, 2014). The land has also been used to respond to needs arising 
from demographic and urban growth. In the name of the economic, social and 
human development of Morocco, the transfer of this land to new owners (in-
cluding public and private companies, both national and international) has 
therefore spread, in the form of long-term leases or final transfers for which 
the communities concerned have been variously compensated. In some cases, 
development or infrastructure projects have been implemented. In others, 
material compensation in the form of money or equipped plots of land has 
been distributed to persons identified by the delegates of the community as 
‘beneficiaries’.
In this transferral process, the Rural Affairs Department of the Ministry of 
the Interior plays an intermediary role. Project promoters must demonstrate 
how their proposal for ‘upgrading’ collective land will contribute to the eco-
nomic and social development of the region. Their argument is all the more 
important as the law stipulates that the transfer of communal land is possible 
only if it contributes to economic development and meets a communal need. 
The speech by Mohammed vi on the occasion of the opening of the National 
Conference on State Land Policy, held on 9 and 10 December 2015 in Skhirat, 
was one of the most recent manifestations of this rhetoric. In his speech, the 
King developed the idea that institutional reform and an acceleration of the 
‘settling of the legal status of collective land’ was required, as this would allow 
such land to be ‘upgraded’, ensuring ‘that it can contribute to the development 
effort’ and ‘making it a means of integration of the beneficiaries […] within the 
framework of the principles of law and social justice, apart from any outdated 
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consideration’ (our transl.).11 The Ministry of the Interior employs similar lan-
guage on the web portal that, since 2012, has been dedicated to its strategy of 
‘developing collective land.’ The ministry’s objective is to include ‘communities 
in the process of development’, both economic and human.12
The Ministry of the Interior’s argument creates a very clear contrast between 
the measures implemented by the state to modernise and reform the institu-
tion of collective land and the obstacles and resistance created by customary 
(or ‘outdated’, as the King put it in his aforementioned speech) types of man-
agement methods. These obstacles are first of a human kind: the demographic 
growth of communities, the resistances of their representatives and the failure 
of their members to take out loans or to show any initiative. They also derive 
from the ‘bad’ management, the underutilisation, or the ‘anarchic’ use of col-
lective land. Of the practices presented as backward and in contradiction with 
the development process that Morocco is currently embarked upon, the min-
istry particularly denounces the way local delegates have managed women’s 
issues. The ministry regrets that local resistance opposes the efforts made by 
its departments to include women as beneficiaries of collective land. Yet, the 
advocacy of women’s right on the part of the ministry arose only recently, in 
response to the movement of a number of women from the communities con-
cerned; women who, since 2007, have been struggling against their exclusion 
from the right to enjoy this land.
3 Distributing the ‘Development Rent’: Collective Land and  
Social Inequalities
The legal status of collective land is based, as we have seen, on the principle 
of ‘permanent and exclusive occupation’ granted to communities as a right of 
use. Some categories of the local population are therefore excluded by defini-
tion from this form of ownership. The law provides only a loose definition of 
the group owning collective land (or the community) and the individuals (or 
‘beneficiaries’) from within this group who are granted the right to use the land. 
The dahir of 1919 only mentions that the right of use is entrusted to ‘heads of 
households’, without defining the characteristics of this category. The delicate 
and contentious task of managing collective land—including the distribution 
11 For the full text of this speech, see http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/sm-le-roi 
-mohammed-vi-adresse-un-message-aux-participants-aux-assises-nationales-d-0 (acces-
sed on 31 May 2016).
12 See www.terrescollectives.ma (accessed on 31 May 2016).
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of plots of land among a community’s members according to criteria defined 
by customary use—falls to the assembly of delegates.
Consequently, the ways of sharing out the right of use vary from community 
to community due to the criteria chosen by each community: birthright, the 
effective use of the land, notability, or marriage among others. While the crite-
ria for determining beneficiaries vary from community to community, women 
are denied—totally or partially—the right to be given a plot of land in almost 
all communities. This practice, apparently based on practices dating from the 
pre-colonial period, was not questioned by the dahir of 1919. By making ‘heads 
of households’ the main beneficiaries of collective land, this legislation has 
given free rein to the dominant representations that associate this role with 
the figure of the man.13
The fact that certain categories are excluded from this right of use has unde-
niably led to conflicts and tensions. Disputes relating to rangeland use by live-
stock, the sharing of territory and the exploitation of plots of land are indeed 
part and parcel of the management of collective land (Bendella, 2009). They 
have long preserved a temporary, local character, being confined to life within 
communities and families. In addition, ‘social pressure made it extremely rare 
that this type of conflict was dealt with in judicial terms’ (Bendella, 2016, 276, 
our transl.). The situation changed with the increasing commodification of 
collective land, which has intensified the pressure on land and increased its 
value. The often definitive dimension of these transactions has also introduced 
the concept of a ‘final deadline’ (Lund, 1998, 6), defined as the date after which 
it is no longer possible to claim a share of the indemnities or plots of land 
distributed at the time of the transfer. This deadline has created a sense of 
urgency that has exacerbated tensions and made more visible the social in-
equalities inherent in the status of collective land, including cases of material 
compensation given to the individuals comprising the community.
As individual compensation has to be distributed according to the lists 
established at the time of each transfer by the community’s assembly of del-
egates under the supervision of the ministry responsible, the criteria used to 
define ‘beneficiaries’ have become a significant issue. By legitimising their 
choice with reference to the customary uses mentioned above, local delegates 
have established these lists by applying criteria that they themselves drew 
up, and thus excluded certain categories of the local population. In the com-
munities studied in the regions of the Gharb and Fez-Meknes, the excluded 
13 This process is found in other contexts where the land reforms introduced during colonial 




categories were women, unmarried men, people who cannot prove a patrilin-
eal genealogy linking them to the community, adopted persons, those whose 
ancestors were included at a late point in the community’s existence, and—
sometimes—those who have emigrated. The establishment of these lists has 
been the source of many local conflicts between the ‘excluded’ on the one 
hand, and delegates and representatives of the Ministry of the Interior on the 
other. But initially, only women from communities deprived of their right to be 
included on the lists of beneficiaries have managed to impose their demands 
on the political scene.
4 The Movement for Women’s Rights to Land
Women from communities were the only ones able to impose their claims on 
the public stage through their movement, earning the sympathy of the nation-
al and international media as well as the support of the ministry responsible. 
This movement began in 2007 and is now better known as the ‘Soulaliyate’ 
movement, a reference to the soulâlâ, the kinship between members of the 
same ethnic community. This movement initially demanded women’s right to 
receive a share equal to that of men when compensation was handed out.
The fact that women were excluded from the lists of beneficiaries 
exacerbated existing gender inequalities. Transfers made while the land was 
still being used and inhabited had dramatic consequences: Men who were 
compensated were able to settle in other geographical areas, but women 
(especially those who were widowed or single) found themselves in a very 
precarious situation. In other contexts, gender tensions were exacerbated by 
the emergence or intensification of economic and social inequalities between 
men and women within individual families, neighbourhoods, or villages. It 
is with great bitterness and anger that the women interviewed mention, for 
example, the substantial improvement in the economic situations of their 
brothers while they continue to live in very modest and even precarious 
conditions. The aggravation of these differences has resulted in significant 
conflicts within families.
Resorting to an appeal to public authorities or to justice is a long, expen-
sive and difficult process for women who very often come from modest back-
grounds and are almost illiterate. For many of them, joining the Soulaliyate 
movement was a way of seeking advice and support. The movement was born 
in 2007 with the support of a number of influential civic associations, including 
the Democratic Association of Women of Morocco (Association démocratique 
des femmes du Maroc; henceforth the adfm) whose mission is to protect and 
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promote the ‘universally recognised human rights of women’.14 This feminist 
organisation, founded in 1985, has a long history of activism and special con-
tacts with international organisations and political representatives. It also has 
a good knowledge of the international instruments concerning human rights 
and development. The organisation became closely involved in the movement, 
providing it with more than just encouragement. While the Soulaliyates em-
bodied the movement and were giving concrete expression to its demands, 
the adfm undertook to provide logistical and material support to the women 
who mobilised locally. It gave them the benefit of its expertise in lobbying, 
contacted the national and international press, conducted negotiations with 
public authorities, and provided legal advice (Berriane, 2016).
Springing from the Gharb region where collective land is now rare and the 
pressure of investors particularly strong, the movement has since spread to 
other parts of the country. This expansion of the movement has led to a broad-
ening of its demands, which now include the equal division of collective land 
in contexts where such land is not sold or leased. The movement is particularly 
distinguished by very high-profile actions that aim to turn the various local 
conflicts into a national problem. For example, the movement organised two 
demonstrations in front of Parliament in 2008 and 2009. In March 2009, follow-
ing the second demonstration, six women resorted to the Rabat Administra-
tive Court to lodge a case against the government, directly incriminating the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior in his capacity as the guardian 
of collective land. In the meanwhile, the movement is conducting negotiations 
with, and direct lobbying of, the public authorities handling the case, and of 
various elected officials.
5 Women’s Rights and Development: What Consensus?
The women’s rights movement is distinguished not only by the media expo-
sure it has gained nationwide but also because its demands have been partially 
met. Between 2009 and 2012, the ministry responsible issued three circulars 
that gave women the right to benefit—like men—from compensation when 
the ownership of collective land is transferred, and a share of that land when 
it is divided out. The walis15 and governors were invited to ensure that these 
14 For a description of the aims of the adfm, see http://www.adfm.ma (accessed on 31 May 
2016).
15 The walis are state representatives appointed by the king at the regional and provincial 
levels. They hold significant power and exercise many and diverse functions, not always 
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new guidelines were respected, and representatives of the Department of Ru-
ral Affairs were told not to accept lists of beneficiaries that did not contain any 
female names (Berriane, 2015). The Ministry of the Interior has highlighted the 
existence of these new regulations, and the results obtained thanks to their 
implementation, on its electronic portal devoted to collective land, thereby 
emphasising the reforming role of the state.16 According to the website, 80,000 
women received material compensation between 2011 and 2013, worth usd 
35.6 million in total (mad 350 million), which represents 30 per cent of all 
compensation distributed. The (relatively) rapid response of the ministry 
in including women in the beneficiaries lists contrasts with the state’s non- 
interventionist position in the past. In fact, until 2009, the ministry responsible 
did not raise any opposition to the practices of exclusion that women suffered, 
under the pretext that it was unable to act in the absence of any desire on the 
part of delegates to change customary practice.
Among the reasons that may explain the rapid reaction of the Ministry of 
the Interior to the Soulaliyate movement’s demands is the movement’s con-
sensual approach.17 While the movement’s members claimed their right to 
land and criticised the practices of exclusion that then prevailed, they used 
a set of arguments and principles that are considered to be legitimate and 
therefore licit in the contemporary Moroccan context.18 Their argument gives 
a central place to development, to which they refer in a manner similar to that 
employed by the state. The Soulaliyates’ demands are based first on a critique 
of ‘customary law’, which they view as responsible for the exclusion of women. 
Depending on the individual case, this law is presented either as pre-Islamic—
a legacy of the jâhiliyya, the era of ‘ignorance’—and as contrary to the precepts 
clearly defined, including reinforcing the power of the Ministry of the Interior over com-
munities. While governors are appointed at the provincial and prefectural level, the  walis 
(also known as ‘super governors’) are responsible for wilayas, which include several pre-
fectures and provinces. The role of the walis in fostering development in Morocco is ana-
lysed in Nadia Hashimi Alaoui’s contribution to this volume.
16 See www.terrescollectives.ma (accessed on 31 May 2016).
17 It is important to mention that this ‘consensus’ exists primarily at the national level. At 
the level of communities and families, calls for women to be included on lists of benefi-
ciaries have met with much more resistance. Negotiations were held with communities 
during which other arguments were brought to the debate, such as the responsibility of 
men for the women in the family (Berriane, 2015). In some regions, these negotiations are 
still ongoing.
18 Demands relating to ‘women’s rights’ became ‘legitimate demands’ following a long ad-
versarial process in which many factors played a role, including the mobilisation of femi-
nist organisations—such as the adfm—over several decades.
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of Islam, or as incompatible with the social and political changes occurring 
in Morocco today (Ait Mous and Berriane, 2016). This view is shared by the 
Ministry of the Interior which contrasts ‘bad, backward-looking custom’ with 
‘good, development-friendly public policy.’ In distinguishing between custom 
and Islam, it is also possible to win the support of those participants who are 
critical of calls for the principle of equality between men and women to be 
applied, but who consider that ‘customary law’ is not consistent with Islamic 
precepts that give women the right to receive donations and legacies and to be 
the beneficiaries of financial transactions.
These critical voices include the women’s division of the Justice and Spiri-
tuality (Al Adl Wal Ihsane, awi) movement. As Merieme Yafout shows in this 
volume, awi defends ‘a vision of women’s emancipation based on Islamic 
reference points’, a vision that contrasts with those of organisations like the 
adfm, which consider the rights of women to be human rights. In justifying 
their position by highlighting the pre-Islamic character of applied customs, 
awi also promotes the inclusion of the Soulaliyates within the category of ben-
eficiaries. According to this movement, these customs are indeed contrary to 
Islamic precepts that guarantee women the right of inheritance.19 While the 
adfm and awi do not share the same vision of the role of Islam in society, 
the two organisations have found common ground in their condemnation of 
customary law and in their defence of the principle that the economic rights of 
women are guaranteed (in the name of Islam for awi, in the name of human 
rights for the adfm).
The arguments used by the movement gives a central place to the constitu-
tion, which guarantees equality between men and women and to the interna-
tional conventions to which the country is a signatory. It thus refers to human 
rights, and specifically women’s emancipation and their economic and social 
rights as formulated by international organisations like the United Nations and 
the World Bank. This reference to human rights is part of the broader discourse 
on the country’s transition towards a state of law in which these rights must be 
respected. The reference also appears in the three circulars issued by the Min-
istry of the Interior. Furthermore, according to an adfm official interviewed 
in Rabat in September 2011, the reference to gender equality was the strongest 
argument available to the movement because the ‘Ministry officials could not 
19 See, e.g., http://www.mouminate.net/ar/document/2652.shtml (accessed on 31 May 
2016). A fatwa issued in 2010 by the Higher Council of Ulamas also puts forward a similar 
argument: the exclusion of women from the right to the income derived from the use of 
collective land is incompatible with the rights of women in Islam to benefit from financial 
transactions such as gifts or inheritance (Berriane, 2015, 69).
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say they were against the idea of equality between men and women’. The con-
sensual nature of this argument can be explained by the contemporary Moroc-
can context. Change is, indeed, on the agenda and the state primarily derives 
its legitimacy from its planned social and political reforms, focused on decen-
tralisation, the establishment of the rule of law, and the fight against inequality 
and discrimination. The country also owes its reputation as a ‘good pupil’ of 
international development policies to the measures implemented to ensure 
greater gender equality and encourage the inclusion of women in decision-
making bodies.
The Soulaliyate movement, however, does not question the actual founda-
tions of the land policies pursued by the state via its sale of vast tracts of land to 
private investors. It differs in this respect from more recent local movements, 
which cast doubt on the scope of development of collective land as conceived 
and implemented by the public authorities and the companies to whom this 
land had been sold. Unlike the Soulaliyate movement, these movements were 
violently repressed or ignored by the authorities. In 2011, for example, the 
population of Khouribga staged a protest demanding the right to top-priority, 
unconditional recruitment to the Office Chérifien des Phosphates. Also, since 
2011 the inhabitants of a village near Tinghir have organised daily sit-ins to pro-
test against the abusive exploitation of natural resources (particularly water) 
by the Société Métallurgique d’Imider (smi) and to demand a fairer distribu-
tion of the wealth generated. In 2013, the people of Taourirt protested against 
local officials and community representatives who appropriated profits from 
the transfer of the ownership of communal land. While public authorities can 
depoliticise the issue of gender inequality by presenting it as a ‘special’ issue 
created by the local ‘resistance’ of authorities that are applying the customs of 
another age,20 they find it more difficult to do so when demands challenge the 
power relations underlying the way in which politicians, national companies 
and international ones are rapidly appropriating resources.
Furthermore, the demands of the Soulaliyate movement do not pose any 
challenge to the actual foundations of the political system. The movement 
even calls on the Ministry of the Interior to fulfil its supervisory role as required 
by law and to ensure that the egalitarian principles of the constitution and 
relevant international conventions are respected. The consensual nature of 
the movement is ultimately based on its ‘disciplined’ form. Drawing on over 
20 Here we find a tendency to explain the experiences of women by what Abu-Lughod calls 
‘resorting to the cultural’, an approach that makes it possible to ignore the historicity and 
the multiplicity of social and political processes at work in the production of gender in-
equalities (Abu-Lughod, 2002, 784).
�6�Development and Countermovements
<UN>
 twenty years of activism, representatives of the adfm have resorted to now 
routine modes of protest perfectly well tolerated by the state, including waqfa 
(standing gatherings)—a type of demonstration akin to a sit-in (Vairel, 2005)—
which the adfm introduced into the repertoire of women in this movement. 
adfm training workshops teach the foundations of this type of demonstra-
tion: apply for and obtain an authorisation, respect the start and end times of 
the event, do not spill over onto the highway, etc.
In a context in which the hegemonic conception of development places spe-
cial emphasis on respecting women’s rights, equality between the sexes thus 
functions as a powerful tool when the demand for new rights turns confron-
tational. When grounds for agreement exist, the link between development, 
conflict and consensus reveals and (re)produces certain inequalities, fuelling 
conflicts at other levels.
6 Development and Ethnic Divisions: Who are the Legitimate 
‘Beneficiaries’?
While a national consensus was created in the name of gender equality so that 
women can benefit from collective land, the same has not been true of the 
actual ways in which this land and its associated benefits have been shared 
out. Ministerial circulars specify neither the size of the share that women are 
supposed to receive21 nor the selection criteria for beneficiaries. Under the 
regulatory regime for collective land, the members of a council of delegates 
decide on these issues in each community. The definition of ‘beneficiary’ thus 
remains unclear, generating conflicts and inequalities based on the exclusion 
of certain categories of the population. As we shall see, the Soulaliyates con-
tribute, as do others concerned, to the reproduction of these inequalities and 
thus to reinforcing those social boundaries that are based on the argument 
of autochthony. I will illustrate this point by referring to the case of Qasbat 
Mehdia, a town near the Atlantic coast, which is located at the heart of the 
land owned by the Mehdawa community. After being repeatedly excluded 
from the sharing out of compensation, a group of women from the community 
joined the Soulaliyate movement shortly after its creation. Since, nearly 800 
women from the community have received financial compensation and a plot 
21 The practical arrangements for the inclusion of women are unclear, especially as re-
gards the size of the ‘share’ they should be assigned. The Soulaliyate movement requests 
that the principle of ‘equal shares’ be applied, but those who are inspired by religious leg-
islation are in favour of a ‘half-share’, equivalent to the right to inheritance under Islam.
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of equipped land. We will now turn to an analysis of the process that allowed 
these women to be included on the list of beneficiaries reserved for women.
With their new visibility and support from representatives of the Ministry 
of the Interior and from the media, the Soulaliyates of Mehdia actively par-
ticipated in drawing up this list. Their interest was focused on what they call 
the ‘purification’ (tasfiyat) of the list. In the person of the chairwoman of their 
association, a widow in her sixties, they very carefully checked the registration 
of the names on the list of beneficiaries reserved for women, and excluded 
those they considered to be ‘fake Soulaliyates’. During the registration sessions, 
which took place on municipal premises, the main mission of the association’s 
chairwoman and two delegates from the community was to distinguish be-
tween ‘real’ and ‘fake’ Soulaliyates, applying an analysis of the genealogy of 
each postulant. These three persons legitimised their role on the grounds of 
their age and their detailed knowledge of the different families that make up 
the community. Moreover, the chairwoman of the local association of Soulali-
yates considered that her function as a representative conferred on her the 
powers necessary to carry out this task. Once the list had been drawn up, she 
then demanded that the local authorities strike off a number of women in-
cluded on it—women she considered to be ‘fake Soulaliyates’. These included 
women who were not related to the community by kin ties, those who had 
been adopted, and those residents whose ancestors had settled there well after 
the ‘founding fathers’ (believed to number ten).
The distinction between ‘real’ and ‘fake’ Soulaliyates is not specific to the 
establishment of lists of women beneficiaries. Genealogy occupies a central 
place in the land registry of collective land and, in particular, in the arrange-
ments approved by the Ministry of the Interior when land is shared out or 
compensation paid. Anyone wishing to register on a list of beneficiaries must 
prove their membership of the community and only those related to the com-
munity by their father can be called soulâlî (soulâliya in the feminine). In the 
current context of land ownership transfers and the distribution of compensa-
tion, the stakes of such a reappropriation of the notions of ‘tribe’ and filiation 
assume particular importance, as access to significant material resources is 
conditional on the ‘purity’ of a patrilineal genealogy.
This change was accompanied by a reconstruction of the history and gene-
alogy of the group.22 The new version contrasts with the reality experienced by 
22 For the Mehdawa, the genealogy of the community is reduced to some ten or so ‘founding 
fathers’—soldiers from different regions who were united in the late seventeenth century 
by the usufruct granted by Sultan Moulay Ismail on the land surrounding the fortress of 
Mehdia in exchange for securing it (Ait Mous and Berriane, 2016, 130–132).
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the community of Mehdawa who, over the centuries, experienced numerous 
processes of migration, inclusion and assimilation.23 This rewriting of the his-
tory of the ‘clan’ was accompanied by the establishment of a glossary distin-
guishing, in order of priority, between the different categories of people living 
in Qasbat Mehdia. The names of these categories are not new, but they took 
on a new vigour when the process of land commodification intensified. The 
first category is that of ‘soulâlî’, indigenous people possessing the right to use 
the land because they are linked to the community through their fathers. At 
Qasbat Mehdia, the members of this category can benefit from these rights, 
even if they do not live in the community and do not work the land. Other resi-
dents are classified as part of the non-native category of ‘foreigners’ (berrânî), 
those who do not enjoy this right of use because their fathers are not soulâlî. 
Some berrâni have grown up and lived all their lives in Qasbat Mehdia. In this 
case, they are called ‘sons or daughters of the soil’ (weld/bent leblâd), a term 
which—incidentally—is also used to refer to the ‘soulâlî’. For example, chil-
dren of women who come from the community but married to a berrâni fall 
into this category. Although they are ‘locals’, they do not have the right to land.
For the women of Qasbat Mehdia, referring to the distinction between 
‘soulâlî natives’, ‘non-soulâlî locals’, and ‘foreigners’ has turned into a prime re-
source. By focusing on their own patrilineal relationship with the community, 
they are reclaiming the rules of belonging in order to demand their right to 
a share of compensation. They do more than just use this genealogical link; 
they are actively involved in reproducing these categories. In all interviews 
conducted in Qasbat Mehdia but also in other parts of the Gharb, the women 
involved in the establishment of lists of beneficiaries stressed the importance 
of their role as guarantors of the ‘purity’ of the lists established under their 
supervision, in order to distinguish themselves from men who implemented 
practices deemed ‘corrupt’ when they had a monopoly on this function. The 
remarks made by representatives of the Soulaliyate movement show that the 
exclusion of ‘non-beneficiaries’ has become a virtue. However, this process is 
giving rise to new conflicts between beneficiaries (including women) and ex-
cluded groups like the descendants of berrâni who have lived for generations 
in Qasbat Mehdia.
The soulâla is a commonly used term in the discourse of the women of 
 Qasbat Mehdia, but it also finds its place in the discourse of representatives of 
23 As in the case of Afghanistan, described by Fariba Adelkhah in her contribution to this 
volume, it should be recalled that in Morocco, ‘tribal identity is relative and contextual’ 
and is ‘essentially a set of principles and rules according to which political statuses and 
roles are defined and assigned’ (Rachik, 2000, 36, our transl.).
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the adfm, for whom the genealogy of women in the movement has become an 
argument likely to give more weight to the demands of the Soulaliyate move-
ment they helped to create. So members of the movement request that they 
benefit from a share of the compensation distributed to their brothers mainly 
because they are the daughters of a male descendant of the community. In 
other words, the Soulaliyate movement is based on the concept of social equal-
ity described above and combines it with the idea of a patrilineal descent that 
distinguishes some women from others. Paradoxically, the principles of equal-
ity and kinship are of equal importance in this argumentation.
This observation recalls the role played by elites in the production of repre-
sentations of autochthony (Bayart et al., 2001, 181). In the cases studied, these 
representations are gaining in strength and visibility thanks to the actions and 
discourse of the movement created in collaboration with the adfm and the 
use of references to the constitution, which applies to all Moroccan citizens. At 
the intersection of these two sources of political identity (that of autochthony 
and that of national citizenship), the representation of a ‘local citizenship’ 
(Lund, 2011) with a plural and ‘exclusivist’ shape comes into being—a repre-
sentation that draws both on references to so-called universal rights and on a 
‘constituted equality,’ which refers to ‘the conception of a natural and exclusive 
community’ (Cutolo and Geschiere, 2008, 6, our transl.).
7 Conclusion
The analysis of the transformations that are accompanying the commodifi-
cation of collective land in Morocco enables us to highlight the many links 
between development and conflict. Thus, the transfer of ownership of collec-
tive land, which is accompanied by a discourse linking the economic assess-
ment of collective land to the furtherance of human and social development 
promoted by the state, has rendered visible—by exacerbating them— 
inequalities inherent in such a legal status. Until now, the countermove-
ments born of this process have mainly challenged the terms upon which 
the profits resulting from the transfer of land ownership are shared out. In 
this context, the struggle for women’s rights to land has been able to impose 
its demands on the political scene by drawing upon references considered 
‘legitimate’ and without questioning the state’s authority. Conversely, local 
movements that have (sometimes violently) challenged the power relations 
underlying the rapid appropriation of resources by politicians and national 




By analysing the demands being voiced (‘legitimate’ versus ‘ignored’ or re-
pressed) and highlighting certain inequalities, my goal here has not been to 
question the legitimacy of the rights claimed by the women’s movement, but 
to show that there are inequalities between movements. Individual move-
ments’ legitimacy depends largely on the historical and political conjunc-
ture and on the opportunity offered to them to transform reference points of 
 development—such as women’s economic rights or the dichotomy between 
‘custom’ and ‘modernity’—into powerful tools of legitimation, thus reshaping 
power relationships. This study also invites us to consider the inequalities and 
hierarchies that social movements—including those of women—help to fos-
ter, even though they are fighting for an egalitarian distribution of resources 
and rights in society.
The consensus that was formed at the national level around the movement 
for women’s rights is also a vector of exclusion. Processes of exclusion crys-
tallise around the definition of the ‘beneficiary’. By invoking the argument 
of patrilineal descent upon which the sharing out of resources generated by 
collective land repose, the Soulaliyate movement reproduces and strengthens 
social boundaries based on ‘tribal identity’, a process that Fariba Adelkhah dis-
cusses with regard to Afghanistan in this volume. These boundaries are the 
source of new conflicts, but also of new conceptions of citizenship that refer 
to local and national considerations. The link between development and con-
flict, thus, allows us to approach from a new angle the contrast usually made 
between, on the one hand, culturalist representations of ‘tradition’ focused 
on local particularities that are seen as causes of conflict and, on the other, 
a ‘modernity’ considered superior in the name of economic and managerial 
rationality, social justice and universal rights.
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The Sudanese Islamist experiment is far from having put an end to the conflict-ridden 
history of the country, despite the South achieving independence in July 2011. How-
ever, a higher degree of regional integration outside the South was one of the stated 
aims of the Islamists when they came to power in 1989. This chapter will investigate 
the apparent paradox by exploring the experiments in development undertaken by 
Sudanese Islamists during their first republic (1989–2011) on the basis of the study of 
certain social practices they actively encouraged, namely evergetism and philanthro-
py. It is based on an analysis of the charitable practices carried out by the main traders 
in the Sudanese capital’s principal market during the Islamist regime. The regional—
more specifically Darfurian—origin of most of these main traders makes it possible to 
compare what these practices produce in each different territory. The chapter shows 
that this encouragement, which is not part of any specific plan thought up by the Is-
lamists, leads to different forms of development that vary depending on the local and 
human contexts in which the actors live, and also the way they conceive their roles 
within in the circles to which they belong. It then highlights how these variations pro-
duce extremely disparate and often conflict-ridden results, which ultimately pursue 
the asymmetric formation of the Sudanese state, prolonging a historical trajectory that 
has produced injustice and generated conflict (Figure 11.1).
1 Introduction
In Sudan, Islamists1 have been in power for over twenty-five years, and have 
left a lasting mark on the trajectory of the Sudanese state. Before them, only 
1 In this contribution, I will not go into the details of the Sudanese state apparatus; suffice to 
say the Sudanese regime is far from monolithic and since the early 1990’s has significantly 
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Figure ��.� Map of Sudan and the evolution of its borders
Source: Adapted from J. Ryle, J. Wallis et al (Eds.) (�0��), The Sudan 
Handbook, (Rochester: Boydell and Brewer Ltd), and from a  
Wikipedia article History of Sudan.
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General Nimeiry managed to stay in power for more than a decade (from 1969 
to 1985). In addition to their longevity, and though their political orientations 
seem quite different (Islamic and liberal on the one hand, secular and socialist 
on the other), both these regimes share a number of common characteristics: 
the authoritarian character of their political practices, of course, but also their 
explicit willingness to fundamentally transform Sudanese society and state 
and society relationships. Both have also rejected the colonial legacy of a Su-
dan where political and economic resources are concentrated in the country’s 
centre, and both have been intensely hostile to the major traditional parties 
and their elites, which they accuse of having maintained this heritage, and the 
ethnicised power relations on which it was based, during the years they ruled 
the country.
The pursuit of colonial development based on agricultural export located in 
the central regions of the country by governments from the traditional parties 
has been widely noted (Roden, 1974; Bernal, 1997), as have the difficulties of 
the socialist regime to overcome this pattern of development (Niblock, 1987). 
In the late 1970s a real economic crisis faced the country, and these attempts 
were often judged hastily. Most importantly, the resumption of war in the 
South in 1983 and the dreadful famine that hit western regions in 1984 and 1985 
have focused the attention of analysts; few studies have explored development 
policies by focusing on the actors who implemented them and how they are 
rooted in the specific local, regional, and international contexts (oil shocks, the 
massive levels of emigration of qualified Sudanese citizens to the Gulf States, 
evolved. I use the terms ‘Islamist regime’ or ‘Islamists’ to describe the regime that took power 
in Khartoum in 1989, whose main pillar is the Islamic movement, i.e. the Muslim Brother-
hood in Sudan, which became, under the leadership of Hassan al-Turabi, the Islamic Charter 
Front, then the National Islamic Front, and is now the National Congress Party. The generic 
term ‘Islamic movement’ is that used by Hassan al-Turabi, and it seeks to encompass more 
than just the political party, thus including not only the institutionalised aspect of the politi-
cal activities of the movement, but also the satellite organisations. The term was taken up 
by Ali Osman Taha to designate the branch that refused to follow Turabi, who was ousted as 
a result of an internal schism in the movement in the late 1990s and who then created the 
Popular Congress Party (pcp); relatively active in the opposition to the regime, the pcp and 
its leader eventually renewed close informal links with the government during the period of 
the ‘Arab Spring’, mainly because of the international prestige enjoyed by Hassan al-Turabi, 
but also because of the exacerbation of internal rivalries within the Islamic movement over 
the succession of Omar al-Bashir. Another marked feature of the second republic (which 
began after the South achieved independence) lies in the important debates and confronta-
tions to which it has given rise between religious political groups on issues relating to Islamic 
law (which form of sharia should be applied?).
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 regional conflicts, and recurrent droughts in the Sahelian part of the country).2 
The literature has mainly focused on the consequences of the crisis and devel-
oped a simplistic link between climate change and societal violence masking 
the long-term political-economic dynamics and the Sudanese political struc-
ture underpinning the crisis.3 Many studies have also investigated the health 
of the millions of Sudanese who have thronged to the suburbs of the capital 
to escape war or drought (Ibrahim and Ruppert, 1988); others have discussed 
food safety issues in rural areas (de Waal, 2005) or zones affected by conflict 
(Miller, 1993).
Even today, the literature on development in Sudan continues to pursue this 
line of analysis by exploring the problematics of the urbanisation of the capital 
and the modernisation of agriculture and livestock; the latter constituting the 
main livelihood for rural populations (Casciarri et al., 2015).4 Special attention 
is also paid to the form of education that Islamists have sought to encourage 
(Tenret, 2016). In general, development fostered by the Islamist regime’s policy 
choices has not been addressed in terms of its inherently conflictual nature, as 
were the nationalisations of the Nimeiry regime. The exploitation of oil and 
minerals, livestock and grain production for export to specific regions, and the 
construction of large infrastructural projects, such as the dams on the Nile, 
are not choices that are questioned by the actors concerned, or discussed in 
the literature;5 rather, it is the profoundly unequal character of the regional 
distribution of these projects and of their principal beneficiaries that raises 
questions and objections. These inequalities have fomented all the opposition 
armed movements, whether in the South, Darfur, the East, or the regions of the 
Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. It is this aspect, too, that the literature ad-
dressing these conflicts favours; these studies detail this unequal distribution 
and the clientelism of the regime in developmental project selection and the 
allocation of public contracts. Recent studies complement these approaches 
by attempting to decipher what these development projects reveal about the 
practices of Islamist rulers and the way that the Islamist government works 
(Verhoeven, 2013; Beckedorf, 2012; Patey, 2014). The research on which my 
study is based follows the same path, shedding new light on the Islamists in 
2 Apart, that is, from various studies by scholars such as R. Brown who analyzes in detail the 
attitude of international donors to the crisis in the Sudanese economy in the 1980s; see, espe-
cially, Brown (1989 and 1990).
3 On this issue see Verhoeven (2011) and also Brachet and Bonnecase (2013).
4 See also the work of the Feinstein International Center of Tufts University, http://fic.tufts 
.edu/research-item/sudan-environment-and-livelihoods/ (accessed on 29 April 2016).
5 With the notable exception of Gertel et al. (2014).
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Sudan. The literature on Sudanese political Islam focuses mainly on political 
actors, their thinking and discourses (studies including Woodward, 2013; Ibra-
him, 1999), and on their relationships within the state apparatus (e.g. Gallab, 
2016; Sørbø and Ahmed, 2013; Ahmed, 2007) and with the rest of the Sudanese 
political arena (Warburg, 2003). By studying the experiments in government 
carried out by Sudanese Islamists, this research seeks to understand what the 
latter make of power and what power makes of them.
The present study specifically aims to explore the experiment in develop-
ment conducted by the Islamists during their first republic6 by investigating 
the social practices they have actively encouraged since coming to power: 
those of evergetism7 and social philanthropy. In 1989, the value of the religious 
repertoire of redistributive generosity was systematically highlighted in the of-
ficial discourse of the new regime. This was used both as a symbol of religiosity 
and as a tool of redistribution and development, along with its simultaneous 
institutionalisation, in particular through the obligatory payment of zakat.
By analysing how Islamists encourage redistribution practices, we can in-
terpret their conception of development. In addition, deciphering how this 
appeal for generosity is variously received and translated by the governed, 
depending on the social roots and the sociopolitical context in which they 
move, should enables us to see, at least partially, how individuals and groups, 
each on their own scale, conceive development. How do they play a part in 
the production of development that varies according to groups and regions 
and the results of which sometimes prove paradoxical and often conflicting? 
How do these charitable practices combine with the development of the new 
entrepreneurial ethos promoted by Islamists? The answers to these questions 
should help us to envisage more complex configurations than expected and, 
in particular, show how the Islamist experience has gradually brought about 
a form of development that, in principle, is relatively consensual, but whose 
effects are widely conflicting because of the persistence of inequalities in the 
country’s development.
To prove my point, I analyse the activities of the major markets of the Suda-
nese capital and the trajectories and practices of some of their actors mainly 
6 The independence of South Sudan, which marked the beginning of the second republic, pro-
foundly affected the regime and its economy, in particular causing the loss of most of the oil 
revenue that for several years had financed the regime’s development projects. This led to the 
need for a major rethink.
7 I use the term ‘evergetism’ in Paul Veyne’s sense: the financial investment of an individual for 
the public good, the gesture of ‘a man who helps the community with his purse, a patron of 
public life’ (Veyne 1976, 22); on the concept and its critics, see Andreau et al. (1978).
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during the first republic (until the independence of South Sudan in 2011). This 
analysis is based on empirical work carried out since 2004, mainly in the Su-
danese capital, during which I have conducted more than 400 interviews in 
English and Arabic (with a translator) with traders and businessmen as well 
as many observations in the markets.8 My choice of the commercial sector is 
not insignificant. Although it represents only a small share of the gross do-
mestic product (gdp), around 15 percent, this sector plays a central role in the 
Sudanese economic apparatus due to the low level of industrialisation of the 
country and the preponderance, since British colonisation, of agriculture and 
mining, which have become fundamental to the country’s economy since the 
demise of the oil economy.
2 Evergetism: A Specific Tool in Islamist Development
In the very first months of their rule, the Islamists faced a severe food crisis in 
Darfur and Kordofan. The response to the crisis differed greatly from one re-
gion to another—in Kordofan, the governor declared a state of emergency that 
allowed him to obtain substantial international aid, while in Darfur, on the 
contrary, no state of emergency was declared and no outside help was received. 
This decision on the part of the governor of Darfur, a fervent Islamist, was fairly 
typical of the particular view that Islamists hold with regard to the role of the 
state and society: problems in medical care and food safety should be left to so-
ciety through local ngos (Miller, 1993). Darfuri people, especially its economic 
actors, were encouraged to create and finance such ngos,9 while the regional 
authority focuses primarily on security issues.10 We must also remember that 
the Islamists, and especially their leader Hassan al-Turabi, view international 
humanitarian organisations and their political, cultural and religious roles as 
vectors of the acculturation of Muslim populations (Bellion-Jourdan, 2006). 
This highly politicised vision of aid impels Islamists to fight  actively against 
8 Some of these observations and interviews were conducted as part of my doctoral re-
search conducted between 2005 and 2013, for which I analysed the Islamist experience 
on the basis of the development of Darfuri Zaghawa communities (Chevrillon-Guibert, 
2013a).
9 Various interviews, Khartoum, 2004–2012.
10 The region has suffered violent local conflicts since the late 1970s. In the late 1980s, a pre-
carious peace was signed between the main groups involved, but the situation remains 
volatile in northern Darfur (Harir and Vedt (1994) and interview with Yusif Bakhit, secre-
tary of the governor of Darfur between 1981 and 1985, then governor himself between 1986 
and 1988, in Khartoum, April 2016).
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these international organisations, which they accuse of  fostering a civilisa-
tion project that goes against their own, by limiting their interventions to a 
minimum. In 1991, Hassan al-Turabi went so far as to tell a Kuwaiti newspaper: 
‘Some want to use the decline in agricultural production caused by the drought 
to tie our hands. It is preferable for several thousand people to die rather than 
allow the international crusade to come to our aid. We will never proclaim that 
there is a famine while we are an Islamic nation (…) We will not allow inter-
national aid organisations to do what they want in our country and to oppose 
the plans of the Islamic Revolution in the South which, towards the end of 
1991, will see the rebellion crushed.’ (Sawt al-Kuwait, 25 March 1991, quoted in 
Bellion-Jourdan, 1997, 69).
By ascribing this role to aid organisations, Islamists were logically driven to 
create their own charitable organisations charged with spreading their vision 
of society. In 1980, even before they came to power, they set up the organisation 
known as Da’wa Islamiya (Islamic Call), whose initial objective was the spread-
ing of Islam in Africa through education. The establishment of Da’wa Islamiya 
was supported by Mohammed al-Faisal, a director of the financial institution 
Dar al-Mal al-Islami and a main shareholder of the Faisal Islamic Bank created 
a year earlier. He was a personal friend of Turabi. The organisation also ob-
tained the support of the Jami’at ad-da’wa al-islamiya based in Tripoli and the 
Muslim World League based in Jeddah. It was in 1981 that Da’wa Islamiya de-
veloped its own humanitarian arm, the Islamic African Relief Agency (iara).11 
At that time, these associations allowed Islamists not only to gain influence 
among the assisted populations but also to siphon off political support beyond 
their traditional sphere of influence thanks to the very positive response that 
they met with from all actors on the northern Sudanese political scene, which 
was dominated by religious parties. The context was at that time marked by 
the resumption of war in the South and by famine in the West, which drew 
many international humanitarian organisations into the country. However, the 
proximity of these associations to the Islamic movement came to be problem-
atic, especially for secular parties, as it was very difficult to ignore their role in 
the development of Islamist ideology.12
Once they were in power, the Islamists maintained these organisations and 
encouraged the establishment of new ones, in particular granting them many 
11 A few years later, the iara became autonomous and the humanitarian activities of Da’wa 
Islamiya were taken over by two foundations ‘Health’ and ‘Emergency’ and the African 
Charitable Society for Mother and Child Care (Bellion-Jourdan, 2004).
12 In the South, these associations willingly favoured Muslim populations and also proposed 
Islamic alternatives to other communities (El-Affendi, 1990).
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tax exemptions.13 This shows that this initial decision was not only tactical, it 
reinforced the idea that Islamists pay special attention to charitable practices. 
The emphasis on encouraging generosity in a Muslim public is not in the least 
specific to Islamists. Nevertheless, the way the Islamists conceive of this gener-
osity, and the centrality they give it, shapes the roles they attribute to the state 
and society (Marchal, 1999).
When the Islamists came to power in 1989, they followed the Socialists 
twenty years before them by setting out to sustainably transform the country 
and its society. For the former, however, the implementation of ‘good’ develop-
ment was not subject to a set pattern but needed to come from the ‘good’ ac-
tions of Islamised citizens. It was not a matter of setting up a new institutional 
structure or public policies designed explicitly to correct the inequities result-
ing from the accumulation of capital in a Sudan economically structured in 
favour of the central regions, but of turning each Sudanese citizen into a ‘good’ 
Muslim.14 The Islamist project is aimed primarily at fostering a new spirit in 
individuals;15 it focuses on devotion conceived both as an individual and as 
a social practice (Roy 1992). Therefore, the legitimacy of development imple-
mented is linked to the legitimacy of the actors who promote it and to the 
legitimacy of their tools. This legitimacy should be primarily based on religion. 
As is clear from Turabi’s aforementioned statement to the Kuwaiti newspaper, 
what counts is not so much the fate of potential beneficiaries as the Islamic 
project to which the donor contributes.16 Thus, Islamists do not seek to trans-
form the mode of production of material life conditions as such, but rather 
consider that the inherent inequalities in society will be ‘naturally’ corrected 
by the Islamisation of societies and individual practices. If they are nonethe-
less convinced that the entire machinery of the economy must be conquered, 
this is primarily to secure their position in power, which will allow them to im-
plement their project and find positions of influence for men, whose  religious 
13 Interviews, Khartoum, 2011.
14 Darfur has revealed that this priority was not shared by all and that most members of 
the peripheral regions were probably hoping for a much more active commitment 
on the part of the Islamist state to transform the inegalitarian dynamics of development 
in the country.
15 Reversals in the economic policies of the new regime also reflect battles within the re-
gime between advocates of a liberal approach and those favouring a more statist line. The 
latter lost the first battle, with the appointment in 1990 of Abdel Rahim Hamdi, who for 
the next two decades would be the architect of the country’s economic policies.
16 The creation of a Ministry of Planning with wide prerogatives, and the various activities 
in every sphere of Sudanese society, illustrate the Islamists’ specific social strategy aimed 
at renewing Sudanese society on the basis of its individuals.
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faith will be the engine of change. The hesitations and debates within the Is-
lamic movement as to the economic directions to be taken reflect this lack of 
a development model.17 The choices made in this area stemmed much more 
from the political agenda of Islamists seeking to stabilise the North, while con-
tinuing the war in the South, than they did from an ideological imperative or 
any logic of expertise to implement a specific development plan (Marchal and 
Ahmed, 2010).18
Redistribution practices are a typical example of operations promoted by 
the Islamist project, due to their individual and social character: by acting pi-
ously, the donor earns his or her salvation while signifying his belonging to the 
Islamic city that he or she is building. Charity thus becomes a tool for develop-
ing Islamic society, as illustrated by the institutionalisation of several old prac-
tices of evergetism such as paying the religious tax (zakat),19 which became 
mandatory in 1990, and whose base was also widened.
Logically, it is the generosity of those actors favoured by the regime that is 
primarily sought. Islamist militants donate up to 30 percent of their income to 
the movement.20 Economic actors who were close to the Islamists and have 
directly benefited from the largesse of the new government were also eagerly 
asked to act on behalf of the common good,21 as in the case of the Darfuri 
businessman Adam Yagoub, who—in Khartoum in the 1990s—chaired the 
very exclusive club that brought together the 25 most powerful Sudanese en-
trepreneurs.22 Adam was particularly generous to, and especially in Darfur, his 
native region, where he also started his business career, but he also funded the 
Sudanese state while executing—for instance—certain government contracts 
for the Army.23
17 On the role played by charitable donors in social integration, see the discussion (in a 
different context—the end of the Roman Empire) in Brown (2002); see also Ben Néfissa 
et al. (2005).
18 On this aspect, see Tozy and Hibou (2015) and Singer (2008).
19 This tax was introduced at the behest of Islamists in 1984 but was at that time a purely 
voluntary measure, intended to be imposed only on wealthy Muslims, for an amount that 
generally corresponded to 2.5 percent of their annual income.
20 Interviews with former members of the movement, Khartoum, 2015.
21 Interviews, Khartoum, 2004–2012; see also the episode of a government tour of the mar-
kets of the capital, as related by Baillard and Haenni (1997).
22 I analyse his career in Chevrillon-Guibert (2013b).
23 The list of his benefactions can be found in his official biography, published by his fam-
ily after his death (Adam Yagoub Haroun, 2003); interviews with one of Adam Yagoub 
Haroun’s sons, Khartoum, 2008, 2011 and 2015.
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It is easy to understand the conjunction of interests that entrepreneurs 
glimpse at this point, with the state appealing to their generosity in the context 
of practices of ‘discharge’ (Hibou, 1999) and their own economic interests: in 
exchange for their donations, these businessmen hope to obtain various ben-
efits in return. This was particularly true in the 1990s when the government 
decided to privatise most large public companies; today one finds a similar dy-
namic in the allocation of licences for exploration and mining, an activity for 
which the state is responsible (Chevrillon-Guibert, 2016b). On the side of the 
state, one can easily imagine the mutual interest of such action as a tool to de-
velop clientelism, and also to control prosperous individuals whose allegiance 
can be tested. Like the voluntary donations towards the regime’s projects, the 
proper payment of zakat becomes an open sesame for developing one’s busi-
ness in Islamist Sudan, not only because it reflects the Islamic ethos of the 
entrepreneur, but also because it indicates his or her financial allegiance to the 
regime. And this allegiance was essential for the Islamist regime especially in 
the early years when it was actually fighting to survive, as its ability to provide a 
basic standard of living for the population was limited by an economy in crisis 
and the government was not yet in full control of all the machinery of state. 
Thus, the participation of society in public affairs did not lead to a withdrawal 
of the state but rather to its redeployment, since it was exercising greater con-
trol over economic actors and there was an extremely high level of permeabil-
ity between society and state.
The promotion of the Islamic repertoire of values in the new form of gov-
ernment did not prevent a certain prevarication, in a classic pattern whereby 
state resources were appropriated by those actors in the system who were in 
positions of power (board members and administrative and/or political au-
thorities). Soon, in addition to being the tool of generosity—as ‘generous’ en-
trepreneurs sought to win favours from the government—zakat also became a 
means of enrichment for several members of the state hierarchy who directly 
benefited from its funds (Muna Abdalla, 2008). Through citizen participation, 
development has thus become a political arena in which support is sought and 
also tested.
Major businessmen have never been, and are still not, the only people to 
be asked to contribute. All economic actors are invited to fund the civil and 
military operations of the state, whether this involves social philanthropy or fi-
nancial tribute.24 Thus in Khartoum, where the bulk of the country’s resources 
24 The distinction is made by Bellion-Jourdan (1997, 1).
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are concentrated,25 traders are encouraged to set up local charities, in the re-
gions26 and also in the capital, and to participate in state projects. On this last 
point, I should point out the long list of requests that have been and are being 
made to traders in the different markets of Khartoum. A letter sent, in 2002, by 
traders from the Libya souk, one of the largest markets in the Sudanese capital, 
lists the major contributions made by these traders to the community.27 It be-
gins by citing all the market’s infrastructure (including official buildings) and 
then mentions sdp 50,000 (usd 38 000) donated to the Sudanese army in 1984; 
several donations between 1995 and 1996 for the development of Sudanese se-
curity; a billion sdd (usd 13 millions) in 1997 to support the army and sdd 500 
million in 2000 (usd 1,94 million) for the development of Muslim culture:28 to 
buy food for the mujahid—the name given to members of the Popular Defence 
Forces (pdf) fighting in the South in the name of jihad—and to fund mass 
weddings. It also mentions, without giving any amount, the financial support 
provided for the establishment of a camp for the pdf. This list shows that, in 
25 Since independence, Khartoum has grown at a rate well above that of other Sudanese 
cities due to the centralisation of Sudanese politics and the unequal distribution of re-
sources. Indeed, in 1990, the conurbation was home to 73 percent of domestic industry, 85 
percent of commercial businesses in the country, 80 percent of banking services, 85 per-
cent of bank loans to industry and 71 percent of those made with regard to real estate, 70 
percent of taxpayers, and 80 percent of contributions. The decentralisation on which the 
Islamists embarked has not reduced the widening gap between the economy of Greater 
Khartoum and that of other regions, any more than has the oil economy that developed 
in the early years of the new millennium, even though that economy accounted for up to 
7 percent of gdp and nearly 60 percent of the national government’s resources in 2008. 
Indeed, although the oil deposits are located in the regions, most of the economic ben-
efits are concentrated in the capital and have generated only a very small profit for the 
oil-producing regions. The economic recovery that began in 2012 might change this divi-
sion of wealth to some slight degree by involving the regions of the north and the east, 
and that between the two Niles where newly promoted agricultural and mining projects 
are located.
26 While all of the very powerful Darfuri business figures I have met, or their entourages 
(Adam Yagoub, Adam Daossa, and Siddiq Wada, to mention only the most famous), have 
founded charities to promote the development of Darfur and their native regions in par-
ticular, the same is also true of many smaller traders, who have joined colleagues from 
the same village or the same community to found charities for the development of their 
villages or to assist members of their communities. Interviews, Khartoum, 2008 and 2011.
27 The letter can be found in the appendix of my doctoral thesis (Chevrillon-Guibert, 2013a).
28 1000 sdp (Sudanese first pound) = 100 sdd (Sudanese Dinar) = 1 sdg (Sudanese second 
and third pound). Historical data of exchange rates can be found on the website of the 
Sudanese Central Bank. Data can also be found in the Master thesis of Mussabal (2008).
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addition to being encouraged to actively participate in the local development 
of their market by directly financing certain works, traders have also been or-
dered to mobilise for the nation. Just as the rest of the population was involved 
in the conscription of young people into the pdf, it was also expected to play 
an active part in the regime’s war effort against the South, as it was investing in 
the establishment of those paramilitary forces in charge of protecting the re-
gime. A similar pattern exists today with the Rapid Support Forces (rsf): these 
were created from the former Janjaweed militia and assist the pdf.
The enactment of the Popular Defence Forces Act in 1989 was part of the 
same context, as it established a paramilitary force whose objective was co-
operation with the armed forces and the regular security services, but also the 
promotion, among Sudanese citizens, of a ‘level of security consciousness’ 
(Mohamed Salih, 2005, 8). The public sphere, then, was not viewed as the re-
sponsibility of a particular sector of the populace (administrators and politi-
cians) but rather as every person in the country, combined: they were all called 
upon to be aware of their role. Again, the request for popular participation to 
establish a paramilitary security force was not specific to the Islamist regime, 
since the pdf were created by the Sadiq al-Mahdi government in 1986 to coun-
ter the militia of the Islamic movement, but also, and above all, to fight the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the South. However, here too the change 
lay in the growing importance of the pdf in the 1990s compared to that of the 
regular armed forces (El-Battahani, 2016a). M.A. Mohamed Salih believes that 
by 1996 their number exceeded that of the armed forces and in 1999 it was 
three times higher (80,000 regular soldiers, 3,500 Islamist militants appointed 
as military officers, and 150,000 pdf) (Mohamed Salih, 2005, 9). The participa-
tion of the populace was encouraged by a religious rhetoric calling upon those 
drafted to wage jihad in the ‘godless areas’ of the South. Nevertheless, we must 
not lose sight of the material interests also involved in this process: the pdf 
provided the regime with protection against any attempted coup29 and the 
availability of inexpensive soldiers; for individuals who signed up, it meant an 
income, or at least a recognised position in society. Thus, both conviction and 
29 Their effectiveness was demonstrated during the attack carried out by the Justice and 
Equality Movement on the capital in May 2008. It was the pdf and the national security 
forces (not the regular troops) that defended the city. Even now, the threat of an attack 
on Khartoum by the front representing the armed opposition leads the government to 
regularly deploy the pdf (now strengthened by rapid support forces created from the for-
mer Janjaweed militia) in all the districts and strategic locations in the city (Observations, 
2013–16). This was also true during the major events of June 2012 and September 2013. The 
pdf took the lead in combats in which the loyalty of the military could not be counted on.
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material interests dictated the actions of the different groups involved and it is 
still the case today with rsf (El-Battahani, 2016b).
This active participation of citizens in public affairs, which includes their 
charitable activities, reflects a gradual withdrawal of the state in favour of ac-
tive elements working on the revolutionary project. In the episode of the fam-
ine in Darfur in 1991 and 1992, for example, one cannot say that the Darfuri 
state was insensitive to the tragedies afflicting its people or that it held itself 
aloof from development issues. Rather, it was omnipresent and omnipotent, 
through the mechanisms of ‘discharge’. The citizens of this Islamist state were 
now deemed responsible and ordered to create charities and to finance the 
city, including its buildings in the public space (mosques, roads, special public 
institutions, etc.) and its services (urban roads, hospital services and security 
services). These practices, then, do not point to a ‘failure’ of the state in Sudan 
or its ‘weakness’, but reflect instead a form of government that, to some extent, 
strengthens the state. The high level of porosity between the state and society 
promoted by such a form of government is not without consequences for the 
forms taken by development in Sudan: the state coffers were empty in the first 
decade of Islamist Sudan, and so the major development projects of the 1990s 
were based on these redistributive practices, made possible by the direct in-
volvement of citizens who were now the architects of development, whether 
this was voluntary or obligatory. The manner in which individuals participated 
in this redistribution thus proved central to the way development was created, 
and clearly shaped it in all its aspects.
3 Charity and the Creation of Asymmetry and Differentiation
On the side of the ruled, how has this summons to generosity been heard and 
translated into practical terms? How can we evaluate the potential transforma-
tions furthered by this form of government?
One could certainly question the nature of the generosity of the ruled, as-
sessing the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the Islamist project on the basis of the stated 
intentions of the actors concerned. It could then be explained in one of two 
alternative ways: by looking at their convictions, whether religious or ethical, 
or at their material interests. This type of reasoning would suggest that the 
social philanthropy of the traders seems to be motivated more by their non-
material and ideational interests (religious faith or community culture) while 
their evergetic practices—that is to say, their donations in favour of public life, 
are based on material interests (gaining a higher social status). Yet the reality 
is much more complex if we step back from the intentions and justifications 
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claimed by the actors or attributed to them. We can gauge it only if we take 
into account the ‘constellation of interests’ in which their charitable practices 
are deployed.30
Take the example of the Darfuri traders from the great Libya souk; traders 
who flourished in the early years of Islamist domination. There was a signifi-
cant demand for their support from members of their community, both those 
who had remained in Darfur, and were terribly impoverished by the conflicts 
and droughts that had lasted decades, and those who had migrated to Khar-
toum and needed to be taken care of, especially on arrival. The welcome of-
fered by these wealthy individuals already settled in Khartoum was critical for 
Darfuris who were arriving in the capital even more impoverished than they 
might have been, as the roads between Khartoum and Darfur are long and ex-
pensive, making round trips between their villages and the capital few and far 
between.
The Libya souk, with its high level of development and preponderance of 
Darfuri traders from the Zaghawa communities, turned into an ‘airlock’ of in-
tegration for migrants from this community, who have consistently found jobs 
there.31 These migrants have certainly been a burden for the traders, but they 
have also been a boon to them, providing a cheap and accountable workforce, 
in a political context where discretion and trust were the fundamental con-
ditions for the exercise of activities that often took place outside the official 
channels of the economy.32 In addition, the migrants have managed to become 
representatives of the traders in distributing the market’s products. If we fo-
cus only on these motivations, however many and varied they may be, we will 
fail to take into account the actual way in which the generosity of traders is 
connected to the interests of power. It is precisely this connection—between 
an incentive to give and to act for the good of the community, the pursuit of 
personal goals, and the ability to respond to and to appropriate the injunctions 
of those in power—that generates the sometimes unconceptualised and con-
tradictory effects of development.
30 I have been inspired by Hibou (2011) here. She draws on Weber (1978), as interpreted by 
Dobry (2013).
31 Interviews (2004–11) with traders who arrived in Khartoum in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
32 We should bear in mind that the strategy adopted by Islamists to gain power has involved 
investing in the official economic sector through Islamic finance, but also more ‘infor-
mal’ means, using foreign exchange and money transfer services’ networks. Upon their 
assumption of power, they implemented a witch-hunt in this parallel economy so as to 
ensure that the gateway to power would not be reopened by others after them.
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In assessing these effects, let us look again at the traders in the Libya souk 
who flourished with the rise to power of the Islamists; this will help us to un-
derstand what their actual practices and their ‘trajectories of accumulation’ 
tell us about the experience of Islamist development.33 When it came to power 
in the early 1990s, the Islamic movement sought to undermine the foundations 
of the hegemonic alliance built by the major traditional parties since the Inde-
pendence of the country. In the commercial sector, this took concrete shape in 
the intimidation or arrest of members of these parties, but also in the system-
atic destruction of the established commercial bourgeoisie, even if this latter 
was not openly militant. In the eyes of the new regime, its dominant position 
in the economic field, and its sociological composition, led to suspicions that 
it was a potential source of support for traditional parties. The Islamists pri-
marily targeted the major traders linked to these traditional parties, traders 
who had re-established their business activities during the democratic inter-
lude that followed the fall of the Nimeiry regime. Thus, in the early years of 
the Islamist regime, most of them—if they were not arrested or did not lose 
everything due to the first economic measures taken against them—went into 
exile. In this sense, the Islamists had learned from the socialist experiment: a 
similar process had taken place at the very beginning of the Nimeiry regime 
under which all foreign companies had been forced to leave the country and 
the upper class faithful to the traditional parties had been generally repulsed 
(Niblock, 1987). Smaller Sudanese traders, who were not targeted by this witch-
hunt, found this an excellent opportunity to engage in new business. Therefore 
a rather similar process took place in the early 1990s when entrepreneurs close 
to the major traditional parties left the country. A report by the World Bank in 
2000 states that in 1994 a total of 282.6 in every 100,000 people had been im-
prisoned and that, for 1997 alone, 374,110 Sudanese had sought asylum abroad 
(World Development Indicators, quoted in Suleiman, 2007, 2).
The vacuum created by the expulsion of the traditional bourgeoisie did not 
benefit only those businessmen who were openly close to the regime. Other, 
less politicised entrepreneurs used their practical expertise to thrive in the 
space freed up by this process. In the capital, this greatly favoured the activi-
ties of the traders in the Libya souk, a popular market established in the late 
1970s by Zaghawa Darfuri migrants and connected during its early years to the 
33 We take this notion in the sense assigned by Geschiere and Konings (1993). It allows the 
authors to understand the historical variations in the possible modes of accumulation, 
which mean that, within the same country, there are various modes of accumulation 
shaping the relations between the State of Cameroon and the different regions of that 
country.
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border trade with Libya (Chevrillon-Guibert, 2016a). This market became, at 
the turn of the 1990s, the major market for the import of manufactured goods 
such as textiles, electrical appliances and hi-fi equipment. The sociological 
composition of the traders in the Libya souk, who came exclusively from the 
regions and not the major trading families in Khartoum, explains why they 
were not worried by the witch-hunt that followed the coming to power of the 
Islamists—especially as one of them, a fervent Zaghawa Islamist (this com-
munity is very active in the market), was chosen to oversee all the popular 
councils34 in Umbadda, where the Libya souk is located. His intervention has 
enabled the market to develop. Public investments were made in infrastruc-
ture (a road serving the market, the construction of permanent shops, sanita-
tion, etc.) and facilities were provided to the local popular councils to fund the 
traders’ activities thanks to their role in the distribution of products subsidised 
by the regime. These committees tended to favour certain market traders.
This policy has been a success: in just a few years, the Libya souk has taken 
over from the historic markets of the city centre. Nevertheless, one has to won-
der to what extent the traders in the Libya souk, who have found themselves 
favoured ‘by default’ by the new regime because of their non-politicisation, 
have actually been incorporated into these new hegemonic alliance built by 
the Islamists. It is crucial for our argumentation to answer this question, as it 
is the generosity of economic actors such as those of the Libya souk that has 
been sought by the Islamists to develop the country. So their actions constitute 
the core of the regime’s development model.
In Darfur, we have seen that the refusal on the part of the regional state to 
call on Western aid, and the decision to encourage local mutual aid mecha-
nisms, plus the extreme intensity of the relationship between the state and 
society, have led the precarious populations to rely on their family, clan and 
village networks—which all usually overlap. This configuration has also exac-
erbated the competition between groups for access to the local state and its 
scarce resources. The generosity of this new petty bourgeoisie has thus main-
ly taken the form of a community-based social philanthropy; other calls on 
their generosity from the regime, such as participating in public welfare, have 
been unwelcome, as they came on top of social obligations already considered 
34 Popular councils (in Arabic: al-Lijan al-Sha’biyah meaning people’s committee) are a cen-
tral institution in the Islamist regime. They are the ultimate level of the federal system set 
up by the Islamists on their coming to power. Established on the model of the socialist 
popular committees of the socialist regime, they mainly play an intermediary role be-
tween the population and higher institutional levels.
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 colossal.35 The scale of this community-based social philanthropy was further 
intensified by the withdrawal of the state from certain spheres, for example 
in terms of aid to cover the living costs of students, who had previously been 
receiving large government subsidies. Many traders began funding student 
accommodation for members of their families or people from their villages. 
But this entailed changes to community bonds, because, in regions like Dar-
fur, belonging to a family or a village largely overlaps with belonging to one’s 
ethnic group. While, under the previous regimes, students used to be mixed 
together upon their arrival at the state boarding schools of main towns or the 
capital, they now began to live almost exclusively with people of their own 
ethnic community. Thus, by discharging their obligations onto various actors 
in society whose businesses they had favoured, the Islamists in power unwit-
tingly fostered new forms of community even as their project proclaimed that 
ethnic groups would disappear because ‘Muslims don’t know ethnic minori-
ties’ (Lowrie, 1993).
The structure of trade in the Libya souk has also promoted the formation of 
these new communal bonds insofar as the souk is a wholesale market sending 
goods to the regions;36 and the strengthening of links between the popula-
tions that had remained in Darfur and those who had left fostered the com-
munity spirit of the commercial networks. In Khartoum, a long-time business 
partner can easily be asked to host the relative of a trader who has settled in 
Darfur. Of course, these processes vary with the origins of the traders, because, 
although non-Darfuri market traders also have distribution networks in Dar-
fur, they do not belong to the region, and thus the relationships forged in the 
pursuit of their economic activities do not follow community channels. Their 
professional relationships in Darfur are not based on the strong bonds of fam-
ily or ethnic group (Granovetter, 1985). The development of their businesses 
in Khartoum, and their success, are part of the construction of very different 
trajectories from those of Darfuri traders: their paths are more independent 
and more in tune with the new shape taken by the old commercial bourgeoisie 
during the Islamist regime.
The situation of the Libya souk traders from the central regions,37 like that 
of the migrants from these regions, is very different from those of the Dar-
furis. While, throughout the 1990s, there have been an increasing number of 
35 Interviews, Khartoum, 2008.
36 Before the war, more than two-thirds of the products sold in the souk went to the markets 
of Darfur.
37 We define the ‘central’ regions as those of Khartoum, the north, the east, and the regions 
between the two Niles.
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conflicts in Darfur that have resulted in many human tragedies, the centre of 
the country has grown more stable and thus more profitable economically. 
This improved economic situation in the central regions and their proximity 
to the capital has thus led to trajectories different from those of people from 
Darfur. For the natives of central regions, integration into the capital is easier 
and is certainly less dependent on the help of members of the community 
already settled in Khartoum. People from these central regions who decide to 
strike out commercially in Khartoum generally start as itinerant traders, not as 
employees of a major trader from their community.38 In addition, those with 
the initial capital necessary to rent a shop usually have no preference with re-
gard to the market in which they decide to settle; unlike Darfuri migrants who 
still systematically choose Omdurman, where members of their community 
live.39 Traders from the central regions who have settled in the capital were 
thus called upon to provide aid by members of their native villages far less 
often than were Darfuri traders, and this is still true today, as the war in Darfur 
continues. The regime’s appeal to their generosity thus finds a very different 
response among those from the central regions. They willingly finance the de-
velopment of the market where they work, or of the locality where they live in 
Khartoum, and they also invest personally by becoming members of various 
local councils. The links they maintain with their native region also assume a 
different shape from those of Darfuri traders insofar as the personal needs of 
inhabitants from Central regions are less than those of Darfur meaning that 
traders from Central regions would contribute to community development of 
their native area rather than personal fundings. Sometimes Darfuri traders also 
contribute to public welfare in Khartoum or in their region, but this usually oc-
curs at a later stage, once the needs of those around them have been satisfied, 
or if they have significant capital at their disposal. They are therefore less likely 
than traders from the central regions to practise evergetism.
So, in the end, even when what is made in the way of donations is simi-
lar, charitable practices vary from one trader to another, as do their effects. 
Some gifts help maintain community relations that urban life would have 
tended to weaken, and that the Islamists had announced they planned to fight 
against, while others are evidence of involvement in the development of the 
Islamist city.
38 Various interviews in markets in Omdurman, al-Arabi, the Shaabi souk in Omdurman and 
Khartoum in November 2008.
39 The city of Omdurman, which was that of the Mahdi, retains a central place in the imagi-
naire of all Darfuris. Interviews, Khartoum, 2004–12.
Chevrillon-Guibert�86
<UN>
The war in Darfur, which broke out in 2003, reinforces this phenomenon. 
From the summer of 2004 onwards, many fund-raising drives have taken place 
in the Libya souk to assist the affected populations in the traders’ native re-
gion.40 The perpetuation of the conflict, which has now lasted for over ten 
years, increases even further the dependence of local populations vis-à-vis 
their compatriots living in other parts of the country, or abroad. In Khartoum, 
for example, all Darfuris are trying to help, in one way or another, the members 
of their community who are still in Darfur, most of whom now live in refugee 
camps.41 The destruction of villages, and life in the camps, make it impossible 
to carry out development projects similar to those financed by traders from the 
central areas in their native own villages.
This differentiation is also taking shape within regions, and between social 
groups. In Darfur, while the prosperity of some members of the Zaghawa com-
munities has led to a high level of redistribution and encouraged the establish-
ment of significant links of patronage, this is not the case for communities that 
have few business activities, whose members can count only on themselves. 
Without intermediaries, they look much more directly to the state, especially 
as, with the arrival of oil revenues in the early years of the new millennium, 
the state now has substantial resources at its disposal. These differentiated ex-
pectations created by the mechanisms of ‘discharge’ favour a high degree of 
asymmetry between social groups and thus make it possible to shed light on 
the decision taken by various Darfuri groups at the beginning of the war to join 
the state militias or, conversely, to opt for neutrality.
Other government initiatives, such as the creation from scratch of a civil 
administration (an-nizam al-ahli) in Khartoum based on ethnicity, handling 
only people from the western and southern regions, have also favoured this 
differentiation. This new administration is similar to that of the traditional ad-
ministration of the regions (idarat al-ahlia), but its members are appointed by 
the regime. Like the popular committees, this new institution is responsible 
for encouraging participation in the rallies organised by the regime but also 
for national security, with individual contributions this time being sought via 
channels of ethnicity. If the government’s goal is to more effectively control 
the population of Khartoum, where new Darfuris and southerners are con-
stantly arriving, this policy mainly helps to fix individuals now living in Khar-
toum in their ethnicity, even as urban life and the gentrification of the local 
40 Observations, Libya souk, Khartoum, 2004 and 2006; interviews, 2008–14.
41 Interviews, Khartoum, France and Juba, 2006–13.
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 populations42 tend to weaken this same ethnicity. In Darfur, the recreation of 
a traditional administration has also tended to solidify identity by ethnicising 
the machinery of local political power in a devastated region. This hardening 
of identity boundaries has also been favoured by many administrative changes 
(Takana, 2008), which have tended to create mono-ethnic zones in previously 
ethnically mixed territories, gradually attaching the authority of traditional 
leaders to ethnicity and not, as previously, to region (Abdul-Jalil, 2015, 223–234).
In Khartoum, the regime also created, in the case of some communities, 
councils (shura) that brought together the elites of the same ethnic group, rely-
ing on their patronage to gain the favour of their community and, through their 
evergetism, making it possible for them to complete various projects without 
engaging the state financially. For Turabi, whose thinking largely shaped the 
policies implemented by the Islamists in the early years of the regime, the 
councils are the central institutions of this new Islamic state. They comprise 
the democratic Islamic alternative to Western democracy (Moussalli 1994, es-
pecially 57–63).43 Shura (consultation) is supposed to allow the unification 
(tawhid) of all individuals by ensuring the development of a permanent con-
sensus among the people in the framework of God’s law (sharia). But creating 
these councils on an ethnic basis that includes many major traders promotes 
patronage, as it gives these traders a position of power, with the regime ensur-
ing the personal allegiance of the members of the council by granting them 
favours.44 This process has given a communal flavour to the activities of this 
assembly, including the development projects it supervises.
Thus, the combination of different political factors and decisions (from the 
mechanisms of ‘discharge’ to the desire to control populations, from keeping 
Darfur in a state of underdevelopment to the increasing number of conflicts 
tearing the region apart), has resulted in the strengthening of ties between 
members of the same Darfuri ethnic, village and family communities in cer-
tain parts of the region, without this objective having been actively pursued 
by the authorities. This practice has, in concrete terms, brought closer together 
those trajectories that had tended to diverge in the 1980s, at the time of the 
42 Unlike those of Darfur, the populations of Khartoum saw their living standards rise in the 
1990s, and this favoured certain practices of consumption and a certain individualisation 
of success.
43 In this passage, Moussalli refers to Hassan Al-Turabi (1987a, 25–26; 1987b, 79–80).
44 On the way peripheral elites are used and their allegiance is negotiated in return for pay-
ment and/or positions of accumulation, see de Waal (2007). For examples of shura, see 
Abdul-Jalil (2014) and Chevrillon-Guibert (2013a, 552 ff.).
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great migrations and the early years of the Islamic regime. Meanwhile, in Khar-
toum, it has limited the development of more horizontal links between people 
from different regions of Sudan—people sharing identical living conditions 
in markets such as the Libya souk, and has recreated a shared sense of destiny 
between populations that have remained in Darfur and those that have settled 
in the rest of the country or abroad.
Faced with the challenges that accompany the exercise of power, with 
the concessions and negotiations necessarily involved in day-to-day life, the 
construction of a new hegemonic alliance and development related to chari-
table practices promoted by the Islamists take unconceptualised and differen-
tiated shapes, depending on the groups and regions involved. The difference is 
sharper between Darfuri traders and those from other regions because of the 
promotion by the Islamists of a particular entrepreneurial ethos—that of the 
modern, liberal entrepreneur who, while falling in with injunctions to generos-
ity, also favours asymmetric and unequal development.
4 The Entrepreneurial Ethos as a Factor of Exclusion
During the early years of the regime, to benefit from the opening made pos-
sible by the Islamists’ takeover and the ‘organised bankruptcy’ of the actors 
of the previous hegemonic alliance, new economic actors did not hesitate to 
move into the spheres of Islamist sociability. They did so particularly through 
the evergetic practices mentioned above, and, as we have seen in the Libya 
souk actors from the central regions have deployed more zeal in this task than 
their Darfuri colleagues have employed in supporting the populations of their 
bankrupt region. The gradual gentrification of these small-scale economic ac-
tors from the central regions reflects the gradual emergence of a new type of 
entrepreneur favoured by Islamists.
Before the petrodollars started coming in at the beginning of the new mil-
lennium, the launch of the ‘salvation programme’—consisting of a series of re-
forms under the leadership of the new Minister of Finance and the Economy, 
Abdelrahim Hamdi—one of the founders of the Faysal Islamic Bank and a for-
mer London banker—fundamentally changed the rules of economic activity. 
The plan, then designed for a period of ten years, from 1992 to 2002, provided 
for a series of economic liberalisation measures and the privatisation of many 
public corporations. Such a programme would not have been unpopular with 
the economists of the International Monetary Fund (imf), as the decision to 
reduce state spending and liberalise the economy was similar to the policies 
they themselves usually develop. The transition from a planned economy to 
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a market economy in the context of a significant restriction of state budgets 
entailed a rearrangement of the positions of all the economic actors. Just as the 
seizure of power had provided the Islamists with new resources, shifted their 
interests, and changed their alliances, the new policies being followed again 
contributed to transformation.
In the trade sector, these economic developments went hand in hand with 
the commercial boom in Dubai, which led to a major reorganisation of the 
supply chain, and also of business practices. Egyptian and Libyan imports, 
where traders excelled, lost their competitiveness, and ease of trade with 
Dubai meant that the ability to endure harsh working conditions, as well as 
the control of several commercial channels, were no longer the great assets, in 
terms of achieving business success, they had once been. However, other quali-
ties became more useful, such as having a permanent visa for Saudi Arabia 
or at least having contacts there; resources that individuals from the central 
regions of Sudan possess more frequently, since many of them have emigration 
experience of the Gulf.45 The profile of the successful entrepreneur was thus 
transformed.
The modernisation of professional practices carried out by the Islamists 
also led to significant changes. Legislation now required those seeking to carry 
out import activities to create trading companies, and several urban projects 
aimed to modernise the tangible practices of traders (shop fronts, the use of 
new technologies, etc.). These reforms were also designed to better control 
the sector, by combatting the opacity of commercial networks and the illegal 
practices that these networks’ fluidity seems to facilitate. But this modernisa-
tion and the mastering of new codes of conduct and business practices require 
a basic minimum of education. Now, historically, education is an important 
marker of the difference between the old trading families of the central mar-
kets in the capital and entrepreneurs in the Libya souk who come from the 
regions and lower social strata. Wealth created by wholesale and import has 
made it possible to finance the education of the children of traders in the cen-
tral markets. The fact that they settled earlier in the capital or in the major 
cities where educational institutions are more numerous than in Darfur (and 
also more numerous than in many central regions) also favoured this higher 
level of schooling. The new guidelines laid down by the Islamist regime there-
fore allowed the least politicised traders of the old bourgeoisie to go back into 
business, especially as many young entrepreneurs directly favoured by the Is-
lamists in the early years of their regime had proven to be poor businessmen. 




But in the late 1990s, the Islamist movement was ready to accept businessmen 
who were less ideologically correct, but more successful financially, especially 
since the development of oil revenues provided members of the regime and 
their families with direct resources much more significant than those previ-
ously gained from levies on business activities. The development of trade with 
the Gulf also promoted this comeback of people in line with the old bourgeoi-
sie because many young people who invested in the central souks had spent 
some years in the Gulf to build up their capital.
Within the Libya souk, non-Darfuri traders were (like traders from the El 
Arabi souk or Omdurman) better educated than their Darfuri counterparts, 
because although they were not from the capital they had generally been bet-
ter educated in their native regions.46 The new global configuration of trade 
has accentuated both this advantage and the success enjoyed by these entre-
preneurs. China’s rise in the 1990s as a source of cheap supplies required sig-
nificant capital, and it is the biggest non-Darfuri traders who had this capital. 
Similarly, it is they who control the machinery needed to trade with China—
such as the ability to travel in a new universe much stranger than the Arab 
Gulf countries, Egypt or Libya had been—and a knowledge of new technolo-
gies such as the internet. The Arabic language is no longer of any particular 
use, as English is becoming an indispensable asset and is conferred by a good 
education. The local context is also proving very unfavourable to Darfuri trad-
ers: the war in Darfur is increasing the constraints on their ability to distribute 
goods, and the regime’s distrust of them (it suspects them of supporting armed 
groups) is also a hindrance to their activities.
Thus, in the Libya souk, the profile of the entrepreneurs emerging in the late 
1990s is similar to that of the old bourgeoisie of the central souks: educated, 
coming from the central regions, and also more individualistic. With them, 
community ties have loosened and aspirations are becoming more individu-
alistic. Future plans primarily concern the individual and his nuclear family 
(wife, children)47 and are part of the national community. These traders, we 
have seen, regularly invest part of their profits in politics, or at least in the pub-
lic sphere. They are also active in those organisations that manage the  activities 
46 These observations were made by several Darfuri entrepreneurs who had been to uni-
versity and noted the discrepancy between the level of education of Darfuri traders in 
the souk and that of traders from other regions (Khartoum interviews, 2014). Darfur has 
always been the Sudanese region with the lowest level of education, though there are big 
differences between different regions and different populations (see in particular the re-
port ‘Literacy and Education’ prepared by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Khartoum).
47 Interviews, Khartoum, June 2015.
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of their market and, with age and reputation, they achieve a status that is local 
(on the scale of the municipality) and then national (across Khartoum State or 
possibly in their region of origin), in a rather traditional pattern of annexation 
and clientelism. The results of the 2010 general elections,48 which were very 
favourable to the regime, reflected the success of this scheme of development 
for the central regions, which saw the virtual disappearance of the major tradi-
tional parties in favour of the ruling party, the National Congress Party.
Meanwhile, the oil economy gave the regime new ways of achieving its 
modernising ambitions by allowing it to invest in modern, technological infra-
structure. It was, yet again, the central regions that benefited from many proj-
ects during the ‘oil decade’: between 2001 and 2009, several large dams were 
built in the north, as well as 2,800 kilometres of paved roads extending from 
the capital to the north, the east, and the region between the two Niles, as 
against barely 300 kilometres in Darfur, even though it comprised one-fifth of 
Sudan before the separation of the South. This new infrastructure favours the 
economic development of these regions—which are, as an added advantage, 
at peace—and thus fosters the rising standard of living of their populations. 
Logically, traders from these regions benefit from this economic upturn, while 
in Darfur the lack of infrastructure and, in particular, the war greatly hampers 
trade and led to the impoverishment of the part of the population that is now 
in refugee camps.
The processes of differentiation and, in particular, the new modes of com-
munity life for some and the increase in individualisation for others have pre-
vented the formation of a common destiny among the traders in the Libya 
souk. The policies implemented have reactivated the differentiated past lives 
led by everyone before they arrived in the market; similarly, the maintenance 
or—contrariwise—the abandonment by traders of the links that existed be-
tween them and the members of their communities who had remained in the 
regions appear to be factors of separation rather than reconciliation. It is also 
these historically constructed trajectories that shape the future plans of each 
group and their relationship to the world, in particular to the national commu-
nity. While traders from the central regions tend to lose their original regional 
identity, this identity remains clearly marked and manifestly organises the spe-
cific social lives of Darfuri traders.
48 In the elections of 2015, largely boycotted by the opposition, there was no real political 
issue at stake. This was not the case for the elections of 2010, which—admittedly—were 
largely rigged, but which constituted the first test of power after the South had broken 
away, but also after the internal split among the Islamists in the late 1990s during which 
the leader of the movement, Hassan al-Turabi, was ousted.
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However, some features that are emerging among many Darfuri traders, 
particularly the Zaghawa, are not completely different from those of the new 
Islamist bourgeois elite. The Darfuri traders too have upgraded their profes-
sional practices and appreciate the benefits of a certain material modernity, 
but they are clearly very different from the bourgeois elite in the importance 
they place, in their social relationships, on strong bonds, often those of family. 
The existence of such bonds is, for many, the sine qua non of their economic 
success, and their relationship to the land and the state and hence to develop-
ment. While the bourgeois elite strives for integration into and recognition in 
the national community, the framework of these much more mobile Darfuri 
traders is largely disconnected from the national territory. It is primarily their 
personal experiences and their native territory, as they imagine it through the 
collective memory of their ethnic community, which shape the contours of 
their own ‘mental map’ (Migdal, 2004, 9–10).
The new economic policies of the regime could further alter the situation: 
it is now the regime’s task to remedy the loss of the oil economy, concomitant 
with the breakaway of the South in 2011, by encouraging investment in agri-
culture and mining. It is true that these new economic development policies 
largely reflect the framework of the old ones by fostering the modernisation of 
these sectors (through the promotion of industrialisation in the mining sec-
tor and the rationalisation of the commercial livestock sector), which encour-
ages, yet again, a certain kind of entrepreneur. Similarly, the concentration of 
administrative procedures and business activities in Khartoum in the case of 
the mining sector (Chevrillon-Guibert 2016b), and in certain specific areas all 
located in the central regions in the case of the livestock sector,49 reinforces a 
very unequal development that favours the country’s capital and certain re-
gions. However, the fact that these two sectors are largely dependent on ac-
tivities in the regions, some of which are on the periphery, may alleviate this 
inequality, which has generated highly unbalanced regional development. The 
way in which activities, whether involving mineral extraction or agriculture, 
are conducted as well as the conflicts they generate locally promote the rede-
ployment of regional strategies for investors who themselves usually remain 
in Khartoum.50 The asymmetry that the new policies perpetuate thus leads, in 
parallel, to a redefinition of relations with the regions, although the profound-
ly unequal structure of the Islamist development experiment is not explicitly 
challenged by the new development projects envisaged by the government.
49 Interviews and observations carried out as part of research conducted jointly with Alice 
Frank, Paris 1/prodig, since 2014.
50 Interviews, Khartoum, June 2015 and April 2016.
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5 Conclusion
The development experiment set up by the Islamists during their first decades 
in power does not fall into a predetermined, explicit pattern that their political 
opponents might have challenged before it was implemented. The specificity 
of their experiment does not lie, either, in the kind of neo-liberal development 
that they are advancing, as this neo-liberal thinking now seems widely shared 
by the entire political class. The tools of development count much more than 
its results. Thus, when it comes to development, Islamists first encourage prac-
tices they consider ‘islamically’ good because they are the ones which are le-
gitimate in their eyes. The form taken by this development, and its concrete 
results once applied, which sometimes conflict with the political project of 
the Islamic movement, take second place; they count in the political agenda 
of power but are not part of the civilisation project in which the movement is 
engaged.
Charitable practices have naturally been part of the Islamic repertoire pro-
moted by the Islamist project and, logically, it is economic actors who have 
mainly been asked to contribute. As no specific development blueprint has 
been provided for them, these actors display their charity in different ways, 
according to the local and human contexts in which they live, but also in accor-
dance with the particular ways they conceive their roles in the circles to which 
they belong (family and ethnic, local and national communities). This partici-
pation in development, sometimes engaged in under duress, involves many 
changes, not only in the forms taken by development and in its scale (which is 
dependent on the donors’ capacities) but also in the spaces concerned (regions, 
capital, urban and rural zones) and in the groups that benefit. Such variations 
necessarily produce highly disparate and often conflicting results, since— 
ultimately—some recipients initially targeted by the government have been 
excluded and the regional inequalities inherited from previous experiences are 
maintained and even accentuated. The same process still subsists today, yet 
the legitimacy of development is not really discussed because it is based on 
practices deemed to be legitimate. The oil economy of the early twenty-first 
century however, has completely reshuffled the cards, profoundly reorganising 
the balance of power between the state and society: during this period, the re-
gime has not only claimed religious legitimacy, that of the Islamic revolution, 
but above all a modernising legitimacy, that of the developmental state (Jones 
et al., 2013). In the latter model, the rulers justify their position of power by 
their ability to transform the economy and by the material benefits that result. 
This transformation favours conflicts around development because it places 
the results, and not the tools, at the heart of the debates on its legitimacy. The 
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glaring inequalities feed deep frustration and a sense of injustice among those 
excluded from development, especially since this oil wealth could have helped 
to proactively remedy these inequalities. The regime, however, has preferred 
to consolidate its base among the populations of the capital and the central 
regions and to ignore the inequalities at the heart of the conflicts that are now 
tearing the country apart, as was the case for the South. Thus, far from pursu-
ing any original trajectory, this Islamic state seems rather to be pursuing a path 
of ‘asymmetric formation’,51 in line with its historical trajectory—a trajectory 
that has produced injustice and long been a source of conflict.
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A Neo-liberal Exception? The Defence Industry 
‘Turkification’ Project
Anouck Gabriela Côrte-réal Pinto
Abstract
Presented at once as an example, evidence, and even a condition of the economic, 
technological, political and security development of Turkey, the ‘Turkification’ of the 
defence industry lies at the heart of the government’s legitimacy. Following a socio-
historical approach, this chapter aims to understand how this major project, insepa-
rable from the ongoing formation of the state and of a national bourgeoisie organically 
related to it, was reconfigured in the neo-liberal era not despite globalisation but based 
on it, particularly through the commodification of Muslim solidarity and military pro-
tection. This project appears to constitute an instrument of ‘nationaliberal’ extraver-
sion that is part of an unstable quest for hegemony, riven by numerous conflicts.
1 Introduction
The coming to power in Turkey in 2002 of the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, akp), an offshoot of political Islam, is generally 
presented as the culmination of neo-liberal reforms in Turkey. These reforms, 
it is said, marked the end of the military-nationalist hegemony, as evidenced 
both by the large number of them that furthered the demilitarisation of the 
political scene and by the great mass trials of Turkish officers (the Ergenekon 
and Balyoz or ‘Sledgehammer’ cases). How, then, are we to interpret the reap-
propriation by this same party of the major project of the ‘Turkification’ of the 
defence industry, symbol of an enlightened pro-activism and a highly illiberal 
interventionism? The incantatory slogan ‘a national tank, a national satellite 
and a national airline’ (‘Milli tank, milli uydu, milli uçak’), delivered during the 
2011 elections and repeated and reinforced by the ‘2023 Political Vision of the 
akp’ (AK Parti 2023 Siyasi vizyonu), illustrates the particular commitment of 
the ‘moderate Islamic’ party to this major military project as a legitimising 
tool and a form of moral armament of the population (Sabah, 2011; akp, 2012). 
This discursive focus is also reflected in an exceptional increase in military 
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 expenditure since 2006, partly due to the soaring number of major national de-
fence projects initiated by the akp: the ‘hundred percent Turkish’ Anka drone, 
the ‘national’ Altay tank, the ‘local’ Atak helicopter, the Göktürk satellite, and 
the milgem warship, etc. (Yentürk, 2014). Finally, it coincides with an unprec-
edented internationalisation of the armament sector, marked by a diversifica-
tion of partners and external suppliers and by an exceptional rise in exports.
Following a socio-historical, ‘non-dependentist approach to dependence’ 
as proposed by Jean-François Bayart (Bayart, 2006, vi), an approach itself in-
spired by Gramsci, this chapter aims to understand how this major project of 
 Turkification—inseparable from the ongoing formation of the Turkish state 
and a national bourgeoisie organically linked to it—has continued to develop 
in the neo-liberal era, not in spite of globalisation but based on it. In particular, 
we will focus on the interrelated levels of the project’s sectoral, national, and 
international dimensions in order to understand how this development project 
is a fiction with multiple power effects; how it articulates, feeds into and results 
from a market logic and a logic of national affirmation. By highlighting the 
arts of ‘making do’ with globalisation (Certeau, 1990), this text calls into ques-
tion both the proactive vision of the political and the vision of a self-regulating 
market; two ahistorical theories that are largely dominant in discourses regard-
ing development in Turkey.1 With few exceptions, the concept of development 
is presented in Turkish scholarly literature either as a social engineering proj-
ect (a Kemalist project or the Islamic project promoted by Necmettin Erbakan) 
or as an economic achievement; reflecting, respectively, a desire to break free 
from the past and a desire to enter into capitalist modernity  (Unsaldi, 2011). 
By focusing on the historicity of this concept in Turkey through an analysis of 
the major project of the Turkification of the defence industry, we can illustrate 
and understand its hegemonic nature, its multiple meanings, and its concrete 
effects of domination.
2 An Exception to the Neo-liberal Rule? The Genesis of an 
‘Anachronistic’ Development Project for National Emancipation
The defence industry is the alpha and omega of the project for the Turkifica-
tion of the Turkish economy: the absence of an indigenous defence industry 
(more broadly of one employing advanced technology) is seen, first, as one 
of the main causes behind the Ottoman defeat against the Russian Empire in 
1 Among the most fervent critics of the paradigm of development in Turkey are Fikret Baskaya 
(2005), Caglar Keyder (1993; 1987) and Ayşe Buğra (this volume).
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the XVIIIth century and, second, as one of the conditions necessary for ‘na-
tional recovery’ (Inalcik, 1992; Lafi, this volume). The multiple meanings of the 
Turkish term kalkınma—which conveys both ‘development’ and ‘healing’ (of 
an injured national psyche)—reflects this siege mentality of development in 
Turkey, by which the concept is seen not just as a way of improving conditions 
but in itself a condition of national survival. As a proof and a gauge of national 
emancipation and of an ambivalent relationship with Europe, linked to a trau-
matic past embodied in what is referred to as ‘Sèvres syndrome’2 (Taner, 2005; 
Bayart, 2011; Schmidt, 2014) the project for the Turkification of the defence in-
dustry is both an affirmation and, simultaneously, a negation of imperial de-
feat. This ambivalence is characteristic of the Turkish collective melancholy 
vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire (Celik, 2011). Development is therefore under-
stood in terms of a double comparative process: a synchronic comparison with 
Turkey’s Western partners and a diachronic comparison with its imperial past. 
The symbolic effectiveness of the idea of ‘technological and civilising progress’, 
ubiquitous in the major defence projects promoted by the akp, is all the stron-
ger in that it echoes national historiography (Copeaux, 1997) and the work of 
leading Turkish and foreign political scientists who present the Turkish army 
as a pioneering institution in the modernisation of the state and society, dia-
metrically opposed to ‘reactionary’ Islamic forces (Ward and Rustow, 1965; 
Heper and Evin, 1988). This association between the army and modernisation 
was widespread both in the political thinking of the 1930s and among Third 
World thinkers from the 1950s through the 1970s. It is indicative of a ‘desire 
for the state expressed through a generalised demand for modernity’ (Hibou, 
2011, 115). In an interpretation inspired by the ‘educational protectionism’ of 
Friedrich List, the formation of a national industry—especially the defence 
industry—is promoted as a condition of development and national secu-
rity, deemed to safeguard the country from ‘the fluctuations of war, foreign 
restrictions and commercial crises’ (List, 1998, 275). Located halfway between 
‘high-tech Colbertism’ (Cohen, 1992) and ‘military Keynesianism’ (Dunne, 2011; 
Krugman, 2011), this policy of promoting major industrial defence projects is 
seen as justified, on the economic level, by the promise of spillover effects in 
terms of jobs, improvements to the balance of trade, and technology transfer 
within both the defence sector and the civilian sector.
2 In Turkey, this expression is used to refer to the obsession with the idea of Turkey becoming 
encircled and the view that the state must survive: the reference is to the abortive 1920 treaty 
of the same name and to the draconian terms imposed on the Ottoman Empire by the victors 
of the First World War.
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Following the passing by Parliament of Law No. 3238 in 1985, which accord-
ing to its first article aims to ‘make progress in the defence industry and mod-
ernise the Turkish armed forces’,3 the projected Turkification of the defence 
industry benefited from completely new sources of funding. The law ensured 
the creation of an annual fund of usd one billion and a new Secretariat of State, 
both dedicated to the law’s stated goal. This budgetary and administrative in-
novation was all the more paradoxical in that it contradicted the dominant 
security, political and economic paradigms of the day, at both the national 
and the international level. How indeed should we interpret the creation of 
this major and extremely expensive state project in the context of Atlanti-
cist collective defence, of a return to civilian rule after three years of military 
rule, and of neo-liberal reforms advocating both the withdrawal of the state 
from economic activity and budgetary restrictions? While in 1980 the Turkish 
economy, at the behest of the military junta, moved from a closed model of 
industrialisation through import substitution to a model open to international 
competition, this plan to modernise the Turkish army and defence industry 
thus seems to be an exception to the neo-liberal rule, challenging both struc-
tural adjustments and a belief in the superiority of market rules promoted by 
international financial institutions. Therefore, this major project offers a par-
ticularly interesting way of gaining an understanding of the significance of the 
coexistence of dirigiste interventions and neo-liberal policies advocating the 
withdrawal of the state from the economy (Buğra, this volume).
2.1 Defending Turkish Society from Its Allies? A Paradoxical 
Developmentalist Project
Often reduced to a simple ‘exit guarantee’ (Cook, 2007)—that is to say, a nego-
tiated condition of the political withdrawal of the military in 1983 in exchange 
for certain material gains—the aforementioned double innovation nonethe-
less also marked a certain ‘civilianisation’.4 In the Turkish context, this term re-
flects the inclusion of the civilian Prime Minister (at that time Turgut Özal) in 
the decision-making processes surrounding arms purchases and the creation 
of a group of civilian experts within the new Secretariat of State dedicated to 
this major project. While reinforcing state intervention, this new law also con-
tributed to the at least partial ‘privatisation’ of the related budget through the 
3 Author’s translation. In Turkish, the text reads, ‘bu Kanunun amacı, modern savunma 
sanayiinin geliştirilmesi ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin modernizasyonunun sağlanmasıdır’; Law 
no. 3238, art. 1 (J.O. 7/11/85).
4 I use this term to describe the process of demilitarisation or at least the strengthening of 
civilian power vis-à-vis that of the army.
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use of dedicated extra-budgetary funds,5 to the benefit of the executive. These 
additional sources of finance ensure that parliamentary controls can be evad-
ed de jure and contribute, in theory, to the development of a private defence 
sector in collaboration with, or complementary to, the public sector. Created 
in 1986, the private ‘local’ company fnss (FMC-Nurol Savunma Sanayii A.Ş.), 
a major actor in this sector during the first decade of the new millennium, was 
thus the result of a partnership between the private Turkish holding company 
Nurol and the us company fmc (later bought by the British company bae 
Systems). The Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk 
Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı, tskgv), a private foundation that in 2013 
owned many companies in the defence sector, also emerged as a major player 
during this period.6 In other words, in the 1980s, this area was—at least in the 
national imaginary—a bridge between two seemingly contradictory visions of 
the role of the state, the Turkish army, and armaments in the national econo-
my: the developmentalist vision and the neo-liberal one.
2.1.1 A Traumatic Historical Trajectory
In spite of all this, it is a difficult exercise to precisely date the beginning of the 
project for the Turkification of the defence industry (and more widely of the 
economy). It began well before the 1985 law since it even preceded the creation 
of the Turkish state in 1923 and has continued ever since—except during the 
Menderes years. The transition from Empire to nation state was echoed by an 
interpretation that stressed security issues in the country’s external financial 
and technological dependence, resulting in a projected Turkification of the 
civil and military economy initiated in the era of the Young Turks. This was il-
lustrated by genocide, forced evictions, expropriations and the violent eradica-
tion of a cosmopolitan bourgeoisie, mostly from the ethno-religious minorities 
of the Empire, in favour of a nascent bourgeoisie described by Baskin Oran as 
‘lahasümüt’, an acronym in Turkish for ‘secular, Hanafi, Sunni, Muslim and eth-
nically Turk’: this bourgeoisie was considered more loyal to the Turkish state. 
This policy for the Turkification of the economy would be resumed in many 
different ways during the Republican period of the interwar years, particularly 
in the form of a wealth tax in 1942 (Bali, 2010; Buğra, 1994, 114–116), which al-
lowed real property transfers at the expense of Turkish religious minorities, 
5 Extra-budgetary resources designate state financial resources that are discretionary, flexible 
and partly private. They are neither included in the budget, nor subject to the normal budget-
ary procedures and controls.
6 The tskgv came about due to the merger of three foundations dedicated, respectively, to 
each of the armed forces (land, sea, and air) and set up during the Cyprus crisis.
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particularly Jews, or even anti-Greek pogroms such as the one that took place 
in Istanbul in 1955 (Kuyucu, 2005; Bali, 2008). Turkey was co-opted by the West-
ern bloc as part of its containment policy and its defence against the Soviet 
threat, illustrated by the country’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (nato) in 1952: this ironically marked the suspension and subsequent 
re-legitimisation of this project of national emancipation vis-à-vis Turkey’s 
Western allies. For while us military aid to Turkey—estimated to have been 
nearly usd 400 million between 1947 and 1951—played its part in enhancing 
the role of the Turkish army on the international and national stage, it also 
reduced the legitimacy and quality of the national arms industry (Truman, 
1947; Orun, 1997; Kayaoglu, 2009; ssm, 2010). So much so that a great deal of 
the funding, equipping and training of the Turkish army under the Menderes 
Administration was ‘outsourced’: it was no longer a matter of national prior-
ity or even one of the prerogatives of the Turkish state, but fell under nato’s 
collective responsibility (Ahmad, 1993, 124). This co-optation also involved the 
formation of a ‘deep state’ (derin devlet),7 whose nerve centre was located in 
a special section of the Turkish army in direct contact with Western intelli-
gence agencies, as part of Operation Gladio (Söyler, 2015, 101–102; Jenkins, 2009; 
Gingeras, 2015, 261–270). In other words, the extraversion policy of the Mend-
eres Administration drastically reduced room for manoeuvre in the matter of 
armaments while contributing to the commodification of the Turkish army, 
to the extent that it even became one of the country’s main ‘export products’ 
(ihraç), to cite one of the controversial expressions of George Soros (quoted in 
Evrensel, 2002). The military coup of 1960 and a return to protectionist prac-
tices inspired by Listian theory and Keynesian developmentalist policies did 
not change this situation. Only a shift in international opinion against Turkey 
in the 1960s and the growing self-assertion of a national bourgeoisie attested 
7 ‘The notion of the deep state may provide an appropriate starting point for investigations 
of how both foreign and domestic industrial magnates, bankers, intellectuals, and social ac-
tivists engage and negotiate with bureaucratic and military agents seeking to overtly and 
covertly suppress dissent and promote the interests of governing regimes’ (Gingeras, 2015, 
267). According to Élise Massicard, in Turkey the phrase derin devlet refers to ‘a vast web of 
corruption linking the crime industry, the highest levels of government, and death squads 
from the radical right’ (Massicard, 2008, 63). This term is reminiscent of the concepts de-
veloped by Peter Dale Scott (1996), who uses the term ‘deep politics’ or even ‘parapolitics’ 
to refer to the illegal us activities conducted in collaboration with international organised 
crime. For if the term ‘deep state’ comes from Turkey, the collusive practices that result from 
the criminalisation, privatisation, and internationalisation of the state are found in many 
other countries. The concept was taken up and used during the Arab Spring to describe the 
way security apparatuses resisted change (Woertz, 2014; Momani, 2013).
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by the creation in 1971 of the first private employers’ organisation, the Turk-
ish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, 
tüsiad), once again made the necessity and legitimacy of the Turkification 
of the arms industry a priority (Buğra, 1994; Billion, 2000). The withdrawal of 
us missiles from Turkish territory in 1963 and the international embargoes on 
military sales imposed on Turkey during the Cyprus crisis revealed the adverse 
effects of excessive external dependence while renewing a national siege men-
tality vis-à-vis the country’s Western partners (Billion, 2000; Şahin, 2002). This 
particular context contributed to the development of the private defence con-
tractor Otokar, created in 1963 and owned by the Koç holding company, and the 
birth of several foundations that appealed for public donations to support na-
tional armament. These foundations made the creation of several companies 
possible, including Aselsan, currently the country’s leading defence provider.8 
However, it was not until the mid-1980s, once the emergency had passed and 
the economy had stabilised, that a significant public policy was implemented 
to carry out this major project of national development. So we are faced with a 
paradoxical situation: the 1960s and 1970s, usually interpreted as developmen-
talist, saw the privatisation of the defence industry in Turkey, while the period 
1980–2010, usually seen as a neo-liberal period open to international trade and 
the rules of the market, was the scene of massive government intervention to 
foster the Turkification of this industry. This major project, the offshoot of the 
traumatic trajectory we have described, promoted the idea of national protec-
tion, an idea that was all the more desirable in that it coincided with a ques-
tioning of the social protection system that held sway under the yoke of the 
neo-liberal reforms adopted by the military junta.
2.1.2 From Collective Defence to Turkish Self-defence: A Challenge to 
the Atlanticist and European Alliance?
This major project, aimed at ensuring Turkey’s strategic and industrial inde-
pendence, also seems to reveal certain conflicts within the Western bloc, even 
putting certain historical caesura into perspective.
The desire to move from being a nation guaranteed by nato (through the 
concept of ‘collective defence’ provided for in Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty) to being a nation also capable of self-defence recalls the prior expe-
rience of France. For this was how technological mastery of nuclear power 
was viewed in the 1960s by the French government and a large part of the 
population: not as a defence against the Soviet threat, but as a tool to free 
themselves from American domination following the humiliation of Suez 
8 The first two letters in the name Aselsan refer to the Turkish word asker, meaning soldier.
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(Vaïsse, 1992; Regnault, 2003). In Turkey as in France, the project of military 
self- empowerment—a technological, economic and industrial project—did 
not challenge the Atlanticist alliance. Instead, it allows the heterogeneous in-
terests of the strategic partners to be fuelled. In the us, the Reagan Adminis-
tration supported this Turkish project for commercial reasons: it would ensure 
the creation of a new market for us defence companies, as illustrated by two 
Turkish–American joint ventures—namely, fnss (described above) and the 
Turkish Aerospace Industries (tai), which is a partnership between Lockheed, 
General Electric and a Turkish company. tai was created to ensure the assem-
bly of F-16 American planes ordered by Turkey. The us government also had 
financial and strategic reasons for welcoming Turkey’s endeavour to ‘empower’ 
itself. This was the time of the lavish Strategic Defense Initiative—nicknamed 
‘Star Wars’—that aimed to establish a missile defence system to protect the 
United States from attack by ballistic strategic nuclear weapons. The Turkish 
project and Turkish–American industrial alliances meant the financial burden 
on the us could be relieved while ensuring protection for America’s Mediter-
ranean flank. From the European standpoint, the goal of emancipating and 
modernising the Turkish defence industry was all the more readily accepted as 
European Member States had, with the exception of Germany, previously not 
been frequent partners in the Turkish arms market. Some member states also 
shared one of Turkey’s aims: independence from us hegemony. Thus, French 
officials promoted, in the context of a ‘variable geometry’ European intergov-
ernmental initiative known as ‘Eureka’, a ‘Europe of technology’ involving the 
development of a common European industrial research endeavour, both ci-
vilian and military, as an alternative to the ‘Strategic Defence Initiative’ estab-
lished by the United States (Karsenty, 2006; L’Express, 1985).
The launch, in 1985, of this major project for the Turkification of the de-
fence industry thus contributed to a rapprochement between Turkey and the 
European Economic Community (eec). This rapprochement was ambiguous: 
it certainly allowed the proliferation of Turkish–European technological, in-
dustrial and military dependences in the form of various Turkish participa-
tions in European military-industrial projects (Airbus A400M) and contracts 
for French, English and Italian firms; but at the same time this major Turkish 
industrial project contributed to a real arms race with Greece, beginning at 
the time of the Cyprus crisis. This was coupled with a diplomatic competi-
tion between Turkey and Greece for the eec, of which the latter had become 
a member in 1981 (Sezgin, 2003; Andreous and Zombanakis, 2006). Alongside 
this equivocal integration of Turkey in European projects, the development 
of the Turkish national defence industry also aimed at opening Turkey up in 
economic and cultural terms to (Muslim) ‘brother countries’. Supported by the 
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United States as part of the ‘green belt’,9 this policy was intended, on the inter-
national level, to better address the Soviet threat and the threat of the Iranian 
Islamic revolution spreading across the region. Domestically, it resulted in the 
establishment of a ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ (Eligür, 2010; Copeaux, 1997), 
promoted as a mechanism for the depoliticisation of Turkish society. This pro-
motion, by the military junta, of Islam as an instrument of social pacification 
was all the more important as the sudden opening of the Turkish economy to 
global competition in the early 1980s might well have led to a ‘countermove-
ment’ (Polanyi, 1957), thus strengthening the Soviet Bloc. To a certain extent 
we find the same process at work in Egypt during the Sadat era (Vannetzel, 
this volume). In this regional context favourable to a cooptation of islam by 
military forces, the commercial diplomacy promoted by Prime Minister Özal 
and President Evren, himself a retired General, elected since 1984 Director of 
the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the 
Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, was meant to ensure the existence 
of a security rent for Turkey vis-à-vis the Gulf countries, so as to soften—in the 
short term—the budgetary impact of this project. In practice, however, despite 
numerous promises, only Libya imported arms from Turkey in the 1980s.10
2.2 From the End of the Cold War to the ‘War on Terror’:  
The Twofold Turkification of Both the Threat and the Defence 
Industry (1990–2001)
Neither the disappearance of the Soviet threat nor the structural adjustments 
put in place to deal with major economic crises (1994 and 2001) brought the 
project to an end. Originally scheduled to run for a period of ten years, the 
Turkification of the defence industry was not only extended by parliament for 
a period of thirty years, the annual one billion dollar revenue was increased 
fivefold. This increase, in apparent discord with the international context of 
democratisation and the reduction of military spending (what is usually called 
the ‘peace dividend’11), was the result of three main interrelated factors: the 
drying up of the international security rent, including us military aid; the 
increasing militarisation of the Turkish political and economic scene, which 
9 This was the term used by Zbigniew Brzeziński, adviser to President Carter in the late 
1970s.
10 See sipri (2014, annex) (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), http://www 
.sipri.org/.
11 This expression is ascribed to George Bush and Margaret Thatcher, who used it in the 
early 1990s to refer to the advantages of lowering defence spending as a result of the dis-
appearance of the Soviet threat.
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was accompanied by the development of the deep state; and the increasing 
number of criticisms and constraints to which Turkey was subjected by its 
European and American partners in matters of procurement and technology 
transfer—criticisms and constraints motivated by Turkey’s multiple violations 
of human rights and its use of the armed forces against the Turkish civilian 
population of Kurdish origin.
2.2.1 The Turkification of the Threat and of the Defence Industry:  
The ‘Low-Intensity’ War on the pkk
Despite their desire to achieve, by force of arms, the independence of those 
parts of Turkey where Kurds were in the majority, the guerrillas of the Kurdis-
tan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, pkk) were viewed throughout 
the 1980s only as a minor threat by Turkish generals (Markus, 2007).12 However, 
they gradually became one of the main political, economic and symbolic re-
sources of the Turkish military. Described as ‘terrorists’ and ‘separatists’, they 
were thus officially seen as replacing the Soviets as the main threat following 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The premature death of President Özal 
in 1993, himself of Kurdish origin and a supporter of a political solution to the 
Kurdish issue, unleashed an extreme militarisation of the political sphere that 
benefited the deep state: this was reflected particularly in an upsurge both in 
political killings and the disappearance of opponents of the government. In 
1994 alone, the ‘low-intensity war’ on the pkk resulted in over 3,700 deaths and 
1,400 villages being evacuated, not counting the numerous extrajudicial execu-
tions that took place (Yerasimos, 1994). This period, which followed the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, also helped to boost the black market trade in weapons in the 
region—a trade based on secret criminal agreements between complementary 
enemies (Massicard, 2008). Thus, in the middle of the Gulf War, 100,000 weap-
ons manufactured by the Turkish public company Mechanical and Chemical 
Industry Corporation (Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu, mkek)—weapons 
that had mysteriously vanished—reappeared in the hands of Kurdish fighters 
from Irak (Sabah, 2010a). The extreme violence and discrimination suffered by 
the Kurds at that time did not prevent certain forms of state co-optation. In-
deed, such co-optation was rendered essential for the maintenance of Turkish 
military dominance in the region. This explains, in particular, the re- institution 
of village guards and the signing of important military contracts benefiting 
Aziz Yildirim. He was a Turkish businessman of Kurdish origin active in many 
fields, was head of the company Maktas, official suppliers to nato since 1973 
12 The pkk, a Marxist–Leninist party formed in 1978 to oppose the Turkish central govern-
ment, officially launched its struggle in August 1984 with a simultaneous attack on several 
military facilities, and claimed it was acting in the name of Kurdish independence.
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and a partner of the company Siemens on several major projects for the Turki-
fication of the defence industry (Radikal, 2011).13
This rise in violence in the east and the increasing number of obstacles 
placed in the way of arms imports from Europe14 explain the fivefold increase, 
in 1995, of subsidies to the programme for the Turkification of the defence 
industry, despite the lack of success enjoyed by what was then a ten-year 
project, and also despite the 1994 slump in the country and austerity measures 
demanded by the International Monetary Fund (imf). In accordance with a 
circular logic, the very absence of a result can always be explained by the fact 
that it required more time and legitimises the endless renewal of a project 
(Rancière, 2004, 54–59). The urgency of the need for weapons to fight the pkk 
simultaneously fuelled a net increase in Turkey’s external dependency, help-
ing to keep the country—until early in the new millennium—among the top 
four importers of weapons in the world (Hen-Tov, 2004). Qualitatively, this pe-
riod marked a diversification of Turkey’s suppliers, with the establishment of 
a  Turkish–Israeli agreement on military cooperation in 1996. At the time, this 
agreement entailed multiple benefits and synergies: respect for us alliances 
in the region, relative independence from European and American suppliers, 
common experience of armed struggle against an ‘enemy within’, the mu-
tual strengthening of projects to ensure that each country ran its own arms 
industry, and finally the hope of slowing the rise of political Islam in  Turkey 
(Nachmani, 2003).
2.2.2 The ‘Reactionary’ Threat and the Postmodern Coup d’État in 1997: 
The End of Military-Islamic Co-optation
In the 1995 parliamentary elections, the historic victory of the Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi), an offshoot of the Islamic movement known as National 
 Vision (Milli Görüş)—both led by Necmettin Erbakan, marked the end of 
13 Aziz Yildirim has held a large number of positions. Since 1998, he has also been chair-
man of the famous football club Fenerbahçe, a club that is highly popular among Turkish 
military officers. In 2013, he also became the owner of Dearsan, an important shipbuilding 
company in the military sector that was in direct competition with Koç regarding the ma-
jor military project of building milgem warship (from the Turkish Milli Gemi, National 
Ship).
14 The 1999 case of the German Leopard tanks is a good example of the political condition-
alities imposed by European governments with regard to weapons supplied to the Turkish 
army. The German Red–Green coalition led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the Social 
Democratic Party (spd) and Vice Chancellor Joschka Fischer of the Greens agreed to the 
delivery of German tanks to Turkey on the sole condition that they were not used for 




the  military-Islamic co-optation initiated in 1980 (Eligür, 2010; Sezgin, 2003). 
This reversal of alliances from Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was in some ways 
the paradoxical consequence of the success of the co-optation strategy and of 
the balance of power that favoured the Islamic party. A succession of corrup-
tion scandals (fostered by unbridled liberalisation in the absence of regulatory 
mechanisms), the negative social effects of the Customs Union with Europe 
and, finally, the 1996 Susurluk scandal—which revealed to the public, for the 
first time, the interdependence of elements of the security apparatus, the ma-
fia and various co-opted Kurdish leaders—were all an implicit reinforcement 
of the legitimacy of Refah Partisi, which advocated the observance of Islamic 
morality (Massicard, 2008; Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). The Welfare Party was 
a nationalist, positivist, Islamic, developmentalist and anti-capitalist project 
characterised in particular by a desire for reconciliation with the Kurdish pop-
ulation and hostility to the European project and to Turkey’s membership of 
nato (Yankaya, 2014). The party was hence likely to challenge the hegemony 
previously exercised by senior civil servants, including those in the military, a 
hegemony supported by part of the national bourgeoisie. This competition be-
tween hegemonic projects also had an entrepreneurial dimension: the rise of 
the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (Müstakil Sanay-
ici ve İşadamları Derneği, müsiad), an employers’ organisation very close to 
the Welfare Party, was starting to challenge tüsiad’s monopoly of access to 
state-owned tangible and intangible resources, bringing together a national 
bourgeoisie that was urban, secular, westernised and organically linked to the 
state (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2012; Yankaya, 2012). The Turkish defence sector was 
one of the main arenas of this political struggle: as a key element in the statist 
and developmentalist policy promoted by Erbakan (an engineer by training), 
it would in theory make an international, Islamic strategic alliance possible. 
Due to its specificity in terms of high level of opacity and large contracts, the 
defence sector in Turkey has always been a field of primitive accumulation. But 
being part of the defence sector is also an important source of prestige for both 
military and industrials as it is associated with advanced technology and na-
tionalism. Those sectoral specificities explain the interest of the rising Islamic 
economic elite grouped within müsiad to invest and compete in this new eco-
nomic field (Çerçeve Dergisi, 1997). This is probably why, in September 1996, 
Deputy Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, the head of the True Path Party (Doğru Yol 
Partisi, dyp), a centre-right party that had tried to remove the Welfare Party 
from power, signed a defence contract worth nearly usd 5.5 billion in the ab-
sence of Prime Minister Erbakan (Hürriyet Daily News, 1996). The latter had 
embarked on a series of controversial visits to ‘brother countries’, including 
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Iran and Libya, with the aim of setting up his own alternative project. Çiller’s 
action meant that the redefinition of the project for the Turkification of the de-
fence industry envisaged by the Prime Minister could be limited, as it was like-
ly to endanger the material and strategic interests of the Turkish army, tüsiad 
and traditional Western partners. This competition between two competing 
hegemonic projects ultimately resulted in political Islam being re-evaluated 
as a security risk by the army. Despite the absence of direct violence, the ‘reac-
tionary’ (irtica) threat, which echoed a traumatic historical memory, was now 
considered by the army to be a greater priority than the ‘separatist’ threat from 
the Kurds (Bozarslan, 2000). The memorandum of 28 February 1997, known 
as the ‘postmodern coup’, came to mark a further step in this indirect struggle 
with the Welfare Party and its supporters in civil society. It led, a few months 
later, to the resignation of the government led by Erbakan.
Many holding companies suspected of having financed the party and ben-
efited from public contracts were later prosecuted for tax fraud and finan-
cial irregularities. Their managers were subsequently regularly ostracised at 
state visits and international fairs, including defence industry events in 1999 
(Yankaya, 2012). The diversity of the roles played by the Turkish army on the 
national stage in the 1990s was nevertheless not just a matter of its own na-
tional historical trajectory; it reflected to some extent the reconfiguration of 
nato’s mission, as evidenced by the development in 1991 of a ‘broader concept 
of security’ including ‘political, economic, social and environmental dimen-
sions, in addition to the indispensable defence dimension’ (nato 1991, art. 25). 
The end of the co-optation of political Islam by the armed forces and the res-
toration of a pro-Western secular military hegemony at the expense of a demo-
cratically elected Islamic party could not fail to recall the cases of Algeria and 
Egypt in the 1990s (Vannetzel, this volume). This attempt to restore military he-
gemony was, however, short-lived in Turkey. The arrest and extradition of pkk 
leader Öcalan, the historic slump in 2000–01, the opening of negotiations with 
the eu and the establishment of the akp, an offshoot of pro-European and 
pro-capitalist political Islam, represented a challenge to military hegemony 
but did not end the major project for the Turkification of the defence industry 
(Tuğal, 2009). Rather, a merger occurred of competing Islamic and capitalist 
hegemonic projects and this changed the very terms of the Turkification of the 
industry (Tuğal, 2009; Haenni, 2005). While the 1990s were characterised by a 
dual Turkification process—the Turkification of the threat and the Turkifica-
tion of the industry—the following decade saw the beginning of a new period 
of internationalisation of the Turkish security rent. Successive akp govern-
ments have benefited politically, strategically and financially from the ‘war on 
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terror’ (Islamic terror, that is) launched by President Bush following the attacks 
of 11 September 2001, while legitimising it only to a certain degree.15
3 A Project Central to akp’s ‘Nationaliberal’ Hegemony
The establishment, early in the new millennium, of major structural and ad-
ministrative reforms that followed the principles of ‘new public management’ 
promoted by the imf, together with so-called democratisation reforms caught 
in the double stranglehold of European candidacy and the akp, did not pre-
vent the extension and intensification of the project for the Turkification of the 
defence industry. To some extent, the project weathered the historic financial 
crisis in Turkey in 2001 and even survived the significant budget restrictions 
and the widespread mistrust of the traditional economic and political elites 
brought about by that crisis. Similarly, the coming to power of the akp in 2002, 
an event inseparable from the rise of a new Islamic bourgeoisie described by 
its opponents as ‘green capital’ (yesil sermaye), did not undermine the project, 
nor even the privileged position of the ‘khaki capital’— secular bourgeoisie 
historically close to the military if not embedded.
3.1 Reconfiguring Clientelist Practices
With few exceptions, the ‘green capital’ so maligned by the secular elites seems 
to have remained secondary and marginal in the defence sector, reduced main-
ly to small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) and to subcontracting.16 It 
nevertheless benefited from positive discrimination under the new forms of 
assessment of the Turkification of arms projects that favour Turkish sme’s in-
volvement (Akça, 2010, 20; Jane’s Defence Industry, 2011).
3.1.1 Resistance of the Military-industrial Complex
The Turkish army and the traditional, pro-Western, secular national bourgeoi-
sie, grouped within tüsiad, remained the main beneficiaries of the project 
15 In March 2003, the Turkish parliament rejected the us military’s request to use Turkish 
military installations as a base for its operations in Iraq.
16 Our hypothesis is based on sipri and Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
reports. It remains, however, incomplete and disputable due to the suspension, since 
2011, of the detailed annual activity reports published by the Turkısh Undersecretariat 
for Defense Industries (Savunma Sanayii Mustesarligi). The undersecretariat no longer 
provides regular and systematic information on defence contracts (size, beneficiaries …) 
 concluded under the auspices of the Turkification project.
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for the Turkification of the defence industry: in 2013, of the top seven defence 
companies in the country in terms of turnover, none were created after the 
electoral victory of the akp, four were controlled by the Turkish army via the 
‘private’ foundation tskgv and only one, mkek, was unrelated to tüsiad, 
due to its legal status as a public company (Table 12.1). tüsiad also operates a 
working group specifically dedicated to the defence sector.
Since the coming to power of the akp, these companies have seen their 
sales increase tenfold (Table 12.2).
We see the same evolution with regard to the scientific and academic insti-
tutes absorbed by the military-industrial complex, as shown by the case of the 
Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (Türkiye Bilimsel ve 
Table ��.� Main Turkish defence companies in 2013 (in terms of turnover)
Rank Name Date of 
creation
Activities Owners Employers’ 
affiliations
1 Aselsan 1976 Land forces 
equipment and 
electronics
Army via tskgv (85% 
share).
Member of tüsiad.
2 Otokar 1963 Land forces 
equipment: tanks, 
armoured cars
Koç Holding. Koç is a founder 
member of tüsiad.
3 tai-tusas 1985 Aeronautics Army via tskgv and 
Lockheed until 2005. 
Since then, 55% 
tkgv/45% sid.
Member of tüsiad.
4 mkek 1930 Artillery Ministry of Defence Public.
5 Havelsan 1989 Electronics Army via tskgv Member of tüsiad.
6 Roketsan 1989 Missiles and 
rockets
Army via tskgv (35%), 




 Kalekalip are 
 members of 
tüsiad.






Nurol is a member 
of tüsiad.
Sources: Author’s compilation of data obtained from the respective web-
sites of these companies and from the �0�3 rankings of the top 500 indus-




Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu, tübitak), the Turkish equivalent of the French 
Centre national de la recherche scientifique, and by prestigious universities 
such as the Technical University of the Middle East (Orta Doğu Teknik Üniver-
sitesi), the Technical University of Istanbul (İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi) and 
Boğazici University (Boğazici Üniversitesi). These institutions are the nurser-
ies of the elite, comprising spaces for shared socialisation between members 
of the military, industrial, and scientific establishment, particularly in science 
parks; since 2006, these institutions have seen a tripling of the contracts related 
to the Turkification of military scientific knowledge. Created in 2010 through 
the merger of the Institute of Information Technologies (Bilişim Teknolojileri 
Enstitüsü, bte) and the National Research Institute in Electronics and Cryptol-
ogy (Ulusal Elektronik ve Kriptoloji Araştırma Enstitüsü, uekae), the Informat-
ics and Information Security Research Center (Bilişim ve Bilgi Güvenliği İleri 
Teknolojiler Araştırma Merkezi, bılgem)—affiliated to tübitak and specialis-
ing in information systems, cryptology and electronics—has benefited greatly 
from this financial support. bilgem was also one of the main sources of exper-
tise when it came to discrediting several members of the military’s leadership 
implicated in various major scandals, including Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledge-
hammer). As a result, the increased dependence of tübitak on contracts 
Table ��.� Exponential development of sales figures for the leading national companies in the 
defence industry between 2002 and 2014 (millions try)
Name of company 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Aselsan 318 358 489 695 982 1,369 2,141
tai-tusas 104 106 272 304 418 404 1,726
Otokar 98 282 348 485 548 894 956
mkek 44 nd nd nd nd nd 658
Havelsan 59 nd 183 208 186 372 406
Roketsan nd nd nd 138 254 414 716
fnss 321 181 nd nd 171 287 330
KaleKalip nd 90 149 188 254 290 nd
Note: nd (not defined) means that the sales figures of the company are, for the year in 
 question, lower than the sales figures recorded by any of the top 500 industrial  
companies in Turkey.
Source: Author’s compilation from the annual rankings of the top 500  




promoting the Turkification of the defence sector seems to reflect at once a 
militarisation, a commodification and an increased politicisation of scientific 
knowledge in Turkey under the akp (Table 12.3).
The Turkish military, the government and the defence companies in  tüsiad 
(and, to a much lesser extent, in müsiad) thus form the ‘triangle of power’17 
(Wright Mills, 1956, 12), legitimised and strengthened by scientific expertise 
(Turse, 2009). It is still difficult to draw a distinction between these actors 
since the boundaries separating public from private, military from civilian, 
and foreign from national are porous. As the sector is characterised by many 
‘multipositionings’ and widespread ‘co-opetition’18 that calls into question ‘the 
theoretical contradiction between competitive relations and collaborative re-
lationships’ (Bruno, 2008, 34), the major defence companies are successively 
or simultaneously customers, partners, competitors and, more rarely, ‘suppli-
ers’ to other defence companies, both Turkish and foreign. Cross-participation 
between the main ‘national’ defence companies in Turkey, and the Turkish–
American joint ventures (fnss, tai) described above illustrates these com-
plex relationships, which also to be seen in major civil infrastructure projects 
(Table 12.1). Similarly, although six of the seven major companies in the sector 
17 A term used by C. Wright Mills, echoing in particular the speech given by President Eisen-
hower at the end of his second term of office in 1961. In it, the former general highlighted 
the risks posed by the impact that uncontrolled strengthening of the military-industrial 
complex might have on American democracy.
18 ‘Co-opetition’ is the careful mix of cooperation and competition. The term was invented 
by Ray Noorda based on the nascent computer networking industry in the 80’s (William-
son, 2006).
Table ��.3 The changing numbers of contracts allocated to tübitak, the other great 
 beneficiary of the Turkification of the defence industry, between 2006 and 2012 
 (millions try)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
tübitak Sage 24.1 31.1 58.9 91.1 70.1 56.3 83.9
tübitak Uzay 12.5 16.7 21.6 22.2 27.8 30.8 36.2
tübitak uekae 72.8 90.2 99.7 125.0
tübitak bilgem 157.8 199.6 208.4




are legally private and civil, this by no means implies any simple privatisation 
or even ‘civilianisation’ of the sector. The tskgv foundation, owner of twenty 
companies in the defence sector, is certainly a de jure private entity thanks to 
its status as vakif (mortmain), but it belongs de facto to the Turkish army. It is 
run by army officers and finances the military effort (Akça, 2010). Free com-
petition and the distinction between political and economic spheres are all 
the more illusory in this sector in that the state remains a central and multi-
positional player. The state is the only customer of the national market; the 
only investor capable of funding such expensive, long, and uncertain projects. 
Whether obtaining national contracts, research grants, permits required for 
arms exports, offsets or state export guarantees, those working in the defence 
industry remain structurally dependent on the government. So ‘the major 
vested interests [the military-industrial complex] often compete less with one 
another in their effort to promote their several interests than they coincide on 
many points of interest and, indeed, come together under the umbrella of gov-
ernment. The units of economic and political power not only become larger 
and more centralized; they come to coincide in interest and to make explicit as 
well as tacit alliances.’ (Wright Mills, 1956, 266–267).
3.1.2 Clientelist Practices and the ‘Reciprocal Assimilation of Elites’
This resistance on the part of traditional military-industrial players to the akp 
government is not the result of the bar being placed too high for new entrants 
or even of the impotence of the government in the face of the aforementioned 
elites. It reflects instead a ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’ (Bayart, 2006), and 
one might even say a reciprocal and asymmetric assimilation of the akp and 
the traditional members of the military-industrial complex. The holding com-
pany Nurol is a particularly good example of this convergence of interests and 
this shared socialisation. This company owns Nurol Teknoloji, is a co-owner 
of the Turkish–British defence company fnss, a member of tüsiad, a pio-
neer in the field of Turkish defence exports in 1997, and well established in 
the Asian markets (Malaysia and the Philippines) and the Middle East (Saudi 
Arabia). Like many other ‘competitors’ in the Turkish defence sector, such as 
sfta and Profilo, the holding company Nurol is highly active in building and 
public works, and also receives public contracts for construction, reconstruc-
tion and weapons, not only in Turkey but also abroad—contracts that are 
characterised by discretionary government interventions (Buğra, this volume). 
These multiple interests and reciprocal yet asymmetric dependences have led 
to the formation of personal connections, as evidenced in 2012 by the presence 
of the  then Minister of the Economy and the Mayor of Ankara at the wed-
ding of the son of the Vice President of Nurol. Another such example is the 
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shipbuilding company Yonca-Onuk, established in 1986. Its owner personally 
met Erdogan to promote its products abroad; this allowed him, for example, to 
access the Qatari and Egyptian markets (Özdemir, 2004; sipri19). The seizure 
by the state of the civilian and military vehicle producer bmc, the ownership 
of which was later transferred to the businessman and media tycoon Ethem 
Sancak—an active member of the Justice and Development Party (akp) and 
müsiad, a former member of tüsiad (2007–08) and very close to Erdogan—
once again proved the centrality, in the defence industry, of personal connec-
tions with the government and the multipositional nature of this sector (Cum-
huriyet, 2015; Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014; Yankaya, 2015).
Contrary to the neo-liberal fiction that sees the international attractiveness 
of Turkish armaments as residing in their competitiveness alone, it is the com-
bination of political, financial and business support provided by the state to 
these defence companies that ensure their success. Co-optation by the govern-
ment, essential if these companies are to sell arms, works not only at home but 
also abroad. According to Prime Minister Erdogan, ‘While people can succeed 
in selling refrigerators and televisions by themselves, regarding the defence in-
dustry, a state guarantee is required; that is why we support this sector’ (quoted 
in Özdemir, 2004).20 Bound sales, known as offsets—that is to say, the military 
import contracts established by the Turkish state in return for the supplier 
country investing in or importing products or services from Turkey that are 
defence-related (direct offsets) or unconnected to the defence industry (indi-
rect offsets), follow the same logic. According to some expert estimates, in 2013 
offsets constituted nearly 70 per cent of Turkish exports in the field of defence 
and aviation, and almost all exports to so-called Western countries (Jane’s 
Defence Industry, 2014c; Jane’s Defence Industry, 2014b). Officially set up in or-
der to limit the negative effects of imports on the balance of payments, such 
practices—widespread in the international defence sector—run against the 
idea of free competition. Protected by a double seal of privacy (they are treated 
as top secret and are at the same time trade secrets), they encourage and to 
some extent legitimise the formation of rents for co-opted national businesses. 
They thus contribute to the development of clientelist practices, understood 
not only as ‘the existence of a pragmatic exchange of goods and services in 
return for support and votes’ but also as ‘the fact that the reciprocity thus es-
tablished can turn into a bond of political allegiance and the dependence thus 
19 sipri, http://www.sipri.org/.
20 Author’s translation. In the original Turkish: ‘biz bu Türk savunma ürünlerini destekli-
yoruz, insanlar buzdolabını telvizyonu kendi başlarına satabilirler ama savunma ürünleri 
için devletlerin referansı gerekir o nedenle destekliyoruz’.
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created can be recognised as legitimate’ (Briquet 1995, 77). While it is undeni-
able that this policy is explained by the desire to strengthen the prestige of the 
state, both internationally and nationally, particularly through the increasing 
number of its extensions into so-called civil society, it seems legitimate to won-
der about the existence of the akp’s direct financial interests in the develop-
ment of this particular industry. Though they do not prove this hypothesis, the 
corruption cases related to the sales of Turkish arms by the company Havelsan 
to South Korea or the sale of German Thyssen Krupp submarines to the Turk-
ish army, the huge amounts involved, their growing opacity, the practice of 
retrocession—quite common in this sector—and the recent accusations of 
corruption that have tainted the reputation of the akp government appear at 
least to provide evidence in support of it (Bekdil, 2015, The Korea Times, 2015; 
Cumhuriyet, 2016).21 The project for the Turkification of the defence industry 
thus involves the proliferation of asymmetrical interdependences between 
military, industrial, scientific and political elites underpinning the formation 
of a shared interest in this major project. As I was told by one of the experts in 
the field, ‘none of the defence officials will refuse a major Turkification project. 
Even if they fail, or if the major project turns out to be impossible, the govern-
ment will have no interest in making their failure public knowledge.’22
3.2 The Major Project of Turkification: A Hegemonic Instrument of 
Extraversion
This major project of Turkification and the practices of co-optation or even 
clientelism that underlie it have not, in the least, led to the suspension of ex-
ternal links. They are, rather, an expression of a strategy of extraversion based 
on increasing external dependences. And these dependences are the vectors 
of a circulation of economic, political, technological and symbolic resources, 
which—taken as a whole—contribute to a quest for hegemony both nation-
ally and on the regional and international levels.
3.2.1 An Instrument of National Affirmation and International 
Negotiations
As an instrument for equalising power relations with its Atlanticist partners, 
the project enables Turkey to play with and play on diplomatic and techno-
logical dependences with Western suppliers so as to assert itself more strong-
ly on the national level. Thus, for example, partner countries that affront 
Turkish national ‘feelings’ and official historiography have been punished 
21 Concerning thıs growing capacity of public defence expenditure, see Footnote 15.
22 Interview with a journalist and expert on defence industry, Ankara, April 2015.
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and  allied countries deemed more respectful and loyal have been rewarded. 
French defence companies were subjected to this carrot-and-stick policy in 
2001 when, following the passing of a law recognising the Armenian genocide, 
they experienced a freezing of military contracts with Turkey even though 
the Turkish army had hitherto been one of the main foreign customers of the 
French defence industry. This ostracism was renewed in 2006 when a bill was 
proposed criminalising the denial of the Armenian genocide (Jane’s Defence 
Industry, 2012). The same applied to contracts won by Israel, which were sus-
pended for ‘technical reasons’ following the resumption of the conflict in Gaza 
and the affair of the Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2010, which claimed the lives of 
nine Turkish civilians. South Korea and China have since taken over from the 
main ‘Western’ suppliers, while allowing Turkey to obtain significant conces-
sions in terms of technology transfer. Thus, the recent success of a Chinese 
company (China Precision Machinery Import–export Corporation, cpmiec) 
in the context of the Turkish call to tender for the establishment of a national 
air missile system to complement the protection afforded by nato—a call es-
timated to be worth several billion usd—attracted significant criticism and 
pressure from nato members, notably expressed through the withdrawal of 
Patriot missiles protecting Turkish territory (Jane’s Defence Industry, 2013; 
Marcou, 2015). Accused of jeopardising the security and solidarity of the At-
lanticist alliance through this agreement with a Chinese company subjected 
to sanctions by the us for its contribution to nuclear proliferation in Iran and 
North Korea, Turkey was strongly ‘invited’ to review its choice in favour of one 
of its Atlanticist allies Lockheed or Eurosam—American and Franco–Italian 
companies, respectively (Jane’s Defence Industry, 2014a; Kemal, 2014). While 
the contract has not been finalised, Western competitors have, in the mean-
time, offered better conditions. The French government, indirectly competing 
for this contract, notably maintained a low profile during the centennial of the 
Armenian genocide commemorated on 24 April 2015, and thus minimised fric-
tion in Franco–Turkish trade relations (Jane’s Defence Industry, 2012).23
In other words, this Turkification project is not only a guarantor of national 
honour on the international stage; it also helps to strengthen the country’s abil-
ity to negotiate with the largest variety of foreign suppliers and to force them 
23 The importance that the French government ascribes to its military and strategic rela-
tionship with Turkey is also reflected in the profile of the French ambassador to Ankara, 
in place from 2011 to 2015: a former chair of the military and civilian cabinet of the French 
Ministry of Defence. The same is true of the Consul General of France to Turkey, in place 




to compete for contracts on the best terms. The project still does not, however, 
allow Turkey to emancipate itself from its Atlanticist allies: the us still largely 
dominates the market as the source of nearly 70 per cent of Turkish armament 
imports in 2014.24 Even those weapons presented as ‘one hundred per cent 
Turkish’ by the Turkish authorities, including the Atak helicopter or the Anka 
drone—symbols of technological and political national independence—still 
rely on many different foreign licences, including American licences, which 
prevent their use and export without the consent of Western partners (Sözcü, 
2015; Timetürk, 2012).
3.2.2 A Muslim Civilizational Development Project: High-Tech  
Port by müsiad
The strong internationalisation of the Turkish defence industry under the akp, 
evidenced by its export performance and by the creation in 2011 of the Union 
of Exporters of the Defence Industry and Aeronautics (Savunma ve Havacilik 
Sanayi İhracatçilari Birliği, ssi), reflects the transition from a logic of means to 
a logic of results, characteristic of the neo-liberal period. Since 2011, when the 
Turkish arms industry officially achieved 50 per cent autonomy, the issue of 
the origin of production and its components is no longer central in gauging the 
success of local development. It has been replaced by two goals: the tripling of 
the turnover of Turkish defence companies and the doubling of Turkish arms 
exports. The aim is to grow these exports from usd 1–2 billion for the period 
2012–16 to usd 20 billion in 2023–the centenary of the Turkish Republic (Jane’s 
Defence Industry, 2012). İn order to achieve this objective, the akp govern-
ment has relied on economic and cultural extraversion with regard to friendly 
‘brother’ countries, particularly including those in the Gulf and countries that 
have experienced the Arab Spring (Tunisia and Egypt). It is reminiscent of the 
aforementioned earlier attempts to develop economic, political and strategic 
ties with Muslim countries conducted by premiers Turgut Özal in the early 
1980s and Necmettin Erbakan in the mid-1990s, respectively.
The project ‘High-Tech Port by müsiad’ is an example of a reciprocal assim-
ilation of elites on the international scale, promoted by the akp government: 
the main Turkish defence companies, members of tüsiad, have thus found 
themselves being co-opted by müsiad, which itself promotes a transnational 
‘market Islam’ (Haenni, 2005; Yankaya, 2015). This alliance combines the tech-
nological know-how—accumulated over several decades—of various mem-
bers of tüsiad and market access to so-called Muslim countries thanks to 




prestige of the akp nationally and internationally (Yankaya, 2015). Presented 
at the end of 2014 under the auspices of President Erdogan and several Turkish 
ministers at the 15th International Fair of müsiad, High-Tech Port officially 
aims to place Turkish know-how at the service of ‘brother countries’ to ensure 
no ‘clash of civilisations’ but a Muslim ‘civilisational competitiveness’ vis-à-vis 
Western countries (Dünya, 2015a). This project, presented as a ‘showcase’ for 
Turkish technological excellence, was again at the heart of the meeting held 
in October 2015 in Qatar, in tandem with the International Business Forum, 
which was then devoted to ‘partnerships in industry and defence between 
 Islamic countries’ (Yankaya, 2014 and 2015). A binational fair exclusively dedi-
cated to the fostering of Qatari and Turkish companies was organised under 
the auspices of the Turkish President, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence 
and the Qatari Sheikh Bin Hamad bin Halifa es-Sani. The family links and 
Ottoman origins of this Qatari have also been highlighted by müsiad so as 
to better legitimise this example of Turkish–Qatari co-optation and naturalise 
the military agreement established the same year (Dünya, 2015b). This pro-
vides for a mutual defence clause in the case of attack, which de facto means 
that the Turks will provide Qatar with military protection should aggression 
occur (Toyay, 2015; Gurcan, 2015). The political entrepreneur Ethem Sancak, 
who had shortly before given up a portion of his shares in the company bmc 
to the Industrial Committee of the Qatari Armed Forces, acted as a bridge-
head for Turkish-Qatari relations, playing a significant role as an intermediary 
(Star, 2015).
However, far from signifying equality between ‘brother’ countries, the fact 
that Turkey has resorted to the argument for Muslim transnational solidarity 
in the defence market contributes rather to a commodification of Islam and to 
a ‘euphemisation’ or legitimisation of the inequality, conflict and competition 
between the countries that make up this imaginary umma. The ‘civilisational 
competition’ with Western forces is indicative of a quest for complementary 
status with brotherly countries. The brotherhood discourse promoted by this 
project is a purely superficial horizontality, and reveals an attempt to justify 
the international division of labour within the so-called Muslim world in fa-
vour of Turkey, involving the exclusion of Iran and its allies. High-Tech Port 
promotes the idea of the civilising and cultural superiority of Turkey over 
Arab countries; the ‘big brother’ among its ‘brother countries’ (Yankaya, 2015). 
This erasure of the logic of social justice and equalisation of the relationship 
between ‘brother countries’ to some extent echoes the theology of American 
neo-Protestant prosperity by activating an ‘imaginary of social success where 
money becomes both the site of the great revenge and the sign of a divine 
election’ (Haenni, 2005, 65, our transl.). Far from the heroic spirit of the ‘great 
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civilisational development’ promoted by Nail Olpak, president of müsiad, 
the policy of exporting Turkish arms to ‘brother countries’ reflects a certain 
pragmatism on the part of the government in the face of the low competitive-
ness of the Turkish defence industry in comparison with Western technology. 
It also results from a multitude of logics to be found in importing countries, 
inherited in part from their own historical trajectories: the shared experience 
of facing an embargo on their arms markets (Pakistan and Indonesia), the par-
allel policy of importing countries that aims to make their defence industries 
independent (Pakistan, Qatar and Malaysia) and the comparative historicity 
of bilateral ties between individual importing countries and Turkey or Iran, 
respectively. Finally, the attractiveness of Turkish arms for Muslim-majority 
countries is inseparable from the ambiguous nature of Turkey’s membership 
of nato, sometimes ‘euphemised’ and sometimes highlighted by the Turkish 
government in its search for international hegemony.
Thus, this project of Turkification reveals complex and organic relations 
with Western partners and ‘brother countries’. Located at the intersection of 
the strategy of extraversion and that of redistribution of public resources to 
Turkish and foreign political entrepreneurs, the project is part of a national 
and international quest for hegemony. It illustrates a ‘combination of globali-
sation and the universalisation of the nation-state’ typical of the concept of 
‘national liberalism’ (Bayart, 2012, 5).
4 2013: Year of Reaffirmation or Challenge to the Cause of  
Hegemony?
Internationally, the violent evolution of the Arab Spring, which turned against 
the new leaders who had emerged from political Islam and been co-opted by 
the akp, strengthened the ties between Turkey and Qatar; witnessing in par-
ticular an exponential increase in Turkish exports to Qatar since 2012.25 Na-
tionally, the Gezi Park protests against the Turkish government in 2013 and the 
disastrous effects of the latter’s neo-liberal politics in environmental, urban 
and social terms have considerably undermined the process of mutual assimi-
lation of certain elites. This is the case of the most powerful holding company 
in the country, Koç (Cemal, 2013). As one of the main beneficiaries of the Turki-
fication of the defence industry hitherto pursued by the akp through its sub-
sidiaries rmk and Otokar, the Koç family was accused of supporting the Gezi 




military contract for building the ‘hundred per cent Turkish’ milgem warship26 
cancelled on a mere technicality while its principal operating subsidiaries in 
the energy sector—Tüpras, Opet and Aygaz—were subjected to a tax audit 
(Gursel, 2013). Similarly, tübitak, a key player in this major project, suffered a 
veritable witch-hunt following the deterioration of relations between the Gül-
en community and President Erdogan, worsened by the Gezi Park movement 
and the revelation, on 17 December 2013, of the existence of a vast network 
of corruption involving key members of the government and their respective 
families, attributed to Gülen’s followers. Formerly a key akp ally, closely inte-
grated into state bodies, the community is now ostracised, being considered 
by the government to be a terrorist ‘parallel structure’. This change in alliances 
has resulted in the abrupt and massive dismissal of hundreds of employees 
of tübitak suspected of sympathising with Hizmet.27 It has simultaneously 
made possible a reversal of power relations through a rapprochement attempt 
by the akp with some militaristic and nationalist elites who were ‘victims’ of 
the scientific expertise contributed by tübitak in the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
(Sledgehammer) trials, formerly backed by akp government. The vice presi-
dent and director of the bilgem laboratory, the main source of judicial ex-
pertise in both the aforementioned cases and the main beneficiary of research 
funds for the Turkification of the defence industry since 2010 (Table 12.3), were 
not only dismissed but also prosecuted for illegally bugging Erdogan’s offices in 
2011 (Saymaz and Çelikkan, 2015).
This breakdown of the alliance by economic means, against the new enemies 
within, is a counterpart to the postmodern coup of 1997 (Cemal, 2013). Gezi 
Park and the Arab Spring have thus, among akp leaders, recalled traumatic 
memories of a military coup past and triggered fears of a new reversal, while 
contributing paradoxically to bolstering military legitimacy through the afore-
mentioned changes in alliances at the expense of the Gülen movement and 
the halting of the embryonic peace process with the pkk. Thus, the mutual 
dependences, both material and immaterial, promoted by the major project 
of Turkification, in no way reflect the existence of harmonious relations or 
even any stability of interest between government, industry and the military 
(Wright Mills, 1969, 31). As they depend on the power relations of the moment, 
the conflicts that constitute this highly publicised and marketed development 
project may lead to reversible co-optations.
26 milgem comes from Milli Gemi, meaning ‘National Ship’.





The major project for the Turkification of the defence industry,  promoted simul-
taneously as an example, a condition and evidence of national  development, 
is thus based on a ‘constitutive imagination’ (Veyne, 2014); a siege mentality 
following a historic path structured by the trauma of the turn of the century. The 
multiple meanings of kalkınma, the Turkish term for development, reveals this 
very clearly. However, this project ‘makes do with’ dependences and external 
resources, be they economic, technological, political or military, and expresses 
a quest for a ‘nationaliberal’ hegemony that is unstable and reversible. Playing 
with and playing on relations of inequality at the international level, it helps to 
alter, if only in the imaginary, the ways in which Turkey is integrated into the 
international system, ensuring a fictitious commodification of the umma and 
the Turkish army in the name of the defence of Turkish society. This project 
thus represents an imaginary bridge not only between the logic of the market 
and the logic of national affirmation, but also between political Islam and the 
secular elite. Neither true nor false (because it is not externally verifiable), this 
great development project at the heart of the government’s legitimacy is a real 
fiction with multiple domination effects, acting as a matrix for the accumula-
tion, conversion and circulation of economic, symbolic, political and religious 
capital. Beyond the circle of elites belonging to the military-industrial com-
plex, the lack of public criticism vis-à-vis this major yet extremely expensive 
militarist project, both uncertain and synonymous with lethal consequences 
for much of the Kurdish civilian population, also expresses a form of consen-
sus, whether mandatory or not.28 As the product of a true ‘normative gram-
mar’ (Gramsci, 1977), this major project offers Turkish citizens an imaginary 
national protection, replacing to some extent the state-provided social protec-
tions that have been undermined by neo-liberal reforms. The project thereby 
contributes to a certain endorsement of state power and to the emasculation 
of a nascent potential ‘countermovement’ (Polanyi, 1957) by answering the ‘cit-
izens’ desire for the state’ (Hibou, 2011, 82), understood in terms of modernity, 
unity, prestige, sublimity and equality. For the civilian populations potentially 
affected by this major project, a public challenge to the last of these would con-
stitute evidence of their betrayal of the Turkish state, as this project remains 
28 ‘By mandatory consensus, I mean a set of opinions, judgments, and public behaviours 
required of citizens in connection with certain values (Kemalism and its principles), cer-
tain facts or events of the present (the war in Kurdistan, the presence of the Turkish army 
in Cyprus) or the past (the Armenian genocide), and certain institutions (the army, the 
army’s control of the government)’ (Copeaux, 2000).
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so closely associated with the survival of the state and the nation. Thus, unlike 
large civil infrastructure projects, this major project is relatively free of critics 
because of the many forms of legitimacy it bears and the impossibility of cast-
ing doubt on the achievements claimed for it because of the double secrecy 
that it enjoys (it is both a trade secret and top secret). As a result, the project 
contributes to an unfinished depoliticisation of social inequality (Ferguson, 
1994) in Turkey. Similarly, the commodification of Muslim solidarity, and the 
‘civilisational competition’ it promotes, depoliticises inequality between so-
called Muslim countries. This ‘nationaliberal’ consensus, located at the heart 
of the quest for akp hegemony both nationally and internationally, appears 
nevertheless to be questioned today by the normalisation of diplomatic rela-
tions with Iran and the recent disclosure of secret Turkish arms shipments to 
Syria (The Guardian, 2016).
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